Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Mazda Australia Pty Ltd
[2021] FCA 1493
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2021-11-30
Before
O'Callaghan J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (89 paragraphs)
INTRODUCTION 1 The respondent, Mazda Australia Pty Ltd (Mazda), is an Australian corporation wholly owned by Mazda Motor Corporation (Mazda Corp), a Japanese corporation which manufactures motor vehicles. 2 Mazda Corp supplies motor vehicles to Mazda pursuant to an agreement between the two corporations. In turn, Mazda supplies those vehicles to dealers throughout Australia. 3 Mazda does not have any retail facilities and, other than to a minimal extent, does not engage in the retail sale or supply of vehicles to end consumers. Mazda appoints dealers to sell, service, and repair Mazda vehicles, and to supply Mazda parts, pursuant to individual dealer agreements. Dealers engage in the retail sale of Mazda vehicles, and the repair and sale of parts, to consumers in Australia. 4 The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (the ACCC, or the applicant) seeks declarations that between 2015 and 2019, Mazda, in respect of nine identified consumers who owned seven vehicles: (1) engaged in conduct that was misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive in contravention of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) (Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)); (2) made false or misleading representations concerning the existence, exclusion or effect of the consumer guarantees under Part 3-2 of the ACL, and the rights or remedies available under Part 5-4 of the ACL, in contravention of s 29(1)(m) of the ACL; and (3) engaged in conduct that was unconscionable, in contravention of s 21 of the ACL. 5 The ACCC's amended concise statement alleged, and Mazda in its concise response denied, that Mazda made the following representations to those consumers: (1) certain faults with Mazda vehicles owned by the consumers were not "major failures" under the consumer guarantee provisions of the ACL; (2) the consumers were not entitled to a refund or replacement vehicle at no cost to them under the consumer guarantee provisions of the ACL; (3) the consumers did not have any ability under the ACL to seek to obtain a refund or replacement vehicle, because Mazda was entitled to repair the vehicles regardless of the number of attempts made to repair the faults, the time it took to repair the faults, the consumers' rejection of the vehicles and requests for a refund or replacement vehicle, and/or Mazda's obligation under the ACL to repair the vehicle; (4) Mazda was not required to provide a refund or replacement vehicle at no cost to the consumers because of the age and/or mileage of the vehicles; and/or (5) a major failure within the meaning of the consumer guarantee provisions of the ACL in respect of a motor vehicle is limited to a failure of a major component of the vehicle. 6 The ACCC's amended concise statement further alleged, and Mazda denied, that each of those representations was false or misleading because: (1) the faults with the vehicles were major failures for the purposes of s 260 of the ACL, or the faults were otherwise failures to comply with the consumer guarantees that the consumers required to be remedied and that Mazda had not remedied (either at all or within a reasonable time) for the purposes of s 259(2) of the ACL, and the consumers were entitled to refunds or replacement vehicles at no cost pursuant to s 263(4) of the ACL in accordance with their requests; (2) the representations incorrectly represented the position under the ACL in that: (a) the consumers did have an ability under s 263(4) of the ACL to seek to obtain a refund or replacement vehicle; (b) the right to a refund or replacement vehicle under s 263(4) was not confined by the age and/or mileage of the vehicle; and (c) a major failure within the meaning of s 260 of the ACL in respect of motor vehicles was not limited to a failure of a major component of the vehicle; and/or (3) at the time the representations were made, Mazda had not given any proper consideration to whether the consumers were entitled to refunds or replacement vehicles at no cost pursuant to the ACL; and in circumstances where the representations impliedly conveyed that Mazda had reasonable grounds for making the statements, Mazda did not have reasonable grounds for making the representations. 7 The allegation that Mazda made the representations that certain faults with Mazda vehicles owned by the consumers were not "major failures" to comply with a consumer guarantee was narrowed during the course of the hearing. The ACCC's case did not involve seeking to prove that the relevant vehicles in fact suffered major failures within the meaning of the ACL. Rather, its case was that Mazda misrepresented the position as to the consumers' legal rights because Mazda's customer representatives expressed an opinion that there was no major failure, in circumstances where they could have had no basis for holding such an opinion, because Mazda had not considered whether or not the issues complained of were, in fact, major failures. The ACCC submitted such statements about the exercise of rights were misleading or deceptive because the opinion was not genuinely held and there was no reasonable basis for it, citing Global Sportsman Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 82 at 88; and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Jayco Corporation Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1672 at [598]. 8 At some points in the ACCC's written submissions with respect to the statements made by Mazda's representatives that were said to constitute misleading or deceptive representations, reference is made to "the Consumers" not being entitled to a refund or replacement vehicle and not having any ability under the ACL to seek a refund or replacement vehicle. These references are not to be understood as references to consumers generally, because the case was not put that way. 9 The ACCC's unconscionable conduct case was not a "system" or "pattern" case. It was, rather, a case directed at Mazda's conduct concerning the nine individual consumers the subject of the proceeding. That conduct, it was alleged, must be considered in light of Mazda's institutional practices, including "internal compliance documentation, process and culture". This was said to be relevant when examining what were alleged to be the common features of Mazda's conduct in relation to each of the consumers. Those common features may be summarised as follows: (1) Mazda did not give any, or any proper or genuine, consideration to the consumers' entitlement under the ACL to a refund or replacement vehicle, and failed to comply with its own internal policies and procedures in dealing with the consumers' requests for refunds or replacement vehicles in accordance with the ACL; (2) Mazda, by its customer advocates, made false or misleading statements to the consumers in contravention of ss 18 and 29(1)(m) of the ACL; (3) Mazda customer advocates made further false or misleading statements to the consumers, in particular, telling them on a number of occasions that their request had been escalated to "senior management" or "legal", when the evidence demonstrated that no such escalation had occurred; (4) Mazda did not give any proper or genuine consideration to the consumers' expressed safety concerns arising from the faults with their vehicles; (5) Mazda was in a dominant bargaining position in relation to the consumers' requests, and engaged in unfair, unjustified, and unreasonable dealings with the consumers, and placed unfair commercial pressure on them to accept offers rather than pursue their requests (including by summarily rejecting requests without consideration on the merits; seeking to dissuade consumers from continuing with their requests, often in favour of repair, free services or extended warranty; and treating their requests as if they were a matter of commercial negotiation); and (6) the sum of Mazda's conduct led to long, drawn-out discussions between the consumers and Mazda customer advocates, often numerous times per day over months, and this frustrated the consumers and their requests. 10 The ACCC submitted that Mazda's conduct was clearly beyond conscience in all the circumstances of each case. It was "irreconcilable with what is right or reasonable", and it involved "unfairness of a significant order, a lack of good faith, or the exercise of economic power in a way worthy of criticism", a "sufficient departure from the norms of acceptable commercial behaviour as to be against conscience or to offend conscience", and "misrepresentation, commercial … pressure and sharp practice, using a superior bargaining position", as those expressions are used in the cases (to which reference will be made below). 11 There were four main areas in respect of both the misrepresentation and unconscionability cases where the characterisation of the facts (and thus the outcome of the case) was disputed, namely whether or not: (1) Mazda gave any proper or genuine consideration to whether the individual consumers were entitled to a refund or replacement car; (2) Mazda made the representations alleged; (3) to the extent that representations were in the nature of opinions, there was a reasonable basis for making them; and (4) taken as a whole, and in all the circumstances, Mazda's conduct was unconscionable. 12 Mazda rejected the ACCC's characterisation of any of the alleged conduct. It contended, among other things, that both elements of the case against it "rely upon selective use of facts and words divorced from a fuller consideration of the circumstances in which they occurred" and that other "significant factual, temporal and legal dimensions … must be taken into account". In its synopsis of its position in written closing submissions, Mazda submitted that such circumstances or "dimensions" included the following: (1) Mazda was not obliged to become involved in the process of assisting consumers whose vehicles had reported problems. That obligation was on the dealer. However, Mazda became involved in order to assist consumers and to give certainty to dealers. (2) Once Mazda became involved, only part of its involvement related to the entitlement of the consumer under the ACL. That involvement was also aimed at providing assistance under Mazda's warranties and providing good consumer service by offering solutions which dealt with the reason the consumer was approaching Mazda. (3) The consumers did not approach Mazda for legal advice. They approached Mazda looking for an agreed solution to their reported problem. Mazda responded to their concerns by offering solutions in the form of paying for the investigation of the cause of the reported problem, paying for the repair of the vehicles, providing loan cars and other forms of compensation and, in two cases, either giving the replacement or the refund sought. (4) Ultimately, the ACCC's case about Mazda's conduct reduced to a complaint that Mazda did not sufficiently separate its consideration of ACL issues from other legitimate considerations. More specifically, the ACCC's case was effectively that Mazda failed to document that "multifactorial" consideration to the extent that the ACCC said should have occurred. However, even if true, that did not constitute unconscionable conduct. (5) The fact that Mazda did not always give the consumers precisely what they were seeking was not unconscionable conduct. It was a reflection of the fact that the information before Mazda did not require the conclusion that it was obliged to provide a refund or replacement vehicle, based on its multifactorial approach to meeting the consumers' concerns. (6) In the context of the claim for unconscionable conduct, Mazda was entitled to deny a consumer's asserted ACL entitlement unless and until the only response conscionably open to it was to accept it. 13 Most of the "circumstances" and "dimensions" that Mazda attempted to employ by way of defence were, it seems to me, ultimately beside the point. By way of example, the ACCC did not contend that Mazda was "obliged to become involved in the process of assisting customers". Its case was that once it did become involved, it rendered itself liable for any false or misleading conduct of its employees, or to a finding that it (or they) engaged in unconscionable conduct, despite the fact that it was not a "supplier" of the vehicles. Likewise, the fact that Mazda was endeavouring to provide "good consumer service" goes nowhere to meet the misleading or deceptive conduct case put against it. And as to the assertion that the consumers did not ask Mazda for legal advice, there was (unsurprisingly) never a contention put by the ACCC that the consumers ever did. 14 Mazda also contended, in summary, that the representations alleged were not capable of being conveyed by the express words relied on, and that the ACCC's case "depends on an artificial and detached reading of what was said and the context in which it was said to alter meaning" and that it fails on the facts. 15 Mazda submitted that: (1) The ACCC's allegation that Mazda did not honestly hold, and could not reasonably form, an opinion that a consumer was not entitled to a replacement or refund unless it had undertaken a detailed review of the facts and the ACL "inverts the analysis". The correct question "is whether the relevant consumer had, at the relevant point in time, demonstrated that there had been a major failure and they were entitled to a replacement or refund. If that had not been demonstrated then, given the onus of proof, Mazda's opinion must have been honestly and reasonably held (at least unless and until there was an objective basis to conclude otherwise)". (2) The ACCC "propounds a multitude of permutations and combinations of different representations said to be implied from a handful of words". (3) The context in which those words were used is important. As an example, Mazda referred to the ACCC's allegation "that an offer of something less than a full replacement or refund conveys a representation that the consumer was not entitled to a replacement or refund". Mazda's case was that no such representation was conveyed by such an offer. It submitted: If the evidence shows that the supplier is not required to conclusively determine that the only conscionable course available to it is to conclude that there has been a major failure then the supplier is entirely justified in making an offer less than a full refund or replacement but which deals with the consumer's stated concerns. This … does not carry a representation that the consumer is not entitled to the remedy. They may be. Equally, they may not be. (4) The fact that a representation is conveyed as a matter of opinion "does not necessarily carry the implication that the opinion was held … or that the opinion was reasonably held … It depends on the context. The context in this case did not involve those implications and, in particular, did not carry any implication that the opinion was based on reasonable grounds". (5) Any opinions conveyed by the representations were reasonably held and "[t]here is no evidence that Mazda had no legitimate option other than to conclude that there had been a major failure. It does not matter whether the information available to Mazda at the time was sufficient. If the evidence discloses a conscionable basis (whether known to Mazda at the time or not) for refusal of relief (including that insufficient evidence is available to conclusively determine that the relief sought must be provided), that is enough". 16 As to the unconscionable conduct claim, Mazda submitted that the ACCC's case "ignores the totality of Mazda's conduct", including the other support and assistance Mazda gave to the consumers without the consumer proving a legal entitlement to that support or being troubled to do so. It also submitted that the conduct alleged did not, in any event, meet the significant hurdle required to demonstrate that conduct was unconscionable, including among other reasons because: (1) there was no allegation of bad faith, and no basis for concluding bad faith in the sense of an act or omission intended to preclude exercise of an established, accrued or potential statutory right; (2) any claim based on systems or patterns was disavowed; (3) when properly analysed, there was no evidence that the impugned conduct had serious consequences for the consumers; (4) the "round table" and "executive panel" processes which made decisions on customers' requests for a refund or a replacement vehicle "were an authentic attempt to ensure a properly informed and rational decision was made in response to an unsubstantiated assertion of a statutory right"; (5) it was not fair or accurate to say that Mazda did not take consumers' safety concerns seriously; and (6) Mazda was not relevantly in a dominant bargaining position. 17 I should, at this point of the introduction, mention another matter that Mazda raised in its written submissions, viz the contention that "an important matter to be confronted at the outset" was that "[t]he ACCC's case in its closing submissions is not the case that Mazda was on notice of having to meet as set out in the amended concise statement … dated 14 December 2020". 18 There was, however, not the slightest mention made of this contention, or any of the reasons advanced in support of it, in Mazda's closing oral address. 19 I am entitled to infer therefore that it intended not to press the matter. 20 But in any event, to the extent that the ACCC's case involved additional clarification or refinement of the case set out in its amended concise statement, those changes were flagged in opening. By way of example, Mazda's written closing submission at [15] complained that "[o]n the misrepresentation case, the ACCC now alleges that the first two representations above were statements of opinion relating to the specific vehicles, rather than statements of fact, and Mazda did not hold the opinions and did not have reasonable grounds for them". But that case was put unambiguously in opening, at [64] of the ACCC's outline of opening submissions, as follows: "[t]he representations made by Mazda as to the [c]onsumers' rights as to the faults with the [v]ehicles should be characterised as statements of opinion which carried an implied representation that Mazda had a basis for them and reasonable grounds for them". 21 It is important to bear in mind that concise statements perform a different role to pleadings. It is permissible, for example, for an applicant to refine its concise case in opening. See Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Delor Vue Apartments CTS 39788 [2021] FCAFC 121; (2021) 153 ACSR 522 at 548 [144] (McKerracher and Colvin JJ). And as their Honours also said at [149], "what [a] party cannot do is save up its complaint that the case is stated too broadly until the conduct of the final hearing and then maintain that no detailed case can be run because no such case has been disclosed", because "[t]o do so is to treat the concise statement as having the same character as a pleading which it is not". 22 In my view, the amended concise statement and the ACCC's opening submissions, both written and oral, provided a fair disclosure of the case it advanced in respect of both claims. For those reasons, even if I am wrong in the view that the "important matter" referred to in Mazda's written closing was not pressed (because it was not mentioned in closing address), I would reject the submission on its merits.