The engagement of Dr Brady
65 The manner in which Dr Brady was commissioned to prepare his report is important for the purpose of ascertaining whether legal professional privilege attaches to it.
66 On the day of the explosion of unit C4, which resulted in a significant power outage, Mr Bills, in his capacity as CEO of CSEL, established a crisis management team. He acknowledged that from the time of the incident he was responsible for managing the consequences arising from the incident.
67 The team had 11 members including Mr Bills. The personnel covered all aspects of the business including asset managers, corporate services, plant operations, markets and commercial, legal, health and safety, people and culture and corporate affairs. No doubt that composition reflected the echoing consequences which the incident would have across the length and breadth of CSEL's business.
68 Mr Bills deposed that "[i]n addition to ensuring the safety and well-being of CS Energy people and protecting property and the environment", his main concern immediately following the incident was that a "large number of legal issues were likely to arise". It can be accepted that there is little doubt that there would be substantial legal ramifications arising from the incident in a number of the areas of CSEL's business. On the other hand, it can also be accepted that, as Mr Bills had made clear in his public statements, another of his main concerns was ensuring the safety and well-being of CSEL workers and protecting the plant.
69 Mr Bills further said that he discussed the prospect of legal issues arising with Ms Claudia Cameron, CSEL's General Counsel, at the first crisis management meeting. Ms Cameron later advised that she had spoken to Mr Martin Osborne, a partner at NRFA, and asked him to commence a process of preparing formal engagement letters for NRFA to provide legal advice to CSEL about legal issues arising from the incident.
70 NRFA was engaged by CSEL by a letter of engagement dated 26 May 2021 which provided, inter alia:
1.1 On the basis of your emails with Martin Osborne on 25 May 2021 and our video-conference on 26 May 2021, we confirm your instructions to act for you according to the following scope of work:
(1) Advise you in relation to the incident on 25 May 2021 at the Callide Power Station that resulted in a significant power outage (the incident);
(2) Advise you about the legal consequences, including regulatory, contractual and other potential liabilities that may arise as a consequence of the incident. This will require us to commission or request the commissioning of an investigation into the root cause of the incident so we can provide our advice;
(3) Advise you about establishing information sharing protocols with other parties including Intergen;
(4) Review various contractual documents provided by you to identify notification requirements and other issues arising out of those contracts;
(5) Provide ongoing legal advice during the course of your response to various regulators, stakeholders and other parties about the incident; and
(6) Prepare for any anticipated litigation or regulatory action that might arise out of the incident.
(Emphasis added).
71 In the days immediately following the incident, Ms Cameron said to Mr Bills that in order for CSEL to be properly advised about its legal risk, NRFA needed to obtain the opinion of an expert who has investigated the cause of the incident. Mr Bills said that he agreed with that and Ms Cameron and he also discussed that the report would be kept confidential so that it could be used for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.
72 In accordance with the above, NRFA subsequently engaged Dr Brady as an expert mechanical engineer to investigate the cause of the incident. On 1 June 2021, NRFA signed a letter of engagement provided by Dr Brady. That letter made reference to what was said to be the purpose of the report:
Confidential and subject to legal professional privilege - Engagement Letter for Norton Rose Fulbright Australia
We refer to your letter of 1 June 2021. We understand that Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (you) wish to retain Brady Heywood (us) in relation to the Incident on 25 May 2021 ('Incident').
This letter, together with the confidentiality obligations in your letter and the enclosed General Terms and Conditions (General Terms and Conditions), sets out the terms of our Engagement. …
Scope of Engagement
We understand that we are instructed to opine on matters relating to the Incident. We further understand that we will receive our instructions from you.
…
Reporting
Any report we prepare in accordance with your instructions may only be relied on for the purposes of the proceedings or potential proceedings. Our report or any other deliverable which we provide, or any part of these, may only be published or distributed, as follows:
a) for the purpose specified in this letter;
b) in accordance with any law or by order of a court of competent jurisdiction; or
c) as reasonably required for the purpose of the proceedings or potential proceedings.
Prior to finalisation, a draft(s) of report(s) may be provided to you. You must not rely on a draft report.
…
Client legal privilege
We understand that all communications between us and you, as well as any materials or information developed or received by us, whether oral or written, may be protected by client legal privilege and they will be treated by us as confidential subject to any disclosure required by law or an order of a Court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction.
…
(Emphasis in original).
73 The general terms and conditions which were part of that letter relevantly provided:
4. Confidentiality
We will keep confidential all information we obtain from you during the course of this Engagement which is not in the public domain. We will not disclose any confidential information to any other person without your consent, except to the extent required by law or subpoena.
(Emphasis in original).
74 On 2 June 2021, Dr Brady signed a letter of engagement provided by NRFA on behalf of CSEL, which articulated the confidential and privileged purpose in the following terms:
Confidential and subject to legal professional privilege
1. Introduction
1.1 We act on behalf of CS Energy Limited, the operator of the Callide C Power Station situated near Biloela in central Queensland.
1.2 On 25 May 2021, there was an Incident at the Callide C Power Station, resulting in a significant power outage to a large part of Queensland.
1.3 We wish to retain you to undertake an independent expert investigation into the root cause of the Incident for the purpose of permitting our firm to provide legal advice to CS Energy.
1.4 We will provide you with instructions as to the issues we would like you to investigate and identify in your investigation in due course. …
2. Confidentiality and Privilege
2.1 In accepting this engagement, you agree that:
(1) this letter and all future communications (whether electronically maintained or not) between us, between you and our client, are confidential. These communications may be subject to legal professional privilege and therefore you must mark all documents and materials produced by you in relation to this matter as 'Confidential - Subject to Legal Professional Privilege', unless advised otherwise;
(2) you must take all steps necessary to preserve the confidentiality of our communications, anything you observe while attending Callide C Power Station, and any material or documents created or obtained by you in the course of preparing any documents or report;
…
(Emphasis in original).
75 It cannot be doubted that NRFA took what steps it could to clothe any report produced by Dr Brady with legal professional privilege. It acted as any competent firm would by causing the investigative processes to be funnelled through it and to explicitly do so on the basis that all investigations were being conducted for the purposes of it providing legal advice. The arranging of investigations in that manner is not uncommon when significant incidents happen: see Tavcol Pty Ltd v Valbeet Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1002 [46]. The benefit of doing so is that if the report is unfavourable to the client, a claim of legal professional privilege may protect its disclosure to an opposing party.
76 It is possible to accept that, to the extent that it was able to do so in the engagement of Dr Brady, NRFA did all that it could do to ensure that legal professional privilege would attach to any report produced. One might even accept that its intention was that any report produced by Dr Brady would be used only for the purposes of it providing legal advice to CSEL and CEPL.
77 Following the decision to engage Dr Brady, Mr Bills deposed that he kept the Board updated on the circumstances surrounding his engagement and explained that Dr Brady had been engaged by NRFA so that it could provide legal advice to CSEL. He said that, at a Board meeting on 2 June 2021, he informed the Board, and the Board agreed, that the investigation would be confidential and subject to legal professional privilege. He attached the minutes of that meeting to his affidavit in apparent support of his statement of what he told the Board, though there is no mention in those minutes of what he claims he said. There is an entry identifying that Dr Brady had been appointed as the "independent lead investigator following consultation with unions". It is not immediately apparent why that consultation was required if the report was confidential to CSEL and being obtained solely for the purposes of CSEL obtaining legal advice. On the other hand, such consultation would be appropriate where the purpose of the report is to ensure safer working conditions in the future.
78 Reliance was also placed on an email the Company Secretary sent to the Board members on 3 June 2021. It is headed "Strictly Confidential and Subject to Legal Professional Privilege" and attaches a document setting out the Callide Incident Investigation Structure "work streams" which appears to cover the incident investigation structure. It is noted from the attachment that CS Energy Legal, being presumably the in-house legal team, instructed NRFA which instructed Dr Brady, but that CS Energy Legal reported to the Chief Incident Investigation Officer, Mr Bill Hopsick. That rather suggests that any report acquired from Dr Brady would be provided to the investigation team as part of CSEL's internal analysis of how the incident occurred. That is an indicator that the report was to have multiple purposes.
79 It is not particularly clear why that email was marked as being privileged or, if it is, why it was disclosed in Mr Bills' affidavit. The document was copied to Ms Cameron of CS Energy Legal, but that does not explain why it was thought to be privileged. It does not appear to have been created for a privileged purpose.
80 A further Board meeting occurred on 9 June 2021, and Dr Brady's engagement was discussed. The minutes of this meeting state that "communication channels similar to those set up for the Queensland Energy Class Action" would be enacted with the State Government "to protect legal professional privilege". The exact nature of what those channels were is not explained, but it is apparent that the Board was aware of the need to attempt to maintain confidentiality as best as was possible for the purposes of securing legal professional privilege to any report produced.
81 The evidence from Mr Bills' affidavit shows that he also said in his affidavit that he told the Government from an early stage that Dr Bardy's report would not be shared with it and that there was a need to create a confidentiality arrangement with the Government to keep communications about the report privileged. It seems that a communication protocol to ensure that legal professional privilege was maintained was put in place. It does not however, specifically relate to Dr Brady's report but more generally to communications which may relate to the obtaining of legal advice.
82 Mr Bills also instituted an internal information sharing protocol for the purpose of protecting any privilege which existed in the report of Dr Brady and he described that in his affidavit.
83 Mr Bills further identified that a committee referred to as "SteerCo" was established for the purposes of managing Dr Brady's investigation. It appears that the committee, or an informal form of it, met with Dr Brady for the purposes of ascertaining how his investigations were proceeding. There is some inconsistency in relation to the alleged purpose of this committee as, on the workflow sheets attached to Mr Bills' report, the Chief Incident Investigation Officer, also reported to it. That also suggests that as a committee, it was not limited to merely considering the investigation of Dr Brady.
84 The evidence establishes that NRFA advised CSEL on a number of matters arising out of the incident in relation to unit C4 and that, in order to do so, it has conducted investigations in relation to it. It has also been involved in the flow of information to Dr Brady and part of the flow of information from Dr Brady to CSEL.
85 CSEL and CEPL also relied on evidence from Mr Busine, who was the Executive General Manager Revenue Strategy of CSEL at the time of the 2021 incident. He subsequently became its CEO. He addressed the public statements which were made by or on behalf of CSEL, and indicated that they were made to explain the progress of Dr Brady's investigations - that is not a statement to which great credence can be given, as it does not accord with that which was actually said in the public statements. He also referred to additional statements made in the second half of 2023 which, on their face, indicate that the report of Dr Brady was for the purpose of allowing CSEL to understand the facts that led up to the incident, so that CSEL could learn from it and improvements can be made to the safety of CSEL's workers and plant. His review of those statements tends against the maintenance of legal professional privilege in that the statements refer to other important purposes for the obtaining of the report and do not mention that it is to be used for obtaining legal advice.
86 There is no need to traverse the further evidence relating to the manner in which NRFA kept the information in relation to Dr Brady's report confidential. It is sufficiently clear that it did. The evidence disclosed that it retained McGrathNicol to establish a database to host CSEL documents that NRFA lawyers could use to in the preparation of legal advice to be given to CSEL. Dr Brady was given a username and password to access the database. A solicitor from NRFA was embedded in the CSEL legal team who was responsible for gathering documents. Further, a process was established for the purpose of controlling the flow of information between CSEL employees and Dr Brady. Dr Brady was also included in the preparation of witness statements and attended interviews. Although no litigation was then on foot, many of those matters are done in the day-to-day conduct of the litigation process and it is clear that the defending of claims was anticipated in the future.
87 Whilst it is apparent that Dr Brady's activities were enveloped within protocols expected to surround communications to which the legal professional privilege attaches, that is not determinative of whether the dominant purpose of his report was for obtaining legal advice. Certainly, if privilege attached to his work, the protocols surrounding it would have ensured that the privilege was not lost as might have been the case when an independent expert conducts an investigation of this nature in the circumstances in which Dr Brady did.