Background
5 On 29 January 2024, the Court made orders on the application of Sev.en for the appointment of special purpose administrators of IG Power (Callide) Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (IGPC). The purpose of that appointment was so that appropriate investigations might be undertaken as to the nature and extent of IGPC's assets - that being an important matter in its administration and in its creditors' consideration whether to vote in favour of a deed of company arrangement (DOCA), should one be proposed. More specifically, the special purpose administrators were to investigate the cause of two catastrophic failures of certain equipment at the Callide Power Station, namely the unit C3 cooling tower and the unit C4 turbine. IGPC has an interest in unit C3 and unit C4, which are operated by it together with Callide Energy Pty Ltd (CEPL) pursuant to a joint venture. It is likely that any cause of action that IGPC has against any entity responsible for the failure of unit C4 or unit C3, would be one of its most substantial assets.
6 The failure of unit C4 in May 2021 caused substantial damage and loss of revenue for IGPC, which was ultimately placed into administration. It is possible, or even likely, that the failure of unit C4 resulted in IGPC's insolvency and administrators being appointed to it. Sev.en, which has a substantial financial and economic interest in IGPC, was dissatisfied with the efforts of the then administrators to investigate the cause of unit C4's failure, and sought the appointment of special purpose administrators to properly perform the investigative task. It was successful, and, as mentioned, orders were made for the appointment of the special purpose administrators.
7 A necessary consequence of the appointment of special purpose administrators was an extension to the convening period for the holding of the second meeting of creditors under Pt 5.3A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act), and on 26 February 2024 orders were made to that effect.
8 Subsequently, on 11 April 2024, orders were made for the further extension of the time for the holding of that second meeting. Relevantly, Order 7 provided:
7. Pursuant to s 447A(1) of the Act, Pt 5.3A of the Act is to operate in relation to the IG Companies as if:
(a) the period for the General Purpose Administrators to convene the second meeting of creditors of the IG Companies under s 439A of the Act (the Meeting) is the period ending at 11:59 pm on:
(i) 7 May 2024; or
(ii) the day after the Sev.en and GPA Applications are finally determined,
whichever is later.
(b) the Meeting may be held within 5 business days after the end of the convening period as extended by subparagraph (a).
9 Orders were also made for the hearing of an application for final relief filed by Sev.en on 10 April 2024; being an application seeking the removal of the general purpose administrators (the "Sev.en application"). It was listed for two days, commencing on 18 June 2024, with the consequence being that the effect of Order 7 above would be that the second meeting of creditors would not occur until at least 19 June 2024.
10 Subsequently, on 19 May 2024, the general purpose administrators made an application to vary the orders made on 11 April 2024, so that they may call a meeting at any time during or within five days after the end of the convening period as has been extended. That application is referred to in the material as the "Daisytek application". The identified purpose behind that application is to enable the general purpose administrators to call the second creditors' meeting before the Court determines the application to remove them. If that was to occur, it is quite likely that Sev.en's application to remove them would become redundant, although the general purpose administrators have previously sought to suggest that it would not.
11 The general purpose administrators had also earlier filed an application seeking judicial advice to the effect that they are justified and would otherwise be acting properly and reasonably in putting to the creditors of the companies in administration a DOCA proposed by CEPL and CS Energy Limited (CSEL) (CEPL DOCA). That application was set down to be heard alongside the Sev.en application. It does not appear to be in dispute that if the CEPL DOCA is put to the creditors, it is likely that it will pass. CEPL and CSEL are IGPC's largest creditors and possibly have effective control of a majority of the other related party creditors. There are some non-related creditors whose interests must not be overlooked, but it is doubtful that they would be able to make a difference to the outcome of a vote.
12 Shortly after the Daisytek application was filed, the general purpose administrators made an application for it to be heard urgently and in advance of the Sev.en application and the application for judicial advice. That application was refused for reasons given on 23 May 2024. Orders were made listing the Daisytek application for hearing at the same time as the Sev.en application and the application for judicial advice. Initially, the dates for the hearing of those applications were 18 and 19 June 2024.
13 For the purposes of the joint hearing, Sev.en issued subpoenas to several persons, but applications were made to set them aside or to vary them. After the applications were heard, the parties were informed that the trial dates of 18 and 19 June 2024 might be imperilled by reason of the time needed to prepare a decision on the challenges to the subpoenas. It was indicated that the hearing might be adjourned to dates in July.
14 The general purpose administrators opposed an adjournment of the hearing claiming that they held concerns about prejudice to creditors which might flow from the diminution of the assets in the administration if the hearing was delayed until July. They asserted that the potential delay of the hearing of the applications prompted them to make an application for an order that Sev.en provide an undertaking as to damages in respect of any damage suffered by reason of the delay in the calling of the second meeting of creditors.
15 In substance, their submission is that, by its actions in having the Daisytek application heard alongside the Sev.en application, Sev.en has effectively enjoined the general purpose administrators from calling a second meeting of creditors. They also point out that, had a person obtained such an order in the usual course, they would have been required to provide an undertaking as to damages as the necessary price for that injunctive relief.
16 To give substance to the submission that damage will be caused to the creditors of IGPC and its related entities by reason of the deferral of the second meeting of creditors, the general purpose administrators referred to the CEPL DOCA which they intend to put to the creditors. In its initial iteration, it provided for the creation of a Deed Fund, the size of which would be sufficient to pay IGPC creditors 100 cents in the dollar. Necessarily, the creditors could not achieve a better return on a winding up and, moreover, by voting for the CEPL DOCA they would receive payment of their debts almost immediately.
17 However, presently, money is being spent by CEPL and IGPC on returning unit C4 (as well as unit C3) to working capacity. Under the joint venture agreement between CEPL and IGPC, the participants are required to pay what are referred to as "cash calls" for the operation of the joint venture business, including the payment of amounts which are to be applied for the rebuilding of units C3 and C4. The sums which have been paid and which will become payable are considerable. The evidence shows that the cash calls which IGPC will pay in June 2024 total around $19.3 million and that substantial additional amounts will be called for in July and August 2024, totalling about $38 million by the end of that month. The calls for payment are made by Callide Power Management Pty Ltd (CPM), which is an operational company and part of the corporate operational structure used by the joint venturers, IGPC and CEPL. It was unclear on the application whether CPM was jointly controlled by IGPC and CSEL or by IGPC and CEPL. Ultimately, it does not matter as CEPL is effectively controlled by CSEL. At present, as IGPC is in default under the joint venture agreement, it lacks any vote or influence in relation to the operation of the joint venture affairs. Therefore, in a broad sense, CSEL and CEPL have control over CPM.
18 Whilst the CEPL DOCA initially provided for the payment in full of IGPC's creditors, that is subject to a diminution to the extent to which CEPL is required to pay cash calls under the joint venture. To the extent of those payments, a similar sum will not be contributed to the Deed Fund, with the result being that the payments to creditors will be correspondingly reduced.
19 Until recently, CPM had been making monthly calls on IGPC and CEPL, and, on earlier occasions, that had been relied upon as indicating to the Court that an urgent hearing in this matter was required. That submission was not inappropriate as the potential diminution of funds available to meet the debts of IGPC's creditors was, and remains, an important consideration. Indeed, due to that feature and other matters, the hearing of the applications was expedited and the matters were accorded hearing dates in priority to other pressing actions.
20 On the present application to require Sev.en to provide an undertaking as to damages in relation to the orders which effectively prevent the holding of the second creditors meeting, the general purpose administrators rely upon the fact that CPM has increased the demands on the joint venturers by requiring the payment of cash calls to be weekly. This, it is said, will further diminish the amount available for IGPC's creditors.
21 There was no evidence before the Court as to why CPM has increased the demands on the joint venturers which has the collateral effect of increasing the rate of diminution of the money which will be available to creditors under the CEPL DOCA. There may be perfectly legitimate commercial reasons for it doing so. Nevertheless, it cannot be overlooked that the effect of CSEL's conduct increases the commercial pressure for the holding of the second meeting of creditors so that the CEPL DOCA can be accepted. That is a commercial outcome which CSEL would desire. Further, for present purposes, it is relevant that it also possibly increases the force of the submission that the delay in the hearing of the Daisytek application will cause IGPC's creditors damage through a reduced distribution under the CEPL DOCA, with the result being that it is more appropriate that Sev.en provides an undertaking as to damages.
22 It needs to be reiterated, however, that there is no evidence to suggest that CSEL has caused CPM to increase the demands on the joint venturers for the purposes of generating urgency or pressure in relation to the hearing of the applications. On the other hand, where CPM's conduct is relied upon and there is an obvious benefit to it doing so in the context of the present dispute, an explanation for its conduct might have been of assistance. That is especially so where, as it is so closely tied to one of the main protagonists, one might have expected that it would not have been difficult to secure some evidence of that.