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[2002] WASC 174
Supreme Court of WA
2002-06-28
Pullin J
Original judgment source is linked above.
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION : ARCUS SHOPFITTERS PTY LTD -v- WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION [2002] WASC 174
HEARD : 2, 3, 6-10, 13-17, 20-24, 27-29 MAY 2002
Resumption or acquisition of land - Compensation - Valuation of land - Comparable sales method - Special value to owner - Whether "special circumstances" existed
Evidence - Expert valuers - Whether Court obliged to accept evidence of valuer
Evidence - Expert - Basis for expert opinion must be explained
Land Acquisition and Public Works Act 1902, s 35 and s 63
Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v Peninsula Balmain Pty Ltd (No 2) [2001] NSWSC 1016
Adelaide Clinic Holdings Pty Ltd v Minister for Water Resources (1988) 65 LGRA 410
Albany v Commonwealth (1976) 12 ALR 201
Balquhidder Pty Ltd v Minister for Environment & Planning (1986) 40 SASR 63
Brewarrana Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways (No 1) (1973) 32 LGRA 170
Britton v Minister for Education (1986-87) 29 The Valuer 224
Brown Bros (Marine) Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales Land & Housing Corporation (1991) 72 LGRA 50
CC Auto Port Pty Ltd v Minister for Works [1965] WAR 148
Celtic Agencies Pty Ltd v South Australian Land Commission (1978) 20 SASR 176
Cerini v Minister for Transport [2001] WASC 309
Cienda Pty Ltd v South Australian Urban Land Trust (1988) 65 LGRA 419
Collins v Ottawa Water Commission (1878) 42 UCQB 378
Commissioner of Succession Duties (SA) v Executor Trustee and Agency Co of South Australia Ltd [1947] HCA 10; (1947) 74 CLR 358
Commonwealth v Arklay [1952] HCA 76; (1952) 87 CLR 159
Commonwealth v Morison [1972] HCA 39; (1972) 127 CLR 32
Crompton v Commissioner of Highways (1973) 5 SASR 301
De Campo v Shire of Chittering, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 4856; 15 April 1983
De Ieso v Commissioner of Highways (1981) 27 SASR 248
Director of Buildings and Lands v Shun Fung Ironworks Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 846
Eagle v The Charing-Cross Railway Company (1867) 16 LTR 593
Fenton Nominees Pty Ltd v Valuer-General (1981) 27 SASR 258
Gregory v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1971] HCA 2; (1971) 123 CLR 547
Hazel v Minister for Lands & Works (1977) 23 The Valuer 504
Housing Commission (NSW) v Falconer [1981] 1 NSWLR 547
In re an Arbitration between Lucas and Chesterfield Gas & Water Board [1909] 1 KB 16
Inglewood Pulp and Paper Co Ltd v New Brunswick Electric Power Commission [1928] AC 492
King v Minister for Planning & Housing (1991) 76 LGRA 288
Konowalow v Minister for Works [1961] WAR 40
Lake Erie & Northern Railway Co v Brantford Golf and Country Club (1917) 32 DLR 219
Latimer v North Coast National Agricultural & Industrial Society (1938) 14 LGR (NSW) 30
March v City of Frankston [1969] VicRp 44; [1969] VR 350
Mario Piraino Pty Ltd v Roads Corporation (1990) 76 LGRA 263
Marshall v Director-General, Department of Transport (2001) 180 ALR 351
McGlynn & Co Pty Ltd v Municipality of Parkes (1939) 5 The Valuer 308
Merivale Motel Investments v Brisbane Expo Authority (1987) 64 LGRA 108
Minister of Environment v Petroccia (1982) 30 SASR 383
Minister of State for Home Affairs v Rostron [1914] HCA 66; (1914) 18 CLR 634
Minister of Transport v Edwards [1964] 1 All ER 483
Moad v Orange City Council (1957) 2 LGRA 171
Nap Nap Station Pty Ltd v Valuer-General (1989) 72 LGRA 275
Pamalco Pty Ltd v Minister Administering National Parks & Wildlife Act 1974 (No 3) (1991) 71 LGRA 441
Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v City of Wanneroo (1994) 11 SR (WA) 1
Pointe Gourde Quarrying & Transport Ltd v Sub-Intendent of Crown Land [1947] AC 565
Prasad v Wolverhampton Borough Council [1983] 1 Ch 333
R K Morgan Holdings Pty Ltd v Melbourne & Metropolitan Board of Works (1992) 77 LGRA 102
Raja Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju v Revenue Divisional Officer, Vizagapatam [1939] AC 302
Re Schooley and Lake Erie & Northern Railway Co (1915) 25 DLR 537
Redeam Pty Ltd v South Australian Land Commission (1977) 40 LGRA 151
Robinson & Co Ltd v Collector of Land Revenue, Singapore [1980] 1 WLR 1614
Royal Sydney Golf Club v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1957] HCA 31; (1957) 97 CLR 379
Sharp v Western Australian Planning Commission [1999] WASC 223
Sheffield Development Corporation v Glossop Sectional Buildings Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 1676
Sisters of Charity of Rockingham v The King [1922] 2 AC 315
Turner v Minister of Public Instruction [1956] HCA 7; (1956) 95 CLR 245
University of Western Australia v City of Subiaco (1980) 52 LGRA 360
Wilson v Liverpool Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 302
Wong v Minister of Water Resources (1985) 55 LGRA 431
Woollams v Minister (1957) 75 WN (NSW) 103
Yates Property Corp Pty Ltd v Darling Harbour Authority (1990) 70 LGRA 187
1 PULLIN J: The applicant ("Arcus Shopfitters") claims compensation for the resumption of the subject land on 27 October 1995. As at the date of resumption, the improvements on the subject land consisted of a substantial factory warehouse with detached brick offices and a brick and iron storeroom. These improvements covered approximately 3,200 square metres of the site. The land is situated in Northbridge, wholly within the district of the City of Perth.
2 The applicant called two valuers, who offered opinions that the value of the subject land and buildings was about $6.9 million. The respondents called two other valuers, who offered opinions that the value of the subject land and buildings was only about $3.6 million. My task is therefore to analyse the evidence of the four valuers, and other witnesses, and reach a conclusion about the value.
3 In the first half of my reasons, I deal with the history of the subject land and the business which was conducted on it. Usually it would be unnecessary to do this, but I am obliged to do so in this case because the applicant contends that its business was adversely affected by the CNBR (defined below), and that this amounted to a "special circumstance" warranting an award of compensation under the proviso to s 63(c) of the PWA (defined below).
Arcus Shopfitters - Arcus Shopfitters Pty Ltd, the applicant, which was incorporated in 1975 and a subsidiary of Arcus Pty Ltd.
Arcus Glass - Arcus Glass Pty Ltd, incorporated in 1975 and a subsidiary of Arcus Pty Ltd.
Northbridge - The area bounded by the CNBR in the north, Beaufort Street in the east, Roe Street in the south, and Fitzgerald Street in the west.
East Northbridge - That part of Northbridge to the east of Lake Street.
West Northbridge - That part of Northbridge to the west of Lake Street.
MRTPS Act - The Metropolitan Region Town Planning Scheme Act 1959.
MRPA - Metropolitan Region Planning Authority - the respondent authority created under the MRTPS Act and the predecessor of the respondent.
PWA - Public Works Act 1902 and in 1995 renamed the Land Acquisition and Public Works Act 1902.
CPS1 - City of Perth Town Planning Scheme No 1, which came into force in 1985 and which was still in force in 1995.
CPS2 - City of Perth Draft Town Planning Scheme No 2, which the PCC resolved to adopt as a draft on 9 August 1994 but which had not received final approval of the Minister in 1995.
Subject land - The land with the street address 138 Aberdeen Street, Perth, located on the north east corner of the intersection of Palmerston Street and Aberdeen Street, and more particularly described as estate in fee simple in all that piece of land consisting of 4,553 square metres of land and being portion of each of Perth Town Lots Y166 and Y167, being part of the land on Diagram 7009 and part of the land comprised in Certificate of Title Vol 923 Folio 16. The applicant is the registered proprietor.
History of the Subject Land and the Businesses Conducted on It
4 The subject land was acquired on 1 June 1927 by Arcus Ltd.
5 On 6 August 1949, Arcus Ltd was privatised and became Arcus Pty Ltd. There were several buildings on the land, and from those buildings first Arcus Ltd and then Arcus Pty Ltd carried on at different times, the business of manufacturing shop and office fittings, metalwork, glass manufacturing, floor tiling, store boards, painting and polishing materials, together with associated work and installations.
6 In 1959, the MRTPS Act was passed. This created the MRPA. Section 30 required the MRPA to make the MRS with respect to the whole or any part of the land within the metropolitan region.
7 The MRS was made and published in the Government Gazette of 9 August 1963. The MRS applied to all land within the metropolitan region. The subject land was within the metropolitan region. Provision was made in the MRS for land to be reserved for public purposes, one of which was for "controlled access highways". Land was reserved for "controlled access highways" in a strip to the north of the Perth city centre. The strip runs west from the Swan River until it meets up with the Mitchell Freeway. This reserved strip of land to the north of Perth became known as the CNBR. It ran between Newcastle and Aberdeen Streets. What is now known as the Northbridge Tunnel runs within, and under, the CNBR. The location of the CNBR between Newcastle and Aberdeen Streets did not alter between 1963 and today.
8 The MRS provided that no provisions of the part of the MRS dealing with reserved land should prevent the continued use of land for the purpose for which it was being lawfully used immediately before the MRS had the force of law. Clause 18 of the MRS provided that no person should commence or carry out any development on reserved land that was not owned by, or vested in, a public authority, without the written approval of the MRPA.
9 Section 36(3) of the MRTPS Act provided that where, under the MRS, any land was reserved for a public purpose, compensation was not payable for injurious affection until, inter alia, the land was sold.
10 In December 1972, Ray Arcus and Dr Arcus staged what Dr Arcus called a "palace revolution", meaning that they gained control of Arcus Pty Ltd.
11 Some time before June 1973, manufacturers of glass which supplied Arcus Pty Ltd began supplying much larger sheets of glass, and this created a difficulty when it came to handling and manoeuvring the packs of these sheets into the glass factory on the subject premises.
12 The minutes of the board meeting of Arcus Pty Ltd dated 6 June 1973 recorded the following information:
"Mr. Barwood briefly outlined the need for both new buildings and submitted an estimate by Halpern Glick and Lewis of $120,000 together with a breakup of the cost showing separate figures for the Glass Shop and the Amenities Building.
Until the attitude of the M.R.P.A. is known regarding new buildings nothing could be done and in any case capital expenditure proposals are to be referred to Dr. Arcus.
Mr. Barwood advised that all glass would, in the near future, be consigned in large containers which cannot be handled with the present equipment. Glass will be supplied in a limited number of sizes and the local importer and distributor will be required to cut to sizes required when selling smaller quantities to other companies.
Mr. Barwood said that the alternative to re-building the glass shop and installing a crane capable of handling the large containers would be for the Company to cease importing direct and purchase it's own requirements from some other importer at a much higher price. It would then only be able to handle small jobs and one consequence, he said, would be the loss of highly experienced tradesmen who would not wish to continue with the Company doing 'two bob' jobs and would seek employment elsewhere.
...
Work on the glass handling facilities was not urgent, although it would have to be undertaken if the Company wished to carry on as a large glass merchant.
The Board members then examined the drawings for the proposed buildings and inspected the existing buildings and lay-out."
13 Dr Arcus was appointed managing director of Arcus Pty Ltd on 27 August 1973. Dr Arcus then examined the way in which the company Arcus Pty Ltd could cope with the problems associated with the supply of larger sized sheets of glass. One option considered by Arcus Pty Ltd was to "lift" the roof. It was not fully explained how this would solve the problem, and neither Dr Arcus nor Ray Arcus could explain it to me. It seemed to have been the idea of Mr Barwood and Halpern Glick and Lewis. The other option was work which did not involve "lifting" the roof or carrying out the work which was the subject of the Halpern Glick and Lewis estimate. This option involved installing a new crane between two of the buildings on the site to handle the unloading of the new packs of glass. There was an issue raised about why the work was not carried out to "lift" the roof. The applicant, through Ray Arcus, said that the reason was because of concern that the MRPA would not approve the carrying out of such work. The minutes of the 6 June 1973 board meeting also mention that concern.
14 The subsequent minutes of meetings of directors of Arcus Pty Ltd, however, do not continue to show any such concern. The minutes reveal that Dr Arcus began to play a significant role in deciding what would happen about the method of handling the new large packs of glass. The minutes of the meeting of directors of Arcus Pty Ltd of 3 July 1973 contained the following:
"Mr. Barwood reported that the [MRPA], the Perth City Council, and the Main Roads Department, approved a sketch plan and it is now for Arcus Pty. Ltd. to submit complete plans and specifications and structural details and on acceptance of these a building licence could be issued.
The M.R.P.A. approval means that the cost of the extensions would be re-imbursed when the land is required by it for the 'Ring Road'. The prospects of early resumption of the land appear to be remote. The proposals have been referred to Dr. Arcus who expressed the view that the shareholders should consider the long term future of the Company before it commits itself to the expenditure.
The Board agreed that an early decision is necessary and Dr. Arcus is to be advised to this effect and asked if he is likely to visit Perth within the next six to eight weeks."
15 Dr Arcus could not recall what was shown in the sketch plan referred to by Mr Barwood, and he did not know whether they related to the Halpern Glick and Lewis proposals. It seems likely that they did. Dr Arcus said that he made contact on many occasions with officers of the MRPA, who led him to believe that developments exceeding a cost of $10,000 would not be approved and that developments where the expenditure would be less than $10,000 would be approved. Dr Arcus does not know to whom he spoke, and it was not about any specific proposal.
16 Dr Arcus' conversation with the unknown officer of the MRPA may have been after those two directors' meetings on 6 June and 3 July 1973, and after he became managing director, but, if so, the subsequent minutes do not say that the attitude of the MRPA was relevant to the decision which was ultimately taken by Arcus Pty Ltd, which was to install the outside crane to handle the new glass packs rather than the other option of lifting the roof. This decision can be seen from the next minutes of the meeting of directors of Arcus Pty Ltd on 27 August 1973. This was the meeting where Dr Arcus was appointed managing director. The minutes record details of a long report from Dr Arcus, who stated that he examined the company as a whole and that the plans for the new building submitted by Halpern Glick and Lewis had convinced him that there should be no decision to carry out proposed alterations to the present glass shop and store to provide further permanent store space, or to provide for the future handling of bulk consignments of glass, pending further study by him. The minutes then go on to record the fact that Dr Arcus believed that:
"... more efficient and economical alternatives could be found than the investment of $120,000 estimated by Halpern Glick and Lewis, to be needed for alterations and additions to existing buildings and a travelling crane of higher lifting capability than the existing crane."
17 The minutes also record a number of ideas put forward by Dr Arcus to deal with the need for further storage space. One of his ideas was:
"The provision of a new travelling crane to unload and move glass in the future should be examined and possibly the cranes at present dismantled and lying between the old brick house and Aberdeen Street could be restored and used."
18 It was probably after this, and some time in 1973, that Dr Arcus spoke to the unknown officer in the MRPA. No subsequent minutes suggest that the conversation Dr Arcus had with a MRPA officer ever influenced the board of Arcus Pty Ltd in its decision to build the external crane to cope with the problem of the glass. The minutes of 5 March 1974 reveal that the external crane was, as at that date, in use. This outside gantry crane was designed by Dr Arcus.
19 I find that the decision to construct the outside gantry crane was because it was a more cost-effective solution than the $120,000 rebuilding works proposed by Halpern Glick and Lewis. I find that the main reason Arcus Pty Ltd decided to erect the outside gantry crane rather than carry out the works proposed by Halpern Glick and Lewis (and rather than the raising of the roof if that were a different proposal from the Halpern Glick and Lewis proposal) was because of economic reasons, and not because there was a concern that the MRPA would not approve of the work to raise the roof. This is not to say that the directors did not consider that there may have been problems associated with the gaining of MRPA approval if ever it had proved necessary to make an application in relation to this work. In fact, it is clear that they did perceive the existence of the reserve would prevent any major development being approved on the site. Dr Arcus said so in a letter to Bond Corporation Pty Ltd, dated 12 September 1982. The fact is, however, that neither Arcus Pty Ltd nor the applicant ever considered that they had to carry out any major development work which required an application to the MRPA in relation to the subject land which might have been rejected.
20 In 1975, Arcus Glass and Arcus Shopfitters were incorporated. Arcus Glass was the company which was involved in glass manufacturing work until 1977, when the activities were transferred to Arcus Shopfitters.
21 In September 1981, the members of Arcus Pty Ltd sought advice from Robinson Cox about the members' voluntary liquidation of Arcus Pty Ltd.
22 The result was that on 29 March 1982, Arcus Pty Ltd went into voluntary liquidation and the subject land was sold to Arcus Shopfitters.
23 By that date, enquiries of the MRPA had indicated to Dr Arcus and Ray Arcus that the land would not be required for the reserved purpose until at least 1993.
24 The sale of the subject land to Arcus Shopfitters by Arcus Pty Ltd triggered the payment of compensation for injurious affection under s 36(3) of the MRTPS Act.
25 On 6 May 1982, a deed of discharge was signed, the parties to that deed being Arcus Pty Ltd and the MRPA. The recitals to the deed refer to the fact that the land had been reserved under the MRS, that Arcus Pty Ltd was at the time of the reservation the registered proprietor, and that after the affected land was reserved, notice had been given to the MRPA of its intention to sell the affected land. The recitals read:
"The Owner has sold the affected land at a price less than that which it might reasonably have expected to receive had the affected land not been reserved under the Scheme as aforesaid and the Owner therefore claims that the affected land was injuriously affected by the said reservation.
The Authority has agreed with the Owner that the value of the land had it not been affected by the reservation was the sum of ... ($725,000.00) and considers that by reason of the said reservation a fair and reasonable valuation of the affected land is the sum of ... ($543,750.00).
The Authority has elected and agreed to pay the owner as compensation the said injurious affection the sum of ... ($181,250.00) being the difference between the said sum of ... ($725,000) and the said sum of ... ($543,750.00).
The Owner transferred the affected land to ARCUS SHOPFITTERS PTY LIMITED of 138 Aberdeen Street Perth by transfer registered in the Office of Titles ..."
"1. THAT the Authority shall pay to the Owner the said sum of ... ($181,250.00) upon the acceptance that the Office of Titles at Perth of a Caveat lodged by the Authority against the affected land and such Caveat shall be lodged as soon as practicable after the execution of this Deed by the Owner.
2. THAT in consideration of the said sum of ... ($181,250.00) to be paid by the Authority to the Owner as hereinbefore provided the Owner HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGES AND DECLARES that such payment constitutes compensation in full satisfaction and discharge of its claim for compensation under the provisions of the said Acts and all other claims or rights of claim by it or any other person or persons claiming by through or under it by reason of the reservation of the affected land under the Scheme and the loss or damage caused thereby and of all other claims or rights of claim which it now has or but for the execution of these presents could or might have had in respect of the injurious affection of the affected land by the said reservation and for all loss or damage suffered thereby."
27 Very soon after the compensation was received, Arcus Shopfitters began making enquiries to see whether a buyer could be found for the business. Hence, on 12 September 1982, Dr Arcus wrote to the chairman of Bond Corporation Pty Ltd, asking whether that company would be interested in "taking under your corporate wing the Arcus clan's 59 year old business ...". The letter continued:
"The founding generation has passed on; the second generation's interest is waning; and the third generation shows no interest in continuing the business as a family concern. The consensus is to take soundings for the sale of the company as a going concern."
"As you know, the company's premises are on land reserved for a future freeway to be constructed 'not before 1994'. No significant further improvement of the site is therefore possible. Some of our buildings and equipment are quite ancient. However, our 42 employees - many of whom have been with us for decades - are competent and dedicated and have earned us (and them) a good reputation..."
29 This letter did not result in any sale, and the business continued to operate. It operated profitably until the end of the 1980s. By the end of the 1980s, the business became less successful. Indeed, in the last six years of its existence as a business operating from the subject land, the company did not make a trading profit. Dr Arcus gave evidence that he thought the trading losses which were recorded for each year from 1989 until 1995 had to be adjusted to take account of interest which was paid to shareholders in relation to debentures which had been issued to support the acquisition of the subject land. He said that, for example, although there was a trading loss of $58,997 for the financial year ending 30 June 1989, that $107,000 debenture interest was paid to shareholders in that year. Dr Arcus also expressed the view that adjustments should be made to take into account the fact that director's fees were paid. In my view, there is no basis for making such adjustments. The money had to be borrowed by Arcus Shopfitters to acquire the subject land from Arcus Pty Ltd, from someone. The fact that the money was borrowed from shareholders does not alter the fact that, when looked at as a trading entity, Arcus Shopfitters did not trade at a profit for the last six years.
30 On several occasions, reference was made to the effects of recession, the reduction in building activity, and the pressure from competitors. For example, in the minutes of the director's meeting of 7 November 1991 of Arcus Shopfitters, it was recorded that the greatest loss ever had been suffered to 30 June 1991, attributable to the severe recession, reduction in building activity and its effect on selling prices. There was also an unprofitable involvement in a contract for the Myers Forrest Chase project. This was recorded as being the "most disastrous episode in the Company's trading history" in the minutes of the director's meeting for 15 March 1989. In the letter to Bond Corporation Pty Ltd, there was a reference to 42 employees, but the minutes of the directors of Arcus Shopfitters on 20 June 1989, reveal that there were, by then, only 18 men employed. A decision was made to cease trading and to terminate the employees' employment in the minutes of 26 August 1993, which decision was later deferred to March 1994. That decision was made by the directors on 7 September 1993, and the reason for deferring the closure of the business was to "avoid the high cost of having to use other firms to undertake our obligations of maintenance under existing completed contracts".
31 In the last two years of the existence of the business, Arcus Shopfitters tried its hand at manufacturing coffins for sale, but that business proved to be unsuccessful.
32 Then, on 27 October 1995, the resumption of 138 Aberdeen Street, Perth, occurred, as a result of which, at a meeting of directors of Arcus Shopfitters on 31 October 1995, it was resolved that because of the resumption, and because of the uncertain future trading conditions, the company's operations should cease, the plant and equipment should be sold, and the company should close the site on 21 December 1995.
33 There was no resolution, and never any discussion at board level, about shifting the business to another site so that the company's business could continue to be carried on. Dr Arcus said that this was because the company could not continue to carry on business at a location other than 138 Aberdeen Street. He said that this location made it ideally placed to carry out contracts in the central business district of Perth, and that this closeness to the central business district gave it an advantage over competitors. If location was an advantage over the other companies which competed with Arcus Shopfitters, then this advantage did not show itself up in the profit and loss account. The references in the minutes, at different stages, to the greater efficiency of competitors, suggests that the business of Arcus Shopfitters had become moribund. I find that the business closed down rather than shift to other premises, because it had become unprofitable. In my opinion, this unprofitability was not caused by the existence of the CNBR.
34 Evidence was given that the reservation had a blighting effect on the properties within the CNBR, and it is clear enough that in general terms this is so. Buildings within the CNBR showed signs of becoming run down, and it seems reasonable to conclude that owners within the CNBR were generally inclined not to expend moneys on redevelopment. Speaking generally, owners of properties probably had the view that applications to redevelop land within the reservation area would be refused if they sought approval for large-scale redevelopment. I find, however, that this does not explain the run down in the business of Arcus Shopfitters. If the business of Arcus Shopfitters had been successful and the business had thrived, then either the current owners or some other interested party would have carried it on. Several efforts were made to sell the business, and advertisements were placed in 1988 in the financial press seeking expressions of interest from those who might buy the business. No sale ever resulted from these advertisements.
35 On 14 November 1995, Arcus Shopfitters made a claim for compensation. The claim has been amended so that it now includes a claim for $6,900,000 for the land and buildings.
36 In addition to the claim for compensation for the resumption of the subject land and buildings, the applicant also claims compensation as follows:
(a) stamp duty, conveyancing and fees to purchase a replacement investment. Alternatively under the proviso to s 63(c) of the PWA, such sums as would place the applicant in the position it would have been in had the respondent not compulsorily purchased the land - $345,000.
(b) a proportion of rates and taxes paid by the applicant after giving up possession of the subject land pursuant to s 63A of the PWA - $14,422.72.
(c) 25 per cent of rates and taxes paid by the applicant from 6 May 1982 to 18 January 1996 - $88,340.83.
(d) An award under the proviso to s 63(c) of the PWA for injurious affection to the applicant's business - amount unspecified.
(e) Solatium at 10 per cent pursuant to s 63(3) of PWA.
(g) Interest in relation to costs and disbursements incurred prior to the issue of proceedings pursuant to s 32 or s 142 of the Supreme Court Act 1935.
37 Mr Elliott, a valuer retained by the respondent, valued the subject land at $3,642,000 as at the date of resumption. Mr Spencer, another valuer retained by the respondent, valued the resumed land at $3,670,000 on that date.
38 The MRS is the general plan for the metropolitan region. The MRS created a "central city area" zone, which included the area from the central city north to the CNBR.
39 The CPS1, like any other local authority town planning scheme incorporates all the MRS reserves. The CPS1 scheme map therefore incorporates the CNBR. CPS1 embodies a central city area called the "Central Area". The northern boundary of the Central Area is the southern boundary of the CNBR. The Central Area takes in all of Northbridge. The remaining area of land zoned in CPS1 is defined as "Suburban Area". The area to the north of the CNBR is in the Suburban Area. In general, under CPS1 the intensity of development permitted within the Central Area exceeds that of the Suburban Area. For example, CPS1 required residential developments in the Central Area to comply with the R160 Code; in the Suburban Areas it was R80. In the Suburban Area, developers were required to provide a minimum amount of car parking on site. In the Central Area, car parking is subject to a maximum, not to a minimum. The differences in development potential between the Central Area and the Suburban Area have an effect on property values.
40 Two of the zonings under CPS1 in the Central Area (and therefore Northbridge) were as follows. South of Aberdeen Street to James Street and west of Lake Street, the zoning was "Industrial" and shown as zone "CI" (meaning "Central Industrial") on the CPS1 Scheme map. South of Aberdeen Street to Roe Street but to the east of Lake Street, the zone was "General Commercial". This was shown as "CC" (meaning "Central General Commercial") on the City of Perth Town Planning Scheme map. The CC zone also covered the area between James and Roe Streets.
41 Within the Central Area, a wide range of uses were permitted under both the CI and the CC zones. Two use classes which were of importance in the case were "attached house, grouped dwelling" and "office building". In the CI zone, "attached house, grouped dwelling" was a "prohibited" purpose, but not so in the CC zone.
42 In the case of "office building", this use was "permitted" if it was an incidental purpose in the CI zone but a "permitted" use in the CC zone. Under CPS1, the CC zone is more favourable to a full range of developments than the CI zone.
43 In the CC and CI zones in the Central Area, developments with a plot ratio of 2.0 west of Lake Street and 3.0 east of Lake Street, were permitted. In the Suburban Area, plot ratios range from 2 down to .5. The land to the east of Lake Street therefore had more development potential than land to the west of Lake Street. Clause 138 of CPS1 allowed the PCC to grant a bonus plot ratio of up to 20 per cent if, in the opinion of the council, the proposed development included a community or other facility or amenity, constituting a significant improvement to the amenities or environment of the Central Area. This provision applied to both the CI and the CC zone.
44 Within the CI and CC zones in the Central Area, there were no specific requirements in CPS1 for setbacks, open space, or landscaping. On the other hand, within the Suburban Area zones, CPS1 required a minimum setback of 4.5 metres to the street, required landscaping in space equivalent in area to 3 metres multiplied by the street frontage and 1.5 metres multiplied by a secondary street frontage, and in the C3 zone required residential development to be subject to the R code provisions, which include significant street and other setbacks and a 50 per cent open space requirement.
45 The requirements applying in the Suburban Area meant that land could not be as intensively developed as land in the Central Area.
46 Finally, I should mention at this point the important cl 48 in CPS1, which provided that if a development did not comply with the standard or requirement prescribed by CPS1 with respect to that development, then the PCC had a discretion, notwithstanding that non-compliance, to approve the application for development unconditionally or subject to such conditions as the PCC deemed fit. Up until 1991, this very wide restriction was limited in one important respect, and that is that cl 48 did not empower the PCC to grant town planning approval or a building licence for any residential development, the density of which would exceed a rate of 160 dwellings per hectare (R160). In 1991, this restriction on the PCC's discretion was removed. In other words, after 1991, the PCC could exercise its discretion under cl 48 to allow a development with a density of greater than R160. The evidence revealed that the PCC did frequently approve developments with a density of greater than R160 in west Northbridge.
47 The evidence satisfies me, and I find, that cl 48 was frequently invoked by the PCC within the Central Area between 1991 and 1995. Clause 48 created a discretion which allowed the PCC to treat each application on its individual merits, unconstrained by the standards set out in CPS1 and constrained only by the need for an absolute majority vote of the council in favour of relaxation. As a result, it is not possible to refer only to CPS1 to determine what developments might have been permitted within the Central Area in 1995. Guidance has to be obtained by observing how the PCC exercised its discretion under cl 48 and from studies commissioned to determine what developments were permitted within the Central Area.
48 In 1994, the Town of Vincent was created. The land within that municipality was taken from the City of Perth. The boundary between the two local authorities was at Newcastle Street. Although the Town of Vincent therefore dealt with development applications in land to the north of Newcastle Street after 1994, CPS1 continued to apply until December 1998, when a Town of Vincent town planning scheme was gazetted.
49 The Northbridge Study was commissioned by the State government and the PCC, with the intention of setting out objectives and policies for the future development of Northbridge to "guide decision making by the council, land owners and developers and other". The final report was adopted by the PCC by resolution on 21 October 1991, and it adopted ch 3 as its policy for the future development of Northbridge and the balance of the study as guidelines for the implementation of that policy. The Northbridge Study revealed that the objectives were to develop mixed uses, preferably with shops and restaurants at ground level and offices and apartments above, increased opportunities for residential development, and the upgrading of Russell Square to "provide a visual and community focus for housing in Northbridge". Russell Square was upgraded by the PCC in 1994.
50 The study noted that the CNBR, combined with industrial zoning to the north, had resulted in severe "blighting of Newcastle Street", and that "the uncertainty surrounding the by-pass severely limits planning for Newcastle Street", which had the potential to be "rebuilt" to become an integral part of the study area with a high degree of pedestrian and driver amenities. Another specific policy suggested that Newcastle Street should be developed to reinforce the importance of the road as an arterial road and as an edge to Northbridge.
51 This review was a joint State government and PCC project. It dealt extensively with the Central Area and was stated to be a review with the aim of providing a basis for the review of the central area section of the City Planning Scheme. It was released for public comment in 1994. It envisaged a continuation of the expansion of Northbridge, which was described as "Australia's most successful entertainment district" and Russell Square as "the focus of the Northbridge area".
52 The Perth inner city housing taskforce was established by the Commonwealth and State governments and the PCC. The taskforce was charged with recommending ways to encourage residential development in the inner city areas of Perth. This report led to the PCC resolving, on 28 April 1995, to prepare an inner city housing-residential strategy with a 5 year action programme.
53 This was published in February 1995. The manual was under preparation at the time of finalisation of CPS2, and it was expressly intended to provide the basis for residential development control under CPS2.
54 On 9 August 1994, the PCC resolved to adopt the draft CPS2. After that adoption, other steps had to be taken before it became law. The adopted draft had to go to the State Planning Commission for examination and consent to advertise. Consent to advertise was received in September 1994. It had not in 1995, and still had not at the date of trial, received the final approval of the Minister. Nevertheless, as at October 1995, it had to be regarded as a seriously entertained planning proposal.
55 Significant changes from CPS1 were as follows. Plot ratio calculations required the inclusion of the thickness of external walls for reduction in the allowable plot ratio east of Lake Street from 3 to 2; a deletion of the 20 per cent plot ratio bonus; a reduction in building heights in Northbridge; a deletion of the distinction between the Central Area and the Suburban Area; and a provision for the application of the R Code to apply to all residential development. The policy manual which forms part of the draft CPS2, stated that only low rise developments of no more than two to three stories were to be allowed, in keeping with the existing distinctive low scale character of the area.
56 The draft CPS2 contains cl 47, which is the equivalent of the existing cl 48 of CPS1, and which therefore conferred a significant discretion upon the PCC to approve development outside the constraints of CPS2.
57 The existence of cl 48, giving the general power to the PCC to ignore restrictions containing CPS1, meant that it was important, in deciding what developments might or might not be approved in 1995, to examine how the PCC had acted up until then. It is clear that cl 48 has been employed on many occasions. In relation to developments in Northbridge, plot ratio restrictions in CPS1 had been ignored, R Code restrictions had been ignored, and use restrictions had been ignored.
58 Insofar as CPS2 could be regarded by the City of Perth as a seriously entertained planning proposal, there was no evidence that the City of Perth had ever refused a development application on the grounds that it infringed restrictions contained in CPS2. Mr Adam (the town planning expert called by the applicant) examined the minutes of council meetings between 1989 and 1995. He summarised the characteristics of these development approvals in a table, which indicated (see par 123 of his report) that, for self-contained residential units, it was normal for the PCC to permit developments with a density of R200 to R350 with a plot ratio of 1.8 to 2.5 and a building of over five to six storeys above ground level. Hotel/serviced apartments with a unit density of R600 and plot ratio of 2.0 to 2.5 over five to six storeys were also approved.
59 Section 37(5)(a) of the MRTPS Act as at 27 October 1995, provided that notwithstanding anything contained in the PWA, the value of land or improvements compulsorily acquired should, for the purposes of assessing the amount of compensation to be paid, be assessed without regard to any increase or decrease in value attributed wholly or in part to the operation or effect of the MRS, but, in assessing the amount of compensation, regard should be had to any amounts of compensation already paid or payable in respect of the land under s 36. The section therefore applies the Pointe Gourde principle. This principle and the section just quoted recognise that a reservation will, or may, influence land affected by the reservation. The phenomenon of urban blight arising out of uncertainty surrounding planning proposals is well known, according to Mr Adam. I accept his evidence on this point. He said it is most clearly demonstrated in cases where land is reserved for a purpose which has an unknown time frame. In the present case, the land between Aberdeen and Newcastle Streets was reserved for over 30 years before a final decision was taken on the precise form and timing of the construction of the Northbridge Tunnel. It was then a further two years before the land was actually resumed. Given that long time frame, it is a difficult task for the experts to identify the decrease in value attributable wholly or in part to the provisions contained in, or the operation or effect of, the MRS. As Mr Adam says, it is a matter of careful professional informed speculation to arrive at conclusions about what conditions would have been relevant to the development of the subject land on the date when the resumption occurred had there been no MRS reservation for the CNBR.
60 The MRS had its origins in the plan for the Metropolitan Region Perth and Fremantle 1955, which was called the Stephenson plan. This plan provided for an inner ring of roads circling the central area of Perth, which was then defined as being south of the railway line. The northern by-pass element of this system followed the alignment of Roe Street.
61 In 1963, the MRS made two significant departures from this concept. The first was to significantly upgrade the engineering standards of the ring-road to freeway standard. The second change was to shift the northern by-pass further north, from Roe Street to an alignment between Aberdeen and Newcastle Streets. This became the CNBR. The CNBR became the subject of public debate from the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. The options were to sink the freeway in the CNBR in a trench or to bury it in a tunnel. Eventually the tunnel option was favoured, and the Northbridge Tunnel, as it became known, aroused public controversy and public opposition until 1995, when the government announced its decision to start work on the tunnel the following year.
62 The history reveals that there was uncertainty over a period of 30 years about the timing of the resumption of land in the CNBR. The MRPA did, however, inform inquirers that the land would not be required until 1993.
63 This situation had the practical effect of preventing informed long-term capital investment decisions. According to Mr Adam, whose evidence I accept, the blighting effect extended to discouraging relatively minor improvements and even, ultimately, relatively routine maintenance. The effect was seen in the lack of new, permanent buildings and in the deteriorating quality of existing buildings within the CNBR.
64 The question then arises as to what would have happened had there been no MRS reservation for the CNBR. In other words, would the Central Area of the CPS1 have been extended north of Newcastle Street, thereby taking in the CNBR and therefore the subject land, or would the subject land have been included in the Suburban Area? This is important, not only because planning controls relating to plot ratios and car parking and residential densities are more advantageous to developers in the Central Area, but also because cl 48 of CPS1 was frequently employed by the City of Perth in the Central Area to approve applications for development unconditionally, notwithstanding that they did not comply with standards or requirements of CPS1.
65 Mr Adam, Mr Ednie-Brown and Mr Higham were all of the opinion, and I find, that if there had been no CNBR, then the land between Aberdeen Street and Newcastle Streets (and therefore including the subject land) would have been within the Central Area and zoned C1.
66 Mr Adam considered that development around Russell Square would have tended towards high density, residential development, including boutique hotels, serviced apartments, hostels and home unit apartments in buildings four to six storeys in height. He considered that there would have been an odd mixture of compatible commercial developments, notably restaurants or cafes, and the possibility of an office building of similar dimensions.
67 In Mr Adam's opinion, the subject site was in a prime position overlooking Russell Square, at the heart of Northbridge and with good transport connections. It is a large site, comparatively rare in Northbridge. In his opinion, the site would have been in great demand as a site for a significant hotel or apartment building with accompanying facilities, such as café, restaurant, function and perhaps conference facilities. In his opinion, it would likely also to be in demand for mixed commercial or residential development, with commercial uses at ground floor level and apartments above.
68 In his opinion, such a development would have translated into a six or seven storey building with a plot ratio of 3, or very close to it.
69 The usual method of determining the value of land is to determine the market value, applying the test in Spencer v Commonwealth [1907] HCA 82; (1907) 5 CLR 418.
70 Land may also have a special value to the owner over and above the market value: Pastoral Finance Association Ltd v The Minister [1914] UKPC 77; [1914] AC 1083. The dispossessed owner is entitled to the market value of the land under the Spencer principle or its value to the owner, whichever is the greater: St John Ambulance Association of Western Australia Inc v East Perth Redevelopment Authority [2001] WASC 85.
71 A person whose land is resumed and which has a "special value", is to be compensated by asking what the dispossessed owner would pay if he or she were the hypothetical purchaser: Boland v Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 64; (1999) 74 ALJR 209 at [353].
"... The concept of a price that a dispossessed owner would pay over and above the market price (if he or she were the purchaser) rather than lose the land may not be an entirely reliable guide to what the special value to the dispossessed owner is. In theory all that the notional purchaser need pay is a dollar more than the next available purchaser (without a special interest in the matter) would pay. In the highly artificial construct that the law requires in resumption cases, the formulation of the Privy Council in Pastoral Finance may only become workable if the dispossessed owner as notional investor be regarded as having a right to bid or fix a price which included special value. Another way of viewing the formulation of the Privy Council in Pastoral Finance is to regard it as a means of ascertaining the value of the property to the owner. Part of the difficulty arises from a need or desire to ensure that an owner is compensated for the loss of value of the property to the owner, a value which may not always be the same as the value which the unqualified application of Spencer's case, an exchange value or sale in the marketplace, would yield. Sometimes such a need will involve a calculation of what might properly be called special value. The requirement, and I would regard it as a requirement now long accepted by the courts, of the various statutes providing for compensation on resumption, that an owner be paid the value to him or her, may mean that in some cases the direct and exclusive operation of Spencer's case may not be possible."
73 Special value must be something objective and ascertainable, derived from the land or some attributable property of it, and cannot be recognised if it rests in mere subjective affection or emotional involvement: Bronzel v State Planning Authority (1979) 21 SASR 513; Kerry v State Transport Authority (1985) 38 SASR 502 at 505-506.
74 As a general practical proposition, a special value may be found in a positive advantage, or in an exemption from disadvantage, which the retention of the subject land would have directly conferred. Where a positive advantage is taken away by the acquisition, the claim is likely to be represented by the loss of profits or of other recurrent pecuniary gain derivable from the use and occupation of the retained land as part of the whole: Commissioner of Highways v Tynan (1982) 53 LGRA 1 at 7.
75 Special value to the owner is not to be ascertained by reckoning out savings and additional profits to be derived for the land and then capitalising those savings and additional profits: Yates Property Corp Pty Ltd (in liq) v Darling Harbour Authority (1991) 27 NSWLR 156 at 176.
The Determination of Value When Valuer Witnesses Differ
76 It is clear that a trial Judge is not obliged to accept one out of several competing valuations: In the Marriage of Borriello (1989) 97 FLR 211; In the Marriage of Goodwin (1990) 101 FLR 386 at 394. The trial Judge, however, must never allow himself to be cast in the role of the third valuer: Players Pty Ltd v Corporation of the City of Adelaide [2001] SASC 369 at [81]. The court may make such adjustments as are required by the evidence and arrive at a figure between two values offered by valuation witnesses, provided it is not merely an average or a mean (see Goodwin's case (supra) at p 394). Commonwealth v Milledge [1953] HCA 6; (1953) 90 CLR 157 is not to the contrary (see Borriello's case (supra) at 221). The trial Judge is not obliged to accept the evidence of a particular valuer. Rather, the task is for the court to be satisfied by the means of the application of proper principles, that the value of the property on the relevant date has been arrived at. If the value happens to be different to the value subscribed to the relevant property by the valuers called in evidence, this in itself does not affect the validity of the trial Judge's finding, providing that proper principles have been applied: Commonwealth v Milledge (supra) 160-161 Borriello (supra) at 221.
77 It is not always possible to ask of a valuer, his or her exact exposition of reasons for the conclusions arrived at. In all valuations there must be room for inferences and inclinations of opinion which, being more or less conjectural, are difficult to reduce to exact reasoning or to explain to others: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs v Charlesworth, Pilling & Co [1901] AC 373 at 391. However, the valuer should, as far as possible, expose his reasoning in his report or evidence. On the other hand, it is the prime duty of experts in giving opinion evidence, to furnish the trier of fact with criteria enabling evaluation of the validity of the experts' conclusions: Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305; (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 at par [59] per Heydon JA. Opinions expressed by expert valuers must be comprehensible, and they must reach conclusions that are rationally based. The process of inference that leads to the conclusions must be stated or revealed in a way that enables the conclusions to be tested and a judgment made about the reliability of them: Pownall v Conlan Management Pty Ltd (1995) 12 WAR 370 at 390. A court should not act on an opinion, the basis for which is not explained by the witness expressing it. Unless the process of inference by which an opinion is reached is expressed in a manner which permits the conclusions to be scrutinised and a judgment made as to its reliability, the opinion can carry no weight: Pollock v Wellington (1996) 15 WAR 1 at 3 per Anderson J.
78 It is not satisfactory, in my opinion, for a valuer who values land using the comparable sales method, to list a number of comparable sales, each one suggesting a different value for the subject land and each of which requires some adjustment, and then simply to state an opinion about the value of the subject land. Such an opinion will only have any value if the valuer explains which is the most important of the comparable sales, why that is so, and what adjustments have been made to reach a conclusion about the value of the subject land.
79 In this case, some valuers rely upon sales after the date of resumption. The enquiry is, of course, about the value of the property as at the date of resumption. Section 37(5)(a) of the MRTPS Act requires compensation to be assessed having regard to values current at the time of acquisition, but the amount of compensation, being a matter of assessment, can, like damages, be calculated in the light of any subsequent facts to the extent to which they can throw light upon the value of the subject land at the date of acquisition: Minister for Army v Parbury Henty & Co [1945] HCA 52; (1945) 70 CLR 459 at 514; Melwood Units Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads [1979] AC 426 at 436. Adjustments may have to be made to reflect increases or decreases in the market after the resumption date.
80 Putting aside any premium which the plaintiff claims by way of special value to the owner, the parties agree that the value of the subject land is to be ascertained by the comparable sales methods. The difficulty is that two valuers have been called on each side, and out of the many sales identified by each valuer as comparable sales, there is very little agreement between them.
81 In River Bank Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1974) 48 ALJR 483 at 484 Stephen J noted:
" ... even the first step of selecting sales of properties thought to be sufficiently comparable is attended with difficulty. But all this is the stuff of valuation, the reason why it is an art, not a science, and, once recognized, it nevertheless does not detract from the character of this method of valuation as a proper one for use in determining ... 'the value of the land at the date of acquisition' ..."
82 It is clear that valuers and the court may be compelled to make adjustments in prices achieved for comparable property. Factors may include the difference in timing, differences in market conditions, distance from the subject site, the nature of improvements, zoning, and the prospect of any alteration in zoning, to name just a few. The making of adjustments does not preclude the court from relying upon the sales as comparable: Leichhardt Municipal Council v Seatainer Terminals Pty Ltd (1981) 48 LGRA 409 at 434.
83 The differences may be adjusted in some cases, but in other cases the differences may be so great that the land subject to the sale cannot be regarded as comparable. This will be a question of fact and degree. The differences may be so great that a court may be constrained to hold that the land is in no sense comparable and that the adjustments which have been made are so great that the sale can provide no evidence of the value to be determined and no basis upon which the value can be assessed: Leichhardt Municipal Council v Seatainer Terminals Pty Ltd (supra) at 435.
84 Four experienced valuers were called in the case. Mr Stephen Barry McMahon and Mr Terrence Roy Dix were called by the applicant. Mr Geoffrey Robert Elliott and Mr Jeffrey Allen Spencer were called by the respondent. All valuers appealed to me as witnesses endeavouring to give an unbiased opinion as to the value of the subject land. This is not to say that I am not critical of some of the expert evidence. However, the criticism is not to be taken as any indication that the experts were acting other than in an attempt to discharge their professional duties. All four valuers agreed that the comparable sales method was the correct valuation method to adopt in this case.
85 Since 1994, Mr McMahon has been acting as valuer and negotiator for a number of landowners (including the applicant) who have had land resumed by the respondent for the Northbridge Tunnel project. As a result, he has developed detailed knowledge of the area. Mr McMahon considered a large number of sales in the Central Area from 1985 to 1997 and then from those, selected 12 sales which occurred between 1993 and 1997. All 12 are located within the Central Area. He said that he selected these 12 sales as being comparable sales which, subject to adjustment, provided guidance to him to allow him to form an opinion as to the value of the subject land. Mr McMahon valued the subject land at $6.8 million and the improvements at $100,000.
86 The 12 sales selected by Mr McMahon are as follows:
87 Mr McMahon was asked to identify the most important of these comparable sales. He considered that sales 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 were the most important and ranked them in that order. In other words, the Administration Office the most comparable and number 8 the least important of the six.
88 He regarded sales 5, 6, 9, 10, 10A and 11 as "not so important".
89 To show how Mr McMahon proceeded, I refer to his sale number 9, which related to 56 Francis Street. I refer to this one in particular, because it is the only sale which Mr McMahon, Mr Elliott and Mr Spencer agreed was a comparable sale. In the case of this sale and the case of all the other sales, Mr McMahon presented an assessment sheet which provided details about the land and then identified various factors which might require an adjustment between the sale identified as comparable and the subject land. For example, the sale of 56 Francis Street occurred in May 1994, whereas the resumption occurred on 27 October 1995. In the opinion of Mr McMahon, this required an adjustment of 15 per cent to the sale price of 56 Francis Street to make it a comparable sale. Other adjustments were made. For example, the subject land was assumed by all valuers to have been in the CI zone, whereas 56 Francis Street was in the CC zone. The plot ratio in relation to the subject land was 2.0, and in relation to 56 Francis Street the plot ratio was 3.0. That led Mr McMahon to adjust the sale of 56 Francis Street down by 30 per cent, because he considered this factor made 56 Francis Street more desirable than the subject land. The area of 56 Francis Street was 683 square metres, as opposed to 4,554 square metres in the case of the subject land. He therefore adjusted the sale of 56 Francis Street by 10 per cent in favour of the subject land. He did this because he considered that the larger sized property attracted a premium.
90 After making the various percentage adjustments, he then netted them off and arrived at a net adjustment of 25 per cent. That is, he considered that he would have to increase the rate per square metre derived from the sale of 56 Francis Street by 25 per cent if it was to provide evidence of value in relation to the subject land in October 1995. This resulted in an adjustment from the price per square metre of $1,061.50 to $1,327.00. When that sum was multiplied by the square metreage of the subject land, it suggested the value for the subject land of $6,043,158.00.
91 Mr McMahon was criticised by Mr Elliott and Mr Spencer for making the percentage adjustments which appeared on his adjustment sheet. They said they had never seen a valuer making adjustments in that way.
92 I have already quoted authorities which make it clear that both valuers and the court are often compelled to make adjustments in the prices achieved for comparable properties. For my part, I do not see why the adjustments which are made should not be disclosed in percentage terms. It is true that adjustments are often made by a valuer in dollar terms and without stating what the adjustment is in percentage terms. Mr Spencer and Mr Elliott used that method. Mr McMahon says that setting forth his percentage adjustment in each case exposes his reasoning, and, in my view, it is no criticism that he has used the method which I set out above, providing he applies his mind to the appropriate adjustment in each case and does not mechanically apply the percentage adjustment to each comparable sale, and providing the percentage adjustment is properly explained and supported by some evidence.
93 Mr McMahon was criticised for the fact that in another case before this Court, he gave evidence about adjustments inconsistent with his evidence in this case. In that case, he had been retained by, and gave evidence for, the owner whose land had been resumed on the same date as the subject land in this case. The land (called the "Duffy land") was in Newcastle Street to the east of Lake Street, whereas the subject land in this case is in Aberdeen Street to the west of Lake Street. That means, of course, that the Duffy land was in an area where it was assumed that the plot ratio is 3, whereas the subject land is in an area where it is assumed that the plot ratio is 2. In the Duffy case, Mr McMahon gave evidence and used the same comparable sales as he uses in this case (save for one). In the Duffy case, he gave evidence that where there was sales evidence in the Central Area to the west of Lake Street, he considered that he should adjust those prices upward by 50 per cent because he was of the opinion that land to the east of Lake Street was 50 per cent more valuable than land to the west of Lake Street. He made this adjustment on the basis that the change in "locality" warranted the adjustment. He also adjusted such sales evidence by adjusting the prices by 33 per cent because of the fact that a comparable sale to the west of Lake Street was of land with a plot ratio of 2, compared with the plot ratio of 3 in the subject land to the east. All else being equal, he would take a sale to the west of Lake Street and adjust the price upward by 83 per cent (ie 50 per cent plus 33 per cent) and then use that adjusted price as information to arrive at the value of the Duffy land.
94 In this case, however, the subject land is to the west of Lake Street, and where he used sales evidence from the east of Lake Street, Mr McMahon made no adjustment for the difference in "locality" and made a 30 per cent (or in one case a 35 per cent) adjustment downwards to the comparable sale to the east of Lake Street. If he had been consistent in his treatment of these sales in both cases, then in this case he would have adjusted the comparable sale to the east of Lake Street by downward by 45.3 per cent. This can be illustrated in the following way by reference to two hypothetical sales.
95 If in the Duffy case, he identified a sale of land at, say, $1,000 per square metre to the west of Lake Street, he would adjust that sale by increasing it by 83 per cent (ie 50 per cent plus 33 per cent) to $1,830 per square metre. If in this case, he found a sale of land at $1,830 per square metre to the east of Lake Street and wished to use it as comparable in relation to the subject land (to the west of Lake Street), he should, if he were to act consistently, have reduced that price by 45.3 per cent to bring it back to $1,000 per square metre.
96 That would take account of his evidence that land to the east of Lake Street was 50 per cent more valuable by reason of its location, and 33 per cent more valuable because of the plot ratio difference. Instead, in this case, he has made only an adjustment of minus 30 per cent (or 35 per cent in one case) when adjusting comparable sales east of Lake Street.
97 Mr McMahon attempted to explain this away by saying that he was making an assessment in relation to different resumed land, and that was the reason why there was a difference in his adjustment in the Duffy case from the present case. I was not convinced by that explanation. In his adjustment sheets, the adjustments for "location" and "plot ratio" apply generally. It is the other adjustments which result in a recognition of the particular features of an individual piece of land; for example, adjustments for the size of the land, for what he called "exposure", and for the shape of the land.
98 It was submitted by the respondent that this was an attempt to produce a high result in the Duffy case and a high result in this case, by deliberately manipulating the figures. I do not consider that Mr McMahon did make such a deliberate attempt. In my view, Mr McMahon failed to notice the inconsistency in approach when he prepared his report for this case. The inconsistency, however, does point up the unreliability of the adjustments which have been made by him in relation to locality and plot ratio.
99 Mr McMahon was also cross-examined by counsel for the respondent with the stated intention of showing that because he worked as a negotiator for the applicant, and because he spent so long in that work and in preparing to give evidence, that his evidence should be disregarded, or alternatively treated as having little weight, because he was biased in favour of the applicant. It is true that he did work as a negotiator and that he spent 227 hours on the tasks. It is also true that if an expert witness becomes too closely associated with the party which calls the expert, it may lead to an allegation of bias: Phosphate Co-operative Co of Australia Ltd v Shears (No 3) [1989] VicRp 60; [1989] VR 665, where Brooking J, at 681, pointed to the danger of a client engaging experts who act in a partisan capacity and who become involved as a member of a "team which is being paid very large sums of money to achieve a certain result".
100 However, in most, if not all, resumption cases, negotiations are based on valuation issues. The resuming authority will not settle out of court unless the settlement can be justified by valuers. Thus, there is not much point sending a negotiator to deal with the resuming authority unless the negotiator has valuation expertise. It would seem unreasonable to require a person whose land was resumed, to retain a valuer to value the land and to give evidence at the trial if negotiations did not result in a settlement, and then to employ another valuer to become acquainted with the first valuer's work and then to act as negotiator. That would seem to result in an unnecessary increase in costs. The applicant tendered a copy of the Australian Property Institute's exposure draft of Practice Standard 21, which, if adopted, will recognise that it is acceptable for a valuer to act as the owner's advocate and as a valuer, providing the valuation is prepared in accordance with proper valuation principles. All this is not to say, however, that in a particular case it might be shown that an expert has become biased in favour of the client and the bias has affected his or her objectivity. In my opinion, there was no material which led me to the conclusion that Mr McMahon was biased. In my opinion, he attempted at all times to maintain his professionalism.
101 I now turn to the comparable sales that Mr McMahon put forward.
102 In my view, the Administration Office is not sufficiently close to Russell Square to make it valuable as a comparable sale. The same applies to the Backpackers Lodge.
103 Mr McMahon's sale number 3 is a sale of Lot Y104 James Street. The sale occurred on 25 November 1994. I consider that this is the most important of the comparable sales identified by the valuers. I discuss the evidence concerning this sale in much greater detail later in these reasons for decision. Sale number 4 (the Food Hall land) was a sale on 17 March 1997, which Mr Dix also used as a sale and which afforded evidence which could be used to verify the value of the subject land back in 1995. I say more about this sale later in my reasons. It is important because of the location of the land opposite Russell Square. In my opinion, the sale of the Fermanis House (which is Mr McMahon's sale number 7) is not comparable, because the land is not so well placed as the subject land. The existence of this sale, however, is relevant when it comes to the consideration of the evidence of Mr Elliott and Mr Spencer. I deal with that later. Mr McMahon's sale number 8 is a sale no other valuer was prepared to rely upon. Mr Dix considered the subject land to be better situated. I accept the evidence of all the other valuers that this was not a comparable sale.
104 Mr McMahon also referred to the sale of the Australian Taxation Office land at the corner of William and Francis Streets (sale numbers 10 and 10A). This was a complicated transaction involving the acquisition of land and then the construction of a purpose-built office building for the Australian Taxation Office. In my view, the complications associated with the special dealings between the vendor and the Australian Taxation Office make it unreliable as a comparable sale. None of the other valuers was prepared to use that transaction as a comparable sale.
105 In my opinion, the sale of the Aberdeen Hotel (sale number 11) should be disregarded. The adjusted price of that sale arrived at by Mr McMahon would suggest a value for the subject land of over $14,000,000. This is more than double the value placed on the subject land by any of the valuers, including Mr McMahon himself. In his own report he says: "I have to a large degree discounted it when weighed against the body of contemporary sales evidence". Furthermore, he ranked it number 11 out of the eleven comparable sales. He said that it was one of the five sales that was "not so important". Mr Dix would not use it as a comparable sale because of the difficulty of separating out the value of improvements. Neither Mr Elliott nor Mr Spencer used it as a comparable sale. All of those factors lead me to the conclusion that the sale of the Aberdeen Hotel is not a comparable sale.
106 Mr McMahon was also criticised by the respondent for the adjustments he made to comparable sales which were too far removed in time to rely upon the sales without adjustment.
107 In Mr McMahon's report, he said under the heading "Rising and Falling Market":
"...
There appears to have been a substantial increase on (sic) the value of land in western Northbridge between 1990 and 1995 which I attribute to the change in attitude of the City of Perth to inner city living and its desire to exercise its discretionary powers to promote development.
The assessment shown in attachment number 17 annexed hereto, shows an annual % increase of 11% to 59% in the relevant period of 1990-1995 for properties purchased and re-sold during that period. A similar increase in value appears to continue into and past 1997. Although the assessment is a simple mathematical calculation it is intended to be merely indicative of the increases which were occurring.
I have discounted the rate of increase back to 10% per annum as a conservative measure to allow for unknown factors such as capital improvements between sales and to reflect the imprecise nature of the exercise."
108 The evidence derived from sales in relation to the eleven properties that he selected do indeed show substantial increases in value. The anecdotal evidence has then been converted by Mr McMahon into a formula which requires adjustment of 10 per cent per year for sales before the date of resumption of the subject land.
109 Finally, I comment on Mr McMahon's adjustment which he made in each case in relation to the land area. In each case where a comparable sale was smaller than the subject land, he would adjust the comparable sale price upwards, on the basis that he considered larger areas of land to be more valuable than smaller areas of land and on the basis that a willing purchaser would pay a premium and a willing vendor would demand a premium for a large area of land, as the subject land was. In the case of his sale number 1, Mr McMahon adjusted the sale price of this land, which was an area of 1,206 square metres, upward by 10 per cent because the subject land was nearly four times larger. In the case of sale number 2, which related to a piece of land 790 square metres in size, he once again adjusted that price upward by 10 per cent. In the case of sale number 7, which was a piece of land 438 square metres in size, he again adjusted by 10 per cent. I am aware that valuation is not a scientific process, but this does strike me as an adjustment with no logic or reasoning to support it. More importantly, there was no evidence to support the adjustments Mr McMahon made for size. Mr Dix did not make any adjustment to sales of smaller lots to add a premium for the larger size of the subject land; nor did Mr Elliott or Mr Spencer do so. Mr Elliott and Mr Spencer made an adjustment the other way, but I will deal with that issue later. In my opinion, no upward adjustment should be made to the sale of a piece of land smaller than the subject land merely because of the smaller size of the piece of land.
110 Mr Dix was retained by the applicant in 1999 to prepare a valuation for the applicant. He valued the subject land at $6,829,500 and the improvements at $280,000. He had never been retained to act as a negotiator by the applicants. Mr Dix expressed the opinion that, based on his experience of the Northbridge area, decisions are made about the purchase of land in the Northbridge area on the basis of economic considerations. He said that, in his opinion, the development controls which applied in Northbridge were unique in Western Australia. He observed that the PCC was attempting to encourage residential and commercial development in the one area. He was of the opinion that Russell Square, which is important recreation land in the Northbridge area, would see residential development carried out all around it. He said that the reason why there had not been extensive development before 1995 was because of the blighting effect of the CNBR. He considered that the blighting effect extended to the whole of Northbridge, but he did not - and nor did any other witness - attempt to generally adjust comparable sales upward to take account of the effect of the blight.
111 He employed the comparable sales method. Mr Dix pointed out that there were no comparable sales on the relevant date. He expressed the opinion that it was therefore necessary to identify land with similar attributes and to try and find sales of that land as close as possible in time to the relevant date, namely 27 October 1995. There was no dispute among the valuers that that was the objective.
112 Mr Dix said that the refurbishment of Russell Square by the PCC, which commenced in 1994 and was completed in 1995, had largely cleared up the problem of vagrancy in Russell Square. He noted that the problem had been widespread in Northbridge before then and it continued to be a problem in Northbridge, but in Russell Square the problem had largely been solved by 1995. I accept Mr Dix's evidence on that point.
113 Mr Dix was also firmly of the view that larger areas of land should not be discounted in value compared with smaller areas of land. He said that because the purchase price of land in Northbridge is driven by economic considerations, that there is no discount for magnitude. He disagreed with the evidence of Mr Elliott and Mr Spencer on that point. He pointed out that the purchasers of small areas of land would be different from the purchasers of large areas of land. He said that the purchasers of large areas of land would be the substantial developers and that they were desperate for stock. Mr Dix was of the opinion that while they would buy at the best possible price, they were in competition with other developers seeking to secure large areas of land to carry out developments.
114 Mr Dix expressed the view that the idea of a discount in price for larger areas of land is a phenomenon which is observed sometimes in relation to residential land and in relation to special rural zones. I note that these are two areas where the decision about purchasing land is not always driven by the estimated return from a development on the land.
115 There was sales evidence within Northbridge over a period of about five years surrounding 1995. The difficulty which has been encountered in this case is the selection from the list of sales of those which can be said to be comparable.
116 Mr Dix regarded the subject land as ripe for development. He noted that it is a site which has a regular shape, a long frontage to two streets, a frontage to Russell Square, and a corner location, all of which he considered to be attributes. It is also a very large area of land in Northbridge. The development controls which applied in the area mean that no account had to be taken of setbacks which would apply in the Suburban Area, and that development of mixed residential and commercial had begun to take place on other land before the resumption took place.
117 Mr Dix regarded the improvements on the subject land as obsolete. As a result, he looked for sales of vacant land or sales of land with improvements of no value near to Russell Square. He expressed the opinion that it was not appropriate to select as comparable sales evidence, sales of land which have improvements of economic value standing upon the land. He said that the attempt to ascertain the value of the improvements and to deduct that value from the sale price to arrive at the value of the land, was fraught with difficulty. He gave the example of the Aberdeen Hotel, which was said to have been trading profitably. He said that the value placed on the buildings for such an enterprise might be substantial. If the hotel was run less successfully, then the purchaser may put less value on the buildings. He considered that there were too many difficulties in making the assessment of the buildings in order to arrive at the land value. He said that one method used, which is the replacement value, could not be justified in many cases.
118 Having made the above comments, Mr Dix then set about trying to locate sales as close as possible to the relevant date, involving vacant land or land with obsolete buildings with no economic value standing upon it and facing, or in very close proximity to, Russell Square.
119 The sale which, in Mr Dix's opinion, most clearly satisfied those conditions was a sale in September 1994 - the portion of Perth Town Lot Y104, James Street. The transfer of the land occurred on 25 November 1994, and thus this was sales evidence about one year before the relevant date. The sale date was one of the closest to the relevant date of all the sales offered by valuers. The land could also be developed by building on it a mixed commercial and residential building. It was also land which could be regarded as vacant land, because the buildings had no economic value. It was located almost on Russell Square. The sale price was $1,460,000 for 1,113 square metres of land. That means that the land sold for $1,312 per square metre. All of those aspects commend this sale as strong evidence of the value of the subject land.
120 This piece of land also had the advantage of providing evidence about what had happened to values in the area over a period of time. The land had previously been sold in June 1992 for $860,000, which therefore revealed an increase of 70 per cent in value between 1992 and 1994.
121 Mr Dix then considered the question of whether he should adopt the figure of $1,312 per square metre as at the relevant date, or whether that figure should be increased or decreased for some reason.
122 He referred to a sale of a nearby lot, namely Perth Town Lot Y130 and Y131 (Lot 40), in Parker Street, which had sold in July 1991 and resold in March 1997. There had been a 70 per cent increase in that time.
123 From this information, he considered that he should increase the rate per square metre arising from sale in 1994 if he were to apply it to the subject land in October 1995. He increased it to $1,500 per square metre and applied that to the value of the Arcus land. The increase from $1,312 to $1,500 is a 14.3 per cent increase. I asked Mr Dix if he would still use this sale as a comparable even if the evidence revealed no increase in value between 1994 and the resumption date, and he said he would. As will be seen later in these reasons, I consider that his adjustment of 14.3 per cent for time to be over-generous. I consider the adjustment should be 10 per cent for time, so producing a value as at October 1997 of $1,443. For this part of the reasons I will, however, continue to refer to Mr Dix's figure of $1,500 per square metre.
124 It was contended by the respondent that the sale price in September 1994 of $1,460,000 was influenced by the fact that the purchaser (UTS Investments Pty Ltd), which was a company associated with Mr Graham Hardie (an experienced developer), was too high because the Hardie group of companies owned all of the other land in the same city block and that this sale was a sale to an over-anxious purchaser and should not be used as a comparable sale. Mr Dix rejected the suggestion. He said that he was not aware of any evidence of the Hardie group being an over-anxious purchaser.
125 Mr Elliott expressed a view that this sale should not be taken into account as a comparable sale because it was a sale by an adjoining owner. However, his conclusion that it was "an unreliable piece of evidence from which to deduce a land value for the Arcus site" was supported, not by evidence, but by speculation. Mr Elliott said in his report of 9 March 2001 that:
"... [We] note that no reference was made to the fact that the 1994 sale reflected a purchase by the adjoining owner. We have analysed the evidence disclosed from a search of the transfer document for this property and then a company search of UTS Investments Pty Ltd, to ascertain the identities of its directors.
Similar searches of the adjoining land, and particularly those properties along Roe Street which adjoin the southern boundary of this property, reveal that Mr Graham Hardie is a Director of all of the companies which own land adjoining this site. We consider from this that the adjoining owner may have been prepared to pay a premium for this property, rather than fail to obtain it, in order to provide a James Street frontage and access to the Roe Street properties, pending their future development. As such, we consider this to be an unreliable piece of evidence from which to deduce a land value for the Arcus site."
126 It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that minutes of the PCC dated 14 February 1995 relating to one of the properties of UTS Investments Pty Ltd, led to the inference that it must have been an over-anxious purchaser. This related to a proposed development of 13 shops with a basement carpark and vehicle access from Roe Street over adjacent sites. It was said that this showed the advantage which UTS Investments Pty Ltd gained in having ownership of all the sites in this city block, and that from this it could be inferred that Mr Hardie's company was an over-anxious purchaser. On the other hand, the applicant pointed to the fact that when UTS Investments Pty Ltd purchased Lot Y104 James Street, it was purchased first by Andrew Koh Nominees Pty Ltd and then immediately an interest transferred to UTS Investments Pty Ltd. It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that it could be inferred from this that Mr Hardie's company had ensured that the vendor was not aware that Mr Hardie's company was the purchaser, and that this meant that the vendor would not have been able to extract the premium which he might have sought if he had known he was dealing with the adjoining owner.
127 All of these suggested inferences appear to me to be no more than speculation. It is right to be suspicious of a comparable sale which involves an adjoining owner purchasing land. However, the mere fact that an adjoining owner purchases land does not mean that the sale involves an over-anxious purchaser. In some cases where an adjoining owner controls all of the surrounding land, the owner of a small piece of land may feel that the range of potential purchasers is limited. In that case, the sale would be one involving an over-anxious vendor. The point is that if the sale was to be attacked as unreliable, then it was necessary for some evidence to be led from which it could be established that the sale was unreliable. Mr Elliott's speculation does not amount to proof. As it will be noted later, Mr Elliott, who criticised Mr Dix for using this sale as a comparable sale, had himself included it in his basket of comparable sales when he first prepared a valuation in relation to the land. In addition, another of Mr Elliott's sales is a sale by a neighbouring owner, and the mere fact of a purchase by a neighbouring owner did not lead him to exclude the sale. In short, in the absence of any evidence that this sale was a sale between either an over-anxious purchaser or an over-anxious vendor, I agree with Mr Dix's conclusion that it should be used as a comparable sale. I agree that it is the most important comparable sale to be used in determining the value of the subject land.
128 Having arrived at a value of $1,500 per square metre, Mr Dix then decided to check this against the information which he had concerning the neighbouring land immediately to the west of Lot Y104 James Street. This property to the west now has erected on it a commercial and residential development called "James at Northbridge". Construction of this building had already commenced in October 1995, and so Mr Dix rightly considered that the information available to a willing purchaser and a willing vendor of the subject land in October 1995 would have included the information about the "James at Northbridge" development. By then, Strata Plan No 31304 in relation to "James at Northbridge" had been approved by the Western Australian Planning Commission. There had already been a number of pre-sales of units in the development. Mr Dix obtained information about sales prices for units from the Valuer-General. Some of the sales were after October 1995, but for the purpose of the analysis which was being carried out to check his value of $1,500 per metre, he was prepared to use it. The building licence had been issued on 9 August 1995. This revealed that the estimated cost of construction was $5,000,000. This information came from the building licence issued by the PCC.
129 With this information, Mr Dix then carried out an analysis, which appears in Addendum 1 to his report. The purpose of the analysis was to see whether the value of $1,500 per square metre could be justified by seeing whether a hypothetical development on Lot Y104 would return a developer a satisfactory profit if the developer paid $1,500 per square metre for the land. The analysis involved using the known information from the "James at Northbridge" development. Addendum 1 was found to contain some errors because the Valuer-General's information was incorrect, and Mr Dix amended his analysis to employ the correct information which had been revealed to him during cross-examination. The content of the amended analysis is set out below:
AMENDED ANALYSIS
(20 May 2002)
GROSS REALISATION ADOPTED
2 commercial/retail sites = $1,600,000
40 residential units @ average $225,000 = $9,000,000 $10,600,000
MARKETING COSTS:
Sales commissions say 2.5% $265,000
Advertising say 1.5% $159,000
Conveyancing/legal say $500/unit $ 21,000 $ 445,000
$10,155,000
PROFIT & RISK FACTOR Say 22.44% $ 1,861,399
$ 8,293,601
SUBDIVISIONAL COSTS
Development Costs $5,000,000
Interest on Development costs $ 225,000 $ 5,225,000
$ 3,068,601
HOLDING COSTS
Interest on land
Construction period + ½ selling period
12 months @ 9% $ 253,371
$ 2,815,230
Acquisition costs allow 4.50% $ 121,230
$ 2,694,000
$2,694,000/1,796m2 = $ 1,500/m2
$2,694,000/42 units = $64,143/unit
Unit price distorted by commercial uses, adopt $60,000 - $70,000/residential unit.
Perth Town Lot Y104 adjacent, sold September 1994 - $1,460,000
Development potential without bonus 25 units (Plot ratio 2.0)
1113m2 x 2.0 = 2,226m2/89m2 = 25 units x $60,000 = $1,500,000
= 25 units x $70,000 = $1,750,000
130 As mentioned above, the gross realisation figures come from the "James at Northbridge" sales. Having inserted those, and having deducted marketing costs, Mr Dix arrived at $10,155,000 as the revenue. Mr Dix then went to the bottom of the sheet and inserted the land value, assuming a purchase price of $1,500 per square metre. He then worked up from that figure by adding the acquisition costs, adding holding costs in the form of interest for the construction period and half the selling period, and adding the subdivisional costs which he gained from the building licence relating to the "James at Northbridge" project. The total of the subdivisional costs and holding costs and assumed land cost, came to $8,293,601. The final step in the analysis was then to take the difference between the figure of $8,293,601 and the realisation figure of $10,155,000. That difference of $1,861,399 reveals a profit and risk factor of 22.44 per cent, which, in Mr Dix's opinion, was a more than satisfactory profit and risk factor for a developer to work upon, and which satisfied Mr Dix in his conclusion that his time-adjusted value of $1,500 per square metre was reasonable and was an amount which a fully informed and willing purchaser would have paid to acquire Lot Y104 James Street. It can be assumed that a fully informed and willing vendor would also be aware of that information.
131 Mr Dix said that this exercise supported his adjustment to increasing the $1,312 per square metre sale price for Lot Y104 James Street to $1,500. This was so because he said that a purchaser would have reached the conclusion that a development of units and commercial units would have been feasible, paying $1,500 per square metre for Lot Y104 James Street in October 1995.
132 This analysis carried out by Mr Dix was attacked on the basis that the estimated development costs of $5,000,000 were too low. The respondent called Mr Kelly, an experienced quantity surveyor, who expressed the opinion that the development costs would amount to $6,760,000. His estimates were based not on architectural plans but on the diagrams on the strata title. He said that he was not familiar with dealing with strata title drawings as such. He said that when it came to the circulation areas, which he had to know in order to apply building rates to them, he took the areas of the units as shown on the strata plans and made an assumption as to what would be required.
133 As a result of the limited information he had, he said that his estimate could be out by 10 per cent either way, "perhaps a little more". This was a reference to the amount by which his estimate might vary from the lowest tender that a builder might submit.
134 The contest therefore was between Mr Kelly's estimate of costs, based on only the strata plans, or the builder's figure of $5,000,000 which was given on the building licence. The uncertainties associated with Mr Kelly's estimate, based on such little material, does not convince me that it was wrong of Mr Dix to accept the builder's figure derived from the building licence. I find that Mr Kelly's estimate of $6,760,000 for development costs is too unreliable to require that figure to be used as the likely cost of development. The conclusion I reach later about the value of the land being less than the $1,500 per square metre used by Mr Dix in his analysis, means that when the analysis is carried out using $1,443 as the land value, then a profit/risk factor of greater than 22.4 per cent results.
135 Further, even if the analysis set out above is amended by (a) employing a figure Mr Kelly was prepared to accept, namely $5,881,200 (that is, by taking Mr Kelly's figure of $6,760,000 and adjusting it down by say 13 per cent for inaccuracy, ie 10 per cent plus the "little more" Mr Kelly would allow), and (b) employing a land acquisition cost of $1,443, then the profit and risk factor will still be about 15 per cent. I accept Mr Dix's evidence and find that a reasonable profit and risk factor (which it is often taken by valuers as falling between 20-25 per cent) can occasionally range down to as low as 15 per cent. I therefore hold that Mr Dix's analysis method does corroborate the adjusted value of $1,443 for Lot Y104 as at October 1997.
136 The second sale that Mr Dix considered to be important was the sale of portion of Perth Town Lot Y130 and Y131 Parker Street, Northbridge, which was also a property with improvements consisting of an abandoned food hall. Mr Dix considered the improvements to be of no economic value. This property, like the subject property, overlooks Russell Square. This sale occurred in March 1997. The transfer in relation to that sale reveals a sale price of $3,980,000, or $2,430 per square metre. The property had also been sold in July 1991 at a price of $995,000, or $601 per square metre. This revealed a 70 per cent increase in price between 1991 and 1997. Although this property is closer to the centre of Northbridge than the subject land, it has similar exposure to Russell Square, and this sale of the food hall lacks the size and corner location of the subject land.
137 Mr Dix considered that the price of $2,430 per square metre in 1997 should be adjusted back to $1,500 in October 1995. Once again, he assumed an increase of 14.3 per cent in value in 1994 to 1995. As I have said, the adjustment for time should be 10 per cent per annum over that period. That would suggest a higher rate than $1,500 per square metre for the subject land. However, this sale was after the resumption date, and its value as evidence is merely to confirm that the value of $1,500 per square metre for the subject land based on Mr Dix's sale number 1, is not too high. It does provide such confirmation, although other information leads me to the conclusion that $1,500 per square metre is too high.
138 The sale which Mr Dix referred to here was a sale in August 1993. He said that this older sale was of limited assistance because of the age of the sale, but he relied upon it to provide support for the extrapolation of values during the 1990s. This was because there had been an earlier sale in September 1991.
139 The 1993 sale has a price which converts to $941 per square metre. Mr Dix considered that if he made an adjustment to take account of the increase in values during the 1990s, he would arrive at $1,500 per square metre. He then decided to check to see whether this figure could be supported by carrying out the same exercise which he carried out in relation to the first of his comparable sales, namely Lot Y104 James Street. In this case, he noted that this land had actually been developed. An approval had been granted for a mixed commercial and residential development on this land in 1994, but construction had not started as at October 1995. Nevertheless, to check to see whether the subsequent sales of units would have justified a price of $1,500 per square metre for the site in October 1995, he went through the same exercise as he had gone through in relation to sale number 1 above, ie in relation to Lot Y104 James Street. Mr Dix's analysis was carried out for the same purpose as the analysis in relation to Lot Y104 James Street, and using the same method. The analysis is set out below:
AMENDED ANALYSIS
(20 May 2002)
GROSS REALISATION ADOPTED
2 commercial/retail sites = $ 770,000
16 residential units @ average $297,500 = $4,760,000 $5,530,000
MARKETING COSTS:
Sales commissions say 2.5% $138,250
Advertising say 1.5% $ 82,950
Conveyancing/legal say $500/unit $ 9,000 $ 230,200
$5,299,800
**PROFIT & RISK FACTOR (**Calculated) Say 37.74%
on GR-MGT $ 2,000,129
Or 60.62% on cost $ 3,299,671
SUBDIVISIONAL COSTS
Development Costs (2,732m2) $2,000,000
Interest on Development costs $ 90,000 $2,090,000
$1,209,671
HOLDING COSTS
Interest on land
Construction period + ½ selling period
12 months @ 9% $ 99,881
$1,109,790
Acquisition costs allow 4.50% $ 47,790
$1,062,000
$1,062,000/531m2 = $ 2,000/m2
$1,062,000/18 units = $59,000/unit
Perth Town Lot Y104 opposite, sold September 1994 - $1,460,000
Lot 5 is a better location, being on a corner with a wide frontage to Parker Street overlooking Russell Square and in our opinion would command a higher price. This is supported by the comparable rate/unit approach. The disclosed profit & risk factor indicates a significant buffer against cost increases and lower selling prices.
140 Mr Kelly again expressed an opinion that development costs in this exercise were underestimated. He was of the opinion that they would be $2,813,000 (again plus or minus 10 per cent or "perhaps a little more"). Even if Mr Kelly's development costs figure is employed in the above analysis, there is still an acceptable profit and risk factor, and Mr Dix's analysis does therefore stand up to scrutiny. Mr Dix took the sale of the "On the Park" property into account but considered it to be of "limited assistance". I agree. The sale in 1993 makes it less safe to use as a comparable than the sale of Lot Y104 James Street.
141 I mention this site only because each of the three other valuers referred to the sale of this site, which occurred in May 1994 at a price of $1,061 per square metre. Mr Dix considered it not to be a comparable sale. He was of the opinion that the price would have been severely affected by the existence of a sewer main on the site. The site frontage was only 15.13 metres, and Mr Dix said, and I find, that the sewer line, allowing for its depth and angle of repose required for workman to gain access to it, would mean that approval to build over a strip 7.6 metres wide running down the length of the site would not be granted without a condition requiring protection of the sewer line. In Mr Dix's opinion, and I find that, this was a severe disadvantage in the site which must have been reflected in the price. He also considered that it was not a comparable sale because the subject land had a double road frontage and was a corner site. I accept Mr Dix's opinion that the sale of 56 Francis Street was not a comparable sale.
142 In Mr Dix's opinion, no sale of land outside of Northbridge, and in particular no land in the Suburban Area, afforded any comparable sales evidence. He was of the opinion that the development controls, namely the setback requirements, restricted the ability of a purchaser to carry out development of land in the Suburban Area, and as a result sales in the Suburban Area were of no value at all in determining the value of the subject land, which should be assumed to be located within the Central Area in the C1 zone.
143 Mr Dix set out the sales evidence supporting his opinion that there had been a growth in value in the years leading up to 1995 and beyond. The evidence did indeed show some substantial increases in value for some land from the early 90s to 1995. For example, in relation to the sales of Lot Y104 James Street, the sale and resale of that land which occurred in 1992 and 1994 reveals the 70 per cent increase in the price paid in 1994 over the price paid in 1992. Sale 2, which was sales in 1991 and 1997, showed a 70 per cent increase, and his sale 3, which was sales and resale of the same property in 1991 and 1994, showed a 33 per cent increase. There was other evidence of such increases in other sales to which he referred. As I have noted, Mr Dix reached the conclusion in relation to the sale that he considered most comparable, namely Lot Y104 James Street, that he should adjust the 1994 sale from $1,312 per square metre up to $1,500 per square metre, which was an increase in percentage terms of 14.3 per cent. He was of the opinion that that was a reasonable increase. I have already indicated that I consider his estimate as to the increase in value in 1994/1995 to be over-generous.
144 Mr Spencer was retained on behalf of the respondent in 1995 to prepare a report to show the valuation of the subject land as at 23 May 1995. He inspected the property on 23 May 1995 for that purpose. He arrived at a value at that time of $3,670,000. He was then asked to value the land as at 27 October 1995, which he did and made no adjustment to the value that he had earlier fixed upon for the subject land. He was then finally asked to prepare a consolidated report close to the time of trial. His consolidated report, he said, was prepared in haste, and as a result this revealed a number of errors which are partly explained by the shortness of time available to him but in which, in certain cases, led me to have some concern about Mr Spencer's attention to detail.
145 For example, Mr Spencer valued the land on the basis that it was 4,566 square metres in size. This figure was not correct, and although there has been a slight difference between the other valuers as to the area, the error by Mr Spencer in relation to this fundamental information was not explained by Mr Spencer, other than saying it may have been an error of conversion from imperial to metric. This error alone would not have been significant, save that he made a number of concessions during cross-examination about other errors, each of which alone was not significant but which taken together revealed a carelessness in approach. For example, he included in his list of comparable sales, two properties which he conceded were, in fact, references to one property, namely Lot 91 Aberdeen Street. The inclusion of a sale twice in the list is not a serious error, but the analysis showed two different values for the same site. Furthermore, in relation to the first reference to the sale in Appendix 3 to Mr Spencer's consolidated report, he said that the improvements added little value to the sale, so that he made no adjustment for improvements to arrive at a land value. He therefore arrived at the value of the land by taking the sale price and dividing it by the land area and arriving at $1,221 per square metre. When he considered it again, he considered that the improvements did add value and deducted $221 per square metre to arrive at a land value of $1,000 per square metre. I infer, and Mr Spencer conceded, that he considered the same sale information on two occasions and reached two different conclusions. This error, along with other minor errors which he conceded in cross-examination that he made in a number of his reports, means that less reliance should be placed on Mr Spencer's opinion as to value when compared with Mr Dix's opinion.
146 In Mr Spencer's report, he considered that if it had not been for the CNBR, the land would have been zoned CI in the Central Area. He considered that it was a good site for hotel and mixed commercial and residential purposes.
147 He concluded at p 14 (hard copy p 12) of his consolidated report that:
"The sales evidence examined by us indicates a range in values starting at $530 per square metre for the vacant lots which sold in Weld Street (just off Newcastle Street) and increasing to approximately $1,300 per square metre for the smaller properties in Aberdeen, Francis, James and William Streets. The subject property would not, due to its lesser location and a necessary discount for site size magnitude, achieve the same level as indicated in the prime central core areas of Northbridge but would generally be greater than the rate achieved for properties recently sold in Weld Street, Stirling Street and Beaufort Street."
148 When he prepared his report of May 1995, Mr Spencer said that he had concluded that Northbridge was ripe for a four star hotel development, and a well constructed and presented new development having an experienced national/international operator would possibly be as successful as the Esplanade Plaza Hotel in Fremantle, which also enjoys a Northbridge type position. He concluded in his May 1995 report that a potential purchaser would be prepared to pay a sum of $770 per square metre for the subject land. He subsequently saw Mr Alan Boyes' report, indicating that a hotel in the area would not succeed. He said that he held Mr Boyes in high regard, but he then concluded in his consolidated report:
"We decided somewhat intuitively based on considerable market experience an involvement with the valuation and sale of major hotels, that there still remained a good possibility that a hotel oriented purchaser, possibly of overseas origin, would be prepared to secure the property within a range of $3,600,000 to $4,000,000. Such opinion of site value for hotel purposes was reinforced by the necessary consideration that the City Northern Bypass reservation over the land and nearby properties had never existed, and this part of Northbridge would have had a more dynamic commercial/entertainment/residential streetscape presentation."
"Under this final review of our valuation report, we have retained the opinion that the unencumbered site value was $770 per square metre and within a price range of $3,600,000 to $4,000,000."
"After regard to all factors as noted in this report we hereby assess the current market value of the subject properties ... in the total sum of $3,670,000 ..."
151 Due to the error in the calculation of the square metreage of the subject land, Mr Spencer would, he said in oral evidence, reduce the value of the subject land for the excess land that he had wrongly included. However, he did not in the end alter his valuation because the adjustment was cancelled out by another error he had made in measuring and recording the improvements on the subject land. That is, in his May valuation he had under-measured the improvements on the land. Mr Spencer allowed short-term rental to be included in his assessment of the compensation to be paid for the subject land, and his measuring error meant an increase in the rental amount to be paid, which offset the reduction which he would make because of the reduction which followed the error in relation to the area of the site. As a result, he said that he would make no adjustment to the valuation that he arrived at.
152 Mr Spencer did not identify any particular sale as being the most important comparable sale to assist him to arrive at his value of the subject land. Rather, he put up a basket of sales ranging from 1990 to 1998, and taken from Northbridge and from the Suburban Area, to arrive at his value of $770 per square metre. I bear in mind the authorities which say that it is not always possible for a valuer to explain every step in the valuation process, but I am attracted by the detailed justification given by Mr Dix as to the selection of the site that he thought most comparable and the checks on value that he carried out. Mr Spencer did not go through any such exercise.
153 I now turn to the comparable sales referred to by Mr Spencer. He lists 13 properties but one is duplicated, so there are only 12. When Mr Spencer carried out his valuation in May of 1995, he listed only seven properties as comparables. These seven he used in relation to a number of other valuations that he carried out for the respondent in relation to other land being acquired by the respondent for the Northbridge Tunnel project. When Mr Spencer revised his valuation to bring his valuation date to the date of resumption of the Arcus land in October 1995, he still relied upon the same seven sales.
154 Mr Spencer was retained to give evidence in this case this year, and he then added in his composite report which was tendered into evidence, an additional six sales, namely sales 8 to 13 in his appendix 4. That brought the number of comparable sales up to twelve (after eliminating the duplication in relation to 91 Aberdeen Street).
155 Four of these comparable sales relate to properties to the north of the CNBR in the Town of Vincent and in the Suburban Area. Mr Spencer himself said that he gave priority to sales in Northbridge because they have more in common with the subject land. He placed relatively less importance on the sales in the Suburban Area. In relation to sale 8, which is a sale in the Town of Vincent, he described it as being of "low reliability". In my opinion, the restrictions on development in the Suburban Area mean that land in the Suburban Area is not comparable to the subject land and, in my opinion, sales evidence from the Suburban Area does not afford evidence of value in relation to the subject land. Mr Adam, in his evidence, explained the differences between the Suburban Area and the Central Area, and I accept Mr Dix's evidence that regard should not be paid to sales in the Suburban Area.
156 That leaves eight other sales referred to by Mr Spencer. These sales are all in Northbridge. Three of the eight sales (Mr Spencer's sales 1, 7 and 12) are sales of improved land. In each case, Mr Spencer said that if they were to be used as comparable sales evidence, it was necessary to separate out the value of improvements to arrive at the land value. In several instances, Mr Spencer worked out the value of improvements by working out a replacement cost by taking figures from Rawlinson's guide to the cost of a new building and then applying a depreciation rate. In trying to arrive at the appropriate depreciation rate, he had to make an assessment about when he thought the building might have been constructed. He also had to then consider how much longer the building might remain on the site. He said that this involved an intuitive judgment to allow him to apply a depreciation rate to the new replacement cost. He then took this estimated cost of improvements from the sale price and arrived at a figure which he said was the land component in relation to the sale. This approach struck me in the telling as unreliable, and left me much more attracted to Mr Dix's search for vacant land or land with no, or no significant, economic improvements, to provide comparable sales evidence. I have already referred to Mr Dix's view that the difficulty in determining the value of the improvements leads to too much uncertainty about the land value.
157 In my opinion, the sales of improved land are not reliable comparable sales because of the difficulty of working out what might be the land component in the sale price. This is not to say that valuers should never use the sales of improved land to ascertain the value of vacant land. There will be times when valuers will be driven to such evidence, but in circumstances where there is evidence of sales of vacant land, or sales of land with buildings of no economic value on them, which can be used as comparable sales, then those sales are likely to provide more reliable evidence of value.
158 The unreliability of Mr Spencer's adjustments for improvements on the land was demonstrated in relation to sale 7, which related to the Marco Polo Buildings at 266-272 Francis Street, Northbridge. When he gave evidence on 22 May 2000 before me, he was working on a sale price of $2,115,000. He then calculated a replacement price for the improvements on the land, and depreciated it by 50 per cent. It was then revealed in evidence that he was using the wrong figure for the sale price. The parties had earlier agreed that the transfer revealed that the sale price was $2,150,000. It might have been anticipated that Mr Spencer would then alter the land value by taking off the same figure that he had arrived at previously for the improvements. Instead, he decided to maintain his same opinion in relation to land value by adjusting the depreciation rate from 50 per cent down to a lower percentage. This allowed him to keep the same land value. The foregoing demonstrates that the adjustment for improvements can be quite unreliable. In my view, evidence of sales of unimproved land should be avoided if there is evidence of comparable sales of development sites (meaning sites with no improvements or improvements of no, or very little, economic value). In this case, there are development sites available to draw upon as comparable sales evidence. I therefore regard sales 1, 7 and 12 on Mr Spencer's list as of very little assistance in the case.
159 That leaves sales 2, 5, 9 and 11 on Mr Spencer's list.
160 In my opinion, sale 2 of 93 Aberdeen Street is not of land which is comparable to the subject land. It is a sale of land which has no relationship to Russell Square, it is located directly opposite the CNBR, and is a sale before the resumptions took place for the CNBR. Both factors make the sale unsatisfactory as comparable sales evidence. I accept Mr Dix's evidence that it is not comparable.
161 Sale 5 is not near Russell Square. It is in Lake Street, and the sale is in April 1990. In my opinion, it is far too old to be used as a comparable sale.
162 Sale 11 relates to Lot 11 James Street, Northbridge. The land is not close enough to Russell Square to be of value as a comparable sale, and it is to the western edge of western Northbridge.
163 Sale 9 in Mr Spencer's list is the sale in May 1994 of the old PCC depot to the Fini Group. This is the first development carried out in western Northbridge of a commercial and residential mix, which has become so popular in the area. The PCC was interested in encouraging such development, and it called for tenders or expressions of interest for development of this land. It is 18,261 square metres in size, and it dwarfs all other developments in the whole of Northbridge. It takes up a city block bounded by Fitzgerald Street, John Street, Shenton Street and James Street. Mr Spencer, in his consolidated report, listed it as a comparable sale, but in oral evidence he explained that this sale was only included in the list because it provided evidence of discount for magnitude. Neither Mr Dix, Mr McMahon nor Mr Elliott regard it as a comparable sale, and I hold that it is not a comparable sale because of the special circumstances relating to the sale which meant that neither the valuers nor this Court can be satisfied that it was a sale reflecting a price which would be arrived at by a willing purchaser and a willing vendor.
164 The special circumstances were as follows. In 1989, the PCC passed a resolution which disclosed that it had obtained a valuation in relation to this land. The resolution revealed that the 18,261 square metre site had been valued at $4,000,000 on the assumption it was for residential purposes, and at a higher figure if used for commercial purposes. It can therefore be assumed that a person interested in purchasing the land would be aware of the fact that the PCC had obtained this valuation and knowing the PCC was a public authority, would therefore be aware that the PCC would not in all likelihood sell for a figure below $4,000,000 but may well accept a price not much above it. The land was eventually sold after a process of tendering for $4,320,000.
165 It was clear that this site was regarded by the PCC as a site which would kick off the kind of development which has indeed taken place in western Northbridge. The PCC called for tenders in relation to this land, which required compliance with a number of conditions. No tenders were received by the PCC. A second tender process was instituted, and the PCC imposed a number of conditions that had to be complied with, requiring the purchaser to have a certain mix of residential and commercial areas, requiring restrictions in relation to the number car bays, requiring standards in relation to design and aesthetics, and requiring drawings to be submitted within three months after a tender was accepted, failing which $50,000, which had to be deposited by the tenderer, would be forfeited. These are conditions that would not apply in most cases of an arm's length transaction between a willing vendor and a willing purchaser on the open market. These sort of conditions are, of course, conditions that a local authority would impose in trying to achieve a certain type of development in an area within its district. These are some of the special circumstances which, in my view, lead to the conclusion that the sale of the depot site in May 1994 by the PCC to the Fini Group cannot be taken to be a sale between a willing but not over-anxious vendor. The PCC was anxious to establish the first mixed commercial and residential development in order to alter the atmosphere of Northbridge. In my view, it was anxious to sell the land to achieve that result.
166 It also emerged during cross-examination that Mr Spencer had valued land directly opposite the subject land in Palmerston Street on 14 August 1995. On that occasion, he was, with the permission of the resuming authority, acting for the owner of the land, Mr Scolaro. Mr Spencer's valuation of that land as at 14 August 1995 was $1,025 for the land content. He conceded that the subject land was better located, which would suggest a higher value for the subject land and certainly not the lower figure of $770 per square metre which Mr Spencer offered during the trial as the value of the subject land. Mr Spencer, however, defended his opinion concerning the subject land on the basis that the Scolaro land had some improvements upon it which affected his value of that land. The same could not be said, however, concerning a number of other properties which he said were development sites, one of which was the land of Kakulas and Malaxos, which was four properties immediately to the east of the subject land in Aberdeen Street. It consisted of 759 square metres, and it was valued by Mr Spencer at the rate of $1,000 per square metre. Later he carried out a revaluation and arrived at a figure of $1,050 per square metre. In arriving at that figure, he relied upon the same sales evidence which he put forward in relation to his May valuation of the subject land.
167 Two other properties that he valued in Aberdeen Street (one next door to the subject land owned by Evmaro-Annaghmore and the property further to the east in Aberdeen Street and over Lake Street, owned by Salici, both valued by Mr Spencer in June or August 1995) were valued at over $1,000 per square metre. In the case of the Salici property the square metreage was 759. In the case of the Evmaro-Annaghmore property, the land was 1,518 square metres, which was valued in August 1995 by Mr Spencer at $1,000 per square metre and later at $1,100 per square metre for part of the site, namely 515 square metres on Aberdeen Street. In the face of all that valuation evidence, it seems that the only matter which can account for the difference between the value Mr Spencer arrived at for these other pieces of land he valued in 1995 and the value arrived at for the subject land, is the discount that he applies for magnitude. The subject land is, of course, nearly five times larger than the Scolaro land.
168 Mr Spencer gave evidence that he considered that values in Northbridge climbed from 1990 to the present time. He considered that values rose by 21 per cent between 1993 and 1995, and by a further 21 per cent between 1995 and 1997. He said that this would not necessarily have been in linear fashion, but over each of the two-year periods, that was the increase that he had considered had occurred in land values in the Northbridge area.
169 In conclusion, it has to be noted that in relation to his comparable sales, Mr Spencer made adjustments for time, made adjustments for the magnitude of the subject land, and took into account differences of locality and arrived at his figure of $770 per square metre for the subject land. He did not disclose what adjustments were made to allow him to arrived at that figure. I cannot rely upon the figure, because I do not know how he arrived at it. If, for example, he had said that he arrived at a figure of, say, $700 per square metre or $900 per square metre, it would be impossible to say whether one or other was more likely to be correct. The opinion he expresses cannot be tested in any way. As a result, I conclude that I cannot give Mr Spencer's opinion as to value much weight. Mr Dix's opinion has much more weight.
170 Mr Elliott was retained on behalf of the respondent to give a valuation of the subject land to the respondent. Mr Elliott was retained to carry out over 20 valuations for the respondent for land to be resumed in the CBNR.
171 In May 1995, Mr Elliott valued the subject land as at 19 May 1995 at $3,642,000, or $800 per square metre. He put no value on the improvements. He considered that the highest and best use of the site was a mixed commercial and residential development. In order for Mr Elliott to complete his valuation, he had to make enquiries as to what he considered the zoning of the land would have been if the CBNR had not affected it. It is now agreed that it should be treated as Central Area C1 zone. However, at the time Mr Elliott prepared his valuation in 1995, his enquiries led him to believe that he should value the land on the assumption that the land would have been in the Suburban Area Industrial zone had it not been for the CBNR. He knew that the Suburban Area was within the Town of Vincent. He knew that CPS1 applied, but he did not know about the amendment to CPS1 in 1991, which removed the restriction on the exercise of council's discretion under cl 48.
172 With all of that information, Mr Elliott then selected a basket of 16 sales, which he regarded as comparable, to help him arrive at a value of the subject land. Perhaps, not surprisingly, in view of the information he had about the assumed zoning, he drew heavily on sales in the Suburban Area. He included only five sales in Northbridge and one just to the east of Northbridge. He included as one of his comparable sales, the sale of Lot Y104 James Street, which is the sale which Mr Dix relies upon as the most important comparable sale.
173 Mr Elliott was later asked to revalue the subject land as at 27 October 1995. He did so, and this resulted in no increase in the value he had arrived at in May 1995.
174 Mr Elliott agreed that the period between 1993 and 1996 was a period of rising values in Northbridge. Notwithstanding this, he did not allow any increase in value for the time which had passed between 19 May 1995 and 27 October 1995, a period of over six months. He said that he did not have sufficient information to allow him to make the adjustment. He declined to say, when questioned in cross-examination, what he considered the percentage increase in values to be between 1993 and 1996.
175 Mr Elliott did not rely upon any particular sale in the basket of comparable sales to arrive at his valuation of $800 per square metre.
176 He said that larger areas of land were less valuable than smaller pieces of land, so that if he used a comparable sale of a smaller area of land he would then discount the rate per square metre relating to that sale when applying it to the subject land. Despite questioning during cross-examination, he declined to say what the discount for magnitude should be. Furthermore, if some discount for magnitude applied, then Mr Elliott should have also considered the possibility of the sale of the subject land as two lots, because there were two lots on the title. Mr Elliott agreed that this may have resulted in a higher value, but he did not know what that would have been. Mr Elliott also agreed that any discount for magnitude may have been offset by particular qualities of the land being valued. Mr Elliott agreed that the subject land was "unique" and had particular value as a corner site, which he regarded as generally more valuable than other sites. So not only did Mr Elliott decline to say what the discount for magnitude might be, but also he did not explain whether the discount for magnitude was cancelled out by the offsetting favourable qualities of the subject land.
177 Mr Elliott revealed in cross-examination that when he was asked by the respondent's solicitors to reconsider his choice of comparable sales he deleted from his list Lot Y104 James Street, (Mr Dix's comparable sale number 1).
178 Mr Elliott also agreed in cross-examination that he only learned about the 1991 amendment to cl 48 of CPS1 after he prepared his May 1995 report and his revised report.
179 Mr Elliott did not, in all cases, attempt to arrive at a land value of his comparable sales where the sale price reflected some component for improvements on the site.
180 I note that sale 4 was to the east of Beaufort Street. This fell within Mr Elliott's definition of Northbridge, but no other valuer went that far to the east to find a comparable sale. In my opinion, that is not a comparable sale because it was not in a comparable area to the subject land.
181 Of the five sales in Northbridge, three are in East Northbridge, which all other valuers agreed was a more valuable area of Northbridge but which was also less conducive to residential development.
182 Of the two sales which are in West Northbridge, one is the Fitzgerald Hotel, which is on the western edge of West Northbridge and one which no other valuer relies upon. The value of improvements on this site is difficult to estimate, because it was heritage listed. On 15 November 1993, the PCC had refused a demolition licence for this reason. In 1991, the PCC had refused a development application for a number of reasons, including the fact that it was heritage listed. The hotel is also affected by the Fitzgerald road widening reserve. I find that these are all complications which make it an unsatisfactory comparable sale to rely upon.
183 The other comparable sale Mr Elliott listed in West Northbridge was the sale in September 1995 relating to 245-249 James Street, which I later conclude was not a comparable sale.
184 I find that I cannot rely on Mr Elliott's opinion as to the value of the subject land. Mr Elliott has listed 16 sales which he considered to be comparable. Having done so, he then expressed his opinion that the subject land should be valued at $800 per square metre. He did not in his report, and he declined in cross-examination to, explain to what extent he had adjusted the comparable sales figures. Adjustments had to be made for time, for different geographic location, and for the fact that some of the sales involved land with improvements. He did not explain in his report, or in oral evidence, what adjustments he made in relation to discount for magnitude. He did not explain in his report, and he declined in oral evidence to say, which were the most important of his comparable sales. The 16 comparable sales he has relied upon range in value from $358 per square metre to $1,307 per square metre. If Mr Elliott had said that the value of the subject land was $400 or $600 or $700 or $1,200, they would all fit within the range. His opinion that the value of the subject land is $800 cannot be tested in any way.
185 My finding that sales in the Suburban Area are not comparable sales for the purpose of determining the value of the subject land, means that most of the foundation facts supporting Mr Elliott's opinion no longer exist. As a result, I cannot give Mr Elliott's opinion as to value much weight. Mr Dix's opinion has much more weight.
186 I have just explained why I do not give much weight to Mr Elliott's opinion as to value. The same applies to Mr Spencer's valuation opinion. Mr Spencer's range of comparable sales values is from $236 per square metre up to $1,934 per square metre. He does, of course, make adjustments and explain how he makes his adjustments. Having done so, however, he does not explain why he strikes a figure of $770 based on the adjusted comparable sales figures.
187 Mr McMahon's opinion suffers from the same defect. Although he makes detailed adjustments to each of his comparable sales, each then suggests a different value for the subject land. The range of values suggested that the subject land might be worth anywhere between $4.9 million to $14.3 million (ie $1,076 per square metre to $3,140 per square metre). Mr McMahon has not satisfactorily explained why it was that he struck the rate of $1,493 per square metre for the subject land. As a result, I do not give much weight to Mr McMahon's opinion about the value of the subject land.
188 Mr Dix was the only valuer who explained precisely how he arrived at his value of $1,500 per square metre. He explained that he relied upon the sale of Lot Y104 James Street in 1994 and why he did so, and he then tested his conclusion by considering a hypothetical subdivision on the site, employing information known about an adjoining site. He then confirmed his view by reference to the food hall sale and the "On the Park" sale. I give great weight to Mr Dix's opinion because of the cogency of his explanation about how he arrived at the value of $1,312 for the subject land in 1994, based on his sale number 1 (to be adjusted upward for increase in value in the time up until 27 October 1995).
189 I find that the area of land resumed was 4,553 square metres.
190 The subject land was used as a factory warehouse office complex. That was not the highest and best use. I find that the highest and best use was as a site for a mixed commercial and residential complex.
191 If the CNBR had not existed, all relevant witnesses agreed, and I find, that the subject land would have been within the Central Area of the PCC CPS1 and zoned "Industrial" (or "CI" as it is shown on CPSI scheme map).
192 All four valuers agree that the comparable sales method is the correct valuation method to be employed in valuing the subject land. I find that is the correct valuation method to apply in this case.
193 Mr McMahon and Mr Dix considered that the Suburban Area did not provide any comparable sales evidence, because of the numerous differences in that area and the Central Area Industrial zone which I have referred to above. Mr Spencer agreed that the Suburban Area sales were not helpful as comparable sales. Only Mr Elliott drew heavily upon Suburban Area sales, and it is quite clear that he made that decision at a time when he was relying upon advice that the subject land would have fallen within the Suburban Area. He now agrees that he should accept the town planning advice which has been offered to him since, and that as a result he should have assumed that the subject land would have been in the Central Area Industrial zone had it not been for the CNBR.
194 I find that sales of land in the Suburban Area are not sufficiently comparable to afford evidence in valuing the subject land.
195 Mr McMahon and Mr Dix thought that all comparable sales evidence should be drawn from Northbridge, and from that area alone. Mr Spencer clearly preferred sales evidence drawn from Northbridge. Even Mr Elliott draws on some evidence in Northbridge.
196 I find that comparable sales evidence should be drawn from Northbridge.
197 Mr Dix considered that if sales evidence was available in the area immediately around Russell Square, then that afforded the sales evidence of the greatest comparability. Four sales which Mr McMahon considered to be the most important comparable sales were drawn from West Northbridge, although he also drew evidence from East Northbridge. The third and fourth most important of his comparable sales corresponded with Mr Dix's first and second most important comparable sales. Mr Spencer and Mr Elliott, by their selection of comparable sales, clearly considered that sales immediately around Russell Square were not so important, but Mr Spencer did include in his list of sales the Fini Development.
198 Mr Dix's evidence was that the PCC had identified Russell Square to be the centre of the commercial and residential developments which it wished to see take place in Northbridge. The PCC had kicked off this type of development with the sale of land to the Fini Group, with the requirement that they carry out a development of mixed commercial and residential buildings. Before the subject land was resumed, the "James at Northbridge" development had been approved and construction commenced on the south-east corner of Russell Square. It was a mixed commercial and residential development. An approval had also been granted by the PCC for a proposed commercial and residential development, which later proceeded as the "On the Park" development. There was agreement among all the valuers that the highest and best use of the subject land was as a mixed commercial and residential development.
199 I agree with Mr Dix, and I find, that the most important comparable evidence was to be found and drawn from sales of land in West Northbridge, either facing onto Russell Square or very closely adjacent to it.
200 I have referred to the problems which Mr Dix referred to in relation to the use of sales of improved land as comparable sales. When reviewing Mr Spencer's evidence, I referred to Mr Spencer's method of arriving at a value of the improvements to arrive at a land value. Mr Elliott's method was unreliable, because sometimes he made no adjustment to take account of improvements.
201 The difficulty in determining the land component of sales of improved land is illustrated by two sales referred to by Mr Spencer and Mr Elliott.
202 In relation to the sale of land at the corner of William and Monger Streets, Vincent, which is Mr Elliott's comparable sale number 12, he decided that he would allow nothing for improvements. He thought that the buildings had no economic value and that the $500,000 sale price therefore reflected the value of the land alone. This sale was Mr Spencer's sale number 4. Mr Spencer said that he estimated improvements at a value of $100,000, and he then deducted that amount from the $500,000 sale price to arrive at a land value of $400,000.
203 Another example was provided when Mr Spencer and Mr Elliott valued the Scolaro land in 1995. Mr Spencer arrived at a valuation of $1,025 per square metre, but he said that he would discount this to take account of the value of improvements which had the potential for conversion into terrace houses (see Ex 253 and his evidence in cross-examination). Mr Elliott, on the other hand, offered the opinion that the Scolaro buildings were obsolete and needed to be demolished, and then arrived at a value per square metre without allowing any value for the buildings.
204 These two examples show how sales of improved land are less reliable than sales of vacant land or sales of land on which there are buildings which are, in the opinion of all, of no economic value. If there is comparable sales evidence of vacant land (or land on which the buildings are obsolete and which have no economic value), then it should be used in preference to sales of improved land where an assessment has to be made of the value of the improvements, often using inadequate information to make such an assessment.
205 I therefore find that sales of improved land are less reliable than sales of vacant land or of land with improvements of no economic value.
206 I find that the most important comparable sale is the sale of Lot Y104 James Street in September 1994. This sale yielded a sale price of $1,460,000 for 1,113 square metres of land, which produces a value of $1,312 per square metre.
207 It was important for the valuers to consider whether or not to use this as a comparable sale, because the sale took place in September 1995 and it is in West Northbridge. The sale involved 1,477 square metres of land with buildings erected on it.
208 It is further away from Russell Square than Mr Dix's preferred sales 1 and 2. It is also nearer the western end of West Northbridge, which is less desirable than properties to the east. At the time of the sale, the site was partly covered by a reserve for the Fitzgerald Street flyover bridge. The value of the improvements, according to Mr Spencer, was $150,000; and according to Mr Elliott, $353,375. Mr Spencer therefore considered the land value to be $643 per square metre; Mr Elliott considered the land value to be $506 per square metre. Mr McMahon did not consider it to be a comparable sale. Mr Dix considered that it was not a comparable sale because the property was inferior to the subject land outside the core area of Northbridge and because it was affected by the flyover reserve at the time of sale.
209 I find that this sale was not a comparable sale. I make that finding because I accept the evidence that the sale price would have been affected by the existence of the flyover reserve, and I find that the sale was far enough from Russell Square, and far enough to the west of West Northbridge, to make it unsatisfactory as a comparable sale. I also note that when Mr Elliott did decide to list this sale in his list of comparables, the rate per square metre which he applied to the subject land, was well above the land value of 245-249 James Street. The introduction of this sale as a comparable sale did not cause him to alter his opinion about the value of the subject land. That clearly indicates that it was not, in his opinion, an important comparable sale.
210 The issue between the parties on this subject was as follows. Mr Elliott and Mr Spencer both expressed the opinion that if evidence of a comparable sale related to an area of land which was relatively small when compared with the subject land, then that comparable sale square metreage rate could not be applied directly to the subject lot without making an adjustment to reduce the comparable sale rate per square metre to take account of the fact that the price for the larger subject land area would be discounted because of its large area. Alternatively, if a comparable sale related to a land area larger than the subject land, then the comparable sale figure would be adjusted upward to give a premium to the smaller subject land. Mr Spencer's view was that more capital was risked on larger developments on large sites, that larger sites need a staging of development creating a situation of risk from new competition affecting later stages, and that variations in interest rates over time, and changing market demand and conditions, were the reasons why larger areas of land sell for a lower rate per square metre than smaller areas of land.
211 Mr Spencer said that this view was supported by empirical evidence. Mr Spencer investigated sales of land in an area known as Eastbrook East Perth. This was a new mixed use land development in the new East Perth redevelopment area along Royal and Eastbrook Streets, East Perth, which was developed and placed on the market during 1996 and 1997. Mr Spencer prepared a graph and bar chart relating to ten sales in the Eastbrook area to support his opinion that the price per square metre of land reduces as the area of land increases. In oral evidence, it became clear that he could only produce direct evidence in relation to seven of the sales shown in his bar chart. The three sales of larger area land which were proved, were shown to be at a rate per square metre lower than the smaller areas of land. Mr Spencer was not able to say for certain that there might not have been some variation in location which may have accounted for the difference in the rates per square metre, but in the main he thought that the land was similarly located. He conceded that there may have been incentives offered by the vendor. The vendor was the East Perth Redevelopment Authority. If this was the only evidence, then it does show, if taken at face value, that in three cases out of seven there was some reduction in the rate per square metre for larger areas of land sold in the East Perth Redevelopment Authority area. However, it provides no guide as to what the rate of discount should be in a particular case. Mr Spencer was unable to explain what rate of discount he employed in this case. In my view, the Eastbrook material does not prove that there is a discount for magnitude in Northbridge.
212 Mr Spencer also referred to his list of comparable sales, which he said afforded evidence of a discount for magnitude. He said that if reference were made to sales 1, 2, 4 and 13 and they were compared with sale 9, that this was evidence of discount for magnitude, and that a further example was to be seen by comparing sales 4 and 10, 1 and 12, 7 and 12 and 4 and 10. I note that the reference to sales 1, 2, 4 and 13 in comparison with sale 9, were all comparisons with the sale of the PCC depot site to Fini. For reasons that I have already given, I consider that the Fini sale is not evidence of a sale which could be held to have been arrived at by a willing purchaser and a willing vendor, and thus it would be unsafe to rely upon that sale as evidence of the fact that there is a discount for magnitude.
213 The comparison between sales 4 and 10 is a comparison between a large site and a small site in the Suburban Area. I have already concluded that sales in the Suburban Area are not comparable, and the fact that there is a differential which can be explained as a discount for magnitude in the Suburban Area does not, in my opinion, assist in reaching a conclusion about whether there is a discount for magnitude in the Central Area in Northbridge, where the area comes under the closer scrutiny of developers who, in 1995, were looking at this land under the influence of the PCC's encouraging attitude to mixed residential and commercial development within the Northbridge area.
214 I should at this point note that evidence referred to by the valuers shows instances where there is no discount for magnitude. For example, even in Mr Spencer's evidence, a comparison of sales 2 and 7 shows a higher rate per square metre was paid for the larger piece of land. Sale 7 was a sale of 988 square metres of land in January 1994, which was at a sale price of $1,300 per square metre, whereas the smaller sized land in sale 2, namely 430 square metres, attracted a price of only $1,220 per square metres on a sale in February 1995. In each case, the dollar figure I have given is the land component of the sale price according to Mr Spencer's evidence.
215 Mr Dix's sales 1 and 3 also show that in the case of sale 1, the price of $1,312 was paid compared with $941 paid for a block less than half the size (531 square metres - sale 3).
216 Similarly, there is no sign of a discount if Mr Dix's sales 4 and 5 are compared.
217 It must also be noted that both Mr Elliott and Mr Spencer valued land directly opposite the subject land in Palmerston Street in 1995. This was the land of owners called Scolaro. Mr Spencer valued this land at $1,025 per square metre. He then said that this figure had to be discounted to allow for substantial improvements which had the potential for conversion, and that if the value of these improvements were deducted, then the land value was much less than $1,025 per square metre. Mr Elliott, in his valuation of the Scolaro property in 1995, considered that the improvements were of no value and valued the 852 square metre site at $850 per square metre. That rate is more than the value that he placed on the Arcus land in his valuation. Mr Elliott explains that difference in terms of discount for magnitude.
218 Mr Dix and Mr McMahon were firmly of the view that there should be no discount for magnitude in relation to land which is purchased for its economic value as a development site. Mr Dix said that a discount for magnitude is sometimes observed in relation to the sale of residential land, and in relation to small rural lots. He was of the opinion, however, that there was no evidence of discount for magnitude in Northbridge, where developers were vying for land on which to carry out developments. Both Mr Dix and Mr McMahon were of the opinion that if developers could not secure large enough areas of land, they would try and buy up small areas and consolidate these areas so that they could secure for themselves a site on which to carry out the kind of developments which have been carried out in western Northbridge. There was evidence that in the past there had been a consolidation of titles in the Northbridge area.
219 I find that there is no compelling evidence requiring a discount for magnitude in relation to sales of commercial/residential land in Northbridge.
220 Mr Dix has adjusted the sale of Lot Y104 James Street in September 1994 by just over 14 per cent, and therefore arrived at a rate per square metre in October 1995 of $1,500.
221 He has similarly adjusted the sale in March 1997 of Lots Y130 and Y131 in Parker Street down by employing that percentage to assist in arriving at an adjusted rate per square metre of $1,500 in October 1995. A similar adjustment in relation to Mr Dix's sale number 4 (Lot Y130 corner of James and Parker Streets) produced a figure of $1,500 per square metre. Mr Dix's assumption, therefore, is that there was a relevant annual increase in value between 1994 and 1997, or perhaps 1993 and 1997, of just over 14 per cent per annum. Mr McMahon considered that the rate of increase was about 10 per cent per annum, and Mr Spencer considered that the rate of increase in value between 1993 and 1994 was 21 per cent, and a similar percentage between 1995 and 1997. Mr Elliott considered that there was an increase in values between 1993 and 1996, but he would not offer an opinion as to the extent of that percentage.
222 I am of the view that Mr Dix's adjustment is too high at just over 14 per cent. I prefer the evidence of Mr McMahon and Mr Spencer on this topic, and I find that the annual increase in value between 1995 and 1997 was about 10 per cent, and that is the adjustment for time which should be used in that period.
223 I have accepted Mr Dix's evidence that the comparable sale which affords best evidence of the value of the subject land is Lot Y104 James Street in September 1994 at the rate of $1,312 per square metre.
224 I apply that rate, but would adjust it for time by 10 per cent. I am aware that the sale of Lot Y104 James Street was a little over 12 months before the date for resumption of the subject land, but it is close enough to settle upon the 10 per cent adjustment figure.
225 Thus I find that the value of the subject land is $6,570,890 calculated as follows:
226 Mr McMahon offered an opinion that after arriving at a value for the land, he should then add an amount of $100,000 for the present value of a rental income stream, which he said a hypothetical purchaser would be paid by way of short-term rental for the existing buildings between the time of acquisition of the site and the time when demolition of the buildings took place and redevelopment occurred. Mr Dix puts the claim in a different way. He says that the buildings were obsolete but offered the opinion that, from the owner's point of view, the building had a value based on a short-term rental, the present value of which was $280,000. He regarded this as additional value to the owner. The applicant claims $100,000 for the improvements.
227 In my view, this claim cannot be sustained. I accept Mr Elliott's opinion on this point.
228 The statement of claim does not provide any clue as to the foundation for the claim. Clearly compensation is payable for buildings if they have any value (see s 63(a) of the PWA). Counsel for the claimant said that the claim was made under that subsection, and that the reason the claimed amount should be paid is because it was "value to the owner".
229 Thus, counsel was submitting that Mr Dix's reasoning should be accepted (although Mr McMahon's quantum is being claimed). To establish such a claim based on value to the dispossessed owner, it is necessary to show that the owner would pay an amount over and above the market value rather than lose the land: Boland's case (supra) at par [354]. On the facts in this case, I find that a person in the position of the owner of this unsuccessful business would not pay any amount to keep the industrial buildings for the purpose of earning short-term rental in order that he might not lose the land. This is because the land had a highest and best use as a development site which would yield far more than the land valued as an industrial site, with the capacity only to yield some short term rent from the obsolete buildings.
230 A claim that the buildings have some rental value contradicts the assumption made by those valuers who considered that the buildings were obsolete and that the land had a highest and best use greater than the existing use. The applicant cannot be compensated as though the present use was to continue while at the same time valuing the site as though the highest and best use assumes the demolition of the existing buildings and the construction of new buildings. The claim is similar to a claim for disturbance, when the highest and best use value is higher than present use value. The High Court said in Crisp & Gunn Co-operative Ltd v Hobart City Corporation [1963] HCA 55; (1963) 110 CLR 538 at 547 about such a claim:
"Further we are of the opinion that the requirement of the statute that regard should be had in assessing compensation to a number of factors including 'disturbance and any other matter not directly based on the value of land' does not justify the award of any amount for disturbance in addition to the market value of the land where, as here, that value exceeds the 'present use' value by an amount in excess of any loss resulting from disturbance."
231 If a hypothetical purchaser were looking at acquiring the land in order to develop it as a mixed commercial and residential property for the purposes of sale, then that purchaser would carry out a feasibility study for a possible development on the site. The feasibility study would be carried out by calculating acquisition costs, development costs, holding costs in the form of interest over the period of construction, estimating a realisation value of the completed development, and then seeing whether or not the difference between the estimated realisation value and the total cost of the acquisition, holding costs and estimated costs of developing the site, would leave an adequate profit and risk margin. If the obsolete buildings on the site could be leased for a short period of time between acquisition of a site and demolition, then that is something which the hypothetical purchaser would take into account in arriving at the price to pay for the land. Where the present use is not the highest and best use, then the hypothetical purchaser and hypothetical vendor would arrive at a price for the land which would take into account all factors, including the short term income that the purchaser might secure from the obsolete buildings. So any estimated short-term rental is taken into account in arriving at the price the hypothetical vendor and purchaser would agree upon for the sale of the subject land.
232 I also repeat my finding that Arcus Shopfitters made a loss in its last six years of operation. Neither the land nor the building had any special value to the owner.
233 Finally, there was no evidence led about whether or not the premises could have been leased for a short term. In my view, such a claim cannot be established by a valuer expressing an opinion without establishing some factual foundation for the expression of such an opinion.
Deduction under s 37(5)(b) of the MRTPS Act
234 The subject land was taken under s 13 of the _Tow_n Planning and Development Act, s 13 of the PWA and s 37(1) of the MRTPS Act. Compensation has been paid in respect of the land pursuant to s 36 of the MRTPS Act. Compensation is calculated in accordance with s 63 of the PWA, but provisions in the MRTPS Act affect the amount of compensation payable.
235 Section 35(1) of the PWA provides that when any land is taken under the authority of the PWA and such land might have been taken or resumed by the respondent under the provisions of any other Act, then no compensation shall be payable under the PWA which would not have been payable if the land had been taken or resumed under the provisions of such other Act. I refer to this section because at one stage there was an attempt by the applicant to argue that the land was taken only under the provisions of the PWA and that provisions in the MRTPS Act were irrelevant. In my view, the land was not taken under the PWA alone. However, even if the applicant's argument were correct, s 35 of the PWA treats the resumption as though it had occurred under the provisions of the MRTPS Act for the purposes of determining compensation.
236 That brings into play the provisions of s 37 of the MRTPS Act. In particular, it brings into play s 37(5)(b) which provides:
"Where compensation has been paid ... in respect of land pursuant to section 36, then, subject to the succeeding provisions of this subsection, there shall be deducted from the compensation assessed pursuant to paragraph (a) an amount that bears the same ratio to the compensation so assessed as the compensation paid ... pursuant to that section bears to the unaffected value of the land, as determined under this Act."
237 The parties agree that the "ratio" in this case is 1:4, which means that the "deduction" will be 25 per cent of the compensation. The debate between the parties concerning this provision is about whether the deduction required by it is to be made from the compensation for the land and improvements, or whether the deduction is to be made from the total of the compensation for the land and improvements, plus solatium and any other amounts awarded under s 63 PWA.
238 In my view, the requirements of s 37(5)(b) of the MRTPS Act are quite clear. They require the deduction to be from the compensation "assessed pursuant to paragraph (a)". Section 37(5)(a) refers to the assessment of compensation for "land and improvements".
239 In my opinion the steps which have to be taken are:
(a) first, to determine the value of the land and improvements under s 63(a) of the PWA (and in accordance with s 37(5)(a) of the MRTPS Act);
(b) then to make the deduction required under s 37(5)(b) of the MRTPS Act;
(c) then to add other amounts determined under other relevant provisions of s 63 (including any amount to be awarded as compensation for "special circumstances" pursuant to the proviso in s 63(c) of the PWA);
(d) total the amounts of compensation determined in accordance with sub-paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) above; and
(e) finally, to add an amount "for compulsory taking" as solatium under s 63(c)(ii) of the PWA.
Stamp Duty Conveyancing and Other Fees to Purchase a Replacement Property
240 Under this head, the applicant claims $345,000. It is a claim put forward on the basis that because the subject land has been resumed, the applicant is entitled to these costs of finding and acquiring a replacement property. Counsel for the applicant submitted that this claim was made under s 63(a) of the PWA or under the proviso to s 63(c).
241 There was no evidence put forward that the applicant intended to find a replacement property. Counsel for the applicant submitted that this did not matter. It was said that because the applicant had land at the time of resumption, it was entitled to this sum of money to replace the land if it wished.
242 Counsel for the applicant went so far as to suggest that the claim for this amount could be sustained, even if the applicant's witnesses had come to court and said that they did not intend to replace the land but instead intended to invest the compensation money on the stock exchange at a cost of, say, 1 per cent brokerage.
243 It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that the amount could be awarded under s 63(a) because what had to be determined by the court was the value of the land "to the owner". In my opinion, this subsection does not provide any support for the claim. If the applicant does not intend to shift to other land, then there is no reason for it to pay any amount over market value rather than lose the land. (See Boland v Yates (supra) at [354]).
244 I do not agree that the proviso to s 63(c) justifies such an award. That proviso requires that "special circumstances" be shown which would justify an additional award of compensation. There must be some facts to support the claim. Here there are none.
245 I have already made findings about the fact that the Arcus Shopfitters business was winding down. Its workforce had diminished over the last few years of its existence, it was unable to compete with others carrying out similar work, the efforts of Dr Arcus have not attracted anyone interested in purchasing the business or the company, and it was running at a loss. Then, when the land was resumed, it did not buy other land and carry on its business. Instead it closed up shop.
246 On those facts, this aspect of the claim should be dismissed.
247 Insofar as this might also be seen as a claim for reinstatement under s 63(aa)(ii), the claim again fails because of lack of any evidence to show that the applicant intended to reinstate its business on other land.
248 The applicant claims that there were "special circumstances" within the meaning of those words in the proviso to s 63(c), warranting an award of compensation for the adverse effect of the CNBR on the applicant's business.
249 Section 63(c)(ii) authorises the award of solatium, and it is then followed by the proviso:
"But where the ... Court ... is of the opinion that the application of the provisions of this Act would not result in the assessment of compensation adequate to meet the special circumstances of the case ... the Court, may determine such compensation as it considers adequate for compulsory taking."
250 The provision has been the subject of consideration by this Court.
251 The Full Court in R v Compensation Court of Western Australia (1990) 2 WAR 242, held that the words are of general operation, ie they do not merely authorise an increase in solatium in excess of 10 per cent. In D'Amico v Shire of Swan-Guildford [1969] WAR 183, Mr Commissioner Wilson QC (as he then was) noted it had been introduced by way of amendment to s 63(c) and that in making the amendment:
" ... the legislature did not abandon the traditional test of market value plus an allowance of up to 10 per cent for compulsory taking. This remains the norm, and will continue to supply the basic yardstick to compensation although now with the important proviso that it may be departed from when the Court in the exercise of its discretion concludes that the special circumstances of a particular case are such that the application of the norm in those circumstances would lead to an inadequate result. This is essentially a question of fact for the Court."
252 In Cook & Edwards v City of Stirling (1991) 4 WAR 469 at 476 Anderson J stated that even: "if the basic yardstick to compensation may now be departed from, the court's jurisdiction to do so may not be exercised unless the court concludes that there are special circumstances." In that case, Anderson J held that the fact that loss may have been occasioned to the plaintiffs by the threat (or certainty) of future resumption, was not a "special circumstance". His Honour concluded that the uncertainty created by a notice of intention to resume, and the inhibiting effect of such notice upon use, development or enjoyment of land, was a common feature of compulsory land acquisition and for that reason not a special circumstance. Those comments also apply to a case where there is a reservation of land followed by a resumption.
253 There are a number of other reasons why this claim should be dismissed.
254 First, the compensation payable pursuant to s 63 of the PWA is for the taking of land, not for the injurious affection of a business by reason of a reserve. Even though the proviso to s 63(c) is general in its terms, it is a provision which must relate to compensation for the taking of land as provided for in s 63. This claim by the applicant is not a claim for compensation for the taking of the land. It is a claim for the alleged injurious effects of the CNBR. Compensation for injurious affection for the effect of the reserve is dealt with in s 36 of the MRTPS Act.
255 Secondly, it is my finding that the rundown in the applicant's business was due to competitive forces. This had nothing to do with the existence of the CNBR.
256 Thirdly, no amount has been claimed. The applicant's counsel in closing said that it was not possible to place a dollar figure on the claim. If the applicant cannot quantify its claim, I do not see how the Court could do so.
257 As a result, I dismiss this aspect of the claim.
The Claim for a Proportion of Rates and Taxes from 6 May 1982 to 30 June 1996
258 6 May 1982 is the date of the deed of discharge, pursuant to which the MRPA paid compensation to Arcus Pty Ltd for the injurious affection to the land pursuant to s 36 of the MRTPS Act, as a result of the sale by Arcus Pty Ltd to the applicant. The applicant contends that the deduction which has to be made under s 37(5)(b), in effect, gives the respondent an "equity stake" in the subject property. The applicant's written closing submissions contain the submission that:
"The Court should ... find that such deduction is analogous to an equity stake in the property thus carrying with it the attendant obligations in respect of rent, rates and land tax as a consequence of having the benefit of an appreciating interest in the land. In those circumstances, the Applicant ... submits that the Respondent should reimburse the Applicant for a 25 % proportion of the amounts the Applicant has paid from 6 May 1982 to the date of taking in respect of general and water rates and land tax."
259 This is a claim made pursuant to the proviso in s 63(c) of the PWA. In my opinion, there is no justification for an award of this amount under any provision of the PWA or the MRTPS Act.
260 The payment of compensation, and the adjustment required under s 37(5)(b) when land is resumed, does not give the respondent something "analogous to an equity stake in the property". If a purchaser purchases land at a reduced price because of the existence of a reserve, and if later the land is resumed and valued at its unaffected value, then, were it not for the reduction required under s 35(5)(b), the purchaser would gain a windfall profit when compensation for the taking of the land was paid. If the purchaser purchases the land for three-quarters of the unaffected value of the land, then s 35(5)(b) provides that it should be paid compensation in an amount of three-quarters of the unaffected value of the land when resumed. Another method of dealing with the circumstances would have been for the legislature to require compensation for resumption of the land to be reduced by the amount paid by way of compensation for injurious affection under s 36 of the MRTPS Act, plus an amount being calculated by reference to the difference between the CPI at the time s 36 compensation was paid and the date of resumption. That method was not chosen by the legislature, and such a method would cause injustice in some cases. The deduction required under s 37(5)(b) applies in every case, and so it cannot be a "special circumstance" within the meaning of the proviso to s 63(c) of the PWA. See Cook & Edwards v City of Stirling (supra).
262 Under s 63(c)(ii) of the PWA, the court is granted discretion to "include in the award such amount, not exceeding 10 per cent of the amount of compensation determined under this section, as the court deems proper for compulsory taking". The statement of claim in the prayer for relief, claims "solatium at 10 per cent". No written, opening or closing submissions concerning solatium were made by the applicant. The respondent's opening submissions say only "the practice of the resuming authority (as here) is to allow the maximum of 10 per cent provided for under s 63(c)(ii) of the PWA". I called for further written submissions concerning solatium and was advised by the solicitors for the respondent that if no award was made by me under the proviso to s 63(c) of the PWA, then solatium should be awarded at 10 per cent of the amount of compensation determined under s 63. I have not made any award of compensation under the proviso, and as a result I award solatium at 10 per cent.
(Deduct 25 per cent pursuant to s 37(5)(b) of MRTPS Act ie deduct
5. Stamp duty conveyancing and LTO Fees for replacement property
6. Adjustment of rates and taxes in resumption year (Agreed)
7. 25 per cent of rates and taxes from 6 May 1982 to 18 January 1996
9. Solatium at 10 per cent on total of 4 and 6 ie on $4,942.590.00
263 My total award of compensation is therefore $5,436,849.72, from which must be deducted the advance payment of $3,218,350.66 made by the respondent. The balance due to the applicant is $2,218,499.06. To that sum must be added interest. The parties have asked that I allow them to confer to agree the interest, and only if agreement cannot be reached will I have to make a ruling about the rate and amount of interest.
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION : ARCUS SHOPFITTERS PTY LTD -v- WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION [2002] WASC 174 (S)
HEARD : 2, 3, 610, 1317, 2024, 2729 MAY, 23 & 29 AUGUST 2002
Interest on compensation - Compound interest or simple interest
Land Administration and Public Works Act 1902, s 63(d), s 63(e)
Supreme Court Act 1935, s 142
Marshall v Director-General, Department of Transport [2001] HCA 37; (2001) 205 CLR 603
Re Kearney; Ex parte Jurlama [1984] HCA 14; (1984) 52 ALR 24
Zangzinchai v Milanta [1994] FCA 1361; (1994) 125 ALR 265
1 PULLIN J: I earlier delivered reasons for decision in which I determined that the balance of the compensation which should be paid after taking into account advance payments was $2,218,499.06.
2 I must now decide an issue concerning the interest to be paid on that sum.
3 The applicant's prayer for relief in relation to interest read:
25.1.8 Interest on the aggregate of the foregoing amounts inclusive calculated at 8% ie the rate provided by the Act or at such other rate or rates or for such other period or periods as the court may allow whether pursuant to s. 32 of (sic) s. 142 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 or otherwise adjusted in respect of the advance payment already made for a period from 14 November 1995 to the date of payment of the amount awarded by the Court."
4 Counsel for the applicant contends that interest should be awarded under s 63(e) of the Land Acquisition and Public Works Act 1902 (the "Act") and that interest should be at the rate ruling at the date of resumption (ie 8 per cent) and that interest should be compounded.
5 The respondent contends that interest should be awarded under s 63(d) of the Act. The respondent agrees that if that is the section which applies, then the discretion of the Court should be exercised to allow interest at the rates provided for under s 142 of the Supreme Court Act. The respondent does not agree that compound interest should be awarded.
6 Before I deal with the main issues, I should deal with the applicant's submission that the respondent had conceded that s 63(e) of the Act applied. In my view, negotiations between the parties concerning interest involved no concession of any kind by the respondent, other than those announced by counsel for the respondent in open court. No concession was made that s 63(e) applied. However, the question at hand involves a jurisdictional question which has to be decided before I can make any orders. That question requires me to first decide whether or not the land resumed "produced any rents or profits". If it did, s 63(d) applies. If not, then s 63(e) applies.
7 The only evidence on the point, according to the submissions of counsel, was the evidence of Dr Arcus at pages 371 and 400 to 402 and the minutes of a meeting of the directors of Arcus Shopfitters Pty Ltd on 25 October 1995. At page 371-372 of the transcript, Dr Arcus was cross-examined by counsel for the respondent. The passage of cross-examination was as follows:
"Yes. I need to ask you this, and I'm afraid I'm jumping around in time but at the end - that is to say you closed the business or closed the factory in the end of December 1995 and you gave up possession some 5 or 6 months later. Do you recall that? I think it was ?---Gave up possession?
Yes?---I think we gave up possession - it was either in January or February. Anyway, the date is on record.
Yes. I think it may have been a little later. My recollection might be wrong too but I think ?---I will hazard a guess that it was January 18.
Right. Can you assist us with this: at that time in December 95 part of the premises were being leased, were they not, under some arrangement with a tenant who was using part of the premises for - I can't remember, was it carparking, or something of that order?---That 's right.
Do you remember the name of the tenant?---Yes, I do.
Who was that?---Bob Maher.
All right?---He was the gentleman who owned and operated what was then a restaurant or nightclub occupying what was the old post office on Aberdeen Street, almost opposite us.
Can you assist us with a date? From about when was he renting the property and when did he have to vacate? Did he vacate at the same time that you gave up possession?---No. I think Main Roads allowed him to stay for some time.
All right, thank you?---As for when he started, no, I can't remember. I can't put a date on that but it was, I would say, a year or so before we had to quit.
Could I have document number 1 and page 108, thank you?
This is minutes of the directors in October 95, 25 October.
Do you see it on your screen, Dr Arcus?---Yes. I may have it here.
You appear to be present? There seems to be a reference there to Boss Entertainment?---That's it.
Is that the same as Mr Maher?---That's right.
Is Mr Maher Boss Entertainment?---He is the major domo of that institution, yes.
I take it then that he was there from 25 October 1995 until, as you understand it, after the date that you gave up possession of the premises?---That's right.
Very well, thank you. Dr Arcus, was that on 138 Aberdeen Street or on 154 Aberdeen Street?---With respect to the parking arrangement?"
8 In re-examination, at pages 400 and 401, there were the following questions and answers:
"Dr Arcus, do you remember the questions this morning concerning the arrangement with Boss Entertainment, Mr Maher?---Bob Maher?
Yes?---Yes.
Can you see it on the screen there, opposite Parking?---Yes, Boss Entertainment, that's him.
Is that an accurate representation of the arrangement with Mr Maher?---Just a minute, I'll read it.
Thank you.
PULLIN J: It's apparently not an exhibit yet, Mrs Rowley.
ROWLEY, MS: No. I did note that, thank you, your Honour?---I can't swear to the exact numbers there, my memory is not that good, but the general purport of this is correct.
It says, 'suggested details of an agreement.' Was that arrangement in place at the date of these minutes?---Would you say that again?
Was that arrangement, the suggested details of the agreement, in place at the date of these minutes, and perhaps we could scroll up to the top of the page to check the date of the minutes.
Do you see the date of the minutes, 25 October?---Yes.
Yes. Have you any idea when that arrangement was put into place?---No, but I would say very soon after.
Very soon after?---It might even have started before that meeting.
Well, it doesn't seem to be suggestive. 'The suggested details of an agreement'
EDMONDS, MR: That's leading again, with respect, your Honour.
ROWLEY, MS: The rental obtained by Arcus in respect of that arrangement, would that appear in their annual turnover for that year?---Would it appear in the annual?
Turnover for 1995?---In the accounts you mean. Would it appear in the accounts?
Yes?---Yes.
It would. It would be treated like that, would it, as part of the income?---It wouldn't be shown in the annual accounts under Boss Entertainment or anything like that.
No, but it would be part ?---No, you wouldn't find it there. It would be lumped in with a whole host of miscellaneous income.
I tender that page, your Honour.
PULLIN J: What document is this in, Mrs Rowley?
ROWLEY, MS: This is document number 1, your Honour, so it's 1.108.
PULLIN J: All right. So page 108 in document 1 will be exhibit 1.108.
EXHIBIT 1.108 Plaintiff Arcus Shopfitters Pty Ltd minute book 1975-1997 - page 108."
9 Exhibit 1.108 was a set of minutes of a meeting of directors of Arcus Shopfitters Pty Ltd on 25 October 1995. Arcus personnel attended the meeting. Mr Maher did not attend. No-one else from Boss Entertainment attended the meeting. The item in the exhibit relevant to this issue was as follows:
"PARKING. Boss Entertainment, the operators of a nightclub soon to open in the old post office on the corner of Parker Street, have requested the use of our yard for their staff for parking of up to 10 cars during the day, and night parking for nightclub clients. They have suggested $200 per month for day parking and $1/car/night payable to Arcus.
Suggested details of an agreement were submitted by R. Arcus and were accepted, but it was to be put to Boss that a flat fee of $1000/month be paid instead of the day fee plus $1/night/car for night parking."
10 The meeting therefore took place two days before the resumption notice was published in the Government Gazette. The minutes of the meeting record the fact that Boss Entertainment had requested the use of the yard for parking, and they had "suggested" a rental per month for day parking and an amount per car per night. The minutes record that the details of "an agreement" were submitted by R Arcus "and were accepted" but it was to be put to Boss that a flat fee of $1000 per month be paid instead of the day fee plus a rate per vehicle for night parking. In my opinion, that reveals that negotiations were still under way and had not been concluded. No agreement had been reached concerning rent. The cross-examination at pages 371 to 372 proceeds on the assumption that there was an arrangement of some kind in place, but it is clear that Dr Arcus has a faulty memory about the details. At page 400, Dr Arcus was asked in re-examination whether he had any idea when the "arrangement" was put into place, and his answer was "no". He speculates that it was soon after 25 October 1995, and he speculates also that it might have started before the meeting. Ignoring the speculation, and accepting Dr Arcus' evidence that he had no idea when the arrangement was put into place, means that the minutes of meeting provide the only certainty about the situation concerning rent.
11 In my view, the minutes (Ex 1.108) show only that negotiations were taking place and that Boss Entertainment had made a proposal and that Arcus Shopfitters Pty Ltd was to make a counter proposal. Even if I am wrong and the minutes of the meeting should be read as stating that the Boss Entertainment "suggestion" was an offer which was "accepted", there is no evidence that such acceptance was communicated to Boss Entertainment.
12 I find that the resumed land was not producing any rent on 27 October 1995 or between that date and January 1996 when the applicant vacated the premises. There is no suggestion that the land produced any rent after January 1996.
13 There was a debate about the meaning of the word "profits". The applicant pointed to the fact that Arcus Shopfitters Pty Ltd did not make a trading profit in the last six years of its existence as a business operating from the subject land.
14 The respondent, however, argues that the word "profits" in s 63(d) is not to be read as a reference to a "trading profit", or to an "accounting profit", or to a "gross profit" or "net profit". The respondent's submission was that the word "profits" means simply a reference to revenue earned as a result of the use of the property.
15 The ordinary meaning of the word "profit" can vary, depending on the context.
"1. ... pecuniary gain resulting from the employment of capital in any transaction ...
2. ... returns, proceeds, or revenue, as from property or investments.
3. Econ. the surplus left to the producer or employer after deducting wages, rent, cost of raw materials, etc.
4. ... such additional benefits as interest on capital, insurance, etc.
5. advantage; benefit; gain ..." (Macquarie Dictionary).
17 Neither party has cited any authority to me in relation to the meaning of the word.
18 In Bond v Barrow Haematite Steel Co [1902] 1 Ch 353, it was noted that no single definition of the term "profit" will fit all cases.
19 If the word "profits" was here intended to mean "trading profit" or an "accounting profit", ie a net or gross profit, then it would not fit very well with s 63(d)(i), because from the amount of "profits" must be deducted the reasonable cost of "collection". If "profits" meant "net profit", then the cost of collection would already be reflected in the "net profit".
20 The word "collection" also gives a hint as to the meaning of the word. The word "collection" can refer to the gathering of money, ie revenue.
21 In my opinion, the word "profits" is to be equated with "revenue".
22 On 27 October 1995 and for some weeks after 27 October 1995 until the factory was shut in December 1995, Arcus Shopfitters Pty Ltd earned revenue from the factory that operated on the land, even though it was revenue which, when added to revenue for the rest of the year and expenses for the year deducted, made no accounting profit for Arcus Shopfitters Pty Ltd for the relevant financial year.
23 Arcus Shopfitters Pty Ltd earned revenue from its business. The business was conducted on the land. The question is whether the land "produced" profits. This was not a question raised by the parties, but in my view it must be considered. The word "produce" can mean to cause or "cause to accrue" (see Macquarie Dictionary), and in my view that is the meaning here. The factory was on the land, and work was done in the factory on the land. Revenue was earned from the work done in the factory on the land. In my view, the land produced revenue, and therefore "profits".
Were Rents or Profits Received by the Respondent?
24 There is no suggestion that the respondent received any rent or profits from the day when the land was resumed.
25 The land ceased to produce profits when the factory was closed in December 1995.
26 As a result, interest has to be paid by the respondent as though the respondent had exercised the option provided in s 63(d)(ii): see s 63(d)(iii). Section 63(d)(ii) provides that interest shall be paid on the amount of compensation at the rate of 6 per cent per annum "or such higher rate as the respondent or the court considers adequate having regard to the circumstances of each case".
27 The respondent agrees that there should be a higher rate. It proposes interest as provided for in s 142 of the Supreme Court Act, namely interest at 8 per cent and later at 6 per cent.
28 The applicant suggests that I should exercise my discretion and increase the rate to 8 per cent through the whole period until payment is made in full.
29 I see no basis for departing from the rates prescribed for the purpose of s 142 of the Supreme Court Act 1935. That rate is struck with an eye on the movement of interest rates generally. I therefore determine that interest should be paid from the date in December 1995 when the factory was closed at the rates provided for under s 142 of the Supreme Court Act 1935.
30 Section 63(d) authorises the Court to order the payment of interest "on the amount of compensation". No authority is given to the Court to award interest on interest. An award of compound interest necessarily involves an award of interest on interest. As a result, the claim for compound interest is dismissed. In any event, the prayer for relief did not claim compound interest, and there would have to be proper particularisation of such a claim to specify whether compounding would occur annually or at some other interval. There were no such particulars.
Arcus Shopfitters Pty Ltd
Western Australian Planning Commission [2002] WASC 174
(1976) 12 ALR 201
(1986) 40 SASR 63
(1978) 20 SASR 176
(1947) 74 CLR 358
(1952) 87 CLR 159
(1972) 127 CLR 32
(1973) 5 SASR 301
(1981) 27 SASR 248
(1981) 27 SASR 258
(1971) 123 CLR 547
(2001) 180 ALR 351
(1982) 30 SASR 383
(1914) 18 CLR 634
(1957) 97 CLR 379
(1956) 95 CLR 245
(1907) 5 CLR 418
(1999) 74 ALJR 209
(1979) 21 SASR 513
(1985) 38 SASR 502
(1991) 27 NSWLR 156
(1989) 97 FLR 211
(1990) 101 FLR 386
(1953) 90 CLR 157
(2001) 52 NSWLR 705
(1995) 12 WAR 370
(1996) 15 WAR 1
(1945) 70 CLR 459
(1974) 48 ALJR 483
(1963) 110 CLR 538
(1990) 2 WAR 242
(1991) 4 WAR 469
(2001) 205 CLR 603
(1984) 52 ALR 24
(1994) 125 ALR 265