Appellant v Respondent

2 Section 17(1) of the Uniform Law sets out the prerequisites for the issue of a compliance certificate. They are:

17 Prerequisites for compliance certificates

(1) The prerequisites for the issue of a compliance certificate in respect of a person are that he or she -

(a) has attained the academic qualifications specified under the Admission Rules for the purposes of this section (the specified academic qualifications prerequisite); and

(b) has satisfactorily completed the practical legal training requirements specified in the Admission Rules for the purposes of this section (the specified practical legal training prerequisite); and

(c) is a fit and proper person to be admitted to the Australian legal profession.

3 There was no issue that subsections (1)(a) and (b) were met. Subsection (2) is relevant to the consideration of an applicant as a fit and proper person. It provides:

(2) In considering whether a person is a fit and proper person to be admitted to the Australian legal profession -

(a) the designated local regulatory authority may have regard to any matter relevant to the person's eligibility or suitability for admission, however the matter comes to its attention; and

(b) the designated local regulatory authority must have regard to the matters specified in the Admission Rules for the purposes of this section.

4 Section 26 of the Uniform Law provides a right of appeal:

(1) An applicant for a compliance certificate may appeal to the Supreme Court against the refusal of the designated local regulatory authority to issue a compliance certificate.

...

(4) The Supreme Court may make any order it considers appropriate on an appeal under this section.

5 The process of an appeal is governed by section 28, which provides:

(1) An appeal under this Division is to be by way of a rehearing, and fresh evidence or evidence in addition to or in substitution for the evidence before the designated local regulatory authority may be given on the appeal.

(2) On an appeal under this Division the Supreme Court may make an order as to the costs as it thinks fit, other than an order against the designated local regulatory authority in favour of an applicant where the appeal was not successful.

6 At the time that Ms Angeleska made her application, it was to be made to the Board of Examiners pursuant to the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic). On 1 July 2015, the Uniform Law came into force with respect to admission to the legal profession. From that date, her application has been treated as one seeking a compliance certificate under s 19 of the Uniform Law.

7 As outlined above, the legislation provides that an appeal is by way of rehearing. The nature of an appeal depends upon the terms of the statute conferring the right of appeal.[2] In considering the differing nature of appeals, it has been said that there is no definitive classification of appeals, merely descriptive phrases by which an appeal to one body may sometimes be conveniently distinguished from an appeal to another.[3] Conveniently, a distinction is often made between descriptions of a rehearing and a hearing de novo. On a rehearing generally a decision maker can exercise appellate powers only if satisfied that there was error on the part of the primary decision maker. This is to be contrasted with an appeal by way of hearing de novo, where the appellate body is required to exercise its power whether or not there was error at first instance.

8 In Cole & Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission, the Court noted that the power to take further evidence was indicative of an appeal by way of rehearing whereas a requirement that the appellate body 'make such order as it thought fit' was indicative of an appellate power not constrained by the need to identify error. As can be seen, the Uniform Law provides that an appeal is to be by way of a rehearing but it empowers the Supreme Court to make any order that it considers appropriate on an appeal.

9 This gives rise to a preliminary question whether or not it is necessary to identify error. There have been no decisions in Victoria of appeals made under s 26 of the Uniform Law. Previously in Victoria, an appeal against a decision of the Board of Examiners was provided for as a hearing de novo.[4]

10 I was referred to a line of authority in New South Wales,[5] where appeals under s 26 of the Uniform Law have been determined on the basis that, notwithstanding the language of s 26, an appeal was not constrained by a need to identify error.

11 This approach in New South Wales may have been informed by decisions that considered the previous New South Wales legislative scheme under which, despite the legislative description of an appeal as a rehearing, appeals were conducted as a hearing de novo. It is likely that such assumptions or agreements recognised the power of the Court to make any order as it saw fit was indicative of a hearing de novo despite the express legislative provision for a rehearing. In the matter of Jackson (previously known as Subramanian) v Legal Practitioners Admission Board,[6] Johnson J held that notwithstanding that the New South Wales legislation described an appeal as one by way of rehearing, it was common ground before him that an appeal proceeds by way of hearing de novo. He said on appeal the Court may make such order or declaration as it thinks fit:

The power to make such an order or declaration as the Court thinks fit indicates that the Court's appellate powers are not constrained by the need to find error on the part of the primary decision maker but, rather, that the Court is obliged to give its own decision on the evidence before it.[7]

In the New South Wales Court of Appeal, the bench observed without criticism the statutory description of the appeal, the common ground that the hearing was de novo and the trial judge's observation that he was not concerned with whether there had been an error of fact or law.[8]

12 There is some force to the Board's submission that the New South Wales authorities, proceeding on an assumption or an agreed position that an appeal is a hearing de novo, are not clearly wrong and should be followed. I accept this submission but observe in any event, in conformity with the observations of the High Court in Coal & Allied, what is to be looked at is the substance rather than the descriptor of the appeal. Where an appellate body is empowered to make such order as it thinks fit, the substance of the power is consistent with a descriptor of a hearing de novo. I would also observe that this would be consistent with the legislative history in Victoria which previously allowed for a hearing de novo.[9]

13 The Board is the named respondent. It submits that it appears as contradictor to assist the Court but does not oppose the application and makes no submission as to the ultimate question of whether the applicant is a fit and proper person. In taking this position the Board describes its role as that ascribed to the Board of Examiners under previous legislation and as was outlined by the Court of Appeal in Board of Examiners v XY.[10]

14 While this is a hearing de novo, it is appropriate to set out the basis upon which the delegate of the Board refused the compliance certificate and the grounds of appeal. The Board found:

Mrs Angeleska made her disclosure to the Board over the course of ten affidavits and five-and-a-half years. Despite that, her disclosure, initially and cumulatively, was inadequate.[11]

The Board concluded that despite it being explained to the applicant through correspondence and directions hearings that her disclosure was inadequate, those inadequacies were not addressed, and in her oral evidence before the Board it found that she did not demonstrate any real understanding of why her disclosure was inadequate. Second, it found that the applicant largely attributed her past conduct to lack of understanding of the law and that, having completed her law degree and practical legal training, she now understands that her past conduct was unacceptable. The Board found it difficult to accept assurances that such conduct would not be repeated and was not satisfied that Mrs Angeleska had real insight into her past behaviour. Third, she did not adequately address the finding of the Court of Appeal that she was incapable of complying with costs orders.

15 Ms Angeleska contends that the Board was wrong; she has satisfied her burden of proof that she is a fit and proper person, that the Board failed to take into account her rare intelligence in a difficult position,[12] that she has had no finding of dishonesty against her, and that she did understand her duty of disclosure and the need to voluntarily comply with it.

16 The purpose of a requirement that those admitted as legal practitioners are 'fit and proper' persons is a protective purpose. It serves to protect the public in their dealings with and representation by lawyers, and it protects the public interest in the proper administration of justice.[13]

17 The relationship between legal practitioner and client obliges the practitioner to act in the interest of the client and obliges the practitioner to keep confidential the privileged information imparted by the client. To do so requires both knowledge of the law and the exercise of independent judgment. The public interest in the proper administration of justice demands that courts can rely with absolute confidence on the integrity and honesty of legal practitioners. The standard of fitness is determined by these qualities expected of those practicing law. The Court and the Board exercise their judgment, and thereby control those who may practice law. As was said by Moffitt P in Re B:

A person can only be judged by what he has done and what he has professed in the past and, properly judged, what he claims of himself when he makes an application for admission... Character does not change readily and an application for admission or readmission may have some difficulty in persuading a court that his past character or a past outlook manifested by conduct or the profession of ideas which were incompatible with being a barrister, have changed.[14]

After referring to student exuberance and the development of character with maturity he went on:

Despite what I have said, a very real question may arise as to present fitness in some cases where the particular past conduct and attitudes beyond youth and towards maturity constitute a sustained course of conduct which would have been quite incompatible with their being a barrister.[15]

18 The exercise of a power to admit to the profession is a positive determination that the Court is justified in holding out the individual as a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of a legal practitioner. A conclusion that a person is not presently a fit and proper person for admission to legal practice is not punitive but an acknowledgment that an applicant does not presently meet the burden of establishing the requisite character.

19 The trust and confidence in a legal practitioner, whether relied on by the public or by a Court, relies partly on the honesty of the practitioner. But it is also reliant on an exercise of judgment and an insight into the effect and consequences of the manner in which the legal duties are undertaken. The phrase 'fit and proper' gives wide scope for matters of judgment. It is a holistic inquiry not simply looking at conduct or character, but involves three essential things: honesty, knowledge and ability.[16] It is worth repeating the description as quoted by Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Webb JJ as to these three things essential to fitness for office:

... honesty to execute it truly, without malice, affection or partiality; knowledge to know what he ought duly to do; and the ability...that he may intend and execute his office, when need is, diligently, and not for impotency or poverty, neglect it.[17]

20 The disclosure requirement itself is relevant to the question of fit and proper. It is clear that an applicant must disclose with candour anything she honestly believes is relevant and do so in a way that is complete and not deliberately selective or misrepresentative. In XY v Board of Examiners, Habersberger J said:

Sometimes it is the failure to disclose some past events which is the basis of a finding that an applicant is not a fit and proper person to be admitted rather than the past event itself.[18]

21 A distinction may be drawn between reputation and character showing the importance of candour. In Re Davis, Latham CJ said:

A man may be guilty of grave wrongdoing and may subsequently become a man of good character. If the appellant had frankly disclosed to the Board and to the two solicitors the fact of his conviction, that disclosure would have greatly assisted him in an endeavour to show that he had retrieved his character. But his failure to make such disclosure in itself, apart from the conviction, excludes any possibility of holding that he was [at the time of conviction], or had become [by the time of seeking admission], a man of good character.[19]

22 A non-disclosure may be deliberate, going to the heart of the need for candour. Where not deliberate, it may amount to an error of judgment, or an oversight. In such circumstances the non-disclosure is a matter of weight. In attributing weight, at least the following are relevant; the nature of the information, whether and in what circumstances it was brought to the attention of the Board and ultimately disclosed, and whether what is eventually disclosed is capable of leading to a finding of unfitness for admission.[20]

23 Ms Angeleska's past demonstrates a significant involvement in litigation representing herself and assisting her husband (Mr Slaveski) in litigation undertaken by him. There is no suggestion that she did so other than with the court's knowledge that she was at the time without legal training or admission to practice. Nevertheless her conduct in so doing bears upon the question of whether she is now a fit and proper person for admission to practice.

Litigation in which the applicant has had an involvement

24 The circumstances of Ms Angeleska are somewhat unusual in that she has had a lengthy and quite complicated involvement as a participant in various litigation over a lengthy period of time. The way that she has conducted herself in that litigation is obviously relevant to the question of whether she is now a fit and proper person to be admitted to legal practice. For clarity, I shall summarise the position. I shall refer to Mr Slaveski's various proceedings and others only insofar as they bear on the question of Ms Angeleska's conduct.[21]

25 Mr Slaveski commenced a proceeding claiming damages against Victoria Police. Thirteen incidents were alleged, the first on 8 September 2000 and the last on 7 May 2007. There were twenty three defendants, all but one being individual police officers. Mr Slaveski suffered from a panic disorder and other mental illnesses and the extent to which incidents worsened these conditions was one of many matters in dispute. The trial occupied a total of 115 sitting days. He represented himself during the first phase of the trial, between August and December 2009. Ms Angeleska also assisted her husband as a Mackenzie friend.[22] Ms Angeleska was also a witness for the plaintiff having been present for many of the incidents and gave evidence over twenty five days. During the second phase, between February and August 2010, Ms Angeleska was appointed as litigation guardian and acted as lay advocate. Her appointment as litigation guardian took place shortly before the conclusion of her evidence under cross examination. Justice Kyrou provided detailed reasons as to why it was necessary to do so.[23] He also required Ms Angeleska to obtain independent legal advice as to the role and responsibilities of a litigation guardian.

26 In his principal reasons, Kyrou J set out a number of observations about Ms Angeleska's conduct as litigation guardian and lay advocate.[24] He accepted that it was a difficult task given the complexity of the case and her lack of legal training. He praised her persistence and courage. In my view the judge made a number of criticisms that went beyond failings that might stem from a lack of legal training. He observed that she asked questions of witnesses that were aimed at embarrassing witnesses or which contained 'not-so-subtle threats' that a witness would be sued. He said that she 'put matters to witnesses without any factual foundation and irresponsibly accused all but four of the 40 witnesses she cross examined of lying to the Court.' On occasion the judge said she became argumentative and continued to be so despite an explanation as to why the conduct was improper and a warning not to continue. Time limits set by the judge for examination of witnesses were not observed, delays were occasioned by her conduct or late advised non-attendance at court, and occasions where she made speeches 'for the record'.

27 As a witness his Honour described her evidence as 'generally clear, direct and robust', showing a strong loyalty to Mr Slaveski and his case, and demonstrating a heavy involvement in the preparation of the case. His Honour did not have regard to her conduct as litigation guardian or lay advocate in assessing her evidence. He concluded that on some aspects there was a genuine recollection and he accepted her evidence. On other aspects he said her evidence was 'rehearsed, self-serving, selective and exaggerated. Some parts were improvised, while others were simply fanciful'.[25]

28 Mr Slaveski's claim succeeded in respect of one incident on 13 December 2005 and he awarded $28,300 in compensatory damages. As litigation guardian, Ms Angeleska filed an appeal from the judgment of Kyrou.[26] The appeal was stayed pending payment of security for costs by her. The time to pay the security was extended at Ms Angeleska's request, based upon an affidavit that she was attending to the sale of property to access funds. The security for costs order was not complied with. When the court proposed listing the appeal for a dismissal application, Mr Slaveski wrote to the Court regarding cheques that he had sent to various judicial officers in July 2012, 'for the case to be heard' which matter had been referred for investigation to the police at the time.

29 Ms Angeleska swore an affidavit on 31 January 2013 in which she stated that she had been 'sacked' by Mr Slaveski as litigation guardian and that the sale of property to fund the security had occurred in June 2012. That affidavit also dealt with Mr Slaveski having sent the cheques to judges. The Court said:

In her affidavit of 31 January 2013, Mrs Slaveska deposes that Mr Slaveski told her that he had sent the cheques to the judges because he was sure that the money was safe and could not trust the Supreme Court registry. She says she 'did not think anything of that because they were legit cheques and for a 'legit' reason'.[27]

There is no acceptable explanation as to why the six cheques were sent. This flagrantly disregarded the terms of the order, which very clearly specified the Court officers who were to be the recipients and custodians of the security. We do not accept that Mrs Slaveska did not understand that the orders required the money to be paid to the Prothonotary or the Senior Master. Further, having been advised that the security had not been provided, Mrs Slaveska could have used the balance of the proceeds of sale of the Heyington Ave property in order to provide security in the manner ordered. Further, the conduct demonstrated the obvious incapacity of both Mr Slaveski and Mrs Slaveska to comply with the orders of the Court.[28]

30 A costs order against Ms Angeleska was made and the appeal dismissed for want of prosecution. An application for special leave to the High Court was refused.

31 The first contempt proceeding arising out of events on 2 June 2010 had been heard by Whelan J in November and December 2011.[29] In part Mr Slaveski was legally represented and in part he was self-represented. Ms Angeleska was involved in that trial as a witness and her evidence included reviewing and commenting on the video recording on the courtroom on 2 June 2010 and identifying errors in the transcript. His Honour accepted her evidence on all but one of the transcript corrections. He otherwise concluded, giving her the benefit of the doubt, that her evidence had misinterpreted what had occurred between her husband and a Public Service Officer. Having found the contempt proven a plea was heard. In the plea, Ms Angeleska swore an affidavit on 17 January 2012.

32 In 2012, the Attorney General sought to have Mr Slaveski declared a vexatious litigant. Williams J heard that application between June and September 2013 and delivered judgment on 25 February 2014.[30] In that application Mr Slaveski at first appeared in person and Mr Glick QC ultimately appeared amicus curiae in support of him. Ms Angeleska was present throughout the trial and assisted with preparation of the case. The trial was adjourned part heard to consider whether his mental health was such that Mr Slaveski had become a person under a disability. Mr Glick QC represented that he would appear for Mr Slaveski through the pro bono Bar scheme and would take instructions from Ms Angeleska who was then appointed litigation guardian. An adjournment was granted to allow for preparation of relevant material. At the resumed hearing some five weeks later following an altercation between Mr Slaveski and court officers in which Mr Slaveski alleged a gun was drawn, Ms Angeleska dismissed Mr Glick QC and she and Mr Slaveski failed to attend the remainder of the hearing. Mr Slaveski left Australia. It was in those circumstances that Mr Glick QC appeared amicus curiae providing submissions to the Court as he would have made on Mr Slaveski's behalf. Her Honour made the declaration.

33 An attempt was made to file a notice of appeal and a summons seeking extension of time to apply for leave to appeal was filed naming Mr Slaveski as appellant in his own right. Amended relief sought the appointment of Ms Angeleska as litigation guardian in the proceeding. The Court of Appeal refused the application to be appointed litigation guardian and, given the plaintiff remained absent from Australia, dismissed the summons seeking an extension of time and leave to Appeal without adjudication on the merits.[31]

34 The Attorney General also commenced contempt proceedings against Mr Slaveski in August 2013 (the second contempt proceeding).[32] This related to the sending of cheques and other contact with judicial officers or solicitors that were threatening and intimidatory. The second contempt proceeding was heard by King J who delivered judgment on 12 August 2015. Ms Angeleska appeared at many interlocutory occasions as Mr Slaveski was not in Australia. On occasion she gave instructions to counsel appearing for Mr Slaveski pro bono. She made submissions on sentence dated 15 August 2015 as his wife. Mr Slaveski was convicted and sentenced. An appeal against conviction and sentence was attempted. It appears that Ms Angeleska attended to filing the appeal documents as Mr Slaveski remained absent from Australia. The appeal was dismissed without adjudication of the merits as Mr Slaveski remained absent from and refused to submit to the jurisdiction.[33] The Court of Appeal noted 'scandalous content' in the proposed grounds that the applicant was 'convicted in conspiracy'.[34] Leave to appeal was refused.

35 Ms Angeleska commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court on 24 November 2011. As plaintiff, she sought damages arising from occasions between 8 September 2000 and 1 July 2010. The 17 incidents and the 25 defendants included a large number of incidents and defendants in common with the Slaveski proceeding in which Kyrou J had given judgment on 1 October 2010. The Angeleska proceeding was largely summarily dismissed by Lansdowne AsJ on 1 November 2013 on the basis that all but three incidents relied on were statute barred and leave to extend time was refused. Two incidents were struck out with leave to replead and one incident survived. Apart from the limitation point, the defendants' summons dealt with whether the claims were estopped or disclosed any cause of action. Dismissal on those grounds failed. A costs order was made that Ms Angeleska pay 50% of the defendants' costs of the defendants' summons and of her own summons extending time. The plaintiff represented herself.

36 The orders of Lansdowne AsJ was appealed by Ms Angeleska (the Angeleska appeal).[35] Both the finding that some incidents were time barred (those seeking damages other than for personal injury) and the decision not to extend time in respect of those incidents that were statute barred were appealed as was the costs order. The hearing occurred on 7 November 2014. The Court of Appeal (Warren CJ, Tate JA and Ginnane AJA) published reasons on 10 June 2015 concluding that although claims for damages for personal injury were time barred, some claims sought relief not related to personal injury and to that extent only, those claims survived. The Court then considered whether the claims for the remaining incidents were an abuse of process and said that they were. Two factors underpinned this conclusion. First, the writ was issued over a year after the delivery of reasons by Kyrou J and no satisfactory explanation for the delay had been offered. Second, the claims attempted to relitigate controversies that have already been resolved in a proceeding where although Ms Angeleska was not a party, she was intimately involved. The Court concluded that the appearance of and the actuality of such a degree of re-litigation would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Leave was also refused to appeal the costs order made by the Associate Justice. Costs of the appeal were ordered against Ms Angeleska. Special leave to the High Court was refused.

37 The end result was that claims in respect of three incidents remained on foot and a fourth incident in a limited way. The Angeleska proceeding was then adjourned on a number of occasions to permit amendments to be prepared and considered. The defendants brought on a summons seeking orders for payment of a past costs order in their favour. Finally the Associate Justice refused several amendments to the statement of claim and ordered that Ms Angeleska pay an interlocutory costs order made against her of $19,000 in relation to those past costs. Her proceeding was stayed pending payment of the costs order. In her reasons, Lansdowne AsJ said:

I infer from the nature of her responses that the plaintiff's refusal of offers put is not because of the strength of her commitment to her claims in this proceeding or disagreement with the amount proposed by way of costs, but because she sought to use the refusal, with the necessary consequence of further delay and cost if the proceeding continues or if a taxation is undertaken, as leverage in her desire to avoid or reduce her liability for the costs in her husband's proceeding.[36]

38 These orders were also appealed. J Forrest J, after hearing and dismissing the appeal, ordered that the Angeleska proceeding be summarily dismissed if she failed to pay the $19,000 costs order within a three month period. The claim was given a hearing date in the event that the costs were paid. The costs were not paid.

39 Ms Angeleska disclosed assisting her mother-in-law in County Court proceedings relating to a property in Macedonia sold to her mother-in-law by the defendant (the Elenchevski proceeding). Her disclosure did not deal with an affidavit filed in that proceeding in June 2010 that deposed to her belief that her mother-in-law's previous solicitor had conspired with the defendant's solicitor so that her mother in law would be unrepresented at trial 'so they can get costs against her'. The judge observed that the material provided little basis for this conclusion which demonstrated that Ms Angeleska may find it difficult to remain detached from the issues so as to give proper consideration of what might be in her mother-in-law's best interests.[37]

40 John Dixon J heard an appeal from the Magistrates' Court order for payment of outstanding legal fees to Rotstein & Associates associated with acting in proceedings brought against Mr Slaveski by the Commonwealth Bank. Ms Angeleska advanced an application that his Honour disqualify himself on the ground of apprehended bias if he held any Commonwealth Bank shares. The application alleged a conspiracy between the Commonwealth Bank's lawyers and Rotstein & Associates acting for Mr Slaveski which his Honour described as 'scurrilous' and 'unsupported by evidence'.[38]

41 Criminal charges were brought in respect of the altercation with police in Sydney 2010. While the fact of the charges and the eventual outcome was initially disclosed, nothing was disclosed of two judicial review proceedings commenced in the NSW Supreme Court in relation to those criminal proceedings. The first, commenced in April 2011, sought an order compelling transfer of the listed committal proceeding from Burwood Local Court to the Downing Centre Local Court, application for which had been refused by the Magistrate. The basis for the application and the relief sought from the Supreme Court was a claim of unfair treatment by each of three Magistrates who had occasion to deal with the matter since charges were filed in November 2010, such that adverse judicial attitude towards Mr Slaveski and Ms Angeleska meant that they could not get a fair hearing. On 22 August 2011, when the hearing before Fullerton J proceeded, a 'paper committal' was scheduled for the following day. Before her Honour, transcripts and audio-recordings of the various Local Court applications were tendered. Her Honour concluded:

After considering the evidence and hearing oral argument from the plaintiffs to supplement their written submissions, I am not persuaded that there is any foundation in fact or any proper basis in law for the order sought by the summons. It is simply not a function of this Court in its supervisory jurisdiction to review the listing practices of the Local Court whether to meet the needs of unrepresented litigants or to indulge the perception of some that they have been treated unfairly because the court has not done as they have asked.[39]

42 Her Honour made orders dismissing the proceeding on 23 August 2011. Thereafter on 8 September 2011 Mr Slaveski and Ms Angeleska commenced a further action in the NSW Supreme Court, appealing and seeking judicial review of an order made on 3 May 2011 refusing their application to have the police witnesses give oral evidence at the committal proceeding.[40]

43 By February 2012, a number of charges were withdrawn or amended so that what remained were charges to be dealt with summarily. There would no longer be a committal hearing. At a directions hearing shortly after this Mr Slaveski and Ms Angeleska (appearing by telephone) were asked to consider whether they intend to discontinue and were given a time by which to respond. They advised they wished to continue. The second defendant sought summary dismissal of the proceeding and this was listed for hearing. By email, Ms Angeleska advised she was unaware of the hearing date (16 July 2012) and requested an adjournment advising the court that she and her husband would be absent from Australia in July and August 2012. Beech-Jones J said

In considering the application for adjournment, it must be remembered that these are proceedings brought by the plaintiffs. In commencing proceedings they assumed a responsibility to conduct them expeditiously. ... Moreover, in this case, adjourning a proceeding which has become futile is not in any party's interest nor is it in the "interests of justice".[41]

44 Against this information above I will set out the disclosure made by the appellant in her affidavits and in her viva voce evidence both before the Committee and before me.

The matters disclosed by Ms Angeleska and the circumstances under which they were disclosed

45 Mrs Angeleska swore her disclosure affidavit on 3 June 2015. She swore nine subsequent affidavits detailing further disclosures. Many of those nine subsequent affidavits responded to requests for further information made by the Board or addressed updated events as to disclosed matters or new events. Seven were substantive and two affidavits (the fourth and fifth) corrected administrative errors in the attachment of exhibits. The first affidavit set out biographical details, academic qualifications and the Leo Cussen Institute practical legal training. The applicant was born in 1972 in Macedonia. She came to Australia in 1992. She has three children. She completed secondary schooling after arrival in Australia and underwent tertiary education.

11. On or about January 2010, I was appointed a litigation guardian by his Honour Kyrou J of the Supreme Court of Victoria in relation to a civil case that my husband had (Slaveski v State of Victoria).[42] It was a case against 23 serving and former police members. I was appointed his litigation guardian and was also his lay advocate for conducting the matter. His Honour Kyrou J was the hearing judge in the case. I spent considerable time during this trial in the Supreme Court. I was also called and known as Mrs Slaveska. The evidence was finalised on 22 June 2010, and his Honour adjourned the case until August 2010 for submissions. A decision/judgment was made on 1 October 2010.

12. On or about 10 December 2010, there was a further hearing in relation to costs. I was ordered to pay part cost of the defendants on the basis that I was the litigation guardian for the plaintiff.

13. I also have my own civil proceeding[43] in which I am seeking damages and am currently awaiting an outcome from the Court of Appeal...

14. I have also been in the County Court and Supreme Court of Appeal assisting a family member (my mother-in-law) but only with leave of the Court.

15. On or about July 2010, my family and I went to Sydney NSW to visit my husband who was in Sydney. The first night we arrived there we were pulled up by two police officers allegedly for a seatbelt matter.

47 The affidavit thereafter sets out the events that occurred in July 2010, the making of a complaint about the police conduct to the New South Wales Police Chief Commissioner, the laying of charges against her and the eventual withdrawal of those charges. The affidavit also disclosed an overpayment from Centrelink which she was repaying, a Myki fine from the Department of Transport which was paid and an extract of History of Speeding Fines.

48 A week after that affidavit, the applicant met with representatives of the Board. She was asked about a document from Latrobe University recording a finding of academic misconduct in 2010 during her Bachelor of Arts degree. That finding related to the submission of work with substantially copied content. The second affidavit sworn 6 July 2015 dealt with the failure to disclose this information, the explanation being that having organised for the document from Latrobe University to be sent direct to the Board and believing that the Board received the document directly, she believed that it was not necessary for her to refer to it in her sworn affidavit. The affidavit also dealt with the fact that Ms Angeleska appealed the misconduct finding.

49 The Board then sought particulars and supporting documentation by letter dated 27 July 2015. The letter set out further particulars about her disclosed involvement as litigation guardian and advocate in the Slaveski proceeding seeking her response to observations of Kyrou J of her conduct at particular paragraphs in the judgment. The letter also sought further information in relation to the situation regarding the costs orders made against her, further details of the Angeleska proceeding against the State of Victoria as referred to in her first disclosure affidavit, further details of assistance provided to her mother-in-law in the County Court proceeding and details of the complaint filed with the New South Wales Police Chief Commissioner.

50 The letter also raised a number of matters that had not been the subject of disclosure. Events in court on 2 June 2010 before Kyrou J led to a contempt proceeding against Mr Slaveski (the first contempt proceeding).[44] The Board made reference to the observations of Whelan J in that proceeding and requested she respond to those observations. It sought information in relation to a proceeding before John Dixon J where she had been given limited leave to appear on behalf of Mr Slaveski to make an application for recusal on the grounds of apprehended bias.[45] It invited her to comment on the observations of John Dixon J in that judgment that she had made allegations of a conspiracy. It also requested comment in relation to a Court of Appeal observation about an affidavit sworn by her on 21 July 2014 in the appeal against the order of Williams J that Mr Slaveski be declared a vexatious litigant. The Court of Appeal described her affidavit and the transcript it exhibited as incomplete and as distorting the hearing before King J (the second contempt proceeding arising from the sending of the cheques to judges and other conduct).[46]

51 In response, Ms Angeleska made a third affidavit of disclosure, sworn on 23 September 2015. As to her role as a lay advocate and litigation guardian for her husband in the Slaveski proceeding she deposed:

I was a lay advocate acting for Mr Slaveski (who had a mental illness, as was not capable to run his own trial). I was my self a natural person, who had not studied law. At that time I was in the middle of my Arts degree. Yes I do agree that some questions were embarrassing, and that I had put questions to the witnesses without any factual foundation, but I was not legally trained. I was trying to prove a case in which I was a victim also. As a person back then I could not tell the difference between what is right to ask witnesses and what is wrong. I am a human being and I might have made mistakes, but everything I said or done, I believed at the time was right. Sometimes I would ask questions as I was told by Mr Slaveski as it was his case and I thought it was right at the time. I did the best I could.[47]

She did not accept that she had threatened any witness and maintained that her initial disclosure was one of 'the whole judgment'. I understood this to be maintaining a belief that it was adequate. She also deposed that these events occurred two years prior to commencing her law degree. She drew the Board's attention to other positive comments made by his Honour as to the difficult task she faced, the lack of legal training and his observation that 'I have no doubt that no other lay advocate could have done a better job in presenting his case'.[48] She otherwise provided copies of transcript, including transcript of her apology to Justice Kyrou and elaborated in response to particular questions. In relation to costs of the Slaveski proceeding, she deposed that no quantum had been provided nor any demand for payment made. In her own proceeding she disclosed that an adverse costs order had been made on 13 August 2015 since her earlier affidavits and that she had sought special leave to appeal that order.

52 She made two new disclosures. The first related to events on 12 August 2015 when she appeared before King J to hear judgment in a contempt proceeding against Mr Slaveski (the second contempt proceeding).[49] The hearing before King J arose out of events at court on 16 September 2013 in the course of a hearing to determine whether Mr Slaveski be declared a vexatious litigant. The affidavit of 21 July 2014 was produced. The third affidavit also attached the written submissions made by her in her capacity as his wife in relation to sentencing. The second matter related to an RSPCA charge in September 2015 for animal cruelty. The fifth affidavit exhibited material received by the NSW Police and noted that the summary of charges was contested and a plea of not guilty entered.

53 A special hearing was anticipated. Ms Angeleska asked whether the Board sought any further clarification. In response, a letter dated 13 November 2015 set out a number of considerations that were likely to be raised during her evidence. Those six matters were:

(a) whether her disclosure about the proceeding before Kyrou J was adequate in light of the findings about her own evidence at the trial;

(b) whether she fully understood the serious nature of allegations she made at the trial before Kyrou J that witnesses were corrupt, participated in conspiracies and fabricated evidence;

(c) the extent to which she has accepted the decision of Kyrou J in light of subsequent acts including steps taken to appeal it, allegations made subsequently in the statement of claim in her own proceeding and submissions in the Angeleska proceeding;

(d) having given sworn evidence as to a conspiracy on the part of Victoria Police, whether she still holds that belief, and if so on what basis;

(e) any further matters on the risk of insolvency should the adverse costs orders be enforced; and

(f) any explanation for appealing the academic misconduct finding.[50]

54 A sixth affidavit was sworn 22 December 2015 responding to these matters. In explanation provided in the sixth affidavit, sworn 22 December 2015, the applicant deposed:

As I have stated in my previous Affidavits that disclosing to the Board my involvement in the Slaveski Matter was my fully disclosure [sic] and I had nothing to hide that is the reason I disclose the whole of the case. I respect and accept His Honours decision.

I can not dispute what His Honour said. That Judgment was in relation to the case before His Honour not in general character about me. At the time I had no legal training and did not understand the proper procedure which I know [sic] do.

I do not believe I lied when I gave evidence, I gave evidence what I saw at the shop. I must respect what His Honour's view was and I can not argue with a Judge, but believed I was telling the truth. I disclosed to the Board everything that I possibly could.

I understand now that unless you have 100% evidence you should not allege anything at Court, but back in 2010 I was not aware of that.[51]

...

I appealed the J Kyrou decision but it was dismissed due to non-payment of security for costs, so the Appeal was never heard.

The submissions made to Associate Justice Lansdowne were that I am a different plaintiff and not the same as Mr Slaveski. The defendants argued that I should not be allowed to sue as it will be [the] same judgment, but my submission was it cannot be the same as we are different people and different decisions will be made.[52]

...

The Board further is asking whether I believe there is still such a conspiracy. My answer to that is that: yes in 2010 I believe there was a conspiracy, but having said there was and proving that it is two different issues, and I accept His Honours decision.[53]

55 The outstanding costs issues were dealt with by saying there had been no demand to pay and the costs had not been taxed. Finally she dealt with the academic misconduct.

56 At a directions hearing in February 2016 where Mr Gillies appeared pro bono for Ms Angeleska, the conduct of a special hearing and various issues to be canvassed by the evidence were discussed. It seems a further directions hearing was contemplated but not fixed.

57 On 28 August 2018, a seventh disclosure affidavit was sworn. It served to update matters since the February 2016 directions hearing. It deposed to efforts to obtain work with a law firm which had thus far been unsuccessful. It deposed to ongoing negotiations with Victorian Government Solicitor's Office regarding the costs liability for the Slaveski proceeding and the further developments in the Angeleska proceeding. She described having to travel to Germany during the second half of 2016 because of Mr Slaveski's circumstances there, and his return to Victoria in early 2017. She disclosed the outcome of the RSPCA charge having completed a diversion order.

58 In March 2019, the Board sought an update on the situation regarding any outstanding costs orders and an eighth affidavit was sworn in response on 13 May 2019 as to costs. The affidavit set out the present position which was that the costs orders remained outstanding. The Board then wrote to the Victorian Government Solicitor's Office to ascertain the current status of the outstanding costs orders. The response received was that the Victorian Government Solicitor's Office was awaiting instructions regarding enforcement. The Board informed Ms Angeleska of this and informed her that the Board considered costs owed to Victoria Police was a 'threshold matter' and her application would not be considered until the costs issue was resolved. By her ninth affidavit sworn on 21 July 2020, the resolution of the outstanding costs in relation to the Angeleska proceeding was outlined and payment in accordance with the plan in the Terms of Settlement had commenced.

59 The Board then sought information regarding outstanding costs in the Slaveski proceeding, information about other costs issues including whether she had made a statement of intent not to comply with costs orders in 2010. It sought further information regarding review litigation in NSW associated with the conduct of the criminal charges which had not specifically been disclosed, and an affidavit sworn by her referred to in the Elenchevski proceeding in which she alleged conspiracy by a solicitor. The Board sought copies of various other affidavits and documentation regarding recusal applications. It also requested two character statements from persons who could attest 'to any changes in [her] character since [she had] completed [her] legal studies and ceased being engaged in litigation'.

60 In the tenth affidavit she deposed that there had been no agreement as to costs reached in the Slaveski proceeding and that she understood recovery of costs to now be statute barred. She deposed 'At present I have resolved all outstanding costs orders against me.' In relation to the NSW litigation she said she 'had referred to these matters on 3 June 2015 when I advised the Board. I was unaware that these matters were in some way different and believe them all to be part of one proceeding.' As to the matters of an allegation of conspiracy by a solicitor in the Elenchevski proceeding, the recusal applications made before Dixon J and Kyrou J, any statement of intention not to comply with costs orders, each of which were subject of a request for documents, she simply advised that she no longer had any documents from those proceedings.

61 In relation to the question of Lansdowne AsJ's finding of an improper motive for protracting the Angeleska proceeding, she deposed confirming that the email chain exhibited to her earlier affidavit was all correspondence in evidence before Lansdowne AsJ:

The correspondence being SSA1 in my affidavit of 13 May 2019 I believe includes all the correspondence and evidence before Lansdowne AsJ in Angeleska v Victoria (2016) VSC 568. There is no further correspondence in my possession and, the proceeding is finalised and settled now.[54]

62 She deposed to have had no prior knowledge of her husband sending cheques to the judges and that there had been no finding of contempt for him having done so. She otherwise deposed generally to no longer having any documentation, by way of transcript, statements or copy affidavits available. Finally, as to the events in Court before Williams J on 16 September 2013, she deposed:

On 16 September 2013, Mr Slaveski had a court case before a Judge in court room 7 of the Supreme Court of Victoria. I was his litigation guardian. Leslie Glick QC appeared on Mr Slaveski's behalf. At the time of the incident I had no involvement. When the security came and pulled out guns and Tasers on Mr Slaveski, they asked me and everybody to step back and leave the court room. Before I did, I asked them to stop and I asked Mr Slaveski to leave immediately before a firearm is discharged. I do recall grabbing him by the hand and we left immediately. Since then, Mr Slaveski left the country and did not return until January 2017 as set out in previous affidavits. This incident was very unusual and unexpected. In my belief it was a miscommunication with unnecessary force being used. I was fearful to return that day as I was in shock and shaking from the fear of guns.[55]

63 The affidavit was a literal response to the request, which mostly asked for documentary evidence relevant to particular issues. It did not attempt to provide further explanation in relation to the issues of concern that were identified.

64 The Board then delegated its powers to the Victorian Legal Admissions Committee who conducted a hearing on 19 April 2021. Its decision was provided on 1 June 2021 accompanied by its reasons.

65 The reasons identified that significant matters relevant to the assessment of whether she is a fit and proper person arose in the following litigation; the Slaveski proceeding and the Slaveski appeal, the Angeleska proceeding and the Angeleska appeal, litigation arising from criminal matters in NSW from the incident in Sydney in July 2010, the County Court proceeding brought by her mother-in-law, and the proceeding before John Dixon J involving the dispute between Mr Slaveski and solicitors he had previously instructed in relation to payment of their legal costs. The Board concluded:

Ms Angeleska made her disclosure to the Board over the course of ten affidavits and five and a half years. Despite that, her disclosure, initially and cumulatively, was inadequate.[56]

66 It relied on two propositions as to that inadequacy. They were:

First, the process of disclosure to the Committee looks to an applicant to give full and frank disclosure of their own volition, not to drip feed information as requested in a piecemeal and undeveloped manner. It was not the involvement in litigation itself, which cast a negative light upon Ms Angeleska's fitness to be admitted to the legal profession. It was the manner in which she had conducted the litigation and the adverse judicial findings that had been made about her.[57]

Ms Angeleska's affidavits of disclosure contain very little in the way of reflection on her past conduct. She accepts in her affidavits that she made mistakes in the past and attributes them to her lack of legal training at the time. She says that she regrets her past conduct and would not repeat it.[58]

67 Therefore, the Committee sought to understand Ms Angeleska's insight into her behaviour and her understanding of the reasons why aspects of her conduct were unacceptable at the hearing which was conducted over an audio-visual link on 19 April 2021. She explained that by disclosing the fact of her role as litigation guardian in the Slaveski proceeding she believed all other matters were covered by that disclosure because the judgments were publicly available. In 2015 when making the disclosure, having completed her law degree, she confirmed that she did what she thought was right in 2010 as someone without any legal training, and in 2015 she simply disclosed that which she thought was right at the time. As to her conduct in the Slaveski proceeding, she said she agreed it was wrong, was embarrassed now by what she had done, was regretful of it and apologised at the conclusion of the trial to Kyrou J. When asked not about the conduct itself, but about her disclosure of that conduct, she said she now understood that she should have given more details. She repeated a number of times an assurance that the behaviour, now seen to be wrong, will not be repeated. She said had not disclosed the NSW litigation or its details, as she had forgotten them.[59]

68 There was no explanation given as to what she now understood about her conduct, or why she no longer thought her actions were right. She was asked about the Court of Appeal not accepting her affidavit evidence that she did not know where the costs were to be sent in compliance with the order for payment of security for costs. She said 'I did what I thought was right at the time, but it will not happen. Now I know how to deal with an order'.[60] She found it difficult to answer how, as a legal practitioner, she would go about evaluating whether or not a client was saying something upon which she should act. She was asked about instituting appeals, in circumstances where she has previously instituted appeals both with prospects of success and with no reasonable prospect of success and agreed that there was a need for a legal practitioner to show discernment when advising on appeals.

69 In relation to costs, she accepted she was wrong as to the costs recovery being statute barred. She was asked to reconcile the fact of an outstanding costs order against her with being admitted and becoming an officer of the Court. Her answer was that, not having been asked to pay, she said rhetorically 'how am I going to pay?'[61]

70 In relation to the finding of Lansdowne AsJ referred to above at [37], she was asked why this wasn't mentioned in her subsequent affidavits and only referred to in the tenth affidavit, only to say the matters were finalised and settled. She said 'obviously in your view I'm wrong and I accept that'.[62]

71 She confirmed that it remains her view that she gave truthful evidence before Kyrou J but she accepts that the judge did not believe her. Of her own case she described the ultimate outcome as having settled it.[63] She said that she had honestly produced everything asked of her to the best of her ability and that she wants to put the past behind her and get on with her life.

72 Mr Glick QC also gave evidence. He described having professional dealings with her on two occasions. Once in 2011 when he acted pro bono for Mr Slaveski in an action where the Commonwealth Bank was seeking possession of premises. Although technically acting for Mr Slaveski, Ms Angeleska attended with him and in reality provided real assistance in giving instructions and controlling her husband's behaviour. He thought she was instrumental in the outcome that was able to be achieved. Second, as outlined earlier he appeared pro bono in relation to the application to have Mr Slaveski declared a vexatious litigant. Again, Mr Glick QC described her admirable behaviour in controlling her husband's erratic behaviour. He described being fired by Mr Slaveski. Since that time he has had no further dealings with Ms Angeleska other than some contact in relation to her daughter who was a law student. Mr Glick QC had not been asked to read the disclosure affidavit material and comment on the question of fit and proper but to simply explain his professional involvement and impressions gained from the two cases. From his own observations he supports her application to be a lawyer.

73 Before me, also by audio-visual link, Ms Angeleska gave viva voce evidence. As to her questioning of witnesses in the Slaveski proceeding she described the experience as being thrown into the fire and she apologised saying she did not know then, but knew now that an accusation of lying without a proper basis should not be made. If asked now to make similar allegations against a witness, she said she would get advice from her senior principal or from a barrister before acting on such instructions. She described herself as a 'changed person'.[64] She described attempts to obtain paralegal work, to have an opportunity to demonstrate those changes. She described being punished for something she did ten years ago in not being admitted.[65]

74 When I asked the applicant what caused that change in her, she described being older, wiser and legally trained, saying 'what happened before the trial before Justice Kyrou, that will never ever happen again, never, I can promise you that, I've learned a lot from my mistakes'.[66]

75 On the question of outstanding costs, she was asked about negotiations with Victorian Government Solicitors Office shortly prior to the hearing before Lansdowne AsJ in January 2016. She had made two alternate offers, one that she would withdraw the disputed paragraphs in her amended statement of claim and they withdraw their application for costs, or the other that she withdraw her claim entirely and they agree not to pursue costs in her own proceeding or the Slaveski proceeding. She described the negotiating position she took in this email as one where, having assisted everyone by agreeing to be litigation guardian in the Slaveski proceeding, she did 'not believe I deserve to be liable for any costs.' She told me that she no longer held that view and when she said, it was 'not fair for [them] not to negotiate and ...I just wanted to have everything clean for my future',[67] that it was a figure of speech in the negotiation. The Victorian Government Solicitors Office had offered to each walk away from the Angeleska proceeding and would agree to deal in good faith separately over the costs in the Slaveski proceeding. Ms Angeleska wanted everything to be negotiated at once.

76 Then following her appeal of Lansdowne AsJ's decision, when J Forrest J ordered the proceeding dismissed if the costs were not paid as ordered within three months, Ms Angeleska made no attempt to comply with the costs order. She explained her reason in her seventh disclosure affidavit:

I was ordered to pay a sum of $19,000 to VGS if I want to continue further, and if I don't pay that sum my Statement of Claim will be discontinued / dismissed. As I did not want to proceed with any claims I just did not pay the sum I was ordered and my claim was dismissed.[68]

77 First, disclosure as to the myki charge, the Centrelink debt, and the RSPCA charge can be put to one side. Properly and voluntarily disclosed, none would by themselves lead to a finding that the appellant was not a fit and proper person. Equally, the academic misconduct, although not deposed to initially, the explanation that the relevant transcript was to be forwarded directly by way of disclosure may be accepted, even if it displays a misunderstanding of the need to disclose matters on oath. Without more these matters would not in my mind provide a basis to find that the appellant is not a fit and proper person. The disclosure of involvement in litigation however, warrants further consideration.

78 I can readily accept the submission that the role that Ms Angeleska was requested to take on as Mr Slaveski's litigation guardian and lay advocate was a difficult one for a person without legal qualifications. It should be said that it would be a task beyond the competency of many newly admitted practitioners and even for those with some considerable experience. It was complex litigation legally and factually with a psychiatrically unwell plaintiff who was at times unable to provide coherent instructions. Had the conduct and the issues that they gave rise to in this application for admission been confined to events now over a decade ago and disclosed with candour, then I could relevantly consider whether by conduct, learning or insight, her outlook has changed since that time. Similarly, I place less weight on the affidavit sworn in the Elenchevski proceeding in 2010 because I accept that with a legal education the inappropriate nature of such accusations may become apparent.

79 However, I have difficulty in accepting her own assessment of change in outlook in the face of continued conduct. Ms Angeleska places weight on her lack of legal knowledge before Kyrou J and her subsequent completion of her law degree and practical training to demonstrate understanding of why aspects of her conduct before Kyrou J were incompatible with that expected of a person admitted to legal practice. Yet the hallmarks of that behaviour continued throughout her law degree and even after the lodgment of her request for a compliance certificate for the purpose of admission.

80 First, Ms Angeleska has maintained the Angeleska proceeding throughout the period of her law degree. Although she enjoyed limited success on appeal on the question of the applicable time limit to the extent that she required an extension of time, she had provided no satisfactory explanation for delay. Importantly, given the explanation that she was unrepresented and focused on her role in her husband's claim, there was no explanation provided for the delay from its conclusion in October 2010 until November 2011. It was argued against her that it should be inferred that the commencement of her claim was for an improper purpose - it being filed the day before a hearing in the Court of Appeal in relation to the security for costs applications brought against her personally in the Slaveski appeal. The Court said:

We accept that aside from the timing of the commencement of Mrs Slaveska's proceeding there is no basis on the evidence from which the Court could infer that the proceeding was brought for an improper purpose.[69]

81 The court went on to consider whether the proceeding would amount to an abuse of process in that it attempted to relitigate matters already determined in relation to five of the incidents alleged in her claim concluding:

For the reasons that follow, we consider that in the extraordinary circumstances of this case, to the extent that some residual aspects of Mrs Slaveska's claims in relation to Incidents 5 to 10 were brought within time, to allow her to take those claims to trial now would be to allow an abuse of the Court's process.[70]

Having described the applicant's conduct in the Slaveski proceeding it said 'Much of what she said and did is now proposed to be repeated'.[71]

82 By the time of this appeal hearing in November 2014, Ms Angeleska had concluded her law degree. She was represented by Counsel at the hearing and presumably had the opportunity to benefit from legal advice both as to the prospects of success on appeal and more broadly as to the conduct of her litigation. She nevertheless sought special leave to appeal both as to the dismissal of her appeal and the consequential adverse costs order.[72] She then also continued a position that delayed advancing the surviving claims in the Angeleska proceeding for what Lansdowne AsJ did find to be an improper purpose. She then launched an appeal against the orders made, including the gross costs order. When in May 2017 J Forrest J ordered that the proceeding be dismissed if the costs order was not complied with, he noted the tactical purpose behind the conduct before the Associate Justice - to use the applications to try and negotiate a settlement of her costs liability in the Slaveski proceeding. He quoted as critical the paragraph that described Ms Angeleska's conduct as verging on 'an abuse of process'.[73] All of this conduct is also inconsistent with the aims of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic).

83 To my mind the manner in which Ms Angeleska has conducted herself in her own proceeding, particularly following the Court of Appeal judgment of 10 June 2015 is of greater significance than the conduct that preceded the commencement of her legal training. The conduct of her own litigation and the findings as to the tactical purpose behind the way in which it was conducted demonstrates that despite attaining the formal qualifications she has continued to conduct litigation in a way inconsistent with the obligations of an officer of the court until faced with an ultimatum by the order of J Forrest J - observe the costs order or the proceeding stands dismissed.

84 I am troubled by the statement in the seventh affidavit set out above at [76]. It clearly states a belief that the costs were payable by her only if she wanted to proceed. This misses the point that the sum of $19,000 was ordered to be paid by her and appears on its face to misapprehend there being some contingency to payment required by the order. Any contingency was in the continuation of the claim not the payment of the costs. It was not an order for security for costs but an order to pay costs already incurred. The order was simply ignored. I appreciate the difficulty in finalising outstanding costs orders against her in circumstances where the State did very little to actively bring about finalisation of the quantum of costs payable. No such difficulty was presented by the gross sum amount ordered. The applicant saw no difference in the negotiation of her costs liability from the various proceedings between orders that had been quantified and those that had not yet been quantified. In both cases her approach was to negotiate a financially beneficial outcome less than the value of the court orders. Before me she said she thought it right at the time to negotiate her costs liability on the basis that she didn't believe she should be liable for any costs in the Slaveski proceeding and appeal, but was prepared to negotiate some payment so that she could put the matter behind her.

85 Second, and associated with an understanding of the effect of court orders, was the affidavit before the Court of Appeal sworn 31 January 2013 explaining her response when she learnt that Mr Slaveski had sent cheques to individual judges in the face of an order that she provide security for costs payable to the Senior Master or Prothonotary for the Slaveski appeal. That affidavit identified that she was ordered to pay a total sum of $30,000 to Court and said 'On or about the end of June 2012... property was sold and an amount of $30,000 was paid for the security cost'.[74] She described hearing a conversation between Mr Slaveski and a person at the Supreme Court Registry where Mr Slaveski told the person that he would send cheques to Judges because he did not trust the Prothonotary. She said in evidence before me that she did not think he would act on his words. After the cheques had been sent she deposed asking him why and he said he 'had dealings with those Judges and was sure the money would be safe'. In this context she concluded she 'did not think anything of it, if anything he was obeying a Court Order'.[75] The affidavit goes on to describe dealings with the Court in August and October 2012, consistent with a belief that in sending the cheques Mr Slaveski had met Ms Angeleska's obligation to provide security for costs in the Slaveski appeal. Even allowing that at that time Ms Angeleska was undertaking only the first year of a law degree, she has maintained that belief in the legitimacy of the actions. Before the Committee her evidence focused only on the fact that she had no knowledge of the cheques being sent until after the event. I have reservations about Ms Slaveska's insight and awareness of the importance of compliance with Court orders, and perhaps as importantly, what is to be done in order to comply.

86 Third, her actions as litigation guardian in subsequent matters have borne some of the hallmarks of conduct reflecting poorly on the question of her being a fit and proper person. In the proceeding before Williams J to have Mr Slaveski declared a vexatious litigant she had agreed to provide instructions to Mr Glick QC as litigation guardian. She left court on 16 September 2013 with Mr Slaveski who on that day she described as being at breaking point when guns were drawn on him in her presence. While it may be understandable that she leave court that day in concern for her husband's wellbeing, as Mr Slaveski's legal representative her failure to participate in the balance of the hearing and her dismissal, or acquiescence in Mr Slaveski's dismissal of Counsel on that day, demonstrates an inability to appreciate the difference between her support of her husband and the role of a litigation guardian. Despite not participating in the balance of the proceeding Ms Angeleska attempted to file an appeal against the order on behalf of Mr Slaveski while he was out of the country and attempted to further the appeal by being appointed his litigation guardian.

87 As litigation guardian her role was to provide considered instructions in response to legal advice on behalf of a person unable to do so on their own account. I accept Mr Glick QC's evidence that on other occasions, in conferences with him, she was able to maintain a calming and more dispassionate influence.[76] However, in the conduct and initiation of proceedings on his behalf until 2017 (which brought all avenues for litigation to an end save for outstanding costs negotiations) she has not displayed a degree of judgment or restraint that I would expect from someone who had insight into errors of judgment which might earlier have been explained by ignorance. This causes me to be apprehensive at her ability to provide clients with legal advice that may be measured and dispassionate.

88 Fourth, there remains an issue as to the adequacy and the candour of the disclosure. I accept the submission made on her behalf that no allegation of dishonesty has been made against her. It was also submitted that:

... she has disclosed the principal issues that are relevant. This is not a case of concealment, nor the extent of disclosure. If anything it is the comprehension of what was disclosed.[77]

Clearly the appellant thought it relevant to disclose the fact of her involvement in the Slaveski proceeding. What is not so clear is why at that time she thought it was relevant. The subsequent detail responded to requests for further information and at times made admission that she now knew that particular conduct was wrong. The subsequent affidavits failed to shed light on why the appellant now understood those things to have been wrong. Rather, the explanation seemed to simply accept that she 'cannot dispute'[78] what various judges have written. She maintains her evidence before Kyrou J was truthful in the face of the judge's strong criticism of parts of its veracity. She has not explained why she now understands that the lodgment of indiscriminate appeals and reviews from adverse outcomes and the manner in which she in which she as a self-represented litigant conducted litigation reflect poorly on a person seeking admission as a legal practitioner. To say that she thought it right at the time does not address the fundamental question for disclosure - the present understanding of why it was not right or acceptable.

89 The submissions in reply made reference to a forensic decision that it is best the Court hear directly from the appellant rather than by a further affidavit. This course was appropriate. By answering in her own words, I formed a view that the plaintiff strongly desires admission as a legal practitioner. Given her background circumstances it has been a significant achievement to have completed her academic and practical legal qualifications. Her desire is genuine and remains strong and this is to her credit as are her steps to try and finalise outstanding costs issues. However, the passage of considerable time since her initial application for a compliance certificate has not worked in her favour. Ultimately there is little that can be pointed to since 2015 in support of her own evidence that she has changed and now understands what conduct is required of a legal practitioner.

90 In cross-examination, Ms Angeleska submitted the she is content with being subject to strict conditions upon admission. She stated the following:

I've learned my mistakes, I know, and I recognise why the Board is concerned about this, but believe me, I'm a changed person, I will not do anything without an advice or approval from my supervisor principal. I will always get double opinion from barristers, experienced barristers, experienced senior lawyers... I'm willing to have a three month trial somewhere, I'm willing for the Board to check on me every month, I'm happy to do anything. I can be under strict conditions, I'm happy, I will not say no.[79]

91 These are matters for the local regulatory authority to consider upon admission. Section 47 of the Uniform Law sets out the conditions that the Board may place on a practicing certificate, including that the holder is not authorised to receive trust money or must be subject to supervised legal practice. Section 53 of the Uniform Law provides that the local regulatory authority may impose other discretionary conditions on a practicing certificate, subject to being 'reasonable and relevant'.

92 At this stage the local regulatory authority has not been satisfied of a threshold requirement for admission. While the Court's discretion is wide in regard to making any order it considers appropriate on the appeal,[80] this power exists in the context of a refusal to issue a compliance certificate. Therefore, any condition ordered in this proceeding would necessarily have the effect of qualifying the threshold provision of finding the appellant to be a fit and proper person. Given the protective nature of the requirement that only persons who are fit and proper be admitted to practice, it would in my view be inappropriate to qualify that requirement in the exercise of the Court's discretion. No case was identified to support such an approach. The question of conditions on the applicant's practicing certificate would be appropriately left for the local regulatory authority to consider at the relevant juncture, where she meets the prerequisites for admission.

93 Nor do I accept the submission that the Court's supervisory jurisdiction will be strong as 'it is most unlikely any judicial officer dealing with her would not know who she was'.[81] Even if that was so in this Court, the same could not be said across Victorian jurisdictions generally in which she might practice. But more fundamentally the submission ignores the interests of clients she might represent; persons who would be entitled to ask her to advise them and speak on their behalf on the basis that the Court has admitted her as someone appropriate to do so. It is vital that clients and the Court are entitled to take her at her word.

94 I accept that as a newly admitted practitioner any person will gain experience with time and will be subject to oversight and supervision by more experienced practitioners. But even a newly appointed practitioner is expected to exercise their duties as an independent and competent practitioner, within the limitations of their experience. It is no answer to say that every exercise of judgment will be informed by the advice of a principal or senior barrister. Judgment is also about knowing when it is necessary to seek such guidance. In this I am not holding Ms Angeleska to any different standard and I am not seeking to punish her in any way for past conduct.

I am concerned with the question of whether her disclosure of that conduct demonstrates insight into why her actions were not appropriate. Whether I can be confident in her assurance that such errors would not be repeated depends on my accepting that she has an appreciation of why the conduct was not appropriate in the first place.

95 When asked about whether, after receiving letters in 2015 requesting further information and matters canvassed at the directions hearing in 2019, she still understood that simply disclosing the fact of the Slaveski proceeding was sufficient, she said that it was what she thought at the time. She said it was at the hearing before the Board[82] (in April 2021) that she understood it was relevant to disclose the way the litigation was conducted saying 'specifically, my understanding is like to see whether, how I conducted myself during the hearing, if I have done something wrong, and what the - look, it's for your judgment to decide whether I'm a good and fit and proper person, yes, I understand your requirements now, but I didn't understand it back then. I just thought its enough to disclose the case'.[83]

96 I find that the manner of disclosure demonstrates an ongoing serious error of judgment. She proceeded on the basis that comments of judges as to her own conduct (both critical and praiseworthy) were not matters requiring disclosure on oath because they were matters in the public domain about which the Board could inform itself. Without going to honesty, the evident need for disclosure of such matters bears upon her knowledge and her ability: equally important aspects of an inquiry into whether she is a fit and proper person.

97 Her application for a compliance certificate and this appeal are unusual in that it involves her acting in various litigation as if a legal practitioner, albeit with leave and certainly with knowledge of the judges before whom she appeared. It includes a substantial period of time, from mid-2015, when she otherwise had received all necessary academic and practical professional training. Despite this, I really struggle to see that, before 2017, the applicant understood the failings demonstrated by the way in which she continued to conduct litigation, and that since that time has had some 'light bulb' moment or realisation about the course of her conduct. She is unable to articulate why it reflects poorly on her being a fit and proper person. Nor was there suitably informed character evidence that might illuminate the question of changed appreciation and insight.

98 I am not presently satisfied that the appellant is a fit and proper person for admission as a legal practitioner. The appeal is dismissed.

[1] The Legal Profession Uniform Law is set out in Schedule 1 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (Vic).

[2] Re Coldham; Ex Parte Brideson (No 2) [1990] HCA 36; (1990) 170 CLR 267.

[3] Cole & Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2000] HCA 47; (2000) 203 CLR 194 ('Coal & Allied').

[4] Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic), s 342 (3); Frugtniet v Board of Examiners [2005] VSC 332 ('Frugtniet').

[5] Saunders v Legal Practitioners Admission Board [2015] NSWSC 1839; Hilton v Legal Practitioners Admission Board [2016] NSWSC 1617; Davison v Legal Practitioners Admission Board [2019] NSWSC 959; Green v Legal Practitioners Admission Board [2020] NSWSC 1655.

[6] [2006] NSWSC 1338.

[8] Jackson (formerly Subramaniam) v Legal Practitioners Admission Board [2007] NSWCA 289, at [14] his Honour cited the Victorian case of Frugtniet as authority for the appeal not depending on a finding of error.

[9] Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic), s 342(3); Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic), s 2.3.11(3), which replaced the 1996 Act and which also provided for a hearing de novo.

[10] [2006] VSCA 190.

[11] Reasons for Decision, Victorian Legal Admissions Committee, 1 June 2021, [39] ('Reasons').

[12] A reference to observations of Kyrou J to which I will return.

[13] Wentworth v NSW Bar Association [1992] HCA 24; (1992) 176 CLR 239, 250-251 (Deane, Dawson, Toohey & Gaudron JJ).

[14] [1981] 2 NSWLR 372, 381.

[16] Hughes & Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 2) [1955] HCA 28; (1955) 93 CLR 127.

[18] [2005] VSC 250, [53].

[19] Re Davis [1947] HCA 53; (1947) 75 CLR 409, 416-417.

[20] See Skerritt v The Legal Practice Board of Western Australia [2004] WASCA 28, [61] (Malcolm CJ, Steytler and Wheeler JJ); as discussed in XY v Board of Examiners [2006] VSCA 190, [51] (Habersberger J not accepting that a deliberate non-disclosure might be excused by a later agreement to disclose).

[21] In many of the proceedings Ms Angeleska is referred to as Mrs Slaveski. For consistency I have referred to her by the name Angeleska throughout the judgment other than when quoting from earlier proceedings.

[22] Slaveski v Victoria [2009] VSC 423 ('Slaveski proceeding'), [30].

[23] Ibid; [2009] VSC 596.

[24] Slaveski v State of Victoria & Ors [2010] VSC 441, [76]-[84].

[25] As discussed in Slaveski v State of Victoria & Ors [2010] VSC 441, [367]-[374].

[26] Slaveski v Victoria (Unreported, SCV, CoA, Neave JA and Vickery AJA, 1 February 2013) ('Slaveski Appeal').

[29] R v Slaveski (contempt) [2011] VSC 643.

[30] Attorney General v Slaveski [2014] VSC 48.

[31] [2015] VSCA 31.

[32] The Queen v Lupco Slaveski [2015] VSC 400.

[33] Lupco Slaveski v R [2015] VSCA 264.

[35] Angeleska (known as Slaveska) v State of Victoria & Ors [2015] VSCA 140.

[36] Angeleska v State of Victoria & Ors (No 3) [2016] VSC 568, [114].

[37] Slaveska v Elenchevski [2010] VCC 1383; I note that leave to appeal was refused in Slaveska v Elenchevski [2013] VSCA 283.

[38] Slaveski v Rotstein & Associates [2012] VSC 435 [13].

[39] Slaveski & Anor v Longley LCM & Ors [2011] NSWSC 933 [12].

[40] Slaveski v Conell [2012] NSWSC 810.

[43] Angeleska (known as Slaveska) v State of Victoria [2013] VSC 598.

[44] R v Slaveski (contempt) [2011] VSC 643.

[45] In the matter of applications by Lupco Slaveski (a person subject to a general litigation restraint order) [2018] VSC 39, which was an appeal from the Magistrates' Court proceeding the substance of which was an application by Mr Slaveski's former solicitors for unpaid legal fees.

[46] Attorney General v Slaveski [2015] VSCA 31.

[47] Plaintiff, Snezana Angeleska's third affidavit sworn 23 September 2015, [6].

[48] Slaveski v State of Victoria & Ors [2010] VSC 441, [76].

[49] R v Slaveski [2015] VSC 400.

[50] Letter from Victorian Legal Admissions Board to Ms Angeleska dated 13 November 2015, included at tab 9 of the court book.

[51] Plaintiff, 'Snezana Angeleska's sixth affidavit' sworn 22 December 2015 ('Angeleska sixth affidavit') [3]-[6].

[53] Angeleska sixth affidavit (n 51) [12].

[54] Plaintiff, ' Snezana Angeleska's tenth affidavit' sworn 25 November 2020, [11].

[55] Plaintiff, ' Snezana Angeleska's tenth affidavit' sworn 25 November 2020, [13].

[59] Transcript of Proceedings, In the matter of Mrs Snezana Angeleska (Victorian Legal Admissions Board, 19 April 2021) 27.21 ('VLAB T').

[64] Transcript of Proceedings, Snezana Angeleska v Victorian Legal Admissions Board (Supreme Court of Victoria, S ECI 2021 02346, Forbes J, 14 October 2021) 7 ('T').

[68] Plaintiff, 'Snezana Angeleska's seventh affidavit' sworn 28 August 2018, [9].

[69] Angeleska (known as Slaveska) v State of Victoria & Ors [2015] VSCA 140, [148] (Warren CJ, Tate JA, Ginnane AJA).

[72] [2016] HCASL 5.

[73] Angeleska v Victoria (No 5) [2017] VSC 238, [32] (J Forrest J) quoting Lansdowne AsJ.

[74] Affidavit of Snezana Slaveska (Angeleska) sworn 31 January 2013 in proceeding S APCI 0169/2010 [7].

[77] Appellant, 'Outline of Appellant's Submissions', 27 September 2021 ('Appellant's submissions') [29].

[78] See for example Angeleska sixth affidavit (n 51) [4], [5].

[81] Appellant's submissions (n 77) [32].

[82] Victorian Legal Admission Committee as delegate of the Board.