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[2026] NSWSC 790
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-07-09
Elkaim AJ
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Senanayake v Law Society of NSW [2026] NSWSC 790
Hearing dates: 30 June – 1 July 2026
Date of orders: 9 July 2026
Decision date: 09 July 2026
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Elkaim AJ
Decision: 1. The summons filed on 17 August 2025 is dismissed.
2. The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the proceedings.
Catchwords: OCCUPATIONS — Legal practitioners — application to the Supreme Court to review Law Society’s refusal to renew practising certificate — Legal Profession Uniform Law s 100 — whether plaintiff is a fit and proper person to hold an Australian practising certificate — onus on plaintiff — hearing de novo on the merits — review of Law Society’s decision does not extend to reviewing the decisions of the Migration Agents Registration Authority and Administrative Appeals Tribunal which were relied on — no real acknowledgment of wrongdoing — lack of insight
Legislation Cited: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (repealed), ss 43, 44
Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW), ss 45, 100
Legal Profession Uniform General Rules 2015 (NSW), s 13
Cases Cited: Frugtniet v Board of Examiners [2002] VSC 140
Legal Practice Board and Barker [2026] WASAT 74
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Makasa; 270 CLR 430; [2021] HCA 1
New South Wales Bar Association v Evatt (1968) 117 CLR 177; [1968] HCA 20
Re Application for Admission by Ali [2026] QCA 100
Re Michael and Secretary, Department of Employment, Science and Training (2006) 90 ALD 457; [2006] AATA 227
S M Senarath B Chanaka Senanayake and Migration Agents Registration Authority [2020] AATA 116
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: S M Senarath Bandara Chanaka Senanayake (Plaintiff)
Law Society of NSW (Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
C Senanayake (self-represented)
Mr P Griffin SC (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Law Society of NSW (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2025/314910
Publication restriction: No
These proceedings were commenced with the filing of a summons on 17 August 2025. A response was filed on 8 September 2025.
The ultimate purpose of the summons is for the plaintiff to be declared a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate as a solicitor. To achieve this purpose the plaintiff first needs to set aside the defendant’s decision, made on 23 July 2025, that he is not a fit and proper person.
To this end, the plaintiff seeks a review of the 17 August 2025 decision pursuant to s 100(1) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW) (the LPUL). The summons actually nominates eight previous decisions also for review.
In addition, the plaintiff wants compensation, although the basis is a little unclear.
The defendant, The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales, opposes all of the orders sought by the plaintiff. It says the summons should be dismissed with costs.
Although leave was probably not required, for certainty, Roberts J made an order on 7 May 2026, permitting the plaintiff to be cross-examined during the hearing.
The plaintiff relied on his affidavits of 18 August 2025, 8 October 2025, and 21 January 2026.
The defendant relied on the affidavits of Ms Valerie Griswold dated 19 November 2025 and 29 June 2026, and Ms Cherrie Homer dated 22 December 2025. Ms Griswold is the defendant’s Director of Legal Regulation. Ms Homer is the defendant’s Deputy Director, Litigation and External Intervention.
The plaintiff originally became a solicitor in Sri Lanka in December 1996.
The plaintiff was admitted as a solicitor in New South Wales on 2 April 2004. On 18 March 2010, he was registered as a Migration Agent with the Office of the Migration Agents Registration Authority (MARA).
On 3 November 2016, a complaint was made to MARA about the plaintiff by a Mr M and Ms Z. The plaintiff pointed out some weaknesses in the complaint form. Looking at the form there does not seem to be any reason the complaint was made, but the attachment to the form setting out “Complaint Details” does not seem to be present. In any event, during the investigation of the complaint MARA identified 10 applications for a protection visa which were similar in wording, referred to as “concerns of potentially duplicated and template-based protection claims.”
As a result, on 2 June 2017, MARA instigated its own complaint against the plaintiff. Following this investigation, MARA cancelled the plaintiff’s registration on 9 October 2017.
The plaintiff sought a review of the cancellation decision in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT). The review was unsuccessful (S M Senarath B Chanaka Senanayake and Migration Agents Registration Authority [2020] AATA 116). The decision was handed down on 4 February 2020.
On 30 April 2020, the plaintiff applied to the defendant to renew his practising certificate for the 2020/2021 practising year. On 26 November 2020, the defendant refused this application.
On 2 July 2021, the plaintiff again applied for a practising certificate for the forthcoming practising year. The application was refused on 7 September 2021. This pattern continued with the last application being made on 1 April 2025 (for the 2025/2026 practising year) and then refused on 23 July 2025. This refusal was the ninth refusal of applications made by the plaintiff. He sometimes made more than one application in the same year.
The next step taken by the plaintiff was the filing of the summons.
“With great respect, I seek the Court’s review of the 9th consecutive refusal by the Council of the Law Society of New South Wales to grant me a Practising Certificate, with the most recent refusal being on 23/07/2025, which is annexed hereto and marked ‘A’.”
The plaintiff submits that I should examine the original MARA and the AAT findings, and evidence, so as to reach a conclusion that the findings were unreliable. He says the allegations were “bogus” and the complainant “misled” the tribunal. He continues that the defendant’s reliance on the MARA and AAT decisions as the basis for refusing to grant his practising certificate must also be erroneous.
The summons is to be treated as a de novo hearing (s 100(6) LPUL). Section 100(2) states the court may “review the merits of the decision concerned.” To be clear, the decision here is the defendant’s refusal to grant the plaintiff a practising certificate, made on 23 July 2025. It is not MARA’s cancellation decision on 9 October 2017 or the AAT decision on 4 February 2020.
The plaintiff says the AAT decision is “not binding”. It is only a guideline. He may be right to the extent the decision does not create a precedent, but as far as the plaintiff is concerned it is final and binding. In his written submissions the plaintiff states:
“The Court may reject any reliance on an invalid, void, or non-binding AAT decision, when determining the plaintiff's fitness to hold a practising certificate.”
The efforts of the plaintiff to attack the AAT decision as not final must be rejected for the following reasons.
Section 43(6) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), which was in force at the relevant time stated:
A decision of a person as varied by the Tribunal, or a decision made by the Tribunal in substitution for the decision of a person, shall, for all purposes (other than the purposes of applications to the Tribunal for a review or of appeals in accordance with section 44), be deemed to be a decision of that person and, upon the coming into operation of the decision of the Tribunal, unless the Tribunal otherwise orders, has effect, or shall be deemed to have had effect, on and from the day on which the decision under review has or had effect.
“The object of s 43(6) of the AAT Act, in deeming a decision made by the AAT under s 43(1)(b) or (c)(i) in variation of or substitution for the decision under review to be a decision of the primary decision-maker, is to bring finality to the administrative decision-making process. …”
“… In principle, decisions of the Tribunal are final, subject to appeal on questions of law to the Federal Court of Australia. However, in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 the High Court of Australia held that the Immigration Review Tribunal had jurisdiction to reconsider a decision made in breach of the rules of procedural fairness because such a decision involved jurisdictional error and was properly regarded, in law, as no decision at all. There being no decision the Tribunal was not precluded from considering the matter afresh. In both matters before me it is asserted that there is jurisdictional error. I am prepared, without examining the question, to assume that these claims will be made out. Nevertheless, I propose to decline to consider the applications. The Tribunal can, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to reconsider matters in which it is asserted that there is jurisdictional error. There are very good reasons of practice and policy why it should adopt this course except in the very clearest of cases.”
“... it's a decision made by a properly constituted body in accordance with legislation discharging the duty to review a decision that's been made by another body, and it has to be final unless it is overturned.”
“The basis for the repeated refusals by the Council to grant me a Practising Certificate has been that I am deemed ‘not a fit and proper person’ to hold such a certificate. The Council has stated that I am unfit primarily due to the penalty was imposed on 09/10/2017, under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which I denied from the outset, on the grounds that the complainant's account of the incident was factually incorrect and logistically impossible.”
“The MARA decision appears to be primarily based on hearsay evidence, failing to provide conclusive or direct evidence substantiating the allegation made against me. The decision frequently used phrases such as ‘he may have,’ ‘he may,’ and other expressions of uncertainty, which undermine the reliability of the findings.”
The defendant conceded that since his commencement as a practising solicitor in 2004, putting aside the issues raised in the MARA and AAT decisions, the plaintiff had not committed any crimes, had not adversely come to the defendant’s attention and there was no other reason to say he was not a fit and proper person to be issued a practising certificate.
Ultimately the plaintiff’s refusal to accept the findings of the MARA and AAT decisions is at the core of the defendant’s case and, in turn, determines the outcome of the summons. The defendant submitted the plaintiff’s persistent rejection of the MARA and AAT findings was the glaring hole in his pursuit of a practising certificate. In short, the plaintiff’s lack of insight into the reasons for his rejection was simply too fundamental to overcome.
The defendant, in asserting a lack of insight, pointed to the absolute refusal of the plaintiff:
To recognise the MARA and AAT findings; and
His obstinate rejection of advice given to him by the defendant to assist his obtaining a practising certificate.
I will deal with each of these points in turn, noting firstly that the onus to establish that he is a fit and proper person, is on the plaintiff (s 100(7)(a) of the LPUL).
In cross-examination the defendant carefully took the plaintiff through the findings that had been made against him by the AAT. Here are some examples of the plaintiff’s insistence that he had not breached the Code of Conduct for Migration Agents.
Breach of clause 2.9:
“Q Do you accept that in any respect you were non‑compliant with the code of conduct for migration agents?
A. According to my memory, no.
Q. Not a single instance of non‑compliance with the code?
A. No, I have ‑ I tried my level best to follow the code of conduct at that time and place.
Q. I take it that you deny the conclusion, the finding made in paragraph 73, that you were in breach of clause 2.9 of the code?
A. Yes. That's what they say, your Honour. I‑‑
HIS HONOUR
Q. But you disagree?
A. Yeah, I disagree.”
“Q. You were holding yourself out as an expert in migration matters and clients come to you for advice, don't they?
A. Of course, yes. I haven't breached that condition.
Q. Do I take it that you‑‑
A. I haven't breached that condition.
HIS HONOUR: I understand.
GRIFFIN
Q. I take it that you reject the finding in paragraph 85 that your conduct amounted to a breach of 2.4?
A. I deny.”
“Q. Likewise, when clauses 3.1 and 3.2 are set out at 86 and 87, you were bound by those clauses?
A. Yes.
Q. The member says in 88 he was satisfied that you provided Mr M with a copy of a statutory declaration made by another client as a means of advising him of the type of information he should provide in his own statutory declaration. Did you provide to Mr M a document in relation to another client to give him guidance as to what he should include in his own application?
A. No. I deny it.”
“Q And you'll see at 92, the member found that you acted in breach of 2.8?
A. That's the member's opinion.
Q. Once again, do you deny that you breached clause 2.8?
A. No. I deny it. I deny it.”
“Q. And you know from paragraph 100 that the presiding member came to the view you deliberately misled the authority when you provided the information in those dot points.
A. I deny.
…
Q. Without going through it in detail I take it you reject that you were in breach of clause 2.9A of the code set out in‑‑
A. I deny it.”
“Q. And can his Honour take it that in paragraph 107, when the member sets out the clauses you did not comply with, you deny each and every one of those.
A. Yes, your Honour.”
The plaintiff maintained that the MARA and AAT decisions, without more, raised a prima facie case that they were in error. That being so, submitted the plaintiff, it fell to the defendant to properly examine the decisions whereupon the defects would be evident.
The plaintiff did not see any need to go any further than provide the decisions and make some submissions. He did not, for example, point out purported discrepancies between the transcript and the decisions. The AAT decision actually lists a number of transcript references linked to the point being made in the reasons. The plaintiff did not think it necessary to check the references to see if they matched the reasons.
The plaintiff’s attitude was so confident (as to the wrongness of the decisions) that he simply repeated his submissions each time he made an application. In fact, in respect of the latest refusal his submissions did not reach the defendant because of a mistake in the email address. The plaintiff was content to simply rely on his submissions from the previous year because they were the same.
The defendant put the plaintiff in touch with a Mr Neil Watt, a respected expert in regulatory matters. Mr Watt gave the plaintiff this advice:
“My advice to clients who are trying to overcome an adverse disciplinary decision and thus a presumption of unfitness to practice law, is that Council wants to see four things in your submission:
- Reasons: why the events at the heart of the disciplinary findings happened;
2. Remorse: Self-awareness and an expression of unqualified regret;
3. Restitution: how you plan to make amends (if there were those who suffered loss as a result of the misconduct)
4. Recovery: How you intend to ensure you are not a risk to the public or to public confidence in the profession. How you intend to ensure this won’t happen again.
So, you will need to go through the list that I highlighted previously and address each matter in detail with self-reflection and honesty. They want remorse.”
“Q. One of those headings we've dealt with, which is Rehabilitation. In response to that, you set out your academic and other achievements.
A. Yes. There's nothing else to rehabilitate because I haven't done anything wrong.”
Prerequisites for grant or renewal of Australian practising certificates in this jurisdiction
(1) The designated local regulatory authority may grant or renew an Australian practising certificate only if it is satisfied that the applicant—
(a) is an Australian lawyer; and
(b) if required by this Law to have professional indemnity insurance—has, or will have on or before the grant or renewal, professional indemnity insurance in accordance with this Law and the Uniform Rules; and
(c) has indicated in the application that he or she does not hold (and he or she does not have a current application for) another Australian practising certificate that would be in force concurrently with the certificate whose grant or renewal is sought under this section.
…
(2) Subject to subsection (4), the designated local regulatory authority must not grant or renew an Australian practising certificate if it considers that the applicant is not a fit and proper person to hold the certificate.
(3) In considering whether a person is or is not a fit and proper person to hold an Australian practising certificate, the designated local regulatory authority may have regard to the matters specified in the Uniform Rules for the purposes of this section.
(4) A person may be considered a fit and proper person to hold an Australian practising certificate even though the person does not satisfy the requirements for a matter to which the designated local regulatory authority may have regard, if it is satisfied that this action is warranted in the circumstances.
…”
Consideration of application for grant or renewal of Australian practising certificate
(1) For the purposes of section 45 of the Uniform Law, in considering whether an applicant is or is not a fit and proper person to hold an Australian practising certificate, the designated local regulatory authority may have regard to any of the following matters—
(a) whether the applicant is currently of good fame and character,
(b) whether the applicant is, or has been—
(i) an insolvent under administration, or
(ii) a director or principal of an incorporated legal practice while the legal practice is or was insolvent, or
(iii) a director of a company while the company is or was insolvent,
(c) whether the applicant has been convicted or found guilty of an offence in Australia or a foreign country, and if so—
(i) the nature of the offence, and
(ii) how long ago the offence was committed, and
(iii) the applicant’s age when the offence was committed,
(d) whether the applicant has engaged in legal practice in Australia—
(i) when not permitted to do so under a law or previous law of a State or Territory, or
(ii) if admitted, in contravention of a condition to which the admission was subject, or
(iii) if holding an Australian practising certificate, in contravention of a condition to which the certificate was subject or while the certificate was suspended,
(e) whether the applicant has engaged in legal practice in a foreign country—
(i) when not permitted to do so by or under a law of that country, or
(ii) if permitted to do so, in contravention of a condition to which the permission was subject,
(f) whether the applicant—
(i) is currently subject to an unresolved complaint, investigation, charge or order under an Australian law relating to the legal profession or under a corresponding foreign law, or
(ii) has been the subject of disciplinary action, however expressed, under an Australian law relating to the legal profession, or under a corresponding foreign law, that involved a finding adverse to the applicant,
(g) whether the applicant—
(i) is the subject of current disciplinary action, however expressed, in another profession or occupation in Australia or a foreign country, or
(ii) has been the subject of disciplinary action, however expressed, in another profession or occupation in Australia or a foreign country that involved a finding adverse to the applicant,
(h) whether the applicant’s name has been removed from—
(i) a roll of Australian lawyers, however described or expressed, in any jurisdiction, or
(ii) a foreign roll of practitioners,
(i) whether the applicant’s right to engage in legal practice has been suspended or cancelled in Australia or a foreign country,
(j) whether the applicant has contravened, in Australia or a foreign country, a law about trust money or trust accounts,
(k) whether, under an Australian law relating to the legal profession or a law of the Commonwealth, a supervisor, manager or receiver, however described, is, or has been, appointed in relation to any legal practice engaged in by the applicant,
(l) whether the applicant is, or has been, subject to an order under an Australian law relating to the legal profession or a law of the Commonwealth, disqualifying the applicant from—
(i) being employed by, or a partner of, an Australian legal practitioner, or
(ii) managing a corporation,
(m) whether the applicant is currently unable to carry out satisfactorily the inherent requirements of practice as an Australian legal practitioner,
(n) whether the applicant has provided incorrect or misleading information in relation to any application for an Australian practising certificate under an Australian law relating to the legal profession,
(o) whether the applicant has contravened a condition of a previous Australian practising certificate under an Australian law relating to the legal profession,
(p) whether the applicant has contravened an Australian law relating to the legal profession,
(q) whether the applicant has contravened—
(i) an order of a court or tribunal made in any proceedings, or
(ii) (without limitation) an order of a designated local regulatory authority or other person or body under legislation of any jurisdiction so far as the legislation relates to the control or discipline of any Australian lawyers or to the practice of law,
(r) whether the applicant has failed at any time to pay a required contribution or levy to the fidelity fund of a jurisdiction,
(s) whether the applicant has failed to comply with a requirement under an Australian law relating to the legal profession in relation to professional indemnity insurance,
(t) whether the applicant has failed to pay any costs or expenses for which the applicant was liable under an Australian law relating to the legal profession,
(u) any other matter that is related to a matter referred to in another provision of this rule.
(2) In determining whether an applicant has or will have professional indemnity insurance as required by the Uniform Law, the designated local regulatory authority may have regard to—
(a) evidence in the form of written advice from an insurer or other provider or from an insurance broker to the effect that an insurer or other provider has agreed to issue a policy of professional indemnity insurance, or
(b) evidence that the premium for a policy of professional indemnity insurance has been received and accepted by the insurer or other provider for the purposes of the issue of the policy.
(3) Without limiting any other power of the designated local regulatory authority to refuse to grant an Australian practising certificate, the designated local regulatory authority may refuse to grant an Australian practising certificate for a barrister if the applicant has not successfully completed any examination required by the designated local regulatory authority to be passed as a prerequisite to undertaking a reading program referred to in section 50 of the Uniform Law.
The plaintiff’s primary assertion was that the MARA ban was for 5 years, he has ‘served’ his 5 years, there are no ongoing complaints against him, so why does the defendant continue to deny him a practising certificate?
The ‘I have done my time’ argument is potentially very powerful. Unfortunately, in this case it lacks two closely related elements:
By continuing his denial of wrongdoing, the plaintiff is perpetuating the finding that he is not a fit and proper person. He states that no account has been taken of his “rehabilitation”. The concept of rehabilitation however must include an acknowledgement of past errors. If nothing has been done wrong, then why was rehabilitation required?
There is a complete absence of insight into the reasons and circumstances that led to his registration being cancelled. This lack of insight was emphasised during cross-examination of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff stressed that there are no ongoing issues which might affect his good character. He says he meets all the prerequisites of s 45. In his affidavit the plaintiff does make some concessions about the use of templates and says he will not do so again.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff, instead of expressing the remorse suggested by Mr Watt, goes on in his 2025 application to attack the AAT for accepting “false facts” and he conducts an examination of the evidence before the AAT. He concludes:
“In my case, the subject incident occurred in 2014 (more than 10 years ago) as a registered migration agent not as a solicitor, never being subject to any disciplinary action as a legal practitioner. The subject complaint was a one off unfortunate incident, which I have been denying from the beginning. Things would be completely different, if the person who prepared the decision considered what transpired/revealed at the AAT hearing. There is a huge, noticeable gap between the AAT decision and the AAT hearing transcript (F1 and F2). Kindly compere.”
“The requirement for admission to practice law that the applicant be a fit and proper person, means that the applicant must have the personal qualities of character which are necessary to discharge the important and grave responsibilities of being a barrister and solicitor. A legal practitioner, upon being admitted to practice, assumes duties to the courts, to fellow practitioners as well as to clients. At the heart of all of those duties is a commitment to honesty and, in those circumstances when it is required, to open candour and frankness, irrespective of self interest or embarrassment. The entire administration of justice in any community which is governed by law depends upon the honest working of legal practitioners who can be relied upon to meet high standards of honesty and ethical behaviour. It is the legal practitioner who is effectively the daily minister and executor in the administration of justice when advising clients, acting for clients, certifying documents, and making presentations to courts, governments, other professionals, and so on. The level and extent of trust placed in what legal practitioners say or do is necessarily high and the need for honesty is self evident and essential.”
“The Supreme Court thought, moreover, that as the exercise of its disciplinary powers was, to some extent, a punishment for wrongdoing, mercy might be shown towards a young man who had not understood the error of his ways. The power of the Court to discipline a barrister is, however, entirely protective, and, notwithstanding that its exercise may involve a great deprivation to the person disciplined, there is no element of punishment involved. This has already been pointed out by this Court in Clyne v. N.S.W. Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186, at pp 201, 202. The respondent's failure to understand the error of his ways of itself demonstrates his unfitness to belong to a profession where, in practice, the client must depend upon the standards as well as the skill of his professional adviser.”
“The power exercised by the Court in considering whether a person is fit and proper to be admitted as a lawyer is entirely protective. It serves to protect the public in their dealings with and representation by lawyers, and it protects the public interest in the proper administration of justice. As Forbes J said in Angeleska v Victorian Legal Admissions Board [2021] VSC 829 at [18]:
‘The exercise of a power to admit to the profession is a positive determination that the Court is justified in holding out the individual as a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of a legal practitioner. A conclusion that a person is not presently a fit and proper person for admission to legal practice is not punitive but an acknowledgment that an applicant does not presently meet the burden of establishing the requisite character.’
Trust is at the heart of the legal profession; which is why the highest standards of integrity are required of lawyers. As Spigelman CJ said, in New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins (2001) 52 NSWLR 279 at [20]:
‘There are four interrelated interests involved. Clients must feel secure in confiding their secrets and entrusting their most personal affairs to lawyers. Fellow practitioners must be able to depend implicitly on the word and the behaviour of their colleagues. The judiciary must have confidence in those who appear before the courts. The public must have confidence in the legal profession by reason of the central role the profession plays in the administration of justice. Many aspects of the administration of justice depend on the trust by the judiciary and/or the public in the performance of professional obligations by professional people.’
To quote again from the decision of Forbes J in Angeleska, at [19]:
‘The trust and confidence in a legal practitioner, whether relied on by the public or by a Court, relies partly on the honesty of the practitioner. But it is also reliant on an exercise of judgment and an insight into the effect and consequences of the manner in which the legal duties are undertaken. The phrase ‘fit and proper’ gives wide scope for matters of judgment. It is a holistic inquiry not simply looking at conduct or character, but involves three essential things: honesty, knowledge and ability. It is worth repeating the description as quoted by Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Webb JJ as to these three things essential to fitness for office:
“…honesty to execute it truly, without malice, affection or partiality; knowledge to know what he ought duly to do; and the ability…that he may intend and execute his office, when need is, diligently, and not for impotency or poverty, neglect it.”’”
The protective function of the disciplinary framework, emphasised in the above extracts, also undermines the plaintiff’s double jeopardy argument. The relevant question is not whether the plaintiff has ‘done his time’, but whether he has demonstrated the character and competence required to discharge the duties owed by legal practitioners to the court and their clients.
Other than in respect of the MARA and AAT findings, the plaintiff is a person of apparent good character. He made mistakes in his practice as a migration agent, but he lost his registration for five years. This is a substantial period for a person whose source of income is his occupation.
So why then should these factors not overcome his mistakes and allow him to be restored to his practice as a solicitor? The answer is because he lacks any insight into his wrongdoing. He refuses to acknowledge that he did wrong and he refuses to respect the decisions that have gone against him. There is even a degree of arrogance in his attitude to the extent that he has made no attempt to persuade the defendant of any failings in the above decisions, instead suggesting that prima facie deficiencies (whatever they might be) are enough to found success in his application.
Another element of his attitude is displayed by the serious allegations he made against another solicitor, a Ms Stratigos, who acted for the complainants. He accused her of intentionally fabricating the facts and providing false and misleading statements to the Australian government agencies. Despite the AAT finding no evidence of wrongdoing by Ms Stratigos, the plaintiff would not retreat from his accusations. It is noted that the Western Australia State Administrative Tribunal has recently emphasised the gravity of making allegations of serious impropriety against fellow practitioners without reasonable grounds, recognising such conduct as capable of supporting a finding that a person is not fit and proper (Legal Practice Board and Barker [2026] WASAT 74).
In my view the overwhelming lack of insight displayed by the plaintiff confirms the correctness of the attitude taken by the defendant. The plaintiff has not discharged the onus upon him to establish that he is a fit and proper person.
In the light of my conclusion there is no need to deal with the claim for compensation.
I make the following orders:
The summons filed on 17 August 2025 is dismissed.
The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the proceedings.
**********
Error in date in para 11, 2026 should have been 2016.
Senanayake
Law Society of NSW
[2026] WASAT 74
[2026] QCA 100
[2020] AATA 116
(1968) 117 CLR 177
(2002) 209 CLR 597
(1960) 104 CLR 186
(2001) 52 NSWLR 279