ACM20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 598

1. The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the then Immigration Assessment Authority (the IAA) affirming an earlier decision of the first respondent (the Minister) to refuse the grant of a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (Subclass 790) Visa (SHEV). For an applicant to succeed in this Court, he must establish that the IAA's decision contains a jurisdictional error (Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476). This Court cannot undertake a review of the merits of the decision under review.
2. For the reasons set out below, the Court has not found jurisdictional error in the IAA's decision. On that basis, the application for judicial review cannot succeed.

1. The applicant is a citizen of Iran who first arrived in Australia on 18 March 2013 as an unauthorised maritime arrival (Court Book (CB) 61).
2. On 15 April 2013, the applicant participated in an Irregular Maritime Arrival Entry Interview (CB 12-28).
3. On 10 March 2016, the applicant was invited to apply for a Temporary Protection (subclass 785) visa or a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa (SHEV) (CB 29-34).
4. On 17 February 2017, the applicant lodged an application for a SHEV (the visa) (CB 41-77).
5. In support of his application, the applicant provided a number of documents including black and white photographs of himself which showed significant scarring on the applicant's back (CB 94).
6. On 1 August 2019, the applicant attended an interview with a delegate of the Minister (CB 120).
7. On 25 October 2019, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant the visa (CB 130-142).
8. On 30 October 2019, the delegate's decision was referred to the second respondent, the IAA, for review (CB 144).
9. On 25 November 2019, the applicant's representative provided a submission to the IAA (CB 158-167). That submission included a colour copy of one of the photographs provided to the delegate (referred to above at [7]) (CB 159). The representative also provided a translation of a lease agreement (CB 165-167).
10. On 13 December 2019, the IAA affirmed the delegate's decision not to grant the applicant the visa (CB 173-191).

1. On 9 January 2020, the applicant lodged an application for judicial review in this Court. That application seeks review of the IAA's decision pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
2. On 3 March 2023, the applicant (now represented) filed an amended application containing three particularised grounds of review as follows (without alteration):
   1. The IAA did not properly reach a state of satisfaction when exercising its powers under s473DD(a) and (b)(ii) of the Migration Act 1958, in that it did not properly consider, or failed to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to whether there existed exceptional circumstances to justify considering new information provided by the Applicant's representative, nor did it assess whether the new information was credible personal information not previously known to the Minister which, had it been known, may have affected the Applicant's claim.

Particulars

1. The IAA refused to take into consideration the colour photograph purporting to be of the scars on the Applicant's back, the colour photo making clear what had not been clear to the Delegate who had only black and white photos available of the scars; and

2. The IAA refused to take into account a lease agreement for a shop in Tehran that went to the Applicant's case, on the grounds of a lack of credit.

3. The IAA made findings against the Applicant's credit without a factual basis for such findings.

Particulars

The IAA found that lashing by the Basij (the Iranian regime's enforcement unit), as claimed by the Applicant, was implausible because lashing involved a judicial sentence. The extra-legal behaviour of the Basij is plainly an issue, and there was evidence available to the IAA, which it did not reflect on, detailing the "non-ordered" behaviour of the Basij.

1. The IAA was legally unreasonable in failing to utilise its powers under s473DC of the Migration Act to obtain information relevant to the issue of whether (A) the Basij were capable of delivering a non-judicially authorised lashing (this "information gap" highlighted by the availability of information as to the "non-ordered" behaviour of the Basij and (B) whether the colour photograph purporting to be of the lashing scars was plausible evidence of such a lashing.

1. On 11 November 2025, the matter returned for hearing before the Court. The materials before the Court at that hearing included:
   • the amended application for judicial review filed on 3 March 2023;
   • the affidavit of the applicant sworn on 7 January 2020 and filed on 9 January 2020 (taken as read and in evidence at the hearing on 11 November 2025);
   • a Court Book numbering 191 pages (marked as Exhibit 1 at the hearing on 11 November 2025);
   • written submissions filed on behalf of the applicant on 14 October 2025;
   • written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 28 October 2025; and
   • the affidavit of Michelle Elizabeth Stone affirmed on 27 October 2025 and filed on 28 October 2025, annexing DFAT Country Information reports (taken as read and in evidence at the hearing on 11 November 2025).
2. Following the hearing on 11 November 2025, parties were granted leave to file the following further documents:
   • the affidavit of Sophie Alexandra Ward affirmed and filed on 17 November 2025, annexing further country information which was cited by the delegate and referred to the IAA;
   • supplementary written submissions filed on behalf of the applicant on 25 November 2025; and
   • supplementary written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 1 December 2025.

1. As outlined above, the amended application for judicial review contains three grounds asserting jurisdictional error. The first of these grounds argues that the IAA erred in finding there were not exceptional circumstances to justify considering new information in the form of a colour photograph of the applicant's back which demonstrated scarring he claimed occurred at the hands of the Basij (the colour photograph) and a lease agreement for a shop in Tehran (the lease agreement).
2. The IAA's findings in respect of each of those documents is considered below.

1. To understand the relevance of the colour photograph, it is helpful to understand the context of the claim it was intended to support and how that claim evolved. In his application, the relevant claim is set out by the applicant as follows (CB 78):

I was working in my shop and the volume of the music was too loud, and Basij members came to my shop, attacked me and arrested me due to the sound of music, they ran tear gas into my eyes and I was barely handcuffed from behind. They took me by force into Safa Mosque which was one of the Basij base. They transferred me by worst possible way with closed eyes into the underground of the Mosque, and after beating lashes and wounding over the waist by whip they realised me.

1. As observed above, the application was accompanied by supporting documents including three black and white photographs of the applicant which showed scarring on his back.
2. The delegate's decision outlined the applicant's evidence in this respect given during his SHEV interview as follows (CB 132):

The applicant has claimed that he was in his shop when the Basij came and told him to turn the music down that he was playing in his shop. He claimed that members of the Basij returned to his shop, and took him to the nearby Safa mosque, that was a base of the Basij headquarters in the area, and that he was detained there by the Basij for five to six hours. He claimed that the Basij did not provide any paperwork in relation to his arrest or his release. He claimed that while he was detained he received 30 to 40 lashes, and that they haven't left a scar. When asked if he required medical treatment, he advised that he only used home remedies and that he kept the wounds clean. The applicant has provided photographs to support his claim that he received lashes, however, it is difficult to place weight on these as evidence that he received lashes as they are black and white and the quality of the images is poor.

1. After considering relevant country information, the delegate accepted that it was "plausible that the applicant received lashes as punishment by the Basij for playing music too loud" (CB 134). The delegate then went on to make the following finding (CB 134):

...I find that while he may have experienced some questioning and lashings as punishment from the Basij for playing music too loud, I do not accept his claim that the Basij seized goods in his shop, nor that they had issued a summons for his arrest as a result of the items that were seized, to be plausible. I do not accept that the applicant was of interest to the Basij or any other Iranian authority prior to his departure from Iran.

1. Following referral to the IAA, the applicant's representative provided a submission. Included with that submission was a colour version of one of the photographs previously submitted. In that submission, the representative stated (at CB 161) (italics in original):

Question as to whether the photos supplied are evidence of being lashed

The decision maker has complained about the quality of the photos of his injuries after the lashing. She said, it is difficult to place weight on these as evidence that he received lashes as they are black and white and the quality of the images is poor. [The applicant] sent his agent the photos of his back from his phone. They were in colour so the agent must have printed them in black and white which is not [the applicant's] fault.

I have included a picture of his injuries which was on [the applicant's] phone that he asked a friend to take after he was released by the Basiji.

1. In addition to providing a copy of the colour photograph as an attachment to the submission (at CB 159), a colour copy was embedded into the submission itself (at CB 161). The Court observes that the photograph which is embedded into the submission at CB 161 is approximately 5 cm x 10 cm and is as clear in detail as the copy contained at CB 159.
2. It is useful to set out the IAA's treatment of the representative's submission and colour photograph in full as follows (at [4]-[6]):

The submission reiterated and clarified aspects of information put before the delegate including regarding the material claimed seized by the Basij, the issue of a summons against him and attempt to locate him, the circumstances and motivation of his departure from Iran and explanations of his stress in the Irregular Maritime Arrival Entry Interview (Entry interview), his family conflicts and his religious belief. To the extent that the submission on these matters reiterates previous information before the delegate and makes argument with the delegate's assessment and decision it is not new information and I have had regard to it in the review. To the extent that aspects of the reiteration or clarification of these issues, particularly concerning the type of material seized by the Basij, his knowledge of a summons against him and continued attempt to locate him, and planning for his departure from Iran for Australia differ from the applicant's previous evidence, this may amount to new information that was not before the delegate. The submission also raised a new claim that when taken for lashing by the Basij the applicant had also been stripped naked and they searched his body internally, to humiliate him. He claimed that he has seen a psychologist for trauma. He claimed his father had an illegal TV satellite. This is new information that was not before the delegate.

The new information is personal information in the relevant sense and I am satisfied for the purposes of this exercise that on a prima facie basis it might be capable of belief and that s.473DD(b)(ii) is otherwise satisfied. The submission explained that the applicant had been disadvantaged in the preparation of his SHEV application and statement of claims (SHEV statement) by his previous representative who had not properly obtained his full details. It was apparent in the SHEV interview that the applicant's former representative had ceased practicing at some point in the application process and the applicant alluded to problems with some aspects of his SHEV statement. The submission referred to his discomfort in the Entry interview as the personnel were all female (which I note they were), and that, regarding the claimed physical abuse he does not like to talk about it. The relevant claims in the SHEV statement appear to have largely been copied from the Entry interview. The applicant was not represented in the SHEV interview and the submissions seek to clarify his evidence. I am satisfied for this purpose that there are exceptional circumstances to justify consideration of the new information.

A copy photograph forwarded with the submissions is already in the review material and was before the delegate, and albeit that this is in colour it is not new information.

1. The salient aspects of the IAA's reasoning here for this application are:

(a) The IAA found that aspects of the submission which argued with the delegate's assessment of the material before it was not new information and the IAA had regard to it.

(b) The IAA accepted that there were exceptional circumstances to justify consideration of new information contained in the submission.

(c) The IAA did not consider that the colour copy photograph was new information.

1. Unlike the delegate, the IAA did not accept the applicant's claims to have been detained and lashed by the Basij. The IAA made the following findings in this respect (at [27] and [28]):

The applicant's evidence of his claimed altercation with the Basij at his shop over loud music was that it descended into a physical fight with four Basij members when he resisted their arresting him, until he was subdued when sprayed with teargas so that they then took him away to their base by motorbike. Although DFAT (2013) and Amnesty International report that in addition to moral policing of behaviour, the Basij are also used for internal security and law-enforcement and have been mobilised on occasions against mass-protests and demonstrations, at which times they have been armed and used weapons including tear gas, I have considerable doubt that they would ordinarily be armed with tear gas for routine neighbourhood morals monitoring, even on a revolution anniversary date. Nevertheless, even if not discounting that such an altercation, with teargas, could ensue over an argument over music being too loud, I consider the claim that, in the context of such a dramatic and violent incident claimed with the applicant overcome by teargas and being involuntarily taken away by Basij, that there was presence of mind, or even opportunity allowed for the applicant to arrange with his next-door supermarket owner to take over his shop keys to be improbable.

He gave evidence that he was lashed by the Basij, verbally abused and then released by them, on his pleas, after three hours. Although DFAT reported in 2013 that civilian interaction with Basij units or members could be unpredictable, and they could at times operate without orders, nevertheless, given that lashing is a judicial sentence, determined at the prerogative of a judge after a criminal conviction in court, and used as public deterrence, I consider such a usurpation of the judicial role by some local Basij members for lashing without a court order to be unlikely and implausible. Moreover, I also consider it unlikely and implausible that, having purportedly suffered between 30 to 40 lashes of a whip, a considerable number, on his bare skin (noting his claims that he had been whipped and wounded above the waist, and they had removed his clothing), that he would not have sought any medical treatment of any kind at all, but relied only on a home remedy of keeping the wounds clean, particularly in light of his claim that he wanted the photographs for evidence in case of any future action involving the Basij, and noting they were undated on their face.

I do not accept the claimed incident of the altercation with Basij members in a shop over loud music. I do not accept the claim that he was taken by Basij at that time or any other to the Basij base and there subjected to lashes or whipping or body cavity search or any other form of harm as claimed. I do not accept that he has suffered or been treated for any psychological harm as claimed.

1. The applicant contended that the IAA irrationally rejected the colour photograph and argued that the colour photograph made evident what was otherwise unclear to the delegate. However, there is a clear difficulty in the applicant's submissions. The IAA expressly determined that the fact that the photograph was in colour did not make it new information. It is reasonable to infer from that finding that the IAA had regard to the photograph. That is supported by the fact that the IAA made reference to the photograph at [28] of its reasons.
2. The applicant's argument invites the court to read into the IAA's finding that it did not have regard to the colour copy of the photograph because it had reviewed the black and white photograph. Absent any clear statement by the IAA to that effect, the Court does not accept that is a fair reading of the IAA's finding. The IAA's finding in relation to this was not qualified in any sense. It was simply a statement that it did not consider a colour version of the photograph to be new information. In the Court's view, that was the correct finding. In essence, the colour copy of the photograph was akin to a clearer version of a poorly photocopied document. The IAA was correct to find that the colour copy of the photograph was not new information. It was appropriate that the IAA had regard to it and the Court finds that it did so.
3. Even if that were not the case, the IAA also expressly found that it had regard to all of the submissions (whether new information or not) which contained a copy of the colour photograph embedded within it. The IAA did not set out any caveats in its acceptance of those submissions. Under those circumstances, consideration of the colour photograph was essentially inescapable.

1. As observed above, the applicant's representative provided the IAA with a copy of a lease agreement. The representative submitted that the lease agreement on the shop demonstrated that the applicant didn't own the shop but rather rented it from the owner (CB 162).
2. The IAA's treatment of the lease agreement is at [8] of its reasons and it is useful to set out that paragraph in full as it casts illumination on the IAA's deliberation process in respect of whether it should have regard to that document.

The applicant was asked more than once in the SHEV interview by the delegate whether he had any evidence of running his shop business, but stated it had all been left in Iran. I consider the repeated questioning of whether he had any documentary proof of this business, was reasonable indication to the applicant that proof of his business was in issue. It raises some concern that the claimed Lease Agreement was only provided to the IAA after the decision, and not to the delegate before the decision was made, in which the delegate found that he did not own a shop business, despite the decision being made by the delegate more than two and half months after the SHEV interview. The applicant was given written notice by the Department on several occasions of his responsibility to provide all evidence and information in support of his claims. He acknowledged having read and understood the notice to this effect given prior to the SHEV interview. The applicant explained that he had been unsuccessful in obtaining it previously; that he does not communicate with his siblings with whom he has issues, and so sought his mother's help. I am not satisfied that this explains why he did not seek his mother's help from the start given his claimed issues with his siblings, or seek to obtain any such document straight away, nor that it explains such a significant lapse of time. Moreover, I have some concern that the document would be capable of being believed, noting that the address recorded on the Agreement as the applicant's residential address does not accord with his claims elsewhere in the review material of his residential address at the time and the description of the business, as computer and mobile repairs does not accord with his claims and evidence in the review material that he was in retail selling CDs and DVDs and made no mention of repairs. Also, although purporting to have been registered on 21 May 2012 the document does not record the required registration details. I consider these circumstances all combine to undermine the probative value of the document as corroborative of the applicant's claims. In all the circumstances above I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering this new information.

1. The applicant submitted that the above finding by the IAA reached a premature determination of credit by considering whether there were factors which undermined the probative value of the document rather than a determination of the lease agreement's inherent credibility. In this way, the applicant submitted, the IAA's approach was contrary to the approach identified in CSR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474 (CSR16).
2. The Court has recently considered the approach to be taken by the IAA following CSR16 in AYV19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 40 at [25]- [31]:

The applicant argued that the IAA made the same error as that identified in CSR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474 (CSR16) in that the IAA was said to have applied the incorrect test in determining whether the new information was credible. In CSR16, Bromberg J found that 'credible' (in the sense that it is used in s 473DD) meant "capable of being believed" as opposed to a determinative finding that it was true. The relevant paragraphs of CSR16 provide (at [39]-[42]):

[39] To address the competing contentions, it is necessary to properly understand the basis for the Authority's conclusion that the new information was not "credible personal information". It was not in contest that the Authority was engaged in a process of assessing the veracity of the "new information", not on its face, but by reference to "review material" which had been received by the Authority. By that process, the Authority came to an ultimate or final view that the "new information" was not to be believed and therefore not information that could be received for consideration in accordance with s 473DD(b)(ii). The nature of the assessment made by the Authority indicates that the Authority proceeded on the basis that a condition of engagement of s 473DD(b)(ii) is the Authority's satisfaction that the "new information" is true. That reflects the sense in which the Authority construed the word "credible".

[40] An alternative construction for the use of the word "credible" in the phrase "credible personal information", is that it has a meaning consistent with the meaning given to the word in a setting somewhat akin to that found in s 473DD(b)(ii), that is, in the expression of one aspect of the natural justice hearing rule. I addressed the meaning of "credible" when used in that context in Gbojueh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 288 at [79], where I said this:

The basic principle is that persons whose interests are likely to be affected must be given the opportunity to deal with any matters relevantly adverse to their interests, which the decision-maker proposes to take into account: VAAD at [56]. That opportunity need only be given in relation to information that Brennan J described in Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 629 as "credible, relevant and significant". "Credible, relevant and significant", is to be understood as referring to information which cannot be dismissed from further consideration by the decision-maker before the making of the decision. That is, information which is "evidently not credible, not relevant, or of little or no significance to the decision that is to be made": VEAL at [17] and see at [20].

[41] In my view all that the "credible" element of the s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria requires is the Authority's satisfaction that the "new information" is information which is open to be or capable of being accepted by the Authority as truthful (or accurate, or genuine). It is only at the deliberative stage of its review that the Authority will be required to determine whether or not the "new information" is true. The s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria is concerned with an earlier or anterior stage of the review directed at whether "new information" should be received by the Authority so that it may be considered at the deliberative stage.

[42] The criteria is a filtering mechanism designed to separate information worthy of consideration at the deliberative stage from that which is not. In that context, the word "credible" is used in relation to information, not in the sense that the information is believed, but in the sense that the information is capable of being believed. It is only information that the Authority is satisfied is "evidently not credible" (VEAL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2005] HCA 72; (2005) 225 CLR 88 at [17] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ) that fails to meet the credibility requirement imposed by the s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria.

In this matter, the applicant argued that the IAA went beyond the correct question of asking whether the new information was credible in the sense of being capable of being believed, and instead embarked on a determination as to whether the new information was credible in the sense of being true. The Court accepts that if this is established that would demonstrate jurisdictional error.

The Minister argued that the IAA did not err in the manner identified in CSR16. The Minister argued that the IAA was not required to engage in any formulaic consideration of s 473DD(b), relying upon APH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 23 where Markovic J held (at [79]):

...it is unnecessary for the Authority to engage in any particular formulaic consideration of s 473DD(b). It will be sufficient if, in a particular case, the Court on judicial review is able to infer from the Authority's reasons that the requisite assessment has occurred.

Whilst acknowledging that each case must turn on its own facts, the Minister drew parallels with the Court's consideration of similar findings by the IAA in FGI18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 57 where O'Callaghan J stated that (at [28]):

The IAA was not obliged to use the precise words of the Act or legal tests, and in my view, its expression of "doubts" about the genuineness of the information was a finding that the information was not credible under s 473DD(b)(ii).

Similarly, the Minister relied upon CTP20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1401 where Rangiah J observed (at [30]-[33]):

[30] In its reasons, the Authority referred to the fact that the appellant was fully aware of the new information prior to the interview with the delegate and the making of the decision, and was aware of the requirement to provide such information prior to the making of the delegate's decision. It was also noted that the appellant was prompted a number of times throughout the interview with the delegate to provide any further information. The Authority considered that it was not credible that the appellant would forget such information, particularly given that there was a lot of discussion in the interview about his wife, who had told him about the new information.

[31] The Authority also noted that the appellant had not raised that he had a "friend who also did the same LTTE work as he did in his statement or interview", and stated that "this, as well as the lateness of the claim" led it to doubt the genuineness of the new information.

[32] The Authority further considered that it was "odd" that this kind of information would be shared on Facebook, and if it were, that the appellant could not find it on Facebook. The Authority also referred to the fact that the appellant's statutory declaration provided little information about the circumstances of the man who worked with him for the LTTE, but rather provided "unsourced general assertions about people disappearing or being detained".

[33] In some cases, error has been found because the Authority had not considered the truthfulness or credibility of the new information at all when assessing whether exceptional circumstances existed: BVZ16 at [35]; CQW17 at [51]; CHF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 192 at [44]. However, this is not such a case. The Authority considered all the relevant circumstances, including factors which indicated that the new information was not credible, and ultimately concluded that there were not exceptional circumstances. It is apparent from its reasons that the Authority not only considered the credibility of the new information as part of its consideration of the relevant circumstances, but decided that it was not credible. However, the Authority was not required to make such a finding: cf AQU17 at [16].

The Court also notes that in FPM17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 550, Burley J observed (at [20]):

I am not persuaded that the Authority incorrectly approached the question as one of credibility rather than one of whether a credible claim was open or capable of being accepted. In reaching its conclusion that it was not capable of being accepted the Authority was entitled to have regard to the character of the information that the appellant put forward in assessing whether the information is capable of being believed; Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v BTW17 [2020] FCAFC 159; (2020) 294 FCR 150 at [75] (Mortimer and Jackson JJ).

The Court further respectfully agrees with the decisions of Judge Laing in AGF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 169 (at [35]) and Judge Given in BGW18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1838 (at [66]) that the IAA will have carried out its task permissibly where it does not make any express finding as to whether new information is true or genuine, but instead identifies inconsistencies and concerns which may cast doubt on whether the information was capable of being true.

1. The Minister submitted that the IAA's reasoning in paragraph [8] needs to be considered in full. Importantly, it is clear that the IAA first considered whether the material could have been provided to the delegate prior to the delegate making their decision (in accordance with s 473DD(b)(i)). It did so in noting that the applicant explained that he had been unsuccessful in obtaining the document previously, that he does not communicate with his siblings with whom he has issues, and so he sought his mother's help. However, the IAA noted that it was not satisfied that this explains why he did not seek his mother's help from the start, given his claimed issues with his siblings. That is, the IAA essentially made a finding that it was not persuaded that the material could not have been provided to the delegate and thus did not meet the criteria in s 473(b)(i). In the Court's view, that is an accurate description of the process undertaken by the IAA in the first part of paragraph [8].
2. The Minister submitted that the IAA's statement "[m]oreover, I have some concern that the document would be capable of being believed" is indicative of the IAA moving on to its consideration of s 473DD(b)(ii). Importantly, the Minister submitted, the IAA used the exact wording from CSR16 in assessing whether the document was credible personal information. That is, the IAA considered whether the information was capable of being believed as opposed to making a finding as to whether the information was true or not. The IAA did not undertake a substantive assessment of the credibility of the document or whether the information was true. The Minister submitted that ultimately the IAA reasoned precisely in line with the process identified in CSR16.
3. The Court agrees that the IAA did not reach any conclusions as to the ultimate veracity of the new information. Rather, it considered a number of prima facie concerns with inconsistencies and absent information on the face of the document relevant to the applicant's claims. It did not resolve those concerns in any kind of determinative way but simply observed, notably in the language adopted in CSR16, that it raised a concern over whether the material was capable of being believed. Those concerns were not determinative and were commensurate with the deliberative stage of assessment.
4. Accordingly, the Court accepts that the IAA properly understood and carried out its task in respect of s 473DD(b)(ii), and its reasons do not reveal an error of the kind identified in CSR16.
5. Ground one does not establish jurisdictional error.

1. Through this ground, the applicant argues that there was not a factual basis for the IAA's adverse credibility finding in respect of the applicant's claim that he had been lashed by the Basij. In particular, the applicant asserts that the IAA's finding at [28] was made without any evidence. That finding is as follows (emphasis added):

Although DFAT reported in 2013 that civilian interaction with Basij units or members could be unpredictable, and they could at times operate without orders, nevertheless, given that lashing is a judicial sentence, determined at the prerogative of a judge after a criminal conviction in court, and used as public deterrence, I consider such a usurpation of the judicial role by some local Basij members for lashing without a court order to be unlikely and implausible.

1. The Minister contended that whilst the IAA did not expressly cite any evidence for its findings in [28], it is apparent that the IAA was referring to the country information it had cited earlier in its decision at [17] where the IAA stated (emphasis added):

DFAT's reports indicate that for behaviour proscribed to be a punishable sinful act in public the Penal Code allows, in addition to the act's sentence, a term of imprisonment or lashes, and including for acts that "violate public prudency" but not specifically proscribed as punishable. DFAT reports that the number of lashes often remains at the discretion of the judge handing down the sentence, and only a competent court may pass and execute a sentence.

1. The relevant country information cited was DFAT's Country Information Reports on Iran from 2013, 2016 and 2018. The Court accepts that the IAA's finding at [28] can only sensibly refer to the country information cited earlier at [17]. The question then becomes whether or not that country information does provide an evidentiary basis for the IAA's finding (see generally, DWP19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1852 at [45]- [52]).
2. The Court has reviewed the DFAT reports referred to by the IAA (annexed to the affidavit of Michelle Elizabeth Stone). Those reports all identify that Iranian Penal Code provides for the use of physical punishment, including lashing and floggings (2013 Report: 3.48, 3.56, 3.63, 4.14-4.15; 2015 Report: 4.17-4.18; 2018 Report: 4.12, 4.17-4.18). Those reports also clearly establish that the Iranian Penal Code identifies lashings as a potential judicial punishment and that the number of lashes was at the discretion of the judge.
3. It is well established that a challenge to a finding based on 'no evidence' will fail if there is any evidence, often referred to in the authorities as a 'skerrick of evidence', which might support the finding (see Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Viane (2021) 274 CLR 398 at [17]; EUF20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 130 at [71]- [73]). In this matter, there was certainly evidence before the IAA which grounded a finding that lashings were court-administered sentences and were subject to the discretion of the judicial officer.
4. It is important to consider the actual finding which was made by the IAA. That was that, in circumstances where lashing is a judicial sentence, it was unlikely and implausible that this would be usurped by the Basij. The IAA was alert to the fact that the Basij "could be unpredictable, and they could at times operate without orders". However, there was no country information which supported the applicant's claim that the Basij usurped the role of the judiciary in carrying out corporal punishment.
5. The Court accepts that this finding of fact was open to the IAA on the material before it. That is particularly the case given this finding was only one limb of the IAA's rejection of the applicant's claim in this respect.
6. Ground two does not establish jurisdictional error.

1. Through this ground, the applicant asserts that the IAA should have exercised its discretionary power to obtain new information in relation to non-judicially authorised lashing activities of the Basij and in relation to whether a photograph could be plausible evidence of such a lashing. Its failure to do so, according to the applicant, was unreasonable.
2. In particular, the applicant submits that the IAA erred in not using s 473DC to obtain the coloured photograph. In this sense, the applicant argues that the IAA reached a "diametrically different view of the claim as to being lashed, despite improved evidentiary materials being available on the matter".
3. The applicant relies on ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 34; (2020) 269 CLR 439 (ABT17) and CPP17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2021] FCA 199, although accepts that those decisions are not directly analogous to this matter.
4. The Court has had cause to consider ABT17 recently in AMO20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 496 and repeats its summary of that decision below (at [21]):

In ABT17, the issue was that it was unreasonable to not invite an applicant to an interview to assess that applicant's demeanour in circumstances where how the applicant had presented at the interview had a bearing on the delegate's assessment of credibility which the IAA departed from. In respect of that, the High Court:

• The record of an interview with a delegate forms part of the review material which the Secretary is obliged to give to the IAA and, in turn, that the IAA will be obliged to examine for itself (at [12]);
• There is the potential for an information gap to arise in the review material in circumstances where there is an audio recording, but not a video recording, of an interview (at [13]);
• Such an information gap has the potential to materially influence the IAA's assessment of an applicant's credibility (at [14]);
• Where such an information gap arises, the obvious way for the IAA to resolve its concerns arising from such a gap is to invite the applicant to an interview (at [15]);
• There is no doubt that the IAA has the power to bridge the information gap by inviting an applicant to a further interview. The IAA's own visual impression of the applicant during such an interview would constitute new information (at [16]);
• The question is whether the implied condition of reasonableness in the conduct of the review might compel the IAA to issue such an invitation (at [18]).

1. The applicant's reliance on ABT17 is misplaced. Here, the Court finds that there was no information gap. As observed in respect of ground one, the IAA did have regard to the colour photograph. It was not required to use its power to obtain that photograph because it had accepted that it was not new information.
2. The Court also observes that the photograph itself, irrespective of whether in colour or not, could only ever be evidence that the applicant had scarring on his back. It could not, in isolation, stand as evidence that such scarring was the consequence of lashing, let alone who may have administered such a lashing.
3. Insofar as the applicant says the IAA should have used its power to obtain new information in relation to the extra-judicial activities of the Basij, other than the colour photograph there is no suggestion as to what this information may have been. In any event, the IAA had the same country information which was before the delegate. There is no information gap of the kind identified in ABT17.
4. In such circumstances, there was no need for the IAA to exercise its power to obtain new information.
5. Ground three also fails.

1. The amended application for judicial review, along with the written and oral submissions advanced on behalf of the applicant, has failed to identify any jurisdictional error on the part of the IAA.
2. Accordingly, the application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding fifty-nine (59) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Gerrard.