AAM20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1503

1. The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (the IAA) affirming an earlier decision of the first respondent (the Minister) to refuse to grant him a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa (SHEV). For the applicant to succeed in this Court, he must establish that the IAA decision contains a jurisdictional error (Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476). This Court cannot undertake a review of the merits of the decision under review.
2. For the reasons set out below, the Court has not found any jurisdictional error in the IAA decision. On that basis, his application cannot succeed.

1. On 13 August 2013, the applicant arrived on Christmas Island as an unauthorised maritime arrival (CB 159).
2. On 11 September 2013, the applicant participated in an Irregular Maritime Arrival Entry Interview (CB 1-16).
3. On 20 September 2016, the applicant was invited to apply for a Temporary Protection (subclass 785) visa (TPV) or a SHEV (CB 18-19).
4. On 17 March 2017, the applicant appointed a registered migration agent as his authorised representative (CB 23-25).
5. On 24 April 2017, the applicant lodged a SHEV application (the visa) with the assistance of his migration agent (CB 27-63). The applicant attached various documents accompanying his application, including a statement of claim. The applicant claimed that he fled Iran because his wife, a member of a devout Muslim family, found out about his attendance at an underground Christian church and threatened to tell the government. He claimed that, if returned to Iran, he would not be able to practise Christianity without risk to his life, and he would be captured, tortured and ultimately killed regardless of where he lived in Iran (CB 64-68).
6. On 24 May 2018, the applicant's migration agent withdrew their representation (CB 87-89).
7. On 3 July 2019, the applicant was requested to attend an interview scheduled for 26 July 2019 (CB 90-91).
8. On 2 September 2019, a delegate of the Minister invited the applicant to comment on information received, namely, records from Serco officers at the detention facility where the applicant was held for a time, where he was quoted as having made comments that undermined his claim to have genuinely converted to Christianity (the Serco information) (CB 118-122).
9. On 9 September 2019, the applicant appointed a new migration agent as his authorised recipient (CB 138-140), who responded to the delegate's invitation with submissions, a statutory declaration of the applicant, and other documentary evidence (CB 127-137, 141-155).
10. On 30 October 2019, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant the visa (CB 159-175).
11. On 5 November 2019, the delegate's decision was referred to the second respondent, the IAA, for review (CB 177-178).
12. On 13 November 2019, the applicant's migration agent provided further information to the IAA in support of the review application (CB 185-207).
13. On 2 December 2019, the IAA affirmed the delegate's decision not to grant the applicant the visa (CB 212-225).
14. On 3 January 2020, the applicant lodged an application for judicial review in this Court. That application seeks review of the IAA decision pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

1. To obtain assistance from this Court, the applicant must show that the IAA has fallen into jurisdictional error. It is thus useful to outline the IAA decision in some detail.
2. In respect of the applicant's statement of claims and the protection claims within the SHEV application, the IAA placed no weight on these, as it was not satisfied the documents accurately reflected information provided by the applicant. The IAA outlined examples of inconsistencies between those documents and evidence given later by the applicant, particularly in claims relating to his family and the date he departed Iran (at [10]).
3. The IAA accepted the applicant was a non-practising Muslim (at [19] and [30]) but found he had not experienced any harm in Iran for that reason (at [17]).
4. The IAA did not accept as plausible the applicant's claim that he fled Iran due to his wife's threat that she would tell authorities he was Christian (at [18]), nor did the IAA accept his wife would have been aware of discussions he had in Iran concerning Christianity. The IAA did not accept such discussions had occurred (at [19]).
5. The IAA also did not accept he left Iran to convert to Christianity (at [19]). The IAA found that the applicant identified as a Shia Muslim on arrival in Australia (at [20]).
6. Whilst the IAA noted concerns with the applicant's evidence about his knowledge of Christian festivals in his interview with the delegate, it accepted he attended Christian Bible studies while in immigration detention, attended Christian church services, studied the Bible and had been baptised (at [20]-[22]). However, it did not accept those activities of themselves indicated a genuine conversion to Christianity (at [22]).
7. The IAA noted the applicant refused to answer the delegate's questions at his SHEV interview as to whether, and if so how, he would practise his Christian faith on return to Iran (at [24] and [26]).
8. The IAA was not satisfied the applicant had genuinely converted to Christianity (at [25]). The IAA found he would not practise Christianity or identify as Christian if returned to Iran as he does not have a genuine and ongoing commitment to the faith (at [26]).
9. The IAA was neither satisfied that the Iranian authorities were aware of his Christian activities in Australia, nor was it satisfied they were aware of his Christian-themed social media posts (at [26]). The IAA did not accept he would be perceived to be a Christian in Iran because of his attendance at a Christian church in Australia or because of his baptism (at [26]).
10. The IAA concluded that his baptism, church attendance, Bible studies and other Christian-related activities had been undertaken solely for the purpose of furthering his protection claims (at [26]).
11. The IAA noted that the applicant had a number of interactions with Serco officers whilst held in immigration detention, and that reports had been completed by these officers. The IAA set out that a number of these reports refer to him being Muslim, wanting to visit a mosque, or requesting halal food. Whilst the IAA was satisfied the reports were made on the dates recorded by the Serco officers, it was unclear as to whether the interactions were conducted with a Farsi interpreter, and what questions were asked to elicit the responses given. The IAA confirmed it did not place much weight on these records, although it did have regard to them (at [12]-[13]).
12. The IAA concluded the applicant did not meet the refugee or complementary protection criteria in ss 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Act, and accordingly, refused to grant the applicant the visa (at [31], [35]).

1. On 3 January 2020, the applicant filed an application in this Court seeking review of the IAA's decision. The applicant filed an affidavit with that judicial review application which annexed a copy of the IAA's decision.
2. The applicant now relies on a further amended application which was filed on 23 April 2025. The further amended application contains the following two grounds of review:
   1. The decision of the IAA is affected by legal unreasonableness because the IAA failed to consider inviting the applicant to an interview.
   2. The decision of the IAA is affected by legal unreasonableness because the IAA did not correct for the delegate's failure to comply with s 57(2)(a) of the Migration Act, in that the delegate gave insufficient particulars to the applicant of the "Serco information" by not telling the applicant the names of the Serco officers.
3. The materials before the Court at the hearing on 15 May 2025 include:
   • The further amended application for judicial review filed on 23 April 2025;
   • The affidavit of the applicant affirmed and filed on 3 January 2020 annexing the IAA decision (taken as read and in evidence at the hearing);
   • The Court Book numbering 225 pages (tendered and referenced as Exhibit 1);
   • The affidavit of Hiwa Zandi affirmed and filed on 14 July 2020 annexing material relating to the applicant's brother's immigration history and protection claims (taken as read and in evidence at the hearing);
   • Written submissions filed on behalf of the applicant on 23 April 2025; and
   • Written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 9 May 2025.

Was the IAA required to invite the applicant to an interview?

1. Ground one contends that the IAA acted unreasonably in failing to consider to invite the applicant to an interview in accordance with s 473DC of the Act (as it then was).
2. Section 473DC of the Act relevantly sets out that:

(1) Subject to this Part, the Immigration Assessment Authority may, in relation to a fast track decision, get any documents or information (new information) that:

(a) were not before the Minister when the Minister made the decision under section 65; and

(2) The Immigration Assessment Authority does not have a duty to get, request or accept, any new information whether the Authority is requested to do so by a referred applicant or by any other person, or in any other circumstances.

(3) Without limiting subsection (1), the Immigration Assessment Authority may invite a person, orally or in writing, to give new information:

(a) in writing; or

(b) at an interview, whether conducted in person, by telephone or in any other way.

1. In written submissions, the applicant noted that his brother was granted a protection visa by the same IAA member, and at the same time, as the applicant's adverse decision. The IAA stated in the brother's decision that it accepted key aspects of the brother's introduction to Christianity whilst in Iran and noted the applicant was present at this time. The IAA commented in both decisions that, at each of their interviews with the delegate, the delegate did not ask typical questions asked when an Iranian claims to have converted to Christianity. The applicant placed before the Court some, but not all, of the material which was before the Tribunal in respect of the brother's application.
2. In written submissions, the Minister contended that the IAA did not act unreasonably. Neither the applicant nor his migration agent submitted that the IAA should exercise its s 473DC discretion to interview him or even mention s 473DC, so there was no "trigger" for the IAA to consider its discretion (DUZ17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1593 at [51]). It was also irrelevant that the IAA was impressed by the applicant's brother's interview but not the applicant's, as it gave rational and cogent reasons about its concerns with the applicant's lack of awareness of Easter, an event in the Christian calendar, particularly where he claimed to have volunteered in the month of Easter. Such a claim, in the Minister's view, could not have been addressed by a further interview.
3. The crux of the applicant's case appears to be that, because the same IAA member was impressed by its review of the brother's evidence before the delegate in his case, and less than impressed with the applicant's, it should have used its power to obtain new information and invited the applicant to an interview.
4. In the Court's view, this is problematic. Firstly, putting to one side whether it is appropriate to conduct this kind of comparative exercise, it is not really sufficient, in the Court's view, to place some of the evidence that was before the IAA in the brother's matter as the applicant has done in these proceedings and invite a conclusion on an incomplete evidentiary canvas. There may well have been other material before the IAA in the brother's matter. At the very least, the answers in the brother's protection visa interview appeared to reveal a different calibre of awareness of foundational Christian mythology. That difference is, in itself, an explanation for differing outcomes. It is not a rational basis to propose that a different approach was required to be taken.
5. The fact that a decision-making body accepts a similar claim in one matter does not mean that it must inexorably accept a similar claim in another. Without more, that axiomatic statement is not altered if the respective applicants are siblings. In any event, that is a line of argument that invokes an allegation of illogicality in a decision, which is not how this ground is framed or advanced.
6. Through this ground, whilst the applicant appears to hint at an illogical outcome, it is more advanced on the basis that the process followed by the IAA was unreasonable. However, the difficulty is that the criticism of the process is entirely premised upon the outcome in the brother's matter. The applicant criticises the process in this matter but says nothing of the process in the brother's matter. Essentially that simply posits that the only thing that was unreasonable about the process was that the outcome was different. It is difficult to see how that evidences an unreasonable process. To the contrary, it is indicative that the IAA brought an independent mind to the respective decisions and carefully considered the evidence before it in each. As submitted by the Minister, the question is whether the Tribunal gave rational and cogent reasons in respect of its concerns with the applicant's evidence.
7. In this matter, the IAA specifically held concerns in respect of the applicant's lack of awareness of Easter. These concerns were set out at [21] of the IAA's decision as follows:

When assessing an asylum seeker's claim for protection on the basis of Christian conversion, delegates frequently question them on factual issues such as when are Christian holidays and what are their meanings, what is the trinity, what are the ten commandments and so on. There was little questioning along these lines however the delegate asked what religious celebrations the applicant had been involved in and he responded the day when Jesus was born, which was 25th December, and when He was raised from the dead, which occurred on a Sunday three days after He was crucified. When asked what time of the year the crucifixion occurred the applicant said he did not know and there had been too many questions. A short break occurred and immediately after this break the applicant volunteered that the crucifixion had occurred in April. This response causes me some concern. I consider from the timing of the response that the applicant looked it up during the break and I question why he felt the need to do so. Further to this, the applicant claims to have been attending services in Australia for some six years but did not at any point indicate that he was aware the festival that celebrates Christ's crucifixion and resurrection is known in Australia as Easter.

1. As observed, the applicant does not press his case on the basis that the conclusions which were reached by the IAA were illogical or irrational. The Court observes that the doubts raised by the IAA in respect of the foundational aspects of the applicant's Christian beliefs are cogent. In particular, the IAA's concern that the applicant appeared to have looked up the date for Easter over a break in the proceedings is a question of timing and not one which would necessitate an additional interview before the IAA.
2. The Court does not accept that it is appropriate to compare and contrast the basis between two separate decisions, even if related. However, the Court observes that even if that were an appropriate task for the Court, there is a cogent basis for a differing outcome even if limited to an analysis of their respective interviews. In this matter, the applicant struggled to recall when Easter is; in the brother's interview, he gave a detailed response to being affected by the parable of the prodigal son. There was an inherently rational basis to the Tribunal's different conclusions.
3. In the Court's view, there was nothing unreasonable about the process. It was simply a case of the IAA carrying out its statutory process. It had regard to the evidence which was before it and it evaluated that evidence. There was clearly no requirement to invite the applicant to attend an interview. There was no "informational gap" of the kind identified in ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 34; (2020) 269 CLR 439. The Court does not accept that it was unreasonable for the IAA not to exercise its power to invite the applicant to attend an interview.
4. Ground one is not made out.

Was the IAA required to give further particulars of the Serco information?

1. Ground two alleges that the IAA was legally unreasonable in not correcting an alleged failure to comply with statutory requirements in its invitation to comment on the Serco information. In particular, the applicant argued that the delegate had failed to provide particulars of the names of the Serco officers. The delegate notified the applicant of the Serco information through a s 57 letter. That letter provided as follows (CB 119):
   1. The applicant has claimed that he departed Iran in order to convert to Christianity.

Concerns held in relation to above

Departmental records contain the following records of conversation held between the applicant and a Departmental officer whilst the applicant was in Immigration detention, which note the following:

13 August 2013 - the applicant advised that he is Muslim.

8 October 2013 - the applicant requested Halal food only. He declared that he is a practising Shia Muslim.

11 December 2013 - the applicant is a Muslim. The programs and activities he was participating in at that time included playing cards, football, volleyball, gym and English classes.

10February 2014 - [the applicant] is a Muslim and wishes to attend mosque.

05 April 2014 - [the applicant] has no concerns with his current religious needs - Muslim.

1. The applicant provided a substantial response to this in both a statutory declaration affirmed on 9 September 2019 and in written submissions filed by his migration agent on the same day. In both documents, the applicant refutes the information.
2. Section 57(2) of the Act requires the Minister to:

(a) give particulars of the relevant information to the applicant in the way that the Minister considers appropriate in the circumstances; and

(b) ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to consideration of the application; and

1. The requirements of s 57 have been considered in a number of judgments. In Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 23; (2010) 241 CLR 252, the High Court observed (at [20]):

When the Minister considers that certain information would be the reason, or part of the reason, for refusing to grant a visa, the Minister is to provide particulars of it in order that the visa applicant understands its relevance. The requirement in s 57(2)(b), that the Minister ensure, as far as reasonably practicable, that the visa applicant understands why certain information is relevant, may go further. It would require that the importance of the information and its potential impact upon the applicant's case for a visa be identified and the information be communicated in a way which promotes that understanding as far as is possible. It would also require that consideration be given to the means by which particulars of the information should be provided, as most suitable to that purpose.

1. In Plaintiff M7/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 14; (2021) 389 ALR 1 (Plaintiff M7), Gordon J observed (at [36]):

What is required for the Minister to discharge his or her obligations under s 57(2) depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. The "relevant information" cannot be divorced from the context in which it appears. The required degree of disclosure about that surrounding context will depend upon the individual case. In some cases, disclosure of the substance of the relevant information may be sufficient, whereas in other cases, it may be necessary for an entire document - the "source" of the relevant information - to be provided to an applicant. This reflects that, in each case, compliance with s 57 will only be achieved if what has been provided is sufficient to ensure the applicant understands why the information is relevant to consideration of the application and can meaningfully respond.

1. More recently in this Court, Judge Brown found that it may not be necessary for a delegate to provide all the information "potentially available". The onus is to provide "relevant information" (see AOJ20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 949 at [175]).
2. It is well established that, as a matter of procedural fairness, a decision-maker "need not disclose more than the substance of the information" and that the substance of information is "distinct from the particular mode or source of its expression" (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQHH [2012] FCAFC 45; (2012) 200 FCR 223 at [31] per Rares and Jagot JJ). Particulars of the information must clearly demonstrate the content of the relevant information, as well as its potential significance to the decision (SXRB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 14 at [9]).
3. The applicant asserted in written submissions that, whilst giving particulars differs from giving the whole of the information or document, sometimes a decision-maker must give the whole of a document to a person so they can assess how to challenge the reliability of information. Counsel for the applicant contended that if the applicant was told critical information, namely, the names and contact details of the Serco officers who made adverse notations against the applicant, he might have contacted those persons and requested further information regarding its reliability.
4. In written submissions, the Minister contended that the delegate complied with s 57, as the Minister provided sufficient particulars of the relevant information significant to the decision. The delegate was not required to put the names and contact details of the Serco officers who made the notations to the applicant as they did not form the reason, or part of the reason, for refusing the visa application. Any assertion by the applicant that "the applicant might have contacted these persons" is irrelevant and does not demonstrate non-compliance with s 57.
5. In the Court's view, the Department's invitation to comment sent to the applicant met the requirements of s 57. The applicant was given details of the information, that its source came from departmental officers, and that it was recorded in departmental notes. The applicant was advised that the Department had received unfavourable information which the delegate considered would be the reason, or part of the reason, for refusing to grant a protection visa. This information was said to be inconsistent with the claim that the applicant had departed Iran in order to convert to Christianity.
6. The relevant information which was required to be put to the applicant was that there were departmental records of statements which were made by the applicant which were inconsistent with his claim to have departed Iran to convert to Christianity, including the substance and nature of those statements and the source of who had reported those statements.
7. The s 57 correspondence did set out all of the relevant information. It set out that the information comprised of departmental records of conversations the applicant had with a departmental officer whilst in immigration detention. It set out the dates of those conversations and it set out the substance of the inconsistent statements: that he had stated on each of the five occasions that he was Muslim and that, on one of those occasions, he had said that he is a practising Shia Muslim who required halal food, and on another, that he wished to attend mosque.
8. In the Court's view, the applicant had an adequate opportunity to respond to this information and indeed did so, providing a statement and accompanying submissions which denounced each of the allegations.
9. The Court does not accept that there was a requirement to disclose the names of the officers who had reported the conversations. The only reason put forward by the applicant as to why the names of the officers should also have been provided was that, had the applicant known their names and contact details, he might have contacted them and might have asked them to retract or qualify their statements. But the only relevance of the information in respect of s 57 was that departmental officers had recorded these statements and what these statements were. The relevant information was that the applicant had made various statements that he was a Muslim and this might be part of a reason for rejecting his claim that he had left Iran to convert to Christianity. It was not relevant who had reported those statements save to say that they were departmental officers.
10. At the hearing, the applicant also challenged the description of the statements as having been made by departmental officers and contained in departmental records. In the circumstances of the information that was relayed in this case, the Court does not accept that is a meaningful distinction. It is correct to say that Serco officers would have been engaged in the course of Serco's contractual arrangement to manage detention centres (see Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v SZRWS (2023) 297 FCR 589 at [1] for a description of the contractual arrangements between Serco and the Department in respect of this). Although no evidence was sought or tendered of the relevant Gazettal notice, the Court also notes that Serco officers would have likely been authorised officers pursuant to the definition in s 5 of the Migration Act (see Fernando v Commonwealth [2010] FCA 753; (2010) 188 FCR 188 at [115]). What was important in terms of s 57 was that the applicant was made aware of the substance of the information and that it came from officers aligned with the Department. In the applicant's particular circumstances, the only officers who would claim to be privy to his statements in respect of his detention would have been those who were detaining him. The applicant was clearly given sufficient particulars to which he could, and did, respond. The Court also rejects the claim that the documents were not departmental records. They were held on a department file and they were within the possession and control of the department.
11. At hearing, the applicant's argument evolved from an argument that the names of the Serco officers should have been provided to an argument that the applicant should have been provided with the entirety of the documents. As observed in Plaintiff M7, it may be considered appropriate in some cases to provide the entire document to an applicant. Once again, the appropriate enquiry is whether the applicant has been provided with sufficient particulars in respect of the information in order to meaningfully respond. For the reasons set out above, the Court is satisfied that he was provided with sufficient particulars to meaningfully respond. Indeed, he did provide a meaningful response.
12. Ground 2 does not unearth jurisdictional error.

1. The application for review and additional submissions made by the applicant have failed to identify any jurisdictional error on the part of the IAA.
2. Accordingly, the application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding sixty-three (63) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Gerrard.