Radiocommunications (Spectrum Licence Allocation—Residual 700 MHz Spectrum) Direction 2016

The instrument is built around a small set of interlocking legal concepts and operational rules. Those concepts are defined in section 4 and implemented in sections 6-10.

• Residual 700 MHz spectrum and lot definitions. The instrument maps spectrum to concrete blocks: residual 700 MHz spectrum is 733-748 MHz and 788-803 MHz (s 4). Two product types are defined: 2x10 MHz lots that occupy 738-748 MHz and 793-803 MHz, and 2x5 MHz lots that occupy 733-738 MHz and 788-793 MHz (s 4). The instrument treats a reference to a part of the spectrum as inclusive of frequencies greater than the lower bound and up to and including the higher bound (s 4(2)).
• Allocation procedures and marketing plans. The ACMA must determine allocation procedures under s 60 of the Radiocommunications Act and may make or amend a marketing plan under s 39A of that Act; the instrument directs the ACMA to align those instruments with these directions (s 3, s 8(3), s 10(3)). The instrument explicitly preserves ACMA powers to charge application fees or require financial security, as examples (s 8(3) note; s 10(3) note).
• Limits on aggregate use. The instrument directs the ACMA to impose limits on the aggregate parts of spectrum a person or specified group may use as a result of allocations under the relevant subdivision, ensuring no person or specified group may use more than 20 MHz of either part of the 700 MHz band specified in s 6(3)(b) , that is, the lower 703-748 MHz range and the upper 758-803 MHz range (s 6(2)-(3)). The defined term "specified group of persons" includes an applicant and all its associates, or two or more such groups that have at least one member in common (s 4). The instrument gives a broad definition of associate that captures corporate relationships, 15% ownership/control thresholds, spouses and de facto partners, directors and secretaries, and other persons with relevant agreements (s 4).
• Price metric. The reserve price or pre-determined price is expressed as $x/MHz/pop. The instrument fixes $x at $1.25, and defines pop as 22,872,578; it mandates rounding to the nearest $1,000 (s 4(3), s 8(8), s 10(12)). Applying that formula yields approximate headline reserves: for a 2x10 MHz lot (20 MHz total) the reserve is approximately $1.25 × 20 × 22,872,578 ≈ $571,814,450 rounded to the nearest $1,000; for a 2x5 MHz lot (10 MHz total) half that amount (s 4(3), s 8(8), arithmetic illustrative).
• Instalment mechanics and discounting. Where instalments are permitted (s 7), the instrument requires the present value of instalments to equal the determined total amount (rounded to the nearest $1,000), and sets the discount rate for subsequent instalments at 5% per annum with the present-value base the date the first instalment is payable (s 7(3)-(6)). For licences allocated under section 8, instalments may be no more than three consecutive annual payments (s 7(6)).
• Sequential primary and conditional secondary processes. The primary process (s 8) is a sequential auction-first, then the smaller product, or a pre-determined price allocation if ACMA identifies a person willing to pay the highest value without auction (s 8(4)-(6)). Sections 9 and 10 operate as a switch: when the Minister fixes the commencement date for s 9 and s 10, s 9 repeals s 6 and s 8, and s 10 sets a secondary allocation route (s 2(2), s 9-10). The secondary route uses standing offers for expressions of interest, tender windows, and tender evaluations based on highest present value, or else allocation at a pre-determined price if no valid expression of interest is received (s 10(5)-(12)).

These concepts are framed within the ACMA's statutory powers. The document is a direction instrument rather than a statutory amendment: it instructs the ACMA how to exercise its allocation and charges powers under the Radiocommunications Act and ACMA Act (s 3).

The instrument affects three principal groups: the ACMA as the decision maker charged to implement the directions, commercial participants seeking residual 700 MHz spectrum (including carriers and their associates), and the Commonwealth’s financial interest in spectrum access charges.

• ACMA. The instrument constrains how ACMA must set allocation procedures, marketing plans, and charges determinations for residual 700 MHz licences in the designated area (s 6, s 7, s 8, s 10). ACMA retains operational discretion , for example, to set application fees, require financial security, determine tender tie-breaker methods, and implement marketing and allocation procedures consistent with the directions (s 8(3) note; s 10(3) note; s 10(9)).
• Applicants and potential licensees. Any natural person, corporation or grouping that seeks to be issued a spectrum licence under Subdivision B of Division 1 of Part 3.2 of the Radiocommunications Act will be directly affected by the product definitions (2x10 and 2x5 MHz lots), the sequential offering order (s 8(4)), the allocation methods (auction, pre-determined price, tender), reserve price calculation (s 8(8), s 10(12)), timing and duration rules (s 8(7), s 10(11)), the instalment framework (s 7), and the 20 MHz aggregate use cap per person or specified group (s 6(3)(c)). The instrument’s definition of associate is broad and will affect how applicants and corporate groups must aggregate holdings and arrangements for compliance with the 20 MHz cap (s 4).
• Parties to agreements that affect spectrum use. The instrument’s definition of "relevant agreement" captures formal and informal agreements, written and oral arrangements, and understandings that relate to the acquisition or use of spectrum licences (s 4). That definition expressly excludes roaming services agreements and agreements between carriers provided for by or under the Telecommunications Act or Part XIC of the Competition and Consumer Act (s 4). Because associates and specified groups include persons with relevant agreements, commercial arrangements for using spectrum (for example, sub-licensing, spectrum sharing, or other commercial arrangements that meet the definition) may be aggregated for the purposes of the 20 MHz cap.
• Financial backers and guarantors. The instalment and bank guarantee mechanics directly affect banks, financiers and guarantors who may be asked to provide security; the instrument caps recoverable amounts under a bank guarantee to 5% of the outstanding charges and constrains guarantees to the period during which charges remain owing (s 8(9), s 10(13)). That cap changes the extent of guarantor exposure relative to the outstanding charge.
• Commonwealth revenue and budget officials. The reserve price formula and the instrument’s directions around spectrum access charges, instalments and guarantees determine the revenue stream timing and security profile for the Commonwealth. The instrument prescribes a population-based reserve price that fixes the central revenue expectation for each lot (s 4(3), s 8(8), s 10(12)).

Who pays and who decides. Licensees (or successful bidders) will pay the spectrum access charges fixed by ACMA through charges determinations (s 7(2), s 3 definition of charges determination). The ACMA decides allocation timing, method and additional procedural requirements within the directions given, while the Minister retains the power to trigger the transition from the primary to the secondary process (commencement of sections 9 and 10) (s 2(2), s 8(3), s 10(3)).

This instrument imposes duties largely on the ACMA and prescribes consequential rights and obligations for applicants and licensees.

Duties on ACMA

• Determine allocation procedures that impose aggregate-use limits consistent with section 6 (s 6(2)-(3)). That duty requires ACMA to design rules that ensure no person or specified group may use more than 20 MHz of either the lower or upper part of the 700 MHz band in the designated area (s 6(3)(c)).
• Permit payment of spectrum access charges by instalments where the instalments meet the specified conditions (s 7(2)-(6)). ACMA is instructed to allow instalments for charges fixed in a charges determination relating to licences allocated under this instrument, subject to present-value equivalence and timing requirements (s 7(4)).
• Take action necessary or convenient to allocate and issue licences authorising operation in residual 700 MHz spectrum consistent with the instrument (s 8(2)). That encompasses making or amending a marketing plan and determining allocation procedures consistent with the instrument (s 8(3)).
• Offer the primary products sequentially and allocate primarily by auction, unless ACMA identifies an individual willing to make the highest value payment and allocates at a pre-determined price instead (s 8(4)-(6)).
• When section 9 and 10 commence, allocate remaining unallocated spectrum consistent with the secondary procedure in s 10, including publishing standing offers for expressions of interest and conducting tenders (s 10(2)-(9)).

Rights and obligations of applicants/licensees

• Right to participate in auctions, tenders or pre-determined price allocations in accordance with ACMA allocation procedures and the instrument’s constraints (s 8(4)-(6), s 10(5)-(9)).
• Obligation to comply with conditions for valid expressions of interest if participating in the secondary route, including specifying the licence sought, the licence period sought consistent with s 10(11), and agreement to pay at least the reserve or pre-determined price (s 10(7)).
• Right to pay charges by instalments if the instalment conditions are met (s 7(2)), including timing of first instalment (at least two months before licence commencement) and present-value calculation rules (s 7(3)-(5)). For licences allocated under s 8, the instalments must be no more than three consecutive annual payments (s 7(6)).
• Liability for providing bank guarantees if the ACMA requires them, while the instrument limits the guarantee exposure and duration (s 8(9), s 10(13)).

Operational duties on bidders and groups

• Prepare corporate and contractual mapping to determine whether one is a specified group or an associate of an applicant , the instrument’s associate definition captures directors, secretaries, related bodies corporate, 15% ownership/control and persons with relevant agreements, including informal arrangements (s 4).
• Where bidding under the secondary route, ensure an expression of interest, if used, complies with the offer’s requirements and is lodged within the 30-day or 6-month windows as applicable (s 10(6)-(8)).

The rights and duties in this instrument are procedural and directive. The instrument does not itself impose licence conditions, operational obligations on spectrum use, or criminal sanctions; those are matters for spectrum licences issued and for broader regulatory frameworks under the Radiocommunications Act and ACMA Act.

The direction instrument itself does not create specified penalties or criminal offences. Its operative effect is to direct ACMA how to exercise powers under the Radiocommunications Act and the ACMA Act (s 3). Enforcement of allocation procedures, licence terms and non‑payment of spectrum access charges therefore depends on ACMA’s statutory enforcement powers and the terms of the licences and charges determinations that the ACMA will make under the Radiocommunications Act.

What the instrument does provide for enforcement-related mechanics:

• Charges determination mechanism. The instrument contemplates that spectrum access charges will be fixed in an ACMA charges determination under subsection 294(1) of the Radiocommunications Act, which can fix amounts and specify times when charges are payable (s 4 definition of charges determination). Enforcement of non‑payment would be under ACMA’s powers in the Radiocommunications Act and any contractual or statutory recovery mechanisms contingent on the licence and charges determination.
• Instalment architecture and present-value parity. Where instalments are allowed, the instrument mandates that the present value of the instalments equal the amount determined by the allocation procedures (s 7(4)-(5)). ACMA retains ability to require financial security for the period charges remain owing and can require bank guarantees subject to a maximum claim limit (s 8(9), s 10(13)). Those security instruments provide mechanisms to secure payment; the instrument caps the amount recoverable under a bank guarantee at 5% of outstanding charges (s 8(9)(b), s 10(13)(b)).
• ACMA discretion to require fees and security. The instrument explicitly signals that ACMA may charge application fees or require financial security as part of allocation procedures or marketing plans (s 8(3) note; s 10(3) note). Such requirements are avenues for enforcement and risk mitigation.
• Tender evaluation and allocation mechanisms. For tenders and auctions, the instrument sets evaluation principles (e.g. highest present value for tenders in s 10(9)), and permits ACMA to determine tie-breaker methods. ACMA’s control over the allocation process is an enforcement and compliance lever: it can disqualify invalid bids or expressions of interest under procedures it determines (s 10(7)-(9)).

Limitations and gaps

• No schedule of penalties or licence-specific sanctions in the instrument. Readers should not expect this instrument to prescribe the forms of administrative, civil or criminal penalties for non-compliance with licence conditions or for misuse of spectrum; those matters fall within the Radiocommunications Act and ACMA’s regulatory instruments.
• Reliance on ACMA’s statutory powers for enforcement. The instrument directs ACMA to implement processes and secure payments, but it does not itself create or authorise specific enforcement actions beyond instructing ACMA to use its existing powers consistent with the directions (s 8(3), s 10(3)).

In short, enforcement and penalties flow from ACMA instruments (charges determinations, licences, marketing plans and allocation procedures) and the Radiocommunications Act; this direction shapes those instruments but does not itself establish new enforcement regimes.

This direction instrument operates as an instruction to ACMA under two statutes and references, imports and limits interactions with several other statutory regimes.

Primary statutory authorities

• ACMA Act and Radiocommunications Act. The instrument is explicitly made under subsection 14(1) of the ACMA Act and subsections 60(10) and 294(2) of the Radiocommunications Act (s 3). Those statutory bases give the Minister formal power to direct the ACMA and permit ACMA to make charges determinations and allocation procedures for spectrum licences. The instrument therefore sits within ACMA’s statutory framework and is not, in itself, an amendment to those Acts.

Cross-references to telecommunications and corporate law

• Telecommunications Act 1997. The instrument adopts the statute’s definitions for "carrier" and "public mobile telecommunications service" (s 4). It also excludes roaming services agreements and agreements between carriers provided for by or under the Telecommunications Act from the definition of "relevant agreement" (s 4).
• Corporations Act 2001. The instrument imports the Corporations Act meaning of "related body corporate" into its "associate" definition (s 4).
• Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Part XIC). The instrument excludes agreements between carriers provided for by or under Part XIC from the definition of "relevant agreement" (s 4).

Operational interactions

• Allocation procedures under s 60 of the Radiocommunications Act. The instrument expressly directs ACMA to determine allocation procedures consistent with the direction (s 6(2), s 8(3), s 10(3)). That means ACMA’s established powers to run auctions, tenders and to define eligibility criteria will be exercised subject to the constraints and prescriptions in this instrument.
• Marketing plan under s 39A of the Radiocommunications Act. The instrument requires ACMA to make or amend a marketing plan consistent with its directions (s 8(3), s 10(3)). Marketing plans commonly contain allocation timelines, conditions, application forms and eligibility; the instrument therefore shapes but does not replace those rules.
• Charges determinations and Commonwealth revenue rules. The instrument frames spectrum revenue by fixing the reserve price metric and permitting instalments; the actual tax, accounting and appropriation consequences of proceeds are governed by Commonwealth financial law outside this instrument, but the instrument aligns ACMA’s charges determinations with the specified pricing and instalment rules (s 4(3), s 7, s 8(8), s 10(12)).

Areas of exclusion and interaction risk

• Agreements captured as "relevant agreements" are broadly defined to include informal and unenforceable understandings (s 4). The instrument excludes some categories, but interactions with commercial arrangements, corporate control rules (e.g. 15% ownership thresholds in the associate definition) and competition law mean parties must consider how corporate structuring and commercial contracts will be treated for aggregation and eligibility.
• The instrument instructs ACMA to preserve some discretion, so ACMA’s allocation procedures, marketing plan provisions and charges determinations will be instruments that interact with corporate law, contract law and taxation law in practice.

The instrument therefore functions within a web of existing statutory regimes. It constrains ACMA to certain pricing, timing and limit rules, but expects ACMA’s allocation procedures and charges determinations to operationally interface with the Telecommunications Act, the Corporations Act, competition law frameworks and ACMA’s own statutory powers.

The instrument itself records limited internal amendment-events and repeals, and provides a mechanism for staged change.

What the instrument repeals

• The instrument repeals two prior instruments immediately: Radiocommunications (Spectrum Licence Limits) Direction No. 1 of 2012 and Radiocommunications (Spectrum Access Charges - 700 MHz Band) Direction No. 1 of 2013 (s 5). That means, upon commencement (subject to s 2), those two prior direction instruments cease to have effect.

Staged commencement and conditional repeal

• Commencement timing. The instrument commences on the day after registration on the Federal Register of Legislation except that sections 9 and 10 commence on a single day fixed in a notifiable instrument made by the Minister (s 2). The effect of that structure is that the instrument takes effect immediately in most respects but leaves the Minister the ability to bring sections 9 and 10 into force at a later single date.
• Conditional repeal of parts of the instrument. Section 9 provides for the repeal of sections 6 and 8 of this instrument. Because s 9 itself is subject to the delayed commencement mechanism of s 2(2), the Minister can time when sections 6 and 8 are repealed. The instrument therefore creates two sequencing regimes: an initial primary allocation regime governed by sections 6 and 8, and a secondary regime under section 10 that takes effect after the Minister fixes the commencement date for sections 9 and 10 (s 2(2), s 9-10).

Provisions that set licence terms and durations

• The instrument fixes duration and commencement dates for licences issued under the primary process (s 8(7): licences to come into force on 1 April 2018 and expire 31 December 2029). Section 10 sets limits for secondary allocations , licences must come into force no later than the date 18 months after the first valid expression of interest or request and must expire no later than 31 December 2029 (s 10(11)). These fixed-dates are substantive instrument content rather than amendment history, but they are also time-bound rules that lock in expiry across both allocation phases.

Rounding, pricing and population base

• The instrument sets a pricing metric ($1.25/MHz/pop) and a defined population figure of 22,872,578 to be used in the calculation; it requires rounding to the nearest $1,000 (s 4(3), s 8(8), s 10(12)). That specification fixes a pricing baseline that is mathematically insensitive to future population changes.

Implications for future amendments

• Because the instrument is a direction to the ACMA made under statutory power, the Minister or Parliament can later make different directions or change the underlying Acts. The instrument, however, contains no express sunset or automatic amending mechanism beyond the staged commencement and section-specific repeal mechanism it contains.

In sum, the instrument replaces two prior direction instruments on commencement, creates a primary regime immediately, and leaves the Minister with the deliberate power to switch to a secondary allocation regime by bringing sections 9 and 10 into force on a date of the Minister’s choosing.

The instrument does not reference any litigation, court decisions or tribunal determinations. It is a direction instrument and not a judicial instrument; consequently, the text contains no case law references or litigation history.

What this means in practice

• No cases named in the instrument. The instrument itself neither reports on nor records any disputes about its interpretation or implementation.
• Potential for future disputes. The instrument prescribes allocation mechanisms, price floors, aggregation rules and definitions (for example, "associate" and "relevant agreement") that could give rise to legal disputes when ACMA applies those definitions in the allocation procedures, marketing plan, charges determinations or licence conditions. For example, contestable issues could include (i) whether a particular commercial arrangement is a "relevant agreement", (ii) the correct aggregation of spectrum "use" across corporate structures for the 20 MHz cap, (iii) interpretation of timing rules for instalment present-value calculations and rounding, or (iv) whether an ACMA marketing plan has validly implemented the direction. None of these disputes are recorded in the instrument.
• Administrative review avenues depend on ACMA instruments. Any challenge to ACMA’s exercise of power in allocating licences, setting charges or imposing conditions will proceed under the administrative review and judicial review frameworks that apply to ACMA decisions and to decisions under the Radiocommunications Act and ACMA Act. The instrument itself does not alter those review routes; it merely directs ACMA’s procedural and substantive constraints.

Because the instrument supplies no litigation history, readers relying on legal precedent or challenge patterns must look to subsequent ACMA allocation procedures, charges determinations and any judicial or tribunal decisions arising after ACMA’s implementation of the instrument for concrete litigation guidance.

This instrument contains several operational features that create practical traps for bidders, corporate groups and advisers. The following are concrete, source‑grounded points to watch.

1. Sequencing and conditional repeal

• The Minister controls when sections 9 and 10 commence (s 2(2)). When those sections commence, s 9 repeals s 6 and s 8 (s 9). That repeal changes the applicable regime from the primary process to the secondary process for any unallocated spectrum. Parties must track the Minister’s commencement notice to know whether the auction-first (s 8) regime still applies or whether the secondary expressions-of-interest / tender process (s 10) governs remaining lots.

2. The 20 MHz “use” cap and broad associate definition

• The allocation limit directs ACMA to ensure no person or specified group may use more than 20 MHz of either part of the 700 MHz band (s 6(3)(c)). The instrument defines specified group and associate expansively: associates include directors, secretaries, related bodies corporate, persons with 15% control or holding, spouses and de facto partners, and persons bound by a "relevant agreement" whether formal or informal (s 4). The "relevant agreement" definition expressly captures informal and oral understandings (s 4). Consequence: parties that think they can ring-fence holdings by informal contracts risk aggregation if ACMA interprets the arrangements as relevant agreements; the roaming services and statutory carrier agreements are excluded, but other commercial arrangements may be caught (s 4).

3. What “use” means in practice

• The direction requires ACMA to determine allocation procedures that impose limits on the parts of the spectrum that "may be used as a result of the allocation of spectrum licences" (s 6(2)). That phrasing means ACMA’s procedures must consider not just licence title but the operational use enabled by allocations. The instrument does not define "use" further; ACMA’s allocation procedures and licences will be the place where the practical scope of "use" is defined. Parties must therefore scrutinise those procedures for attribution rules.

4. Reserve price arithmetic and rounding

• The reserve/pre-determined price is $1.25/MHz/pop and pop is 22,872,578 (s 4(3), s 8(8), s 10(12)). The instrument mandates rounding to the nearest $1,000 which, for large sums, can have small but non-trivial revenue effects. Calculated examples: a 2x10 MHz lot (20 MHz) yields roughly $571.8 million before rounding; a 2x5 MHz lot (10 MHz) about $285.9 million. Bidders must model these figures precisely and include rounding in bid strategy.

5. Instalment present-value mechanics and discounting

• Instalments must produce the same present value as the total charge determined, using a 5% per annum discount rate for subsequent instalments discounted back to the date the first instalment is payable (s 7(4)-(5)). The instrument defines the present value of the first instalment as equal to the amount of that payment (s 7(5)), which anchors discounting to that payment date , a detail that affects cashflow calculations and finance costs. For section 8 allocations the instalment schedule is capped at three consecutive annual instalments (s 7(6)). Misunderstanding the anchoring date or the discount rate will alter the true economic cost to bidders.

6. Bank guarantee cap is small relative to total charges

• The instrument caps recoverable amounts under a bank guarantee at 5% of the amount of spectrum access charges owing at any time (s 8(9)(b), s 10(13)(b)). For very large reserves (hundreds of millions), a 5% cap could be a material fraction but still leave significant unsecured exposure for the Commonwealth or a mismatch between ACMA’s recovery needs and available guarantee. Bidders should anticipate ACMA may require other financial security instruments or conditions in allocation procedures (s 8(3) note).

7. Secondary process expressions of interest and tender windows

• The standing offer for expressions of interest must be published within 30 days of the commencement of section 10 and remain open until the first valid expression of interest is received or six months elapse (s 10(6)). If ACMA receives a valid expression of interest, it must conduct a tender open for 30 days (s 10(8)). Valid expressions of interest must state the licence sought, the licence period consistent with s 10(11), and willingness to pay at least the reserve or pre-determined price (s 10(7)). Failing to meet these formalities can disqualify a prospective applicant from triggering the tender.

8. Licence duration lock to 31 December 2029

• Licences under both primary and secondary routes ultimately expire on or before 31 December 2029 (s 8(7), s 10(11)(b)). For secondary allocations, reserve prices are reduced to reflect a shorter licence period where the licence commences after 1 April 2018 (s 10(12)(b)). That means bidders should price future deployment returns against a hard terminal date.

9. ACMA procedural discretion

• The instrument preserves ACMA’s ability to impose fees, require financial security, assess validity of expressions of interest, and determine tie-breaker methods in tenders (s 8(3) note; s 10(3) note; s 10(9)). Those discretions will materially affect transaction costs and bidder obligations, and the instrument gives ACMA space to shape practical implementation.

10. Rounding to the nearest $1,000 for present-value parity

• The present-value equality requirement in s 7(4) is to be applied after rounding to the nearest $1,000. Parties must include that rounding in models; minor rounding can produce asymmetries in instalment sizing.

Each of these points is grounded in the instrument’s express text. Practitioners should map corporate ownership, commercial agreements and payment structures against the instrument’s definitions and ACMA’s forthcoming allocation procedures.

This section translates the instrument’s mechanics into pragmatic compliance steps for bidders, counsel, corporate decision-makers and financiers. It focuses on actions supported by the instrument text.

1. Map associates and specified groups before bidding

• Produce a compliance matrix mapping directors, secretaries, related bodies corporate, any person with 15% ownership or control, spouses and de facto partners, and any party to relevant agreements, formal or informal (s 4). Include both written and oral arrangements in the review, because "relevant agreement" captures informal and partly informal arrangements (s 4). This mapping is necessary to judge whether a proposed bid would breach the 20 MHz per-part cap once ACMA determines aggregation rules (s 6(3)(c)).

2. Draft and examine commercial arrangements with the associate definition in mind

• If commercial structures or sharing arrangements are intended, verify whether they could be caught as "relevant agreements" and thus aggregated (s 4). The instrument excludes roaming services agreements and carrier agreements provided for by the Telecommunications Act and Part XIC, so confirm whether your arrangement is within those exclusions or outside them (s 4).

3. Prepare for the primary vs secondary regime sequence

• Monitor the Minister’s notifiable instrument to learn when sections 9 and 10 will commence (s 2(2)). If you want to engage in the primary allocation process, ensure readiness for the auction and meet any ACMA pre-qualification, application fee and financial security requirements that ACMA’s marketing plan and allocation procedures may impose (s 8(3) note). If you plan to participate under the secondary route, be ready to file a valid expression of interest promptly upon publication of the standing offer and to take part in the 30‑day tender (s 10(6)-(9)).

4. Financial planning: reserve price, instalments and guarantees

• Calculate reserve prices using $1.25/MHz/pop with pop = 22,872,578 and round results to the nearest $1,000 (s 4(3), s 8(8), s 10(12)). For a 2x10 MHz lot, expect approximately $571.8 million pre-rounding; for a 2x5 MHz lot, approximately $285.9 million.
• If planning to pay by instalments, build a model that applies the 5% per annum discount to subsequent instalments, discounted to the date of the first instalment (s 7(4)-(5)). Ensure the present value of instalments equals the total charge (rounded to the nearest $1,000) (s 7(4)).
• If participating in a section 8 allocation, structure instalments as no more than three consecutive annual payments (s 7(6)).
• Expect ACMA may require bank guarantees but that any bank guarantee may only be claimed for the period charges remain owing and is capped at 5% of charges outstanding at any time (s 8(9), s 10(13)). Factor this limited guarantee into creditor negotiations and stress tests.

5. Prepare expressions of interest and tender bids for the secondary process

• If engaging with the secondary process, an expression of interest must identify the licence sought, the licence period sought (consistent with s 10(11)), state willingness to pay at least the reserve or pre-determined price, and comply with any ACMA-specified requirements in the standing offer (s 10(7)). Prepare template EOIs that satisfy these requirements.
• If a tender is triggered, prepare to submit bids based on highest present value principles (s 10(9)), and ensure financial models compute present value in the manner ACMA is expected to use (discounting assumptions, rounding rules).

6. Coordinate timing for payment and licence commencement

• The first instalment must be payable at least two months before the commencement of the spectrum licence (s 7(3)). If the licence under s 8 is fixed to commence 1 April 2018 (s 8(7)), the first instalment must be payable no later than 1 February 2018. For secondary licences, align the instalment schedule to the chosen commencement date and be prepared for ACMA to reduce pre-determined prices where licences commence after 1 April 2018 (s 10(11), s 10(12)(b)).

7. Review ACMA allocation procedures and marketing plan closely

• The instrument preserves ACMA’s discretion to set application fees, financial security requirements and tie-breaker methods (s 8(3) note; s 10(3) note; s 10(9)). Before participating, obtain, review and, where necessary, seek clarification on ACMA’s allocation procedures and marketing plan, because these documents will operationalise the instrument’s abstract requirements.

8. Legal and administrative preparedness

• Ensure procurement of legal advice to draft and vet affidavits, declarations and corporate disclosures that ACMA may require during the application or tender process. Because the instrument makes "relevant agreements" broad, maintain records of negotiations and informal arrangements that could subsequently be categorised as relevant agreements.
• If financing the bid, obtain conditional commitments from banks and guarantors well in advance, clarifying the limited recoverability under bank guarantees (5% cap) and ensuring financiers accept the capped guarantee exposure.

9. Document governance and control thresholds

• Put in place board-level approvals and thresholds that recognise the 15% control or shareholding triggers in the associate definition (s 4). When organising consortiums or equity investments, structure to make governance and ownership transparent and to avoid inadvertent aggregation.

10. Audit and compliance trail

• Maintain a clear compliance trail showing how any relevant agreements were assessed and whether they were considered to create associations for the 20 MHz cap. Keep records for possible ACMA queries or administrative review.

Following these concrete steps, grounded in the instrument’s text, will reduce implementation risk and help bidders, licensees and financiers align commercial behaviour with the direction’s requirements.