Public Accounts Committee Act 1970

The Act’s central concept is the Committee, defined as the Parliamentary Standing Committee of Public Accounts. It is a six-member joint committee with three members from each House. The committee is established at the commencement of the first session of each Parliament. The members are appointed according to the practice for select committees of each House, but with explicit exclusions: a Minister of the Crown, the President of the Legislative Council, the Speaker of the House of Assembly, and the Government Leader or Deputy Government Leader in the Legislative Council cannot be members. This exclusion is intended to keep the committee independent of the executive and the presiding officers. The committee’s term runs for the duration of the House of Assembly; when that House expires by dissolution or effluxion of time, the committee ceases to exist. A new committee is then appointed for the next Parliament.

Public sector finances is defined very broadly in section 1A. It includes money forming part of the Public Account or an Agency Trust Account, money received by an Agency, a Government Business Enterprise, a statutory authority or a local authority, expenditure made or authorised by an Appropriation Act or any other Act or by any of those entities, and any liability for the satisfaction of which expenditure by the Crown is or may be required. This definition captures not only cash flows but also non-cash liabilities such as guarantees, indemnities and contingent obligations. The inclusion of “any money received by” a local authority means that local council revenue, not just state government revenue, falls within the committee’s potential scope of inquiry.

Agency has the same meaning as in the State Service Act 2000. That Act defines an agency as a department, a body or organisation listed in a schedule, or a part of such a body. This incorporates the State Service definition by reference, ensuring consistency across state legislation.

Government Business Enterprise has the same meaning as in the Government Business Enterprises Act 1995. That Act defines a Government Business Enterprise as a body that is declared to be a GBE under that Act and that conducts trading or business activities on behalf of the state. These entities operate at arm’s length from the government but are state-owned. The committee can inquire into their use of public sector finances, including their revenue and expenditure.

Statutory authority is defined as a body or authority, whether incorporated or not, established or constituted by or under an Act or under the royal prerogative, whose governing authority wholly or partly comprises persons appointed by the Governor, a Minister or another statutory authority. This definition includes the governing authority itself. It covers both major statutory corporations and smaller regulatory boards. Bodies established under the royal prerogative, such as the Governor’s office, also fall within this definition.

Appropriation Act has the same meaning as in section 36 of the Constitution Act 1934. That section defines Appropriation Acts as Acts that appropriate money out of the Public Account for the services of the Crown. The committee can therefore inquire into any expenditure authorised by such Acts.

Quorum is set at four members in section 4(1). The chairman and vice-chairman are elected by the committee. The chairman has a deliberative vote only, and if votes are equal the question passes in the negative. This means the status quo prevails in tied votes, which discourages deadlock but can prevent action if the committee is evenly divided.

The Act also creates the office of secretary, appointed by the Governor on the joint recommendation of the President of the Legislative Council and the Speaker of the House of Assembly. The secretary performs duties required by the committee and can be paid remuneration approved by the Governor. This role is distinct from the committee’s members and provides administrative support for inquiries.

The Act primarily affects the public sector entities and officers whose finances and management may be scrutinised by the committee. Agencies (as defined by the State Service Act 2000) are subject to inquiry into their management, administration and use of public sector finances. This includes all state government departments and any body listed as an agency under that Act. Their senior officers may be summoned to give evidence and produce documents. Government Business Enterprises are similarly exposed. Because GBEs operate commercially, committee scrutiny may affect their competitive position if commercially sensitive information is brought into public hearings, though the Act provides mechanisms for confidential evidence. Statutory authorities, which include regulatory bodies, public trusts and various boards, are also within scope. Local authorities are included under the definition of “public sector finances” because the committee may inquire into money received by them or expenditure they make, even though local government is a separate sphere of government. This gives the committee potential oversight over council finances, though in practice the committee may focus on state-level matters.

Witnesses summoned by the committee are directly affected. Any person (including private contractors, consultants, former public officers or members of the public) can be required to appear and produce documents. Witnesses have the same protections and privileges as a witness in an action tried in the Supreme Court (section 7(2)), meaning they cannot be compelled to incriminate themselves or breach legal professional privilege in a way that a court would not permit. However, the committee is not a court and its interpretation of privilege may differ, which could create uncertainty for witnesses. Witnesses are also entitled to fees and travelling expenses calculated under the Public Works Committee Act 1914 scale (section 9).

The Auditor-General can refer matters to the committee (section 6(2)(b)). This gives the Auditor-General a channel to bring issues beyond the scope of an audit report to parliamentary attention without having to publish them directly. The Auditor-General is not compelled to refer matters; it is a discretionary power.

Members of Parliament who are not on the committee may be affected if they wish to have a matter referred to the committee by their House. Any MP can move to refer a matter, but the House must vote to do so. The Act does not give individual MPs a right to compel the committee to inquire; only the House or the committee itself can initiate.

Private sector entities that do business with the state, such as contractors or service providers, can be affected if their contracts or financial arrangements are examined. For example, if a public-private partnership involves a liability requiring expenditure by the Crown, that liability falls within “public sector finances”. Such entities may be summoned as witnesses and may need to disclose sensitive commercial information. The committee can take evidence in private where it relates to a secret or confidential matter (section 7(4)), but the committee retains discretion to publish or disclose that evidence unless the witness requests otherwise and the committee agrees the evidence relates to a secret or confidential matter, in which case the witness’s consent in writing is required before the committee may publish it (section 7(6)). This provides some protection for commercial confidentiality, but the committee’s discretion to determine what is “secret or confidential” is not defined, creating risk for businesses.

The committee has a duty under section 6(1) to inquire into, consider and report to Parliament on any matter referred to it by either House relating to the management, administration or use of public sector finances, or the accounts of any public authority or other organisation controlled by the state or in which the state has an interest. This duty is mandatory: if a referral is made, the committee must do the work. The committee also has a power (but not a duty) under section 6(2) to inquire into any matter arising in connection with public sector finances that it considers appropriate, and any matter referred by the Auditor-General. This discretion allows the committee to choose its own priorities, subject to whatever parliamentary direction it receives.

The committee has extensive powers to summon witnesses and compel production of documents (section 7(1)). It has all the powers of a Select Committee of the House of Assembly. This includes the power to order attendance, require answers on oath or affirmation, and require the production of records. A person who fails to attend or produce documents may be reported to the House as a contempt, which can lead to fines or imprisonment by the House. However, the Act does not create a specific statutory offence for non-compliance; it relies on the inherent contempt power of the Houses.

Witnesses’ rights are protected in several ways. Under section 7(2), a witness summoned or appearing has the same protection and privileges as a witness in an action tried in the Supreme Court. This includes the right not to answer questions that might incriminate them, the right to legal professional privilege, and the right to be free from harassment or improper questioning. The committee cannot override these privileges. Section 7(3) requires that evidence be taken in public except where the committee considers there is good and sufficient reason to take it in private. When a witness requests that evidence be taken in private, the committee must take the evidence in private if, in the committee’s opinion, it relates to a secret or confidential matter (section 7(4)). This gives the witness a right to a private hearing, though the committee retains the power to decide whether the subject matter qualifies. If evidence is taken in private, the committee may only disclose or publish it if it has already been lawfully published, or if the witness gives written consent, unless the committee determines the evidence does not relate to a secret or confidential matter (section 7(6)). Witnesses also have the right under section 9 to claim fees and travelling expenses.

Confidentiality obligations bind everyone, including committee members. Section 7(7) prohibits any person (whether a member of the committee or not) from disclosing or publishing evidence taken in private without the authority of the committee, given in writing by the chairman, unless the evidence has already been lawfully published. This is a broad prohibition that covers MPs, committee staff, witnesses and anyone else who obtains the evidence. The obligation continues after the witness leaves the hearing. Unauthorised disclosure is a criminal offence.

The committee’s procedural rules are largely self-determined. Section 4(8) allows the committee to sit during any adjournment or recess, at such times and places, and conduct its proceedings in such manner, as it thinks proper. This flexibility means the committee can operate outside parliamentary sitting periods. The committee must keep minutes of its proceedings (section 4(7)). Where a division is called, the names of members voting must be stated in the minutes and report (section 4(6)). This ensures transparency of voting.

Section 8 permits the next constituted committee to consider evidence taken by a previous committee that ceased to exist before reporting. This prevents loss of work when a committee’s term ends mid-inquiry. The new committee can treat that evidence as if given before it, saving the need to re-summon witnesses.

Section 11 declares that membership of the committee is not an office of profit or emolument under the Constitution Act 1934. This ensures that serving on the committee does not disqualify a member from sitting in Parliament or void their election.

The Act creates one criminal offence. Under section 7(9), any person who discloses or publishes evidence contrary to the confidentiality provisions of section 7 is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding 100 penalty units or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or both. “100 penalty units” is a monetary amount set by other legislation; as of 2025, a penalty unit in Tasmania is $200, so the maximum fine is $20,000. This applies to any person, including committee members, parliamentary staff, witnesses, journalists or anyone else who receives private evidence without authorisation. The offence is not limited to public disclosure; any “disclosure or publication” that is not authorised and where the evidence has not already been lawfully published can attract liability. This is a strict prohibition, but the prosecution must prove the elements beyond reasonable doubt.

Crucially, section 7(10) provides that no prosecution for this offence may be instituted without the consent of the Attorney-General. This is a significant procedural hurdle. The Attorney-General is a member of the executive government. The Act does not specify criteria for granting or withholding consent. This creates a risk that prosecutions may be declined for political reasons, especially if the disclosure related to sensitive government information. The requirement for ministerial consent is common in parliamentary privilege offences but still gives the executive a veto over enforcement of a law designed to protect the committee’s confidentiality.

The Act does not create penalties for failure to comply with a summons or for giving false evidence. Those matters are dealt with under the general contempt powers of each House. The committee can report a recalcitrant witness to the House, which may then punish the person for contempt. The maximum penalty for contempt is theoretically unlimited, but in practice the Houses have imposed fines or imprisonment for fixed terms. The absence of a specific statutory penalty for non-compliance means the committee relies on the political will of the House to enforce its summons.

Section 7(11) applies the Parliamentary Privilege Act 1858 section 2A to matters being examined by the committee. That section provides that the powers, privileges and immunities of each House extend to committees. This reinforces the committee’s authority to punish contempts, but it also means that the Act’s provisions do not override parliamentary privilege.

The Act explicitly incorporates definitions from several other Tasmanian Acts. The definition of Agency (section 1A) adopts that in the State Service Act 2000. Any amendment to the State Service Act that changes the definition of agency will automatically flow through to this Act, unless a contrary intention appears. The definition of Government Business Enterprise adopts that in the Government Business Enterprises Act 1995. Similarly, amendments to that Act will affect the scope of the committee’s oversight. The definition of Appropriation Act adopts the meaning in section 36 of the Constitution Act 1934.

The Act directly references the Public Works Committee Act 1914 for the scale of witnesses’ fees and travelling expenses (section 9). This means that any changes to that scale under the Public Works Committee Act will automatically apply to witnesses before the Public Accounts Committee.

The Parliamentary Privilege Act 1858 is engaged by section 7(11), which applies section 2A of that Act to any matter being examined by the committee. Section 2A provides that the powers, privileges and immunities of each House extend to committees. This means that the committee can exercise the same contempt powers as the Houses, and its proceedings are protected by absolute privilege. Statements made in committee (whether in public or private) cannot be the subject of defamation proceedings or other civil action. This protection extends to witnesses giving evidence, subject to the limits of the Act.

The Acts Interpretation Act 1931 is relevant to the appointment of the secretary. Section 5(2) provides that, notwithstanding section 21(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1931 (which deals with acting appointments), the President and Speaker may jointly select an officer to act as secretary. This overrides the default rules for acting appointments.

The Constitution Act 1934 is relevant in two ways. First, the definition of Appropriation Act refers to section 36 of the Constitution Act. Second, section 11 of this Act provides that membership of the committee is not an office of profit or emolument within the meaning of the Constitution Act, thereby preserving members’ eligibility to sit in Parliament.

Interaction with freedom of information laws is not addressed in the Act. Documents produced to the committee may be subject to claims of confidentiality under other legislation, but the committee’s powers to compel production override any statutory secrecy provisions that do not expressly protect the information from parliamentary committees. The committee can also receive documents that are exempt from FOI disclosure, and its proceedings are not subject to the Right to Information Act. This creates a tension: the committee can access information that cannot be obtained by the public through FOI, but the committee’s own decisions about publication are not reviewable under that Act.

Interaction with privacy and data protection laws is also not addressed. Witnesses may be compelled to produce documents that contain personal information. The committee is exempt from the Personal Information Protection Act because it is a parliamentary committee, but the Act’s confidentiality provisions provide limited protection for individuals whose data is produced.

The Act does not create any liability for the Crown or for committee members acting in good faith. Committee members likely have immunity from suit for anything said or done in the course of committee proceedings, under parliamentary privilege and the common law.

The Act has been amended multiple times since its enactment in 1970. Key amendments include:

• No. 27 of 1973: Section 10 was repealed. The original content of section 10 is not specified in the current text, but its repeal removed whatever provision it contained.

• No. 43 of 1991: Section 7(9) was amended by reference to the schedule. The penalty was likely updated to penalty units. The current maximum penalty of 100 penalty units or 12 months imprisonment was presumably set or confirmed by this amendment.

• No. 89 of 1997: This was a significant amendment. It inserted section 1A (Interpretation) for the first time, establishing definitions for Agency, Appropriation Act, Committee, Government Business Enterprise, public sector finances and statutory authority. It amended section 2(1) to change the committee’s name to “Parliamentary Standing Committee of Public Accounts” (it was previously just “Public Accounts Committee”). It amended section 4(8) to allow the committee to sit and transact business during any adjournment or recess, and omitted section 4(9). Most importantly, it substituted a new section 6 (Functions of Committee), replacing the previous narrower functions with the current dual structure of mandatory inquiries on referral and discretionary inquiries on the committee’s own motion or on referral from the Auditor-General. It also amended section 7(3) to require evidence to be taken in public except where the committee considers there is good and sufficient reason for private hearings.

• No. 38 of 1999: Section 2(4) was amended to add the exclusion of the Speaker of the House of Assembly and the Government Leader and Deputy Government Leader in the Legislative Council from membership. The original subsection (4)(d) was omitted. This tightened the eligibility rules.

• No. 86 of 2000: The definition of Agency in section 1A was amended to refer to the State Service Act 2000, following the enactment of that Act.

• No. 80 of 2001: Section 7(11) was amended to refer to the amended Parliamentary Privilege Act 1858.

• No. 4 of 2017: The definition of public sector finances in section 1A was amended to include any money forming part of, or payable to, an Agency Trust Account. This broadened the definition to capture trust money held by agencies.

• No. 33 of 2023: Section 7(11) was amended again, likely to update references to the Parliamentary Privilege Act 1858.

The Act has not been subject to a major consolidation or rewrite since 1997. The definitions and functions have remained stable since then. The amendments have generally expanded the committee’s scope and modernised terminology.

The source text of the Act does not record any litigation history. There are no cases cited in the Act itself. The absence of recorded litigation is not unusual for a parliamentary committee statute. Disputes over the committee’s powers or the treatment of evidence could arise, but they are typically resolved within Parliament through the process of privilege rather than in courts. The Act’s provision that witnesses have the same protection as in the Supreme Court (section 7(2)) allows a witness to seek judicial review if the committee improperly demands answers that are privileged, but such applications are rare and would be heard by the Supreme Court of Tasmania. The requirement for Attorney-General consent to prosecute an offence under section 7(9) would be subject to judicial review if consent were withheld manifestly improperly, though the courts are generally reluctant to interfere with prosecutorial discretion. The interaction with the Parliamentary Privilege Act 1858 may limit the court’s jurisdiction to question committee proceedings, as parliamentary privilege protects proceedings in Parliament from challenge in any court or place outside Parliament. However, the committee’s statutory powers under this Act are not coextensive with parliamentary privilege, and a court may intervene if the committee acts beyond its statutory authority (ultra vires). No such case is reported in the source, but the potential for litigation exists, particularly in relation to the committee’s power to compel production of documents that are subject to legal professional privilege or other protections.

• “Unless the contrary intention appears” in section 1A means that the definitions can be displaced by context. A court or the committee itself could interpret a term differently if the Act’s purpose requires it. This creates flexibility but also uncertainty for those trying to predict how a term will be applied.

• Quorum of four out of six members means that as few as two government and two opposition members can form a quorum. This can allow business to proceed without crossbench or independent members, but also means that if the committee is politically balanced, a tied vote on a question results in the question passing in the negative (section 4(5)(b)). This favours inaction. For important matters, the committee may need to ensure it has a voting majority.

• The chairman’s deliberative vote only means the chairman does not have a casting vote. This contrasts with many committees where the chair has a casting vote to break ties. Here, ties are resolved by the negative, which strengthens the position of members who oppose a proposal.

• Evidence taken in private is not automatically secret. The committee can disclose or publish it in its discretion (section 7(5)), unless the witness requested non-publication and the evidence relates to a secret or confidential matter, in which case the witness’s written consent is required (section 7(6)). This means a witness cannot assume that evidence given in private will remain confidential; the committee may later decide to publish it, and the witness has no right to object unless the conditions in subsection (6) are met.

• The secretary is appointed by the Governor on joint recommendation of the President and Speaker (section 5). This is an unusual appointment mechanism that gives the two presiding officers shared control over the committee’s administrative head. If they disagree, the position may remain unfilled. The secretary may be paid remuneration approved by the Governor, but the Act does not specify a salary band.

• Section 4(8) allows the committee to sit during any adjournment or recess. This means the committee can hold hearings when Parliament is not sitting, potentially during election campaigns or when the Houses are prorogued. This can give the committee a life independent of the parliamentary calendar, but also means witnesses may need to attend at inconvenient times.

• Section 7(7) prohibits any person from disclosing private evidence without the committee’s authority. This includes committee members, who might otherwise be able to speak freely about evidence given in closed session. A member who leaks private evidence could face up to 12 months imprisonment and a $20,000 fine, plus potential contempt proceedings in the House.

• The offence under section 7(9) requires the Attorney-General’s consent (section 7(10)). This gives the government of the day control over whether to prosecute leaks. If the disclosure benefited the government, consent may be refused. If the disclosure embarrassed the government, consent may be granted. This creates an uneven enforcement risk.

• The committee can consider evidence taken by a previous committee (section 8). This means that even if a witness dies or a committee expires before reporting, the next committee can use that evidence. Witnesses cannot rely on the committee’s dissolution to prevent their testimony from being used.

• The definition of “public sector finances” includes “any liability for the satisfaction of which any expenditure by the Crown is, or may be, required.” This captures contingent liabilities, such as government guarantees on private loans, indemnities, and potential payouts under litigation. The committee could therefore inquire into the state’s exposure to liabilities that have not yet crystallised, including those relating to public-private partnerships, infrastructure projects, or disaster recovery schemes. This is a very broad gateway for inquiry.

For witnesses summoned to appear before the committee, the primary obligation is to attend at the time and place specified in the summons and to produce any documents required. If a witness cannot attend, they should contact the committee secretary as soon as possible to request a rescheduling or to seek permission to appear by alternative means (the Act does not explicitly permit remote appearances, but the committee can determine its own proceedings). Before giving evidence, witnesses should consider whether any of the information they may be asked to provide is subject to legal professional privilege, the privilege against self-incrimination, or other protections recognised by the Supreme Court. The witness can claim that privilege and refuse to answer or produce documents. It is advisable to have legal representation at the hearing. If the witness believes that all or part of their evidence relates to a secret or confidential matter (e.g., commercially sensitive information, trade secrets, or personal privacy), they should immediately request that the evidence be taken in private. The committee must take the evidence in private if it agrees the matter is secret or confidential. The witness should also request that the evidence not be published and seek written consent from the committee before any publication. If the witness’s evidence is taken in private, they must not disclose or publish that evidence to anyone else without the committee’s written authority, unless it has already been lawfully published. This obligation applies both during and after the hearing.

For officers of agencies, Government Business Enterprises, statutory authorities and local authorities, compliance involves preparing relevant financial records, management reports and audit documents that the committee may request. Officers should be familiar with the Act’s definitions to determine whether their entity falls within the committee’s jurisdiction. Many such entities may not realise that their revenue and expenditure are subject to committee scrutiny, especially local authorities. Officers should have a protocol for responding to committee requests, including designating a contact person and legal adviser. Any claim of confidentiality or sensitivity should be raised promptly with the committee.

For the committee itself, compliance with the Act means ensuring that proceedings are conducted in accordance with sections 4 and 7. The committee must keep minutes, record votes where divisions are called, and ensure that a quorum of four is present. When taking evidence, the committee must generally sit in public, and only depart from that where it considers there is good and sufficient reason. If a witness requests private evidence, the committee must determine whether the evidence relates to a secret or confidential matter. Its discretion is not unfettered; it should have a reasoned basis for its decision. The committee must also follow the rules on disclosure and publication of private evidence, obtaining the witness’s written consent before publishing if the witness so requested and the evidence was taken as confidential.

For the Houses of Parliament, compliance primarily involves ensuring that any referral to the committee is within the scope defined in section 6(1). The House should also ensure that vacancies on the committee are filled within ten sitting days (section 3(3)). The President and Speaker must jointly recommend the secretary’s appointment.

For the Auditor-General, compliance means that any matter referred to the committee under section 6(2)(b) should be within the Auditor-General’s functions and should not duplicate existing audit work. There is no prescribed form for such a referral.

For all persons, the key compliance risk is the confidentiality obligation. Anyone who comes into possession of evidence taken in private by the committee (whether by attending the hearing, receiving a transcript, or being told about it by a committee member) must not disclose or publish that evidence without the committee’s authority in writing from the chairman. The safest approach is to treat any evidence labelled as private as confidential until the committee or the chairman expressly authorises its release, or until it has been lawfully published elsewhere. If in doubt, seek legal advice or contact the committee secretary. The maximum penalty of 100 penalty units or 12 months imprisonment means this is a serious criminal offence. The fact that the Attorney-General must consent to prosecution does not make it safe to assume prosecution will not occur; the risk is real, especially if the disclosure damages a government interest or is politically motivated.