This Act has been repealed and is no longer in force. It is retained for historical reference.
Jurisdiction
Commonwealth
Act Number
145 of 1983
Collection
act
Plain English Summary
7/10 complexity
What this law does, mechanically
Creates a framework for price surveillance administered by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (the Commission) (see definitions in s3 and functions in s17).
Allows the Minister to require or approve the Commission to hold inquiries into prices for particular goods or services (s18). The Minister can also give written directions about special matters to be considered (s20) and can direct the Commission to monitor prices, costs and profits in an industry or for a particular supplier (s27A).
Enables the Minister, or the Commission with the Minister's approval, to make formal written declarations that (a) certain goods or services are "notified" (s21(1)(a)); (b) a specific person is a "declared person" for particular goods or services (s21(1)(b)); or (c) certain supplies are "exempt supplies" (s21(1)(c)). Declarations are published in the Gazette and may be varied or revoked (s21(1)–(2)). Special procedural limits apply before declaring State or Territory authorities (s21(1A)–(1D)).
Imposes a requirement on declared persons to notify the Commission before increasing prices for notified goods or services, subject to detailed rules about historical comparators and timeframes (s22). It is an offence for a declared person to supply at a price above the permitted threshold unless the notification process in s22(2) and related timing rules have been followed (s22(1)–(7)). Penalties are specified (s22 notes).
While an inquiry is underway (after the Commission serves a notice under s19(1)(b)), the person subject to that notice must not increase prices above specified historical maxima until the "prescribed day" (s24). The Commission can grant interim permission for an increase under tightly framed written notices (s25).
Sourced from the Federal Register of Legislation (legislation.gov.au), CC BY 4.0.
The Commission keeps a public register of notices received under s22(2)(a) and outcomes of its consideration, including reasons and related correspondence (s23). The register is inspectable by the public, though the Commission can exclude legitimately confidential information (s23(2A)–(2B)).
The Commission holds inquiries in public unless there is a reason to take confidential evidence in private (s31). It has powers to summon witnesses, require documents and take evidence under oath (ss34–36). The Chairperson may issue written notices to require production of information and documents relevant to a notice or inquiry (s32); refusal without reasonable excuse is an offence (s32(2)).
The Act sets out protections for confidential information supplied to the Commission; the Commission must take reasonable steps to prevent disclosure where disclosure would damage a person’s competitive position and public interest does not require disclosure (s33). It also establishes secrecy obligations on prescribed persons and penalties for unauthorised disclosure (s43).
Reports from inquiries or monitoring must be provided to the Minister and made publicly available in specified ways; affected persons receive copies and some reports must be published for public inspection (ss26, 27, 27B).
Prosecutions for offences under the Act are to be instituted in the Federal Court (s40). The Governor‑General may make implementing regulations (s45). Transitional secrecy obligations from a repealed petroleum pricing law are preserved for certain persons (Part V, ss51–46).
Official stated purposes and the Act's explicit policy considerations
The Act explicitly requires the Commission, when exercising its functions, to have particular regard to (a) maintaining investment and employment, including the influence of profitability on investment and employment; (b) discouraging persons who can substantially influence a market from taking advantage of that power in setting prices; and (c) discouraging cost increases arising from wages and employment conditions inconsistent with industrial tribunal principles (s17(3)). These are the express considerations the Commission must weigh.
How those aims map to costs, incentives and trade-offs (source‑grounded analysis)
Who decides and where discretion sits: the Minister decides which inquiries to require or approve and may give directions about matters to be considered (s18, s20). The Minister and Commission jointly make declarations that trigger the Act's price rules (s21). The Commission decides how to conduct inquiries (subject to Ministerial directions) and whether to accept confidentiality claims and exclude information from public registers (ss17(2)–(3), 31, 33, 23(2B)). These provisions concentrate substantial procedural discretion in the Minister and in the Commission (s18, s20, s21, s31, s33).
Who pays and bears compliance costs: firms declared under s21 ("declared persons") face the highest compliance obligations. They must give advance notices before increasing prices (s22), may be required to produce documents and information on short notice (s32), and can be criminally penalised for non‑compliance (s22, s32 notes). Preparing notices, responding to information notices, and potentially defending inquiries create administrative and legal costs for those firms (s22, s32, s23). Witnesses summoned to inquiries may incur travel and other expenses; those are paid either by the party who applied for the summons or by the Commonwealth (s39).
Effects on pricing freedom and contracts: declared persons lose immediate unilateral freedom to raise prices for notified goods or services above recent historical maxima unless they follow the notification process or obtain Commission permission (s22, s24, s25). That constraint operates through a combination of a statutory prohibition (s24), a pre‑notification mechanism (s22(2)), and the Commission's power to authorise interim increases (s25).
Interaction with competition and market power concerns: the Commission must consider discouraging exploitation of market power in pricing (s17(3)(b)). Mechanically, the Act gives the Commission investigatory and monitoring tools (s17(1)(c), s27A, s32) and the ability to make price information public (s23, s26, s27), which can influence firm incentives and competitive behavior by increasing transparency and regulatory oversight.
Trade‑offs signalled within the Act: the Commission is explicitly required to balance competing policy priorities — for example, to give regard to maintaining investment and employment while discouraging misuse of market power (s17(3)(a)–(b)). This creates an internal trade‑off the Commission must manage in its reports and recommendations (s17(3), s26).
Procedural timing and implementation risk: the Act sets specific short timeframes for the Commission's non‑objection process after a price notification (default 21 days, with limited extension powers and a 14‑day extension after certain Commission responses) (s22(5)–(7); s18(5)–(6)). Those time limits and the possibility of Ministerial extensions (s18(6)) create risks of administrative delay or compressed decision windows for businesses seeking clearance to change prices.
Public disclosure vs confidentiality tension: the Act requires publication of notices, register entries and reports (s23, s26, s27B) but also protects commercially sensitive information when the Commission accepts a confidentiality claim (s23(2A)–(2B), s33). The Commission has discretion to withhold information it judges confidential and not required in the public interest (s33), which balances transparency against competitive harm but gives the Commission a gatekeeping role.
Who is affected in practice
Declared persons and suppliers of notified goods or services are most directly affected (s21, s22, s24). The Commission and the Minister are decision‑makers (ss17, 18, 20, 21). The Federal Court handles prosecutions under the Act (s40). The National Competition Council has a defined consultative/limiting role before declarations are made about State/Territory authorities (s21(1A)–(1D)).
Concrete compliance burdens and enforcement mechanics (source citations)
Advance written notifications before price increases and prescribed waiting periods (s22(2), (5)–(7)).
Prohibition on increasing prices during pending inquiries; penalties for contravention (s24).
Commission power to require production of documents and information under notice, with penalty for non‑compliance (s32).
Criminal and civil protections for witnesses and members; secrecy rules for Commission staff and others with penalties for unauthorised disclosure (ss34–37, 43).
Public registers and publication requirements, with a process for excluding legitimately confidential material (ss23, 26, 27, 33).
Net effect, mechanically stated
The Act creates a process that can limit a targeted supplier's ability to raise prices for specified goods or services without prior notification or Commission approval (s22, s24, s25). It supplements that control with investigatory powers (s32), public reporting (s23, s26, s27B) and criminal penalties for non‑compliance (s22 notes, s32 notes). The Commission must weigh investment and employment considerations alongside concerns about market power and wage‑driven cost increases when conducting inquiries (s17(3)).