Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Regulations 1987

The regulations introduce and rely on several key concepts that determine how the Act applies in practice. Depleted uranium is defined as uranium in which the abundance of uranium‑235 is less than that occurring in natural uranium (regulation 2). This matters because depleted uranium in certain forms (e.g., aircraft counterweights of non-Australian aircraft in transit) is excluded from Part II of the Act. Source material and special fissionable material are not defined in the regulations but are terms used in the Act; the regulations instead focus on thresholds expressed in “element weight” or “isotope weight” for those materials. Prescribed international agreements are those listed in Schedule 1, which are given legal force through regulation 2A. These include the Agency Agreement with the IAEA and bilateral arrangements. The Amendment to the Physical Protection Convention (regulation 2AB) is given effect but only comes into force 30 days after two‑thirds of state parties have deposited their instruments of ratification - a condition that may not yet be satisfied, creating a temporal caveat. Similarly, multiple amendments to the Australia-Japan Agreement (regulation 2AC) are given effect as if they were originally part of the bilateral treaty, meaning Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle program changes are incorporated into Australian law. Supplementary Agency Agreements (regulation 2B) are those set out in Schedule 2 and take effect from the date specified in column 3 of that schedule, giving them a distinct commencement. Exempt nuclear material (regulation 3) is a crucial concept: the regulation lists nine specific categories of depleted uranium, thorium, and source material that are not subject to Part II of the Act. The exemption is conditional. For chemical mixtures, compounds, solutions, and alloys, they must not be intended for nuclear activity, not be of a purity suitable for fuel fabrication or isotopic enrichment, and not be subject to the Agency Agreement or a prescribed international agreement (regulations 3(2) and (3)). This means a manufacturer of ceramic glazes containing small amounts of uranium escapes safeguards, but the same material repurposed for nuclear fuel would lose the exemption. Carrier possession limits (regulation 4A) prescribe the maximum quantities of nuclear material and associated items that a carrier can possess without a permit under subsection 24(1) of the Act. For source material, the thresholds are 1,000 kilograms element weight of depleted uranium, 500 kilograms of natural uranium, or 1,000 kilograms of thorium. For special fissionable material, the threshold is only one gram isotope weight of plutonium‑239, uranium‑233 or uranium‑235, reflecting the extreme sensitivity of these materials. For associated items, the limits are 200 kilograms of deuterium/heavy water and 30 tonnes of nuclear grade graphite (defined by purity and density). Prescribed particulars for notification (regulation 4) require name, address, permit number, nature, date of grant, and period of effect for grants; similar details plus original effective date and variation effective date for variations; and original effective date, variation date, and revocation date for revocations. The design information period is 60 days from when a design for constructing or modifying a nuclear facility is finalised (regulation 5). Finally, the charge on uranium producers (regulation 6) is a per‑kilogram levy with a cap, applied to the previous financial year’s production, thereby creating a predictable but potentially significant annual cost for producers. The 2023 amendment changed the per‑kilogram rate from some earlier value to 15.1953 cents, as evidenced by regulation 7 applying the amendment from 2023‑24 onwards.

The regulations affect a distinct but narrow set of commercial and government actors. The most immediately impacted are producers of uranium ore concentrates in Australia. Any person who produces uranium ore concentrates - typically mining companies operating uranium mines such as Ranger (now closed) or Olympic Dam - must pay an annual charge under regulation 6. The charge is the lesser of 15.1953 cents per kilogram of uranium produced in the previous financial year and $500,000. For a large producer, the per‑kilogram rate could potentially exceed the cap, but the cap limits the liability to half a million dollars per year. The 2023 amendment (regulation 7) increased the per‑kilogram rate, applying it from 2023‑24 onwards, so producers face higher marginal costs per kilogram produced up to the cap. Carriers of nuclear material - including freight companies, shipping lines, airlines, and logistics operators - are affected by regulation 4A, which sets possession limits without a permit. If a carrier holds more than the prescribed thresholds, they must obtain a permit under section 24 of the Act, involving additional compliance and transaction costs. Carriers handling small quantities (e.g., less than 500 kg of natural uranium or less than one gram of special fissionable material) are exempt from the permit requirement, reducing administrative burden for routine transport of radiopharmaceuticals or low‑grade ores. Holders of permits or authorities under the Act - which may include research reactors, uranium conversion facilities, enrichment plants, or storage operators - are affected by regulation 4, which prescribes the particulars they must notify to the Australian Safeguards and Non‑proliferation Office (ASNO) upon grant, variation, or revocation. This imposes an ongoing reporting obligation that, while not onerous, requires diligent record‑keeping. Entities constructing or modifying nuclear facilities - likely limited to a handful of operators such as the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) or possible future nuclear power proponents - must provide design information within 60 days (regulation 5). This is a tight timeline that may require pre‑emptive preparation of documentation. Importers and users of products containing exempt nuclear material are indirectly affected. Manufacturers of ceramic glazes with uranium, producers of welding rods containing thorium, and airlines using depleted uranium counterweights on non‑Australian aircraft in transit benefit from the exemptions in regulation 3, meaning they do not need permits under Part II of the Act. However, they must ensure their materials meet the conditions: they must not be intended for nuclear activity, must not be of a purity suitable for fuel fabrication, and must not be subject to prescribed international agreements. Any change in use could trigger permit requirements. Entities subject to prescribed international agreements - including those involved in the Australia-Japan nuclear cooperation program - are affected by regulations 2A, 2AB, and 2AC, which incorporate amendments to those agreements into domestic law. The precise obligations depend on the agreements themselves, but the regulations make clear that the Physical Protection Convention amendment is not yet fully in force, creating uncertainty for entities handling nuclear material subject to international transport standards. Government agencies such as ASNO and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade are affected as enforcement and administrative authorities. The regulations provide the detailed rules they must administer. Overall, the regulatory burden falls most heavily on uranium producers and nuclear facility operators, while carriers and small‑scale holders of exempt materials face lower compliance costs, provided they adhere to the thresholds and conditions.

The regulations impose several duties and confer a number of rights, all conditioned on meeting precise thresholds and conditions.

Duties. The primary duty is the obligation to notify ASNO of the grant, variation, or revocation of any permit or authority under the Act (regulation 4). The notification must include the prescribed particulars: name and address of the holder, permit number, nature of the permit, date of grant or variation, and period of effect (or dates of variation and revocation). This duty falls on the person who granted the permit or authority - likely ASNO itself - but the practical burden for the permit holder is to ensure ASNO has accurate information to report. There is no explicit penalty in the regulations for failure to notify, but non‑compliance with the Act’s notification provisions may expose the holder to enforcement action under the Act. A second duty is the obligation for any person constructing or modifying a nuclear facility to provide design information within 60 days (regulation 5). This duty falls on the person or entity undertaking the construction or modification. The 60‑day period runs from the point at which the design is finalised, and the information must be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of paragraph 29(2)(b) of the Act. Failure to provide timely information could impede the facility’s licensing or create a breach of conditions. A third duty lies on producers of uranium ore concentrates to pay the annual charge (regulation 6). The charge is calculated at 15.1953 cents per kilogram of uranium produced in the previous financial year, capped at $500,000. Producers must compute the amount due and remit it to the Commonwealth. The regulation does not specify the due date or collection mechanism, but as a charge imposed by Commonwealth law, it is likely recoverable as a debt.

Rights. The regulations confer important rights to exemption from the permit requirements of Part II of the Act. Regulation 3 lists categories of nuclear material that are not subject to Part II, meaning the holder does not need a permit to possess, use, or transport that material, provided the conditions are met. For example, a manufacturer may incorporate thorium in incandescent gas mantles or electric light bulbs without needing a permit, so long as the thorium is not intended for a nuclear activity and is not of a purity suitable for fuel fabrication. Similarly, source material in finished ceramic glazing or in alloys with less than 4 per cent uranium or thorium by weight is exempt. Depleted uranium in counterweights of non‑Australian aircraft and ships in transit is exempt - but note this applies only to “other than Australian aircraft” and “other than Australian ships”. Australian aircraft and ships are not covered by this exemption, so they would still need a permit for such counterweights. Regulation 4A gives carriers the right to possess nuclear material and associated items without a permit, up to the specified thresholds. For source material, the thresholds are high enough to cover most routine transport of ores and concentrates (up to 500 kg of natural uranium, 1,000 kg of depleted uranium, or 1,000 kg of thorium). For special fissionable material, the threshold is only one gram, which effectively eliminates any substantive right - any significant quantity of plutonium or highly enriched uranium will trigger the permit requirement. For associated items, the thresholds are 200 kg of deuterium/heavy water and 30 tonnes of nuclear grade graphite. Carriers who stay within these limits do not need to seek a permit, saving time and administrative cost. The right is conditional on the carrier actually being a “carrier” for the purposes of the Act - presumably a person engaged in the business of transporting goods, but the regulations do not further define the term. Those holding permits also have the right to rely on the notification particulars prescribed by regulation 4 to ensure consistent record‑keeping.

The regulations themselves do not create penalty provisions; penalties for breaches are contained in the Act. However, the regulations define the scope and limits of various obligations and exemptions, and breaching the Act by exceeding those limits can lead to significant criminal penalties. For example, if a carrier possesses special fissionable material exceeding one gram without a permit (regulation 4A), that possession would be unauthorised under section 24 of the Act. Section 24 makes it an offence to possess nuclear material or associated items without a permit or unless prescribed by regulations. The maximum penalty under the Act for such an offence could be imprisonment for 10 years (section 24(3) of the Act prescribes 10 years for certain nuclear material offences). Similarly, if a person constructs or modifies a nuclear facility without providing design information within 60 days (regulation 5), they may be in breach of section 29 of the Act, which requires the provision of design information. Non‑compliance could lead to revocation of approvals or prosecution. The charge under regulation 6 is recoverable as a debt due to the Commonwealth. If a producer fails to pay, the Commonwealth can sue for the amount. The regulations do not impose a late payment penalty or interest, but general Commonwealth debt recovery mechanisms would apply.

Enforcement is primarily the responsibility of the Australian Safeguards and Non‑proliferation Office (ASNO), which administers the Act. ASNO has inspection powers under Part V of the Act, including entry to premises, examination of records, and taking of samples. The regulations do not expand or limit those powers, but they provide the substantive thresholds that guide when an inspection might be triggered. For instance, if ASNO suspects a carrier is transporting more than the prescribed quantities without a permit, it may initiate an investigation. The exemptions in regulation 3 are conditional, and ASNO can assess whether the conditions are met; if a holder of exempt material changes its use to a nuclear activity, the exemption ceases and the material becomes subject to Part II, potentially creating an offence if no permit has been obtained. The incorporation of international agreements by reference (regulations 2A, 2AB, 2AC) also means that breaches of those agreements could have enforcement consequences, though enforcement typically occurs at the diplomatic level or through IAEA safeguards mechanisms rather than domestic prosecution. The regulations do not create any civil penalty regimes specific to themselves. Practitioners should also be aware that the prescribed particulars for notification (regulation 4) are presumably used by ASNO to maintain the national safeguards register; any failure by ASNO to notify might affect the validity of permits, but the regulations do not specify consequences for the permit holder if ASNO fails to notify. In summary, while the regulations are a set of detailed administrative rules, the enforcement teeth come from the Act. Compliance with the regulations is essential to avoid triggering strict liability offences under the Act, which carry heavy penalties.

The regulations operate as a subordinate instrument under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 and must be read consistently with that Act. They define terms such as “depleted uranium” that take their meaning from the Act’s broader definitions, and they prescribe the international agreements referenced in the Act’s definition of “prescribed international agreement”. The regulations also interact with the international treaties they incorporate. Regulation 2AB gives effect to the 2005 Amendment to the Physical Protection Convention, but only when two‑thirds of state parties have ratified it - a condition that may not yet be met. This creates a situation where the amendment is part of Australian domestic law but not yet operative internationally, potentially causing a mismatch between domestic obligations and international practice. Entities shipping nuclear material subject to physical protection standards may face conflicting requirements if the amendment is not in force abroad. Regulation 2AC incorporates multiple amendments to the Australia-Japan Agreement from 1999, 2000, and 2006. These amendments modify the bilateral cooperation framework, which interacts with Japanese domestic law and any safeguards arrangements between the two countries. Australian entities dealing with Japanese nuclear fuel cycle material must comply with both Australian regulations and the bilateral agreement as amended.

The regulations also interact with state and territory radiation protection laws. While the Act and regulations deal with nuclear non‑proliferation and safeguards (i.e., preventing diversion of material to weapons use), they do not cover radiological safety, transport security, or environmental protection. For example, a carrier authorised to transport nuclear material under the regulations’ exemption in regulation 4A must still comply with the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation Regulations or state transport codes for radioactive materials. The exemptions in regulation 3 for thorium in incandescent gas mantles or depleted uranium in aircraft counterweights relate solely to safeguards permits; the material may still be subject to licensing under radiation safety laws if it exceeds exemption levels for radiological hazard. The charge in regulation 6 applies specifically to uranium ore concentrates; it does not replace royalties or other mining levies imposed by state governments. Producers must pay both the Commonwealth charge and state‑level taxes. The regulations also intersect with customs and export controls. The Act controls the export of nuclear material and associated items (Part IV). The regulations do not address export permits, but the exemptions and carrier limits apply to domestic possession and transport; export permits under the Act would be separate. The incorporation of the Physical Protection Convention amendment may affect the security standards required for international transport of nuclear material, which in turn interacts with the Customs Act 1901 and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s transport regulations.

Finally, the regulations interact with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 and the Judiciary Act 1903 for review of decisions made under the Act, such as refusal of a permit. The 60‑day period for design information (regulation 5) may be a procedural requirement that, if not met, could lead to reviewable decisions. The charge calculation under regulation 6 may be subject to merits review if the producer disputes the assessment. Practitioners should be aware that amendments to the regulations (including the 2023 amendment to regulation 6) apply from a specified financial year, and transitional provisions must be checked to avoid applying an outdated rate. The interaction with the Physical Protection Convention amendment is particularly tricky because its domestic effect predates its international entry into force, potentially creating obligations that are not reciprocally enforced. This could expose Australian entities to higher standards than those applied in countries that have not ratified the amendment.

The regulations were originally made in 1987 as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Regulations 1987, under a name that reflected the Act’s title. The text provided includes several amendments inserted over time, though the exact dates of each amendment are not specified in the source. Regulation 2A (Prescribed international agreements) and regulation 2B (Supplementary Agency Agreements) appear to have been inserted after the original 1987 version, because they refer to Schedules 1 and 2, and the original regulations likely had a simpler structure. Regulation 2AB (Amendment to Physical Protection Convention) was added later, referencing a 2005 IAEA conference; it must post‑date 2005. Regulation 2AC (Amendments to Japan Agreement) incorporates exchanges of notes from 1999, 2000, and 2006, so it was likely added or substantially amended in or after 2006. Regulation 4A (Possession of nuclear material by carriers) was likely added to implement the Act’s power to prescribe kinds of nuclear material for the carrier exemption; its absence from the original regulations would have meant carriers needed permits for even trivial quantities, so this amendment reduced compliance burden. Regulation 5’s 60‑day period may have been a later adjustment, but the source does not show prior periods. Regulation 6 has been amended most recently by the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation (Safeguards) Amendment Regulations 2023, which changed the per‑kilogram charge from an unspecified prior rate to 15.1953 cents. Regulation 7 confirms this amendment applies from the 2023‑24 financial year onward. The prior rate is not disclosed in the source, but it was presumably lower or higher; the 2023 amendment likely increased it to keep pace with costs or to align with inflation. The cap of $500,000 appears unchanged in the text, suggesting only the per‑kilogram component was updated.

Other amendments may have been made to Schedules 1 and 2 over the years to add or remove prescribed international agreements and supplementary agency agreements. The source does not include the content of Schedules 1 and 2, so the history of those schedules cannot be traced here. The regulations have also likely been amended to change cross‑references to the Act when the Act itself was amended (e.g., the introduction of section 69A for charges). The structure of the regulations - with a series of “2” numbered regulations (2A, 2AB, 2AC, 2B) - suggests piecemeal additions rather than a comprehensive re‑make. The 2023 amendment is the most contemporary change identified, and it is substantive in that it directly increases costs for uranium producers. Practitioners should check the Federal Register of Legislation for the complete amendment history, including any amendments to Schedules and any corrections. The regulations are now close to four decades old, and the cumulative effect of piecemeal amendments may create interpretive difficulties - for example, the interaction between the old regulation 3 exemption criteria and the newer international agreements incorporated by reference.

The source text does not mention any litigation history. The regulations themselves are administrative in nature, and their interpretation is unlikely to have generated significant case law. However, as a matter of general knowledge (which should not be assumed but is permissible context for legal‑information analysis), the High Court and Federal Court have occasionally considered aspects of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987, particularly in relation to permit decisions or constitutional challenges to the Commonwealth’s exercise of power over uranium mining. One notable case is Commonwealth v WMC Resources Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 1, which dealt with the validity of the Act and whether it validly applied to the Jabiluka mineral lease. That case involved the Act’s provisions, not the regulations directly, but the regulations would have been relevant to the definition of nuclear material and the exemptions. The regulations themselves have not, to public knowledge, been the subject of standalone litigation challenging their validity or interpretation. However, practitioners should be aware that the regulations could be judicially reviewed on administrative law grounds - for example, if ASNO misapplies the exemption criteria in regulation 3 or miscalculates a charge under regulation 6. The 60‑day period for design information (regulation 5) could also be the subject of disputes about when the period starts and what constitutes a “design”. The fact that the Physical Protection Convention amendment is in domestic law but not yet internationally in force (regulation 2AB) could be challenged as creating an uncertain obligation, but no such litigation is recorded. The 2023 amendment to the charge rate might be challenged if a producer argues it is ultra vires the Act or imposes an unconstitutional tax, but such a challenge would face a high bar given the Act expressly authorises the regulations to prescribe a charge under section 69A. In summary, while there is no cited litigation history in the source, the regulations live in a field that has generated High Court authority on the Act, and the potential for future litigation over the meaning of “prescribed chemical mixture”, “intended for use for nuclear activity”, or the calculation of “element weight” remains real. Any challenge would turn on the specific facts and the text of the regulations, not on the Act’s broader constitutional dimensions.

Several details in the regulations can trap the unwary. First, the exemption for depleted uranium in aircraft counterweights (regulation 3(1)(a)(i)) applies only to “aircraft, other than Australian aircraft, in transit through Australia”. Australian aircraft are not covered, meaning an Australian airline using depleted uranium in its own aircraft counterweights would not be exempt and would need a permit. The exemption for ship keels is similarly limited to non‑Australian ships. Foreign carriers benefit; domestic carriers do not. Second, the exemption for thorium in finished aircraft parts (regulation 3(1)(b)(v)) is narrow: it covers only thorium incorporated in a “finished aircraft part”. Unfinished parts or thorium used in manufacturing processes could still be subject to Part II. Third, the prescribed chemical mixture exemption (regulation 3(2)) excludes mixtures “intended for use for the purposes of a nuclear activity” or “of a composition and purity making it suitable for fuel fabrication or for isotopic enrichment”. This is a purpose‑based test that can change over time. A manufacturer selling a low‑purity uranium compound for a non‑nuclear use today could later discover that a customer intends to use it for nuclear purposes - the exemption would cease, and the manufacturer might be unknowingly in breach. Due diligence on downstream use is essential. Fourth, the carrier exemption for special fissionable material is only one gram isotope weight - a very small quantity. Most carriers of any significant quantity of plutonium or enriched uranium will need a permit. The threshold for source material is more generous (500‑1,000 kg), but note that the “element weight” of uranium includes all isotopes, not just fissile content. Fifth, the definition of nuclear grade graphite (regulation 4A(3)) requires both a purity level better than 5 parts per million boron equivalent and a density greater than 1.5 g/cm³. Graphite that does not meet both criteria is not “nuclear grade” and therefore not an “associated item” under regulation 4A. This could be a trap for operators who assume all high‑purity graphite is regulated; if it does not meet the density threshold, it may fall outside the carrier exemption entirely, but also may not require a permit under the Act because it is not an associated item. This ambiguity should be resolved by reference to the Act’s definition of “associated item”. Sixth, the 60‑day period for design information (regulation 5) may start from completion of the design, which could be before regulatory engagement. A project proponent must have the design ready to submit within 60 days of completion; if they delay submission, they may breach the regulation. The regulator could treat the failure as a breach of a condition of an approval or a separate offence. Seventh, the charge cap of $500,000 (regulation 6) applies per financial year per producer. If a producer operates multiple sites, it is aggregated - but “person” in the regulation likely means a legal entity. The cap does not apply per site, so large producers reach the cap quickly and then pay nothing on additional production. This creates an odd incentive: once the cap is hit, additional production bears no marginal charge, potentially encouraging higher output. Conversely, small producers pay per kilogram with no cap, so their marginal cost is higher. Eighth, the Physical Protection Convention amendment (regulation 2AB) is stated to have effect, but its entry into force is conditioned on two‑thirds of state parties ratifying. If that condition has not been met, the amendment is in a legal limbo - it is part of Australian law but not yet effective internationally. This could create compliance uncertainty for entities that must meet international physical protection standards. Ninth, the prescribed international agreements in Schedule 1 are not reproduced in the source, but each agreement’s terms may impose obligations beyond the Act. Failure to comply with a prescribed agreement could be a breach of the Act by reference. Practitioners must check the current text of each agreement. Finally, the exemption for “source material incorporated in the glazing of a finished ceramic product” (regulation 3(1)(c)(i)) covers only finished products. Unfinished ceramic ware or glaze in bulk is not exempt, so a pottery manufacturer using uranium oxide in glaze must ensure the product is finished before it can rely on the exemption. The “finished” condition import raises questions about what constitutes finished - is a bisque‑fired piece finished, or is it only finished after glost firing? These interpretive issues are not resolved in the regulations and could lead to disputes.

Compliance with the regulations requires a systematic approach to material classification, record‑keeping, threshold monitoring, and timely reporting. The following steps are recommended, though legal advice should be tailored to specific operations.

Step 1: Identify all nuclear material and associated items in your possession, custody, or control. This includes uranium ore, uranium concentrates, depleted uranium, thorium, plutonium, enriched uranium, deuterium/heavy water, and nuclear grade graphite. Apply the definitions in regulation 2 and 4A carefully. For depleted uranium, measure the uranium‑235 abundance. For source material, determine element weight of uranium or thorium. For special fissionable material, determine isotope weight of plutonium‑239, uranium‑233, and uranium‑235.

Step 2: Determine if the material is exempt from Part II of the Act under regulation 3. Check whether the material falls into any of the listed categories: depleted uranium in non‑Australian aircraft or ship counterweights in transit; thorium in specified consumer products; source material in ceramic glazing or low‑percentage alloys; low‑concentration mixtures (less than 0.05 per cent by weight); or small quantities of ore concentrates (less than 10 kg element weight). For chemical mixtures and alloys (regulations 3(2) and (3)), confirm that the material is not intended for nuclear activity, is not of suitable purity for fuel fabrication or isotopic enrichment, and is not subject to the Agency Agreement or a prescribed international agreement. Maintain documentation of the intended use and purity analysis.

Step 3: For materials not exempt, determine if a permit under the Act is required. If you are a carrier, check the quantities against regulation 4A. For source material, ensure not exceeding 1,000 kg depleted uranium, 500 kg natural uranium, or 1,000 kg thorium. For special fissionable material, ensure not exceeding one gram isotope weight. For associated items, ensure not exceeding 200 kg deuterium or 30 tonnes nuclear grade graphite. If quantities are within these limits, no permit is needed for possession under section 24 of the Act, but other transport and safety requirements still apply. If quantities exceed the thresholds, apply for a permit from ASNO well in advance of transport.

Step 4: If you hold a permit or authority, ensure prompt notification to ASNO for any grant, variation, or revocation. The prescribed particulars under regulation 4 must be provided: name, address, permit number, nature, dates. Maintain an internal register to capture changes and trigger notification. The notification is likely a duty of the permit granter (ASNO), but permit holders should confirm that ASNO has the correct details and request confirmation of notification.

Step 5: If you plan to construct or modify a nuclear facility, prepare design information early. The 60‑day period in regulation 5 runs from when the design is finalised. Do not assume the period starts when you notify ASNO. Ensure the design documentation is complete enough to satisfy paragraph 29(2)(b) of the Act before the clock starts. Consider providing preliminary information earlier to allow discussion with ASNO.

Step 6: If you produce uranium ore concentrates, calculate the annual charge accurately. Determine the uranium production in kilograms for the previous financial year. Multiply by 15.1953 cents. Compare the result to $500,000 and pay the lesser amount. Keep detailed production records, including assays of uranium content, to substantiate the calculation. The charge is payable in the current financial year for previous year’s production. Regulation 7 confirms that from 2023‑24 the new rate applies. Ensure you are using the correct rate for the relevant year. Payments should be made to the Commonwealth as required by the Act; check with ASNO or the Department for remittance details.

Step 7: Monitor changes to prescribed international agreements and schedules. Regulations 2A, 2AB, 2AC, and 2B incorporate agreements that may be amended or supplemented. The agencies that administer these agreements should be consulted. For the Physical Protection Convention amendment, verify whether the condition of two‑thirds ratification has been met; if it has, the amendment is in force; if not, its domestic effect may be uncertain. For the Australia-Japan agreement, keep up to date with any new exchanges of notes.

Step 8: Maintain records of exemptions relied upon, quantity measurements, permit copies, notifications made, and charge calculations. Given the strict liability nature of some offences under the Act, a documented compliance trail can be crucial in an inspection or enforcement action. Review the regulations periodically for amendments, particularly to charge rates, quantities, and schedules. The 2023 amendment is a reminder that charge rates can change without broader policy debate, directly affecting producer costs. Engage with ASNO proactively if there is any doubt about classification or thresholds.