Practitioners using this Act should watch for several traps. First, the no automatic stay rule in s 23(1). The making of an application for review does not affect the operation of the decision or prevent action to implement it. This means a decision‑maker can act on a decision even while it is under review unless and until the Court orders a stay. To obtain a stay the applicant must specifically apply, and the Court cannot grant a stay without giving the decision‑maker a reasonable opportunity to be heard, except in urgent cases where the stay does not take effect until served on the decision‑maker (s 24). Even then, the stay is subject to conditions (s 25).
Second, the time limits for seeking review are tight. The prescribed period is 28 days from the provision of reasons or from notification of the decision (s 17(2)). While a late application is possible if a reasonable explanation is provided (s 20), there is no guarantee of extension. The application to extend time must itself be made in writing. If the applicant dilly‑dallies, the right of review may be lost. Similarly, a decision‑maker may apply to extend the period for making the original decision if there is a reasonable explanation (s 19).
Third, the duty to give reasons is not absolute. A decision‑maker may refuse to provide reasons if the request is made more than 28 days after the person received a written decision, or if it is not made within a reasonable time (s 14(1)(b), (c)). The Court can override this refusal only if the person applies under s 15, which itself requires the person to have received a notification of refusal (s 15(1)). A person who simply does not request reasons within time loses the right to force their production, which may hinder the review application because a statement of reasons is often critical to understanding the basis of the decision.
Fourth, the Government policy requirement in s 27 can be a trap for the unwary. The Court must give effect to any relevant Government policy in force at the time the decision was made, unless the policy is contrary to law or would produce an unjust decision in the circumstances of the case (s 27(1)). This means an applicant who argues solely on the merits against a policy may lose, because the Court is bound to apply the policy unless one of the two exceptions applies. The Premier or another Minister can certify a policy as Government policy, and the Court takes judicial notice of that certificate (s 27(2), (3)).
Fifth, costs are not routinely recoverable. Section 45(1) provides that each party bears their own costs. The Court may order costs only if it is satisfied it is fair to do so, having regard to specific factors such as whether a party conducted the proceeding in a way that unnecessarily disadvantaged another party, or made a claim with no tenable basis (s 45(3)). This defies the usual rule in litigation that costs follow the event. A party who wins a review may still have to pay their own legal fees unless the loser’s conduct was egregious. Worse, a representative who is responsible for such conduct may be ordered to pay costs personally (s 45(4)), so lawyers and other representatives must be especially careful.
Sixth, hearings can be dispensed with entirely (s 37). If the Court considers the issues can be adequately determined in the absence of the parties, it can decide the matter on documents alone. This removes the opportunity for oral hearing. Similarly, the Court can hold hearings in private or restrict publication of evidence (s 36). Parties should therefore ensure their written submissions are comprehensive.
Seventh, the irregularity provision in s 38(3) provides that non‑compliance with the Act or rules does not nullify proceedings, but the Court may set aside proceedings or decisions. This gives the Court a broad discretion to salvage or strike out proceedings based on procedural errors.
Eighth, applications that are frivolous or vexatious can be dismissed at any stage (s 34(5)(h)). The Act also gives the Administrator power to apply for a vexatious proceedings order (s 20A). Repeated applicants face serious restrictions.
Ninth, transitional risks. Section 54 provides that appeals or reviews commenced before the Act’s commencement are dealt with under the old law. Anyone with a pending application when the Act comes into force must check whether it is caught by this section.
Tenth, the Crown is bound (s 6), but the Act is subject to contrary provision in the underlying enactment (s 11). Some enactments may reverse the default procedural rules, so one must always check the originating legislation.