Judicial Review Act 2000

The Act builds on a defined set of conceptual primitives. A "decision to which this Act applies" is a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made under an enactment, unless the decision falls within classes listed in Schedule 1 (s 4). The definitions in the preliminary provisions (s 3) elaborate central terms: "reviewable matter" (decision, conduct engaged in for making a decision, or failure to make a decision), "order of review" (orders under ss 17-19), "person aggrieved" (broadly, a person whose interests are adversely affected by the decision, conduct or failure, s 7), and "conduct engaged in for the purpose of making a decision" (which expressly includes preparatory acts such as taking evidence or holding an inquiry, s 8).

Grounds for challenge are spelled out for each application type. For decisions an applicant may rely on a breach of natural justice, failure to observe procedural requirements, lack of jurisdiction, absence of power under the enabling enactment, improper exercise of power, error of law, fraud, absence of evidence to justify the decision and any other contravention of law (s 17(2)). For conduct, similar grounds apply with present, past and prospective variants: e.g., a breach of natural justice that has happened, is happening or is likely to happen, or an error of law that has been, is being or is likely to be committed (s 18(2)). For failure-to-decide claims, the Act creates two limbs: unreasonable delay where no statutory timeframe exists (s 19(1)) and failure to act within a statutory period where the applicant alleges the duty remains despite expiry of the period (s 19(2)). The Act also gives a non-exhaustive description of what amounts to an "improper exercise of power", itemising irrelevant or omitted considerations, purpose-misuse, bad faith, blind rule-following, unreasonableness, uncertainty of result and abuse of power (s 20).

Procedural and substantive constraints are integral to the core concepts. Time limits for bringing a review are defined: an application about a decision set out in a document given to the applicant must be made within 28 days of the relevant day, unless the Court allows further time (s 23(1)). The definition of "relevant day" depends on whether the decision document included reasons, a later supplied statement of reasons, or a request for reasons under s 29 (s 23(4)). The Act provides that requesting reasons and obtaining statements is a distinct mechanism: request procedures (s 29), the decision maker’s duty to comply within 28 days (s 30), content requirement (s 31), and exceptions for confidential information and Attorney-General certificates (ss 32-34). The Act also abolishes common-law writs, making statutory orders under s 27 the mechanism for judicial relief (s 43). Interaction concepts are embedded in ss 10-15 and the Schedules which exclude or limit review for specified classes of decisions or under certain enactments.

The Act creates legal positions and obligations for three principal actor groups: applicants (persons aggrieved), decision makers (public officers, statutory authorities, Ministers, the Governor-in-Council), and the Court machinery (judges, registries, rules-makers). A "person aggrieved" is defined to include anyone whose interests are adversely affected by a decision, conduct or failure to make a decision (s 7). That definition governs who may apply under ss 17-19. The Act permits other persons affected by an application to apply to be joined as parties (s 25). A requester for reasons is any person "entitled to make an application to the Court under s 17" in relation to the decision (s 29(1)).

Decision makers are those who make decisions of an administrative character under an enactment. The statutory definition of "statutory authority" in s 3 captures bodies established by or under an Act or the royal prerogative whose governing authority is wholly or partly appointed by Governor, Minister or another statutory authority. Specific procedural roles attach to particular office-holders: where a decision is by Governor-in-Council or Cabinet, a request for reasons must be given to the Minister responsible for the enactment rather than to the Governor-in-Council itself (s 29(2)(a)); and where a review relates to a decision of the Governor-in-Council, the respondent is the Minister administering the enactment (s 41).

The Crown is expressly bound by the Act in right of Tasmania (s 9), and the Attorney-General may intervene in proceedings on behalf of the Crown, becoming a party with costs consequences (s 39). The Act contains a provision to treat decisions by an officer who later vacates office as decisions of the replacement person, and identifies who the "replacement person" is (s 40). Rules and regulations makers are identified: judges may make rules of court for procedure (s 44), and the Governor may make regulations except where rules of court are authorised (s 46). Administrative responsibility is initially assigned to the Attorney-General and the Department of Justice and Industrial Relations until Administrative Arrangements provide otherwise (s 47).

Certain groups are insulated from review by design. The Act excludes classes of decisions from the definition of "decision to which this Act applies" (s 4(2)) by reference to Schedule 1, and in Part 5 Schedule 3 lists decisions for which reasons need not be given (ss 28; Schedule 3). Schedule 2 lists enactments whose operation the Act does not affect (s 15(2)). These Schedules identify specific sectors, for example decisions relating to criminal justice administration, tax assessments, personnel management in the State Service, tendering outcomes and decisions on commercial activities of Government Business Enterprises and specified statutory authorities (Schedules 1 and 3).

The Act confers substantive rights to seek court-ordered review and sets out corresponding duties on decision makers and the Court. The right to apply is conferred on any "person aggrieved" by a reviewable matter (s 17(1); s 18(1); s 19(1)-(2)). The Act expressly states that these rights are additional to other review rights that a person may hold under other laws or tribunals (s 10). However, the Court retains power to dismiss or stay applications in various circumstances where proceedings overlap, where other suitable review channels exist, or to avoid interference with an ongoing initial proceeding (ss 11-14; s 38).

Decision makers have a statutory duty, where a requester is entitled to apply for review, to provide a written statement of reasons when asked (s 29-31). That duty is framed as a requirement to provide the statement "as soon as practicable, and in any event, within 28 days" of receiving a request (s 30(1)). Decision makers have tailored procedural rights where they believe the requester is not entitled to make the request: they may notify the requester of that view within 28 days or apply to the Court for a declaration under s 36 (s 30(2)-(3)). Decision makers may refuse a request where it is out of time (s 30(4)), but must notify the requester within 14 days (s 30(5)). The Act requires the statement to contain "the reasons for the decision" (s 31), but allows withholding of confidential personal or business information (s 32), and information covered by an Attorney-General’s certificate asserting public interest non-disclosure (s 33). Where information or the whole statement is withheld under these exceptions, the decision maker must give written notice explaining the omission or refusal (s 34(1)-(4)).

Applicants have procedural duties too: applications must be made in the manner prescribed by rules of court, set out the grounds of the application and be lodged with a registry of the Court (s 22). Time limits apply: applications about decisions supplied in a document must be made within 28 days of the "relevant day", and the Act supplies a layered definition of that day to accommodate reasons supplied later or requests under s 29 (s 23). If a decision maker fails to provide a requested statement within 28 days, the requester may apply to the Court for an order compelling the statement (s 35). If the decision maker has applied for a declaration under s 36 and the court refuses that declaration, then the decision maker must prepare and give the statement within 28 days of the Court’s decision (s 36(3)).

The Court has duties and powers set out in the Act. It has jurisdiction to hear applications under the Act (s 16). It may exercise equitable and declaratory powers under s 27 across decisions, conduct and failures to decide, including quashing decisions, referring matters back with directions, declaring rights and directing parties as necessary to "do justice between the parties" (s 27(1)-(3)). The Court can suspend operation of a decision or stay proceedings arising from it (s 26(2)). The Court is directed to exercise dismissal powers by order and to endeavour to do so at the earliest appropriate time (ss 14(1); 38(2)). Appeals from orders under this Part are restricted and typically require leave (s 14(4)-(5); s 38(5)-(6)).

The Act does not create criminal offences or penal sanctions. Enforcement operates through the Court’s civil powers and procedural controls. The primary enforcement mechanisms are the Court’s orders under s 27, which include quashing decisions with specified retrospective or prospective effect (s 27(1)(a)), referring matters back for reconsideration with directions and time limits (s 27(1)(b)), declaring parties’ rights (s 27(1)(c); s 27(2)(a); s 27(3)(b)) and directing parties to take or refrain from taking actions necessary to do justice (s 27(1)(d); s 27(2)(b); s 27(3)(c)). The Court may revoke, vary or suspend orders it has made (s 27(4)).

The Court has procedural powers to control the progress and viability of claims. It may stay or dismiss applications where continuation is inappropriate, no reasonable basis is disclosed, or the application is frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process (s 38(1)). The Court may also dismiss applications under ss 11-13 where other review mechanisms are in play or it is necessary to avoid interfering with an initial proceeding; those dismissal powers must be exercised by order and the Court is asked to ensure early resolution where appropriate (ss 11-14). The Act imposes time bars on bringing applications (s 23); failure to comply can lead to the Court refusing to consider an application (s 23(2)(c)-(d)).

Costs consequences are addressed indirectly. The Attorney-General may intervene on behalf of the Crown and, if so, is taken to be a party; the Court may make such order as to costs against the Crown as it considers appropriate (s 39(1)-(2)). The Act does not otherwise prescribe costs rules; normal courts’ costs powers will apply subject to judicial discretion and any orders the Court makes under this Act.

Remedial architecture is deliberately statutory rather than prerogative. The Act abolishes the prerogative writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, quo warranto and scire facias (s 43). That structural choice channels enforcement through the Act’s specified orders and court processes rather than historic royal writs. Procedural enforcement is supported by rules of court and regulations: the judges may make rules for how applications are made and served (s 44), strict compliance is not required (s 45), and the Governor may make regulations for matters not reserved to rules (s 46). The Act also allows for an applicant to be joined to an existing proceeding (s 25), and for documents lodged with the registry to be amended on terms (s 42), which facilitate practical enforcement steps.

The Act is express about its relationship with other statutory review regimes and with existing law. It states that rights conferred by the Act are additional to any other rights to seek review of a reviewable matter, whether in court or another tribunal, authority or person (s 10). That means an applicant may have parallel avenues, but the Court and other decision-makers must account for possible overlaps. Conversely, the Court may dismiss applications where an application under this Act is redundant or would interfere with other review proceedings or with the due conduct of an "initial proceeding" before the original decision-maker (ss 11-13). The Court may act of its own motion or on application to dismiss such applications, and must attempt to hear such applications at the earliest appropriate time (s 14).

The Act has primacy to the extent provided in s 15(1): it “has effect despite any law in force at its commencement.” But s 15(2) provides a carve-out, listing enactments in Schedule 2 whose operation the Act does not affect. Schedule 2 contains a list of Acts,some with amendment notes,that are to be treated as not displaced; for example, the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (as added by an amendment) and other specific statutes (Schedule 2). Schedule 1 and Schedule 3 establish categories of decisions that are excluded either from the Act’s reach (Schedule 1, s 4(2)) or from the Part 5 reasons regime (Schedule 3, s 28). Those Schedules create sectoral limitations: criminal justice investigatory decisions, many taxation assessment decisions, certain industrial and personnel decisions, tendering and award decisions, council budgeting and rates decisions, and commercial decisions of Government Business Enterprises and particular statutory authorities are examples listed (Schedules 1 and 3).

Procedural cross-overs are built into time and remedies provisions. The Act allows the Court to dismiss an application under the Act if the applicant has sought another review otherwise than under this Act or if adequate provision is made by other law for review (s 12). It specifically contemplates and preserves review under other statutory regimes while enabling the Court to manage overlap to avoid duplication or interference with proceedings (ss 11-13). The Act also provides practical alignment points: for Governor-in-Council decisions the respondent is the Minister administering the enactment (s 41), reflecting executive-administrative structures under other Acts. Administrative Arrangements orders will govern administration of the Act (s 47).

Finally, the Act replaces common-law writs as the route to relief (s 43). Where other enactments provide bespoke review schemes, Schedules and s 15(2) preserve those schemes. The interplay is therefore a mix of addition (s 10), primacy (s 15(1)), exceptions (s 15(2) and Schedules), and judicial case management powers to manage overlap and potential interference (ss 11-14; s 38).

The text supplied includes internal amendment annotations in the Schedules identifying post-enactment changes to the lists of excluded or non-reviewable decisions. These annotations are the sole amendment history present in the Act text provided. Schedule 1, which lists decisions to which the Act does not apply (s 4(2)), contains multiple amendment notes: items c-k (relating to various tax and revenue Acts such as the Duties Act 2001, Gaming Control Act 1993, Land Tax Act 2000, Land Tax Rating Act 2000, Payroll Tax Act 2008, Racing Regulation and Integrity Act 2024, Taxation Administration Act 1997, TT-Line Gaming Act 1993, and Vehicle and Traffic Act 1999) are annotated as amended by No. 8 of 2008, s 27, applied 02 May 2008. Payroll Tax and other specific references also reflect subsequent amendatory instrument citations (No. 16 of 2008 applied 01 Jul 2008). Schedule 1 was further amended by No. 67 of 2009 s 120 (Applied 01 Oct 2010) to add items 4A and 4B concerning the Integrity Commission Act 2009 (reports and certain determinations). There are annotations showing No. 64 of 2004 (Sched. 1, Applied 01 Jan 2005) and No. 18 of 2008 (s 30, Applied 26 Jun 2008) in relation to certain items. Item 5A reflects amendment by No. 22 of 2018 s 8 (Applied 15 Oct 2018). Item 6 references an amendment by No. 18 of 2008 (Applied 26 Jun 2008). Additional amendments include No. 86 of 2009 Sched. 1 (Applied 17 Dec 2009) and No. 32 of 2016 Sched. 1 (Applied 01 Jan 2017) in Schedule 1.

Schedule 3, which lists decisions for which reasons need not be given (s 28), contains amendment notes: subsection 10(2) identifies amended items concerning TasTAFE and Tourism Tasmania, with amendments recorded by No. 45 of 2008 (Applied 01 Jan 2009), No. 11 of 2013 (Applied 01 Jul 2013) and No. 32 of 2021 Sched. 4 (Applied 01 Jul 2022).

Schedule 2, which lists enactments that provide for non-review or limited review (s 15(2)), includes amendments such as No. 42 of 2013 s 50 (Applied 01 Jan 2014) adding the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998, No. 53 of 2004 Sched. 1 (Applied 16 Feb 2005) and No. 18 of 2012 Sched. 7 (Applied 01 Jul 2012) as shown in the text.

The Act’s own commencement provision requires proclamation (s 2). The administration was to be assigned to the Attorney-General until an Administrative Arrangements Act order specified otherwise (s 47). The text contains a Schedule 4 cross-reference at s 48 but the supplied text only states “See Schedule 4” without listing the consequential amendments contained in Schedule 4 except that it exists (s 48; Schedule 4 heading present). The provided statute text does not include express amending instruments beyond the in-text amendment annotations in the Schedules, nor does it list repeal, consolidation or other historical stages of the principal Act beyond those embedded annotations. The annotations themselves should be read as part of the Act’s recorded amendment history within the supplied text.

The supplied statute text contains no case citations, reported decisions, or references to litigation outcomes. There are no judicial authorities cited in the Act text, no example decisions, and no summary of how courts have interpreted particular provisions. Practitioners seeking litigation history must therefore consult external case law resources; the Act text itself does not record any judicial interpretations.

However, the Act contains several provisions that shape the likely contours of litigation should a challenge proceed under the Act. It prescribes narrow windows for applications (s 23), sets out grounds in statutory language that courts will need to interpret (s 17(2), s 18(2), s 19), and provides for a defined suite of judicial orders (s 27) rather than historic writs (s 43). The Act also constrains appeal routes: certain orders and dismissal decisions are appealable only with leave of the Court, and appeals lie to the Full Court of the Supreme Court (ss 14(4)-(5); s 38(5)-(6)). The Act permits the Court to receive evidence on applications to dismiss or determine entitlement to a statement (ss 14(3); 38(4); s 36(2)), which implies that factual disputes may be litigated at interlocutory stages.

Several provisions will commonly generate interlocutory litigation and contest over procedure: whether the applicant is a "person aggrieved" (s 7), whether an application was made within a reasonable time (s 23(2)-(3)), whether a requester was entitled to ask for reasons (s 30(2)-(3), s 36), whether information falls within the confidential/business affairs exception (s 32) or is covered by an Attorney-General certificate (s 33), and whether the Court should exercise its discretion to dismiss or stay the application given parallel review avenues (ss 11-14; s 38). The statutory description of "improper exercise" (s 20) supplies a multi-faceted statutory standard that litigants will need to prove, and ss 21 and 31-37 create discrete proceedings over reasons statements and their adequacy.

Because the statute abolishes mandamus, certiorari and other writs (s 43), litigants seeking traditional prerogative relief will litigate under the Act’s express remedies and procedures (s 27). The absence of cases in the text means the Act’s application in live disputes and the shape of judicial reasoning on the Act’s specific phrases remain matters to be explored in the court record, not in the statute.

Several practical pitfalls flow directly from the text. Time is a critical constraint. The primary general rule mandates that an application about a decision contained in a document given to the applicant must be made within 28 days of the relevant day (s 23(1)(a)). The definition of "relevant day" is layered. It depends on whether the decision document included reasons, whether a subsequent statement of reasons was provided within 28 days, whether a request for reasons under s 29 was made and when a statement was given or denied, or whether the decision document itself was the first notification (s 23(4)). Practitioners must map these contingencies carefully when advising on limitation points.

Requesting reasons is itself a procedural route with its own traps. The requester must be "entitled to make an application to the Court under s 17" (s 29(1)). A decision maker who believes the requester lacks entitlement can, within 28 days, notify the requester or apply to the Court for a declaration of non-entitlement (s 30(2)). If the decision maker elects not to prepare a statement because the request was out of time, the decision maker must give written notice explaining the refusal within 14 days (s 30(5)). Where a decision maker withholds information as confidential or on Attorney-General certificate grounds, s 34 requires written notice explaining the omission or refusal at specified times (s 34(2)-(4)). Failure to observe these notification duties can affect subsequent litigation but the Act itself prescribes these procedural obligations.

Substantive thresholds present pitfalls. The "no evidence" ground is not made out lightly: s 21 requires that the decision-maker must have been required by law to make the decision only if a particular matter was established, and either there was no evidence from which the decision-maker could reasonably be satisfied that the matter was established, or the decision was based on a non-existent fact. Practitioners should not assume "no evidence" simply because evidence was weak; s 21 sets a tailored test.

Sectoral exclusions and exceptions can be overlooked. Schedule 1 excludes many classes of decisions from the Act (s 4(2)), and Schedule 3 specifies categories of decisions for which reasons need not be given under Part 5 (s 28). Examples include criminal justice investigative decisions, many tax and assessment decisions, personnel management decisions in the State Service, tendering selection outcomes, council budget/rates decisions, and commercial decisions of Government Business Enterprises and certain statutory authorities. The Schedules carry amendment annotations that alter scope; counsel must check the up-to-date statutory instrument to see if a decision type is excluded.

Remedies are not framed as historic writs. The Act abolishes prerogative writs (s 43), so relief must be sought by the statutory orders under s 27. That changes the pleading pattern and may have consequences for strategic relief-seeking and interlocutory optics. The Act preserves the Court’s discretion to dismiss applications where another review avenue exists or where the Court considers the continuation inappropriate (ss 11-14, s 38). An applicant who has pursued other review processes might find a court dismissing an Act application on grounds of duplication or the balance of convenience.

The Act allows decision makers to refuse to provide certain information (s 32) and allows the Attorney-General to certificate public interest non-disclosure (s 33). Where this occurs, the decision maker must still give statutory notice, and the Court retains discovery and evidence powers (s 34(5)), but practitioners must plan for additional interlocutory steps and possible factual evidence on confidentiality claims.

Finally, strict compliance with rules of court is not required; "substantial compliance" suffices (s 45). That buffers against procedural slippage but does not eliminate the need to follow rules and to lodge applications in the manner prescribed (s 22). The Act also allows amendment of documents on terms (s 42), which can be helpful but may introduce cost and delay if parties contest amendments.

For decision makers

• Identify whether the decision falls within the Act. Determine whether the decision is a "decision to which this Act applies" (s 4) and check Schedules 1 and 3 for excluded classes (s 4(2); s 28; Schedules 1 and 3). If excluded, the Part 5 reasons obligations or the Act’s reviewability may not apply.

• Record decisions and reasons contemporaneously. If a decision is likely to be the subject of review, consider including reasons with any document that sets out the terms of the decision, as the inclusion of reasons in the decision document affects limitation periods (s 23(4)(a)). Keeping a written record also facilitates compliance with s 31 (statement must contain the reasons).

• Prepare to respond to requests under s 29 within the prescribed period. A requester entitled to apply under s 17 may request a written statement of reasons (s 29). The decision maker must provide the statement "as soon as practicable, and, in any event, within 28 days" after receiving the request (s 30(1)). If the decision maker believes the requester is not entitled to make the request, the decision maker must, within 28 days, give written notice of that opinion or apply to Court under s 36 (s 30(2)).

• Use s 36 proactively if entitlement is genuinely disputed. If the decision maker is of the opinion the requester was not entitled to make the request, applying under s 36 within 28 days preserves the ability not to comply pending judicial determination, and avoids potential orders under s 35 compelling the statement.

• Apply exceptions carefully and document the basis. If information relates to another person’s personal or business affairs of a confidential nature, or would reveal a trade secret, was supplied in confidence, or would adversely affect a statutory authority’s commercial activities, s 32 permits withholding. If an Attorney-General’s certificate under s 33 applies, the decision maker must treat the information as covered. In each case the decision maker must comply with the notification obligations under s 34, stating the reasons and supplying notice within the required timeframes (s 34(3)-(4)).

• Observe the timeframes for notice when refusing to prepare a statement on timeliness grounds. If a request was not made within 28 days for a decision that was given in writing, or otherwise not within a reasonable time, the decision maker must give written notice within 14 days stating the statement will not be given and why (s 30(4)-(5)). Consider preserving documentary and timestamp evidence to support the timeliness determination.

• Anticipate possible Court orders under s 27. Decisions may be quashed, referred back with directions, or be subject to declaratory or mandatory directions. Ensure internal processes can implement such judicial directions, including setting time limits and preparatory steps.

For prospective applicants

• Confirm standing as a "person aggrieved". Review s 7’s definition: persons whose interests are adversely affected by the decision, conduct or failure qualify. If uncertain, consider whether to request reasons under s 29 first; a requester must be entitled to make an application under s 17.

• Comply with procedural form and lodging requirements. Applications must be made in the way prescribed by rules of court, set out the grounds and be lodged with a registry (s 22). Substantial compliance is acceptable (s 45), but counsel should use court rules to avoid interlocutory disputes.

• Manage limitation risks. If the decision document included reasons, the 28-day clock under s 23(1)(a) starts on the day the decision document was given (s 23(4)(a)). If reasons are provided later or are requested, the "relevant day" may be the day the statement is given or the day the applicant is notified that the statement will not be given (s 23(4)(b)-(c)). Where no document was given, the Court may refuse to consider an application not brought within a reasonable time (s 23(2)-(3)). Consider seeking extensions from the Court (s 23(1)(b)) and, where necessary, applying for a declaration that a request for reasons was made within a reasonable time (s 30(6)).

• Use the reasons regime strategically. If uncertain about grounds for review, a requester entitled to apply may request a written statement under s 29. If the decision maker fails to supply the statement within 28 days without applying under s 36, the requester can apply under s 35 to compel the statement, and the Court may order provision within a specified period (s 35(1)-(2)). If a statement is provided but lacks adequate particulars, the requester can apply under s 37 for further particulars.

• Anticipate interlocutory responses. Decision makers may notify non-entitlement or invoke confidentiality or Attorney-General certificates. Be prepared to litigate entitlement under s 36; if the Court refuses a s 36 declaration that you lack entitlement, the decision maker must give the statement within 28 days of the Court decision (s 36(3)).

• Consider parallel reviews and strategic timing. The Act’s rights are additional to other review rights (s 10), but the Court may dismiss or stay Act applications where other proceedings exist or are preferable (ss 11-14; s 38). When other reviews are underway, carefully advise clients on the risk of the Court dismissing an Act application on grounds of interference with an initial proceeding (s 13).

Administrative and record-keeping steps

• Establish administrative processes to identify which decisions fall under Schedules 1-3 and to track the giving of decision documents and any statement of reasons provided.

• Maintain a log for requests under s 29, with dates of receipt, responses, applications to Court under s 36 if any, and any notices given under s 30(5)/s 34(3)-(4).

• Prepare template forms of statement of reasons that meet s 31’s requirement, and protocols for redacting confidential business or personal material consistent with s 32 and the notification obligations in s 34.

• Ensure registry compliance for all applications: follow rules of court for lodgement and service (s 22; s 44), but document steps showing substantial compliance where perfect compliance is impractical (s 45).

• For Ministers and the Attorney-General: if intervening or responding, note s 39’s intervention rules and the potential for costs against the Crown.

Following the Act’s text, these steps align with the statutory deadlines, procedural rights and duties, the exceptions and the Court’s remedial structure.