Creates a standalone Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission (DVSC) and a statutory Commissioner, moving the entity out of Part VIIIE of the Defence Act into its own Act (consequential and transitional provisions repeal Part VIIIE and preserve ongoing matters).
Sets out the DVSC’s object: to drive improvement in suicide prevention and wellbeing outcomes for veterans and to monitor and report on the Commonwealth’s implementation of the Government response to the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide (clause 3).
Gives the Commissioner broad functions to monitor, inquire into and report on systemic matters affecting veterans (clause 10), and to exercise all powers reasonably necessary for those functions (clause 11).
Enables the Commissioner to start inquiries on their own initiative (clause 16), and requires the Commissioner to carry out inquiries or provide advice when requested in writing by the Minister (clause 17), subject to specified matters the Minister must consider before making a request (clause 17(2)).
Creates a special‑inquiry regime with coercive information‑gathering powers (summonses, compulsory production of documents, swearing witnesses, entry to Commonwealth premises and contractors’ premises, remote access, and search warrants) and criminal penalties for non‑compliance (clauses 30–36; offences and penalties in Part 5).
Sets rules for hearings (public and private), how submissions can be invited and handled (including confidentiality and redaction), what can be put in final reports, and processes for excluding and handling classified or operationally sensitive material (clauses 19–29; 41–46; 29).
The Defence and Veterans’ Service Commissioner Bill 2025, now Act No. 27 of 2026, transitions the Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission from Part VIIIE of the Defence Act 1903 to a standalone Act. Schedule 1 of the accompanying Consequential and Transitional Provisions Bill repeals Part VIIIE of the Defence Act and inserts related provisions into the Archives Act 1983 and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986. Clause 3 of the principal Act sets out the object to drive improvement in suicide prevention and wellbeing outcomes for veterans through an independent Commission. Clause 10 refines the Commissioner’s functions by removing references to serving Australian Defence Force members as a separate category while defining veteran in clause 7 to include current and former members, and adds subparagraph 10(1)(f)(ii) to cover families of veterans. Clause 12 strengthens independence by providing that the Commissioner is not subject to direction in relation to the conduct of an inquiry, including its terms, timing, priority or manner. Clause 72 provides for appointment of the Commissioner by the Governor-General following a merit-based process with public advertising and a five-year prohibition on recent Australian Defence Force service. Clause 13 alters the entity name to Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission and expands its composition under subclause 13(2) to include Deputy Commissioners, Assistant Commissioners, contractors, consultants and assisting persons. Part 3 details inquiry processes with specific timeframes in clause 18 for Royal Commission implementation inquiries to be completed by 2 December 2027 and 2 December 2030. Clause 34 introduces powers for authorised officials to enter Commonwealth premises during special inquiries without a warrant, subject to national security declarations by the ASIO Minister. Clause 36 updates search warrant provisions to require detailed descriptions of places and identification by executing officers. Clause 72 and related staffing clauses enshrine administrative matters such as acting appointments, disclosure of interests, leave, resignation and termination in primary legislation rather than rules. Transitional provisions in Schedule 2 of the Consequential Bill allow ongoing investigations to continue and treat prior actions under the Defence Act as if taken under the new Act.
Official source available
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Introduced with the Defence and Veterans’ Service Commissioner (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2025, the bill establishes an independent Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission to monitor, inquire into and report on matters relating to suicide prevention and wellbeing outcomes for veterans, including the Commonwealth’s implementation of the Government’s response to the recommendations of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide.
Parliamentary progress
Progress
House of Representatives
Introduced and read a first time
27 Nov 2025
Second reading moved
27 Nov 2025
Second reading debate
11 Feb 2026
Second reading agreed to
11 Feb 2026
Consideration in detail debate
11 Feb 2026
Third reading agreed to
11 Feb 2026
Senate
Introduced and read a first time
03 Mar 2026
Second reading moved
03 Mar 2026
Second reading debate
30 Mar 2026
Second reading agreed to
30 Mar 2026
Committee of the Whole debate
Amendment details: 1 Opposition agreed to
30 Mar 2026
Third reading agreed to
30 Mar 2026
House of Representatives
Consideration of Senate message
Details: House agreed to Senate amendment
31 Mar 2026
Finally passed both Houses
31 Mar 2026
Assent
Act no: 27
Year: 2026
01 Apr 2026
Notes
Documents and transcripts
Text of bill
First reading
As passed by both Houses
Explanatory memoranda
Explanatory memorandum
Transcript of speeches
All second reading speeches
Creates criminal offences and protections: failure to comply with summonses/requirements, provision of false or misleading information, destruction of documents, unlawful disclosure of draft reports or protected/classified material (clauses 57–70). Many offences carry maximum penalties up to 2 years imprisonment; some lesser offences carry shorter penalties.
Preserves and adjusts legal privilege and self‑incrimination rules: legal professional privilege can be accepted or rejected by the Commissioner (clauses 60–61); there is a use immunity for compelled information but no explicit derivative use immunity (clause 62; see EM discussion and PJCHR comments).
Strengthens witness protections against detriment and threats beyond employment dismissal (clause 64) and provides for annual reporting and an independent review after 3 years (clauses 87 and 95).
Sets appointment, term, and eligibility rules for the Commissioner (Governor‑General appointment after merit‑based process; 5‑year term; cannot have served in the ADF in the previous 5 years) and allows Deputy and Assistant Commissioners and staff to be engaged (clauses 72; 81–86).
Who is affected
Veterans (defined to include current and former ADF members) and their families: they are the focus of the Commission’s monitoring and inquiries (clause 7 definition; clause 10(1)(f)(ii) includes families).
Commonwealth entities, public servants, and contractors: may be required to provide information, give evidence, allow entry to premises or remote access to systems, and comply with subpoenas and notices (clauses 30–36, 44–46).
Persons asked to give evidence (witnesses) and organisations that make submissions: subject to confidentiality rules, publication controls and criminal penalties for improper disclosure (clauses 20–21; 68–70).
Defence contractors and private firms that hold Commonwealth information: obligations to comply could impose administrative and compliance costs and may interact with contract confidentiality clauses.
The Commonwealth budget: the Act is funded from Commonwealth appropriations (initial establishment and operational funding were allocated in Budget documents referenced in the EM and Bills Digest).
Why it matters (stated purpose and practical trade‑offs)
Stated purpose: the Act implements the Royal Commission’s recommendation to establish an independent statutory body to oversee system reform across the Defence and veteran ecosystem and to improve suicide prevention and wellbeing outcomes (clause 3; Royal Commission recommendation 122 as described in the EM).
Practical effects and trade‑offs to watch (attributable to the bill’s mechanics):
Independence vs ministerial responsiveness: the Commissioner is expressly insulated from direction about how to conduct inquiries (clause 12), but the Minister retains a power to request inquiries which the Commissioner must comply with (clause 17). That creates a practical tension between political responsiveness and operational independence; the Bill tries to manage it by requiring the Minister to have regard to certain matters before requesting an inquiry (clause 17(2)).
Information access and legal protections: the Commissioner has coercive powers to obtain material held by Commonwealth agencies and contractors (clauses 31–36). Those powers reduce barriers to evidence gathering but limit some usual protections (e.g. legal professional privilege may be rejected in specific circumstances — clauses 60–61 — and self‑incrimination is limited by a use immunity rather than a fuller derivative use immunity — clause 62). The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights noted those privacy and privilege intrusions and suggested proportionality safeguards (PJCHR comments in EM).
Compliance burden on agencies and contractors: Commonwealth entities and their contractors must allocate time and resources to respond to notices, allow premises access, and assist authorised officials (clauses 34–35; clause 63 makes obstruction an offence). This is a direct compliance cost and an operational one where sensitive systems or operational activity are involved.
Confidentiality and speech constraints: the Bill criminalises disclosure of draft reports and certain protected information (clauses 68–70). That can preserve inquiry integrity but may chill publication or whistleblowing unless routed through the Commissioner’s processes.
Concentrated benefits, diffuse costs: beneficiaries of the Commission’s work are veterans and families (diffuse beneficiaries). The most discrete group affected by enforcement and compliance burdens are Commonwealth agencies, staff and contractors who face specific obligations and potential penalties.
Budgetary and opportunity costs: the Commonwealth funds the DVSC. The digest and EM record initial establishment and operational allocations; some funding was drawn from Defence resources in recent budget updates. That reallocates resources that could otherwise be used for other Defence or veteran services.
Overlap and coordination risk: the Bill requires consideration of contemporaneous inquiries (e.g. Inspector‑General of the ADF) to avoid prejudice (clause 17(2)). Practical implementation will require active coordination protocols to avoid duplication, conflicting evidence powers, or contradictory public statements.
Who pays, who decides, what behaviour changes
Who pays: the Commonwealth (Commonwealth budget appropriations). The Bills Digest and EM record dedicated establishment and operational funding allocated in recent budget rounds.
Who decides: the Commissioner decides inquiries to commence and how to conduct them (clause 16; clause 12 on independence); the Minister can request inquiries and selects a Commissioner appointment process participant (clause 17; clause 72 requires Governor‑General appointment following merit process). Courts (via search warrants) and the ASIO Minister (in national security cases) have defined roles for limiting entry powers (clause 34; clause 36). Parliament receives and can review reports (clause 26 and requirement to table independent review after 3 years — clause 95).
Behaviour changes required: Commonwealth entities, contractors and witnesses will need to comply with notices, produce documents, make staff available for hearings, and create/maintain records in forms the DVSC can access. Agencies may tighten internal record‑handling and legal compliance processes; contractors may renegotiate confidentiality and compliance clauses or change how they store Commonwealth data.
Implementation and compliance risks highlighted by the material
Administrative friction and capacity: the DVSC will need staff, secure systems and processes to handle classified information and large evidence sets (clauses 46; 29; Part 6 staffing provisions). The EM and interim Commissioner submissions urged clearer administrative rules in primary legislation to reduce operational ambiguity.
Legal and human rights friction: limits on privilege and self‑incrimination, and the criminalisation of certain disclosures, attracted scrutiny from scrutiny and human rights committees (EM and PJCHR comments). The absence of a derivative use immunity and tight controls on privilege were specifically noted as issues that may require legislative or procedural care.
Coordination with other oversight bodies: the Bill builds in some protections against prejudice to other inquiries (clause 17(2)), but practical overlap remains an implementation risk.
Source citations in this summary: clauses 3, 7, 10–13, 16–19, 20–29, 30–36, 41–46, 50, 54, 57–70, 72, 81–87, 95; consequential Schedule 1 repealing Part VIIIE of the Defence Act and Schedule 2 transitional provisions (see Consequential and Transitional Provisions Bill).
Overall bottom line (mechanics then purpose): the Act migrates the existing Defence and Veterans’ Services Commission out of the Defence Act into a standalone statute, formalises the Commissioner’s independent monitoring and inquiry powers focused on suicide prevention and wellbeing for veterans (including families), grants coercive powers for special inquiries with associated criminal penalties and protections, and sets administrative, information‑handling and reporting rules. The Government and oversight committees frame this as implementing the Royal Commission’s recommendation for an independent oversight entity; the Bill balances investigatory reach with statutory safeguards but introduces notable compliance costs for Commonwealth entities and contractors and raises questions about privilege, use immunity and coordination with other oversight bodies (as discussed in the explanatory materials).
Main concepts
The central concept is an independent statutory entity, the Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission, headed by a Commissioner to provide oversight of systemic reforms improving suicide prevention and wellbeing outcomes for veterans. Clause 3 articulates the object of monitoring, inquiring into and reporting on matters relating to suicide prevention and wellbeing, including the Commonwealth’s implementation of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide response. Key concepts include own-motion inquiries under clause 16 covering data and trends on suicide and suicidality, systemic factors in Commonwealth administration, the state of the defence and veteran ecosystem, and progress on Royal Commission recommendations. Ministerial request inquiries under clause 17 allow the Minister to direct inquiries while requiring regard to objects, existing inquiries, resources and avoidance of prejudice to other processes. Special inquiries under clause 30 trigger coercive information-gathering powers including summonses, oaths, document production and premises entry. Information management concepts in Part 4 distinguish public and private hearings, protect sensitive information such as operationally sensitive information, intelligence information and personal and private information, and authorise disclosures despite state or territory laws. Procedural fairness requirements in clauses 22 to 25 ensure draft reports allow responses from affected entities before final reports are prepared, tabled and published. Annual reporting obligations in clause 87 require disclosure of inquiry numbers, coercive power uses and search warrant applications while excluding sensitive information. Independence is reinforced through Governor-General appointment, limitations on ministerial direction and requirements for merit-based selection. The framework distinguishes the Commission’s role from courts by prohibiting findings of civil or criminal wrongdoing or cause of death under subclause 10(3).
Who it affects
The Act directly affects veterans, defined in clause 7 as persons who are or have been members of the Australian Defence Force, encompassing both serving and ex-serving personnel. Families of veterans are included through the expanded functions in subparagraph 10(1)(f)(ii). Commonwealth entities, including the Department of Defence and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, are subject to monitoring, inquiries and recommendations regarding policies, programs and administration affecting suicide prevention and wellbeing. Officials and employees of these entities may be summoned, required to provide information or documents, or asked to respond to draft reports during inquiries. Contractors and consultants engaged by the Commission under clauses 83 to 86 are brought within the Commission’s structure. Persons providing information to the Commissioner, including witnesses at hearings, receive protections against detriment under clause 64 and use immunity under clause 62. The Minister for Defence and the Prime Minister may receive referrals when entities fail to respond adequately to recommendations under clause 27. Intelligence agencies must make arrangements for handling intelligence information under clause 46. The public may make submissions to inquiries under clause 20, with options for confidentiality. Parliamentary committees receive tabled reports and government responses under clause 26. The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security gains authority to disclose information to the Commission through amendments in the Consequential Bill. Individuals subject to search warrants or premises entry during special inquiries under clauses 34 and 36 are affected by the exercise of coercive powers.
What people will want to know
Veterans and families will want to know how to make submissions to inquiries, request confidentiality under subclause 20(3) and understand that the Commissioner cannot investigate individual complaints or determine cause of death. Commonwealth officials will want to know the process for responding to summonses under clause 31, the requirement to provide facilities for premises access under clause 34 and the consequences of non-compliance including offences carrying up to two years imprisonment. Entities subject to recommendations will want to know the 15-sitting-day tabling requirement in clause 26 and the three-month deadline for government responses, as well as the Commissioner’s power under clause 27 to escalate inadequate responses to the Prime Minister and Parliament. Persons concerned about privacy will want to know the safeguards in clauses 28 and 50 limiting disclosure of personal, operationally sensitive or intelligence information and the requirement for consent before naming individuals in reports. Those considering providing information will want to know about use immunity under clause 62, protections against self-incrimination except for ongoing court proceedings, and witness protections against detriment in clause 64. Stakeholders will want to know that the first Royal Commission implementation inquiry must be completed by 2 December 2027 and that the Commissioner may publish reports at discretion for own-motion inquiries. Recruitment details matter because the permanent Commissioner must be appointed by the Governor-General after public advertising and merit-based assessment with no Australian Defence Force service in the preceding five years. The public will want to know that annual reports under clause 87 will disclose the number of coercive powers used and that hearings may be public or private depending on the nature of information involved.
Status and what happens next
The Bill received royal assent on 1 April 2026 as Act No. 27 of 2026 following passage through both Houses, with the House of Representatives agreeing to one Senate amendment. It was introduced in the House of Representatives on 27 November 2025, passed the House on 11 February 2026, passed the Senate on 30 March 2026 after committee of the whole debate, and finally passed both Houses on 31 March 2026. Commencement occurs on the earlier of a date fixed by proclamation or six months after royal assent. The Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission was already operating from 29 September 2025 under the prior Part VIIIE provisions, with Penny McKay serving as Acting Commissioner pending permanent appointment. The next steps include the Governor-General appointing a permanent Commissioner under clause 72 following the required merit-based process. The Commission will continue existing inquiries and commence new ones under the standalone Act once commenced. The first statutory review of Royal Commission recommendation implementation must be completed by 2 December 2027. An independent review of the Act’s operation is required under clause 95 as soon as practicable after three years from commencement, with the report to be tabled in Parliament. The Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee has already reported on related provisions, and scrutiny committee comments from the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills have been addressed in the Explanatory Memorandum.
Powers, duties and rights created
Clause 11 grants the Commissioner power to do all things necessary or convenient to perform functions within and outside Australia. Clause 16 creates the power to initiate inquiries on data trends, systemic factors, the defence and veteran ecosystem and Royal Commission implementation. Clause 17 imposes a duty on the Commissioner to comply with ministerial requests for inquiries while creating rights for the Minister to specify terms of reference. Clause 18 creates a duty to conduct periodic inquiries into Royal Commission recommendation implementation with fixed completion dates. Clause 30 allows the Commissioner to designate an inquiry as special, triggering coercive powers. Clause 31 creates the power to summon persons to hearings and require evidence or documents, with reasonable grounds suspicion required. Clause 33 creates power to require production of information or things. Clause 34 creates power for authorised officials to enter and remain on Commonwealth premises, access documents and remove copies. Clause 35 creates remote access powers for electronic records. Clause 36 creates search warrant powers with enhanced procedural requirements. Clause 50 creates power to make public statements in the public interest subject to safeguards. Clause 64 creates rights for witnesses to protection from detriment. Clause 27 creates a duty for entities to provide details of actions taken on recommendations and empowers the Commissioner to refer non-compliance to the Prime Minister and Parliament. Clause 87 imposes duties to report annually on inquiries, summonses, premises entries and warrants. Clause 72 creates the right for the Commissioner to appoint Deputy and Assistant Commissioners. Clause 95 creates a duty for the Minister to commission an independent review after three years.
Money, penalties and enforcement
The Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 2024-25 allocated $5 million over two years for establishment, with a further $44.5 million allocated in September 2025 for four years of operations drawn from Defence resources. Penalties are set out in Part 5. Clause 57 creates offences for failure to attend hearings, answer questions or produce documents, each carrying a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment, with reasonable excuse defences available. Clause 58 creates an offence of knowingly providing false or misleading information or documents with a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment. Clause 59 creates an offence of destroying documents or things with a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment. Clause 63 creates an offence of failing to provide facilities or assistance for premises entry with a maximum penalty of six months imprisonment. Clause 64 creates offences of causing or threatening detriment to witnesses with a maximum penalty of one year imprisonment. Clause 66 creates offences of obstructing the Commissioner or committing contempt with a maximum penalty of three months imprisonment. Clause 67 creates an offence of presenting false evidence at hearings with a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment. Clause 68 creates an offence of disclosing draft inquiry reports with a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment. Clause 69 creates an offence of publishing information in breach of non-publication directions with a maximum penalty of one year imprisonment. Clause 70 creates an offence for entrusted persons disclosing protected information with a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment. Offences have extended geographical jurisdiction Category B. Enforcement occurs through prosecution in courts, with hearings treated as judicial proceedings under the Crimes Act 1914 for related offences such as giving false testimony.
Pressure points and controversies
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights identified that collection, use and disclosure of personal information limits the right to privacy, though it accepted the legitimate objective of improving suicide prevention outcomes. The Committee suggested amendments to require notification, consent where possible, opportunity to correct information and limitation of disclosure to what is strictly necessary, preferably in de-identified form. The Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills raised concerns that coercive search powers in clause 36 may unduly trespass on personal rights and liberties, noting the need for tight controls and safeguards. The same Committee questioned the abrogation of legal professional privilege in clauses 60 and 61, expecting clear justification in explanatory materials. The Committee also sought advice on why the privilege against self-incrimination is abrogated in clause 62 without a derivative use immunity. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights suggested that clause 66 on obstruction could be narrowed to conduct that effectively prevents the Commission operating and recommended updating the statement of compatibility regarding freedom of assembly and expression. Trade-offs arise between the need for effective information gathering to drive systemic reform, as recommended by the Royal Commission, and protections for individual rights including privacy, legal privilege and freedom from self-incrimination. The balance struck includes use immunity rather than derivative immunity, reasonable excuse defences, requirements for reasonable grounds suspicion before exercising coercive powers, and national security overrides by the ASIO Minister for premises entry. Another trade-off exists between ministerial ability to request inquiries under clause 17 and the Commissioner’s independence protected by clause 12, with parameters requiring regard to resources and existing inquiries intended to mitigate interference risks.
What changes if it passes
With royal assent granted, the standalone Act replaces the previous embedding within the Defence Act, providing greater perceived and actual independence for the Commission as a listed entity under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 with the Commissioner as accountable authority. The Commission gains a distinct physical and electronic identity separate from Defence. Appointment processes are now more transparent, requiring Governor-General appointment after public advertising and merit-based panel recommendation, with a five-year cooling-off period for former Australian Defence Force members. Administrative arrangements for leave, resignation, termination and disclosure of interests are set out in primary legislation. The Commissioner may now access Commonwealth premises during special inquiries without applying for a judicial warrant, subject to national security declarations. Search warrant procedures include additional safeguards such as detailed descriptions of places and identification requirements for executing officers. Inquiry reports on Royal Commission implementation must follow fixed timelines with the first due by 2 December 2027. Families of veterans are explicitly within the scope of functions. The Commission may appoint Deputy and Assistant Commissioners to handle specific inquiries or provide assistance. Annual reports must detail the use of coercive powers. Entities face clearer obligations to respond to recommendations, with escalation pathways to the Prime Minister and Parliament if responses are inadequate. Transitional arrangements ensure continuity of ongoing work while shifting the statutory foundation. The three-year independent review mechanism provides a structured opportunity for future refinements.
Social post angles
New standalone watchdog for veteran suicide prevention begins operations: the Act moves the Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission out of the Defence Act to strengthen independence and transparency. Governor-General to appoint permanent Commissioner after public merit process: clause 72 introduces a five-year ban on recent Australian Defence Force service and requires open advertising for the role. First Royal Commission implementation check due by December 2027: clause 18 sets binding deadlines for the Commissioner to report on government progress in addressing the 2024 Royal Commission recommendations. Coercive powers available for special inquiries into veteran wellbeing: clauses 30 to 36 allow summonses, premises entry and search warrants when reasonable grounds exist, with penalties up to two years imprisonment for non-compliance. Families now explicitly included in oversight functions: subparagraph 10(1)(f)(ii) expands the Commissioner’s role to cover wellbeing outcomes for veterans’ families alongside serving and ex-serving members. Privacy safeguards and public hearing options balance transparency with sensitivity: clauses 42 and 50 require private hearings for intelligence or personal information while allowing public statements when in the public interest. Annual reports will disclose how often coercive powers are used: clause 87 requires the Commissioner to publish numbers of summonses, premises entries and warrants each year. Three-year review will examine whether the new framework is working: clause 95 mandates an independent review of the Act’s operation with the report to be tabled in Parliament.
Minister's second reading speech
Proposed amendments
House of representatives
Detail - Opposition
THOMPSON, Phillip, MP
Senate
CW - Jacqui Lambie Network [sheet 3652]
LAMBIE, Sen Jacqui
CW - Opposition [sheet 3673]
MCDONALD, Sen Susan
Schedules of amendments
Schedule of the amendment made by the Senate
Bills digest
Bills Digest
Notes
Considered by scrutiny committee (04/02/2026): Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights; Report 1 of 2026
Considered by scrutiny committee (04/02/2026): Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills; Scrutiny Digest 2 of 2026
Referred to Committee (05/02/2026): Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee; Committee report (26/02/2026)
An electronic version of this Act is available on the Federal Register of Legislation (www.legislation.gov.au)
Key points
The main purpose of the Defence and Veterans’ Service Commissioner Bill 2025 and the Defence and Veterans’ Service Commissioner (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2025 is to transition the Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission from Part VIIIE of the Defence Act 1903 to a standalone Act.
On 9 September 2024, the Final Report of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide was released. On 2 December 2024 the Albanese Government responded to the Royal Commission’s report. The response included an intention to immediately act on Recommendation 122 of the Final Report , 'to establish a new statutory entity to oversee a system of reform across the whole Defence ecosystem’.
The Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission (DVSC) was established by the Veterans’ Entitlements, Treatment and Support (Simplification and Harmonisation) Act 2025, through the introduction of new Part VIIIE of the Defence Act.
In January 2025, former Commonwealth Ombudsman Michael Manthorpe was appointment interim Head of the DVSC.
On 20 February 2025 the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee (SFADT Legislation Committee) commenced an inquiry into the relevant provisions of the VETS Act.
The SFADT Legislation Committee reported its findings to Parliament in August 2025, making 3 recommendations, the first of which was to transition Part VIIIE of the Defence Act into standalone legislation.
The Albanese Government’s response to the Committee’s report was the introduction of the Bills.
The Bills have been referred to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee for inquiry and report by 26 February 2026. At the time of writing this Digest no submissions to the inquiry were available.
The Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights have commented on the Bills. Their comments are discussed below.
Introductory Info
Date of introduction: 27 November 2025
House introduced in: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Prime Minister and Cabinet
Commencement: On the earlier of proclamation or 6 months after Royal Assent
Purpose of the Bills
The purpose of the Defence and Veterans’ Service Commissioner Bill 2025 and the Defence and Veterans’ Service Commissioner (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2025 (the Bills) are to transition the Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission from Part VIIIE of the Defence Act 1903 to a standalone Act.
The Bills also seek to refine the role, powers and functions of the Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission and its permanent Commissioner following stakeholder consultation and parliamentary review of existing legislation.
Structure of the Bills
The Defence and Veterans’ Service Commissioner Bill 2025 (DVSC Bill) contains 7 Parts:
Part 1 deals with preliminary details
Part 2 establishes the role and functions of the Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission (DVSC) and the Commissioner
Part 3 outlines the inquiry processes and sets out the information gathering powers for special inquiries
Part 4 deals with information management, including appropriate disclosure of information and the handling of information
Part 5 specifies offences and protections for persons providing information to the Commissioner
Part 6 outlines administrative procedures in relation to staffing and reporting
Part 7 includes miscellaneous items like delegations, eligible judges, protections and allows the Minister to make rules.
There are 2 Schedules to the Defence and Veterans’ Service Commissioner (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2025 (Consequential Bill) that support the DVSC Bill.
Schedule 1 repeals Part VIIIE of the Defence Act and inserts a new provision into the Archives Act 1983 , for records of the DVSC that are subject to non-publication direction , and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (IGIS Act) , to set out circumstances where an Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security official can disclose information to the DVSC.
Schedule 2 sets out transitional provisions to allow the continuation of ongoing investigations and allow actions taken under Part VIIE of the Defence Act to be treated as if they were taken under the Bill.
Background
In 2020, the Morrison Government sought to establish a permanent National Commissioner for Defence and Veteran Suicide Prevention through the introduction of 2 Bills:
the National Commissioner for Defence and Veteran Suicide Prevention Bill 2020 and
the National Commissioner for Defence and Veteran Suicide Prevention (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2020.
The 2020 Bills did not proceed. Instead, the Royal Commission into Defence and Veterans Suicide commenced in July 2021 and, in response to the recommendations of the Royal Commission, the DVSC was established under legislation in February 2025 (details noted further below).
A Department of Veterans’ Affairs official informed a Senate Committee in August 2025 that provisions in the existing legislation are ‘modelled heavily’ on the 2020 Bills (p. 32).
Further background information on the 2020 Bills is available in the Bills Digest.
Royal Commission into Defence and Veterans’ Suicide
On 9 September 2024, the Final Report of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide was released. On 2 December 2024 the Albanese Government responded to the Royal Commission’s report. The response included an intention to immediately act on Recommendation 122 of the Final Report.
Recommendation 122: Establish a new statutory entity to oversee system reform across the whole Defence ecosystem
The Australian Government should establish a new statutory entity with the purpose of providing independent oversight and evidence-based advice in order to drive system reform to improve suicide prevention and wellbeing outcomes for serving and ex-serving Australian Defence Force members (p. 168).
The Royal Commission recommended the new body be established as a non-corporate Commonwealth entity through enabling legislation that outlines the purpose and functions of the entity (p. 284).
This recommendation was based on a consultation process that took place from November to December 2023. The Consultation Paper highlighted reasons for establishing a new entity including ensuring change happens, addressing a grave and systemic problem, maintaining relevance, allowing a more holistic approach and providing independent oversight and accountability (pp. 3-5).
The Royal Commission received 252 submissions during the consultation process and stakeholder views were overwhelmingly in favour of the proposal to establish a new entity (Final Report of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide, pp. 301-302).
Passage of legislation to establish the Commission
The Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission was established through an amendment to the Veterans’ Entitlements, Treatment and Support (Simplification and Harmonisation) Bill 2024 (VETS Bill).
The amendment inserted Schedule 9 in the Bill to establish the DVSC in new Part VIIIE of the Defence Act. The amendment set out the role of the Commissioner and the powers and functions of the new entity.
The VETS Bill, including new Schedule 9, passed both houses of Parliament on 13 February 2025 and received Royal Assent on 20 February 2025 (known as the VETS Act) with DVSC set to commence operations on 29 September 2025 (Schedule 9, section 2(1), item 8).
Note: The Bills Digest for the VETS Bill did not include analysis of Schedule 9 as the amendment to include Schedule 9 had not been introduced at the time of writing.
Establishing the Commission
In January 2025, former Commonwealth Ombudsman Michael Manthorpe was appointed interim Head of the DVSC to lead the establishment of the new entity.
With the passing of the VETS Bill in February 2025, the DVSC was scheduled to commence operations on 29 September 2025 (Schedule 9, section 2(1), item 8).
The Interim Commissioner’s May 2025 submission to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee (SFADT Legislation Committee) inquiry into Schedule 9 of the VETS Act provided insights into potential issues with the existing legislation and made several recommendations , which the Bills attempt to address , including:
Standalone legislation excising Part VIIIE from the Defence Act and creating its own Act in an earlier timeframe rather than waiting for the 36-months review period (subsection 110ZLE). This would ‘appropriately recognise the significance and independence of the Commission as a new stand-alone body to oversee the defence and veteran ecosystem and lend appropriate gravitas to its creation’ (p. 7). The DVSC should be established as ‘a separate physical and electronic identity distinct from Defence’ (p. 8).
Under this legislation, the Commissioner should be appointed by the Governor-General on advice from the Minister and the terms of the recruitment and appointment processes should be ‘transparent and robust’ (p. 8). The eligibility criteria should be amended to ensure the incumbent Commissioner has not recently served in the ADF within the last 5 years (p. 8).
The primary legislation, rather than regulations, should ‘deal with the administrative matters pertaining to the Commissioner’s role’, similar to other statutory authorities like the Commonwealth Ombudsman, Inspector-General of Aged Care (IGAC) and the National Anti‑Corruption Commissioner (p. 8). Administrative matters might include clarification about acting appointments, disclosure of interests, leave arrangements, resignations and terminations (p. 8).
Limiting the power of the Minister to direct the DVSC to conduct a review into specific matters (p. 9). The interim Commissioner noted ‘the Minister’s power to direct the IGAC to conduct a review is limited in similar terms’ (p. 9).
Removing the potential for the Minister to constrain the Commissioner’s ability to conduct a special inquiry (p. 9).
Reinforcing the independence of the Commissioner by providing, similar to the arrangements that apply to the IGAC, that the Commissioner is not subject to direction in relation to the conduct of an inquiry (p. 10).
Enshrining various other requirements in legislation, rather than in the rules, relating to procedural fairness, reports to be published at the Commissioner’s discretion and timing for Royal Commission implementation inquiries (pp. 10-12).
Inserting general powers into the legislation that allow the Commissioner to access Commonwealth premises as part of a special inquiry without the need to apply for a warrant issued by a judge (p. 12).
The interim Commissioner also made several suggestions for consideration (pp. 13-20) and attached a table setting out the elements of the Royal Commission’s new entity recommendations in line with the relevant Schedule 9 VETS Act sections (pp. 21-27).
The DVSC was formally established as planned on 29 September 2025. At the time of the announcement, the Government stated it would introduce standalone legislation for the DVSC, with the Commissioner to be appointed by the Governor-General and defence and veterans’ families included in DVSC functions.
Penny McKay (former Deputy Commonwealth and Defence Force Ombudsman) replaced interim Commissioner, Michael Manthorpe, being appointed on 29 September 2025 to the role of Acting Commissioner, while recruitment takes place for the permanent DVSC Commissioner position.
Parliamentary inquiry
Section 5 of the VETS Act required the SFADT Legislation Committee to commence an inquiry into Schedule 9. The SFADT Legislation Committee commenced its inquiry on the day the VETS Act received Royal Assent.
One of the key issues raised during the inquiry, and noted in the Committee’s report, identified ‘the importance of an independent commission’ including through standalone legislation for the operation of the commission (p. 13). The interim Defence and Veterans’ Services Commissioner, Michael Manthorpe, recommended that Schedule 9 of the VETS Act be excised and transitioned to a standalone act (p. 16). The Committee report cited Manthorpe:
Given the significance of this body, the importance people have placed on it, the gravity of the issue and the importance of having a standalone independent commissioner, I think that having a standalone act is an important part of that story. (p. 17)
The Committee reported its findings to Parliament in August 2025 with 3 recommendations:
Recommendation 1
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government transitions Part VIIIE of the Defence Act 1903 into standalone legislation.
Recommendation 2
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government considers amending Schedule 9 of the Veterans’ Entitlements, Treatment and Support (Simplification and Harmonisation) Act 2025 to include a reference to veterans' families for the purpose of the Defence and Veterans' Services Commissioner's functions.
Recommendation 3
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government reviews the functions and powers of the Defence and Veterans' Services Commission, specifically to consider the amendments proposed by the Interim Head of the Defence and Veterans' Services Commission (p. ix).
The Albanese Government’s response to the Committee’s report was the introduction of the Bills.
Policy position of non-government parties/independents
The report of the SFADT Legislation Committee’s review of Schedule 9 of the VETS Act 2025 included additional comments from the Coalition, the Greens, and the Jacqui Lambie Network (JLN). All supported the Committee’s recommendation to establish standalone legislation for the DVSC. The Greens and the JLN also supported the recommendations of the interim Commissioner, such as the Governor-General appointing the Commissioner, restricting the Minister’s powers to intervene in inquiries and expand the Commissioner’s powers of investigation.
Financial implications
The Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 2024-25 Budget allocated $5 million over 2 years towards the establishment of the DVSC (p. 234).
In September 2025 a further $44.5 million was allocated for operational funding over a 4 year period (p. 1897). This measure was confirmed in the Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 2025-26 drawing from within Defence’s existing resources (pp. 21, 183, 223).
Key issues and provisions
The Bills incorporate proposals from the SFADT Legislation Committee’s final report following its inquiry into Schedule 9 (Part VIIIE of the Defence Act) and the Interim Commissioner, Michael Manthorpe’s submission to the SFADT inquiry.
Standalone legislation
The Bills seek to establish an independent DVSC under standalone legislation. Schedule 1, Part 1 of the Consequential Bill repeals Part VIIIE of the Defence Act. The DVSC Bill establishes the DVSC and the Commissioner under a standalone act. The Interim Commissioner’s submission (p. 7) noted standalone legislation would alleviate key stakeholder concerns about ‘the perceived and actual independence of the Commissioner’, the DVSC and its staff.
Clause 3 sets out the object the Bill, which is to drive improvement in suicide prevention and wellbeing outcomes for veterans by:
establishing an independent DVSC headed by the Commissioner to inquire into, and provide advice on, systemic reforms, including the Commonwealth implementation of the Government’s response to the recommendations of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide and
establishing a framework for the Commissioner to report publicly to the Minister and Parliament.
Establishment of the DVSC and the Commissioner
Part 2 of the DVSC Bill establishes the role and functions of the Commissioner and the DVSC.
Functions of the Commissioner
Clause 10 mirrors existing section 110ZJB of the Defence Act in relation to the Commissioner’s functions, except for the removal any reference to serving Australian Defence Force (ADF) members , subclause 10(1) uses the term veteran only. However, clause 7 defines veteran as a person who is or has been a member of the Australian Defence Force, which ensures that the term covers serving members.
Additionally, subparagraph 10(1)(f)(ii) would include a reference to the families of veterans, which may satisfy the SFADT Legislation Committee’s second recommendation of the Schedule 9 inquiry (noted above) ‘to include a reference to veterans' families’ for the purpose of the Commissioner's functions (p. ix).
Subparagraph 10(1)(a)(v) has been added to allow the Commissioner to monitor, inquire into and report on any matter that another provision in the Bill or other Commonwealth law permits or requires such action on. Subclause 10(2) stipulates the Commissioner’s reporting function includes reporting evidence-based findings of the Commissioner’s monitoring or inquiring and making recommendations. Subclause 10(3) outlines the functions not applicable to the Commissioner’s role. These excluded functions are:
to make findings of civil or criminal wrongdoing
to make findings on the manner or cause of death of a veteran, including findings that the manner or cause of a death was suicide
to monitor or inquire into a single exercise of a power, or a single performance of a function or duty.
The Explanatory Memorandum (EM) to the Bills explains this is to ensure the Commissioner will not be undertaking the role of a court and does not deal with complaints from individuals in relation to other Australian Government agencies as these matters are handled by other relevant agencies. This also reflects the intent expressed in the Royal Commission’s Final Report (p. 16).
Powers and independence of the Commissioner
Clause 11 clarifies the Commissioner has powers to do all that is necessary or convenient to perform their functions as provided in Clause 10. The Commissioner may exercise their powers within and outside Australia.
Clause 12 implements the Interim Commissioner’s submission (p. 10) recommendation that existing legislation (section 110ZJD of the Defence Act) be strengthened in relation to the independence of the Commissioner and specify ‘that the Commissioner is not subject to direction in relation to the conduct of an inquiry, including its terms, timing and priority, or how it is to be conducted’.
The Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission
Clause 13 clarifies a minor alteration to the entity’s name, which will be the Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission (currently the Defence and Veterans' Services Commission, subclause 13(1)). Subclause 13(2) expands upon existing section 110ZKA of the Defence Act, which sets out the composition of the DVSC. Currently the DVSC consists of the Commissioner and the public service staff of the Commission. Under subclause 13(2) the DVSC will also consist of Deputy Commissioners, Assistant Commissioners, contractors, consultants and persons assisting. Subclause 13(3) maintains (as currently under section 110ZKA) the status of the DVSC as a listed entity and the Commissioner as an accountable authority of the DVSC within the meaning of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act).
Clause 14 would establish the function of the DVSC as assisting the Commissioner in the performance of their functions as outlined in the Bills (this reflects current section 110ZKB of the Defence Act). The substantive functions contained in the Bills are conferred on the Commissioner personally rather than the DVSC as a listed Commonwealth entity.
Inquiries by the Commissioner
Part 3 of the DVSC Bill outlines the inquiry processes and sets out the information gathering powers for special inquiries.
Clause 16 would allow the Commissioner to inquire on their own initiative into matters relating to suicide prevention or wellbeing outcomes for veterans. This includes:
data and trends regarding suicide and suicidality among veterans;
systemic factors relating to the Commonwealth’s administration of policies, programs, systems and practices that contribute to suicide and suicidality among veterans;
the state of the defence and veteran ecosystem, as it relates to the prevention of suicide and suicidality among veterans;
the Commonwealth’s implementation of the recommendations of the Defence and Veteran Suicide Royal Commission, including progress, impact and outcomes;
any matter that another provision of this Act or any other law of the Commonwealth permits or requires the Commissioner to monitor, inquire into or report on (paragraphs 10(1)(a)(i-v)).
Inquiries by Ministerial request
Clause 17 sets out the circumstances under which the Minister may request the Commissioner to conduct an inquiry or provide advice on specified matters. Subclause 17(1) provides that the Minister may request the Commissioner to inquire into or advise on a matter mentioned in paragraph 10(1)(a) (set out above). Subclause 17(2) outlines matters the Minister must have regard to prior to making a request to the Commissioner. These include:
the objects of the DVSC Bill, as set out at clause 3 (discussed above)
any current or planned inquiries by the Commissioner
any advice already being prepared by the Commissioner
whether the Commissioner has sufficient resources to conduct the inquiry or provide the advice
the need to avoid prejudicing other contemporaneous inquiries like an Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force inquiry under section 110C of the Defence Act.
Under subclause 17(3) the Commissioner must comply with any such request. According to the EM, the subclause expresses the intent of the Royal Commission that ‘the Minister should have the power to direct the entity to conduct a particular review. This is so the entity can be responsive when different areas of government identify pressing matters requiring inquiry that relate to the entity’s functions’ (p. 21).
Under subclauses 17(4)-(6) the Minister would be able to request a person other than the Commissioner conduct an inquiry. If such a request is made, the Commissioner must provide the Minister with a list of suitable people and the Minister must choose a person from this list to conduct the inquiry. The Commissioner is required to appoint this person as a Deputy Commissioner. As set out in the EM, this means that the listed people ‘must not only have the appropriate skills and experience to conduct the inquiry… but they would also need to have the appropriate skills and experience to be appointed as a Deputy Commissioner’ (p. 22).
The Minister can include terms of reference in their written request to the Commissioner (subclause 17(7) and any written ministerial request is not a legislative instrument (subclause 17(8)). The Minister would be able to withdraw or amend any inquiry request prior to the Commissioner providing the final report or advice to the Minister (subclause 17(9)).
The Interim Commissioner’s submission (p. 9) recommended supporting the independence of the Commissioner and the operation of the DVSC by including additional parameters around existing legislation (section 110ZFB of the Defence Act) relating to requests by the Minister. Mr Manthorpe emphasised this would ‘ensure that the Minister must have regard to the objects of the legislation establishing the Commissioner, the current and planned inquiries for the year, and whether the Commission has sufficient resources to conduct the activities directed’. Similar parameters are in place for reviews conducted by the IGAC.
Inquiries into the implementation of Royal Commission recommendations
Clause 18 mirrors existing section 110ZFC of the Defence Act by requiring inquiries into the implementation of the Royal Commission’s recommendations. Subclauses 18(3)-(4) provide specific timeframes with the first inquiry to be completed by 2 December 2027 and the second inquiry to be completed by 2 December 2030. The Commissioner may prepare more than one final inquiry report.
Notice of inquiry
Clause 19 outlines the notification process required for inquiries under clauses 16 or 17. The Commissioner must provide written notice of the commencement of an inquiry, including the terms of reference, to the Minister. The Commissioner must also publish the notice on the DVSC’s website, unless satisfied that doing so would adversely affect the proper conduct of that, or any other inquiry, or the preparation of an inquiry report. The EM provides:
The ability for the Commissioner to exercise discretion not to publish a notice of an inquiry is appropriate in these limited circumstances as there may be instances where an inquiry deals predominately with matters of national security or otherwise highly classified information.
Inviting submissions
Subclause 20(1) allows the Commissioner to invite submissions to an inquiry under clauses 16, 17 or 18. Subclause 20(2) provides the Commissioner with discretion in deciding matters connected to the invitation process such as publishing an invitation for submissions from the public or inviting specific persons or organisations to provide oral submissions at a meeting.
Submitters would be able to request confidentiality under subclause 20(3). The Commissioner must agree to any request made by a person or body that is not a Commonwealth entity (subclause 20(5)). Subclause 20(4) allows the Commissioner to still have regard to information contained in a confidential submission. The Commissioner may determine whether to agree to a confidentiality request from a Commonwealth entity if the request is reasonable, granting the request would not unduly impede the inquiry, and the submission was made in good faith (subclause 20(6)). If the Commissioner refuses a confidentiality request from a Commonwealth entity, that entity may withdraw the submission or part of the submission (subclause 20(7)).
Making submissions publicly available
The Commissioner may make a submission or part of a submission publicly available under clause 21. However, the Commissioner must not make a submission, or part if a submission available to the extent that it names or identifies individuals (other than, for instance, Ministers, SES employees, or the individual making the submission) or the submission contains sensitive information, intelligence information, or operationally sensitive information. These terms are defined in clause 7. The Commissioner would be able to redact, or partially redact, submissions to remove such material before making them publicly available. A written record of an oral submission made by a person must not be made publicly available unless the person has verified the content of the record .
The EM notes that clauses 20 and 21 reflect Australian Privacy Principle (APP) 2, which provides individuals with the option not to identify themselves.
Inquiry reports
Clauses 22 and 23 deal with draft inquiry reports including ensuring Commonwealth entities or any other person or body have a reasonable opportunity to respond to criticism or comment on preliminary findings etc. Any responses must be included in the final inquiry report (paragraph 25(1)(d)). The Interim Commissioner’s submission (p. 10) recommended that procedural fairness requirements be included in the legislation.
Clause 24 outlines the process and requirements for the Commissioner when preparing, providing and publishing a final inquiry report. Subclause 24(3) allows the Commissioner to prepare more than one additional final inquiry report.
Clause 25 sets out requirements for final inquiry reports. A final inquiry report must contain findings, a summary of the evidence on which the findings are based and any recommendations. The Commissioner has discretion as to whether to provide the final report of an own motion inquiry under clause 16 to the Minister and publish it. The Commissioner must provide the Minister with final reports for inquiries into the Government’s response to the Royal Commission under clause 18 or requested by the Minister under clause 17. The Commissioner must also provide these reports to any Commonwealth entity or other person to whom a recommendation is directed or to whom the draft inquiry report was provided. The reports must also be published on the DVSC’s website.
Clause 26 requires final inquiry reports that have been provided to the Minister to be tabled in Parliament within 15 sitting days after receipt by the Minister. The Minister must table the Government’s response within 3 months or 15 sitting days of the report’s tabling (whichever is later).
Clause 27 seeks to ensure that adequate, appropriate and timely action is taken in response to recommendations made in final inquiry reports. It allows the Commissioner to require details from a Commonwealth entity or official, or any other person, of any action taken, or proposed to be taken.
If the Commissioner is not satisfied with the response of a Commonwealth entity to a request for information, they may refer the matter to the Prime Minister and Minister and provide details to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for presentation to Parliament.
If the Commissioner is not satisfied with the response of a person (other than a Commonwealth entity or official) to a request for information, they may make a public statement. It is not clear what action the Commissioner may take if they are not satisfied with the response of a Commonwealth official.
Clause 28 stipulates that inquiry reports must not include certain information like personal and private information, unless the individual to whom the information relates gives consent. The Commissioner must also exclude from inquiry reports operationally sensitive information or intelligence information.
Clause 29 specifies the process the Commissioner must follow when excluding operationally sensitive information or intelligence information from a final inquiry report to ensure the information remains confidential. This involves the Commissioner preparing a classified information report that sets out the information and the reasons for its exclusion in the final inquiry report. The classified information report is provided to the Minister, is not publishable and must not be tabled in Parliament.
Coercive powers in relation to special inquiries
Clause 30 reflects existing section 110ZGA of the Defence Act. It allows the Commissioner to determine that an inquiry under clauses 16,17 or 18 is a special inquiry and provides for coercive information gathering powers in the conduct of special inquiries. The EM explains there is an expectation that engagement with the Commissioner will be collaborative and ‘in good faith’. Nonetheless, the Royal Commission cautioned that this might not always be the case, and the Commissioner should have the appropriate powers:
… to obtain necessary information from those agencies, or any other person or body, if they have reason to believe they have information or a document relevant to the [Commissioner’s] functions (p. 36).
Note: there is a requirement for the Commissioner’s annual report to include the number of times the Commissioner uses coercive powers (clause 87).
Clause 31 reflects existing section 110ZGC of the Defence Act and allows the Commissioner to summon a person to attend a hearing for a special inquiry, give evidence and produce documents or things. To exercise these powers the Commissioner must have reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has evidence relevant to a special inquiry. Failure to comply with a summons is an offence with a maximum penalty of 2 years imprisonment (subclause 57(1)).
Clause 32 mirrors existing section 110ZGD of the Defence Act and allows the Commissioner to require a witness appearing at a hearing for a special inquiry to take an oath or make an affirmation. Refusal to take an oath or make an affirmation, or to answer a question or provide evidence, are offences under subclauses 57(1) and (2), with a maximum penalty of 2 years imprisonment. Hearings overseen by the Commissioner are considered judicial proceedings as defined in Part III of the Crimes Act 1914, meaning the offences and penalties under Part III including giving false testimony, fabricating evidence, intimidation of witnesses, corruption of witnesses, deceiving witnesses and destroying evidence are applicable (EM, p. 39).
Clause 33 reflects existing section 110ZGE of the Defence Act and provides the Commissioner with power to require a person to provide information, a document or thing to a special inquiry. To exercise these powers the Commissioner must have reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has information relevant to a special inquiry. Failure to comply is an offence under clause 57.Clause 34 would provide the Commissioner with the power to allow an authorised official to enter and remain on premises as part of the conduct of a special inquiry. The EM states:
This power and the associated offence at clause 63 are necessary to ensure that the Commissioner can undertake full, independent and transparent investigations that are not hampered by non-compliance on the part of a Commonwealth entity (p. 41).
This power only allows entry to premises occupied by a Commonwealth government entity or a Commonwealth contractor (subclause 34(2)). The authorised official must be able to fully and freely access any documents or other property at all reasonable times, assess and make copies of or take extracts from any documents and may remove the documents from the premises (subclause 34(4)). If the ASIO Minister is satisfied that entering certain premises might prejudice national security or defence, they may make a declaration that requires entry to such premises to be authorised by a Minister and impose conditions on the exercise of the power (subclauses 34(7) and (8)). The Interim Commissioner’s submission (p. 12) recommended the inclusion of powers to access Commonwealth premises for the purpose of a special inquiry.
Clause 35 would allow the Commissioner, or an authorised person, to remotely access electronic documents or other records held on an agency’s systems.
Clause 36, which deals with search warrants, reflects existing section 110ZGJ of the Defence Act and aims to incorporate changes in response to concerns raised by the Scrutiny of Bills Committee on the existing legislation.
The Scrutiny of Bills Committee considered the ‘authorisation of coercive search powers has the potential to unduly trespass on personal rights and liberties’ and legislation enabling coercive search powers should be tightly controlled and include sufficient safeguards (Scrutiny Digest 3/25, p. 17).
The proposed section differs from the existing provision by:
requiring the warrant to include a description of the land, premises, vessel, aircraft or vehicle to which the warrant relates (proposed paragraph 36(4)(c))
requiring the person executing the warrant to identify themself and provide a copy of the warrant to the owner or occupier of the place to be searched (proposed subsections 36(6) and (7)) and
allowing a thing seized in a search to be retained for as long as is reasonably necessary (proposed subsection 36(8)).
The EM states that it is expected this power would only be used in ‘exceptional circumstances connected with a potentially imminent concealment, loss, mutilation or destruction of material relevant to a special inquiry, rather than forming part of the Commissioner’s usual information- and evidence-gathering processes’ (p. 46).
Clause 38 mirrors existing section 110ZGL of the Defence Act and relates to witnesses who are subject to questioning at a hearing of a special inquiry. It sets out who can question or cross-examine witnesses.
Information management
Part 4 of the DVSC Bill deals with information management, including appropriate disclosure of information and the handling of information.
Clause 41 mirrors existing section 110ZFD of the Defence Act, except for the removal of sections 110ZFD(3) and (4) in relation to issuing written guidelines on procedures for hearings. The Commissioner has the power to hold hearings in public and not be bound by rules of evidence. A record of the hearing must be made.
The provisions in relation to the conduct of private hearings have been strengthened from existing section 110ZFE of the Defence Act ensuring that a private hearing must (instead of may) be held if the Commissioner determines that operationally sensitive information or intelligence information may be given at a hearing (subclauses 42(1)-(2)). As with the current provision a private hearing may be held if the Commissioner is satisfied that personal and private information concerning a deceased person or the family, friends or associates of a deceased person, or a veteran’s lived experience with a suicide risk may be disclosed at the hearing (subclause 42(3)). Clause 43 deals with the use of evidence provided at a private hearing.
Clauses 44 and 45 relate to the disclosure of information to the Commissioner and reflects existing sections 110ZGN and 110ZGP of the Defence Act. As currently, the authorisations to disclose information to the Commissioner under the provisions has effect despite anything in state or territory law that might restrict or prohibit the disclosure of information.
Clause 46 reflects existing section 110ZGQ of the Defence Act, which requires the Commissioner to make specific arrangements with the relevant Australian intelligence agencies when entrusted persons (as defined in clause 7) handle intelligence information.
Note: Item 3 of Schedule 1 to the Consequential Bill would insert new section 34AC in the IGIS Act to allow the disclosure of information to the DVSC.
Clause 50 would allow the Commissioner to make public statements, if deemed to be in the public interest, regarding the performance of the Commissioner’s functions and powers or an inquiry (subclause 50(1)). There are safeguards built in around the consideration of sensitive information relating to deceased persons, family and friends/associates, or information that is personal, private, operationally sensitive or intelligence based (subclause 50(2)). The Commissioner would also need to have regard to any potential impact on other ongoing investigations (such as an investigation by the Inspector-General of the ADF). Before making a statement that is critical of a Commonwealth entity or person, the Commissioner must provide them with an opportunity to respond (subclauses 50(3)-(4)).
Note: The disclosure of protected information (as defined in clause 7) outside of the parameters of subclause 51(1) could be an offence under clause 70 of the Bill, which attracts a maximum penalty of 2 years imprisonment.
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (PJCHR) noted that measures in the Bill that authorise the collection, use and disclosure of personal information limit the right to privacy (p. 19). The PJCHR stated that it considered that these measures pursue legitimate objectives (p. 22) but that the proportionality of the measures may be assisted if the Bill was amended to:
provide that a person that may be affected by the disclosure or publication of certain information is notified, gives consent where possible and is afforded the opportunity to correct information prior to its disclosure or publication and
require that the extent of personal information disclosed is limited to that which is strictly necessary to achieve the purpose for which the information is disclosed, and where possible, information is disclosed in a de-identified or anonymous form (p. 23).
Offences and protections
Part 5 of the Bill specifies offences and protections for persons providing information to the Commissioner.
Offences under Part 5 of the Bill would fall under extended geographical jurisdiction Category B (section 15.2 of the Criminal Code Act 1995). As set out in the EM, this means that the offences extend to conduct outside of Australia by an Australian citizen or resident or body corporate, including, for instance in overseas operations. In the case of a resident of Australia, the offence would only apply if there is an equivalent offence in the law of the local jurisdiction (EM, p. 68).
The Final Report of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veterans Suicide recommended the legislation establishing the new oversight entity should include offences ‘for failing to give the information, produce a document, or appear as requested … as should offences for the provision of false or misleading information or documents’. The Royal Commission noted there ‘is precedent for this approach in the Inspector-General of Aged Care Act 2023 (IGAC Act), which provides for coercive information gathering’ and offences for those who fail to comply with such requests (p. 286).
The Interim Commissioner’s submission (pp. 18-19) noted the absence of an offence in Part VIIIE of the Defence Act for providing false or misleading information or destroying a document or thing sought by the Commissioner. This has been addressed in the Bill.
Clause 57 sets out offences for failure to attend a hearing, refusal to be sworn in or make an affirmation or answer questions at a hearing, provide information or produce documents or a thing, which could attract a maximum penalty of 2 years imprisonment. Reasonable excuse provisions are available in subclauses 57(4)-(6), for instance, where a person does not have the information, document or thing identified in the Commissioner’s notice. The defendant bears an evidential burden, which the EM states is consistent with subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code and ‘would require the defendant to adduce or point to evidence that suggests a reasonable possibility that the matters comprising the defence exist or do not exist. If the defendant does so, the prosecution would then need to discharge its legal burden to negate that possibility beyond reasonable doubt for the offence to apply’. (p. 71).
Clause 58 would make it an offence to knowingly provide false or misleading information or documentation, which would attract a maximum penalty of 2 years imprisonment. Similarly, the destruction of documents or things would be an offence under clause 59, with a maximum penalty of 2 years imprisonment.
Clause 60 in relation to legal professional privilege mirrors existing section 110ZHD of the Defence Act, which provides that, subject to some exceptions, a claim of legal professional privilege is not a reasonable excuse for a person to fail to give information or a statement, or to produce a document or thing. If a claim of legal professional privilege is made, the Commissioner can accept or reject the claim.
Clause 61 mirrors existing section 110ZHE of the Defence Act dealing with offences relating to failure to give evidence, or produce a document or thing, when a claim of legal professional privilege has been denied. A maximum penalty of 2 years imprisonment may apply.
The Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee raised concerns in its assessment of Schedule 9 of the VETS Act, stating sections 110ZHD and 110ZHE of the Defence Act abrogate legal professional privilege:
… which is intended to encourage full and frank disclosure by clients in seeking and obtaining legal advice without apprehension of being prejudiced by subsequent disclosure of that communication.
…
The Committee expects any justification for limiting legal professional privilege should be set out clearly within the explanatory materials to the bill (Scrutiny Digest 3/25, p. 15).
This issue is dealt with at pages 77-81 of the EM.
Clause 62 mirrors existing section 110ZHF of the Defence Act and provides that an individual is not excused from providing evidence, information or a statement, document or thing on the ground that it might tend to incriminate them. The only exception is where the evidence relates to an ongoing criminal charge still before the courts (subclause 62(2)). A ‘use immunity’ is provided for potentially self-incriminating information, such that the information and the giving of that information, is not admissible in evidence against the individual in most criminal or defence service proceedings (subclause 62(3)). The PJCHR advised that ‘the proportionality of this measure may be assisted were the bill amended to provide for a derivative use immunity’ (p. 25). The Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Infringement Notices and Enforcement Powers explains that the effect of a ‘derivative use immunity’ is that ‘any information or evidence given that would tend to incriminate the person may not be used to gather other evidence against that person’ (p. 90). The absence of a derivative use immunity was also noted by the Scrutiny of Bills Committee, which requested advice from the Minister ‘as to why it is necessary and appropriate to abrogate the privilege against self-incrimination’ (p. 29).
Clause 63 makes it an offence if a person fails to provide facilities or assistance to an authorised official for the effective exercise of the official’s powers. The maximum penalty for this offence is 6 months imprisonment.
Witness protections
The Interim Commissioner’s submission (p. 16) recommended that witness protections in existing legislation (section 110ZHG) be broadened and strengthened to incorporate circumstances beyond dismissal from employment.
Clause 64 is broader in scope than section 110ZHG of the Defence Act in relation to protecting witnesses. Subclause 64(1) makes it an offence to actually cause detriment to another person because of a belief that the person has, may have or intends to assist the Commissioner in performing their functions. Subclause 64(2) deals with a person threatening to cause detriment to a person because of a belief that the person has, may, or intends to assist the Commissioner perform their functions. The threat might be expressed or implied, conditional or unconditional (subclause 64(3)). A maximum penalty of 1 year imprisonment would apply.
Subclauses 65(1)-(4) aim to ensure persons providing information to the Commissioner are protected from prosecution under other Commonwealth laws or from having the information provided to the Commissioner used against them and ensures that it does not impact any claim for legal professional privilege.
Obstruction and contempt
Clause 66 mirrors existing section 110ZHJ of the Defence Act and provides that it is an offence to:
obstructs or hinder the Commissioner’s work (subclause 66(1)) or
engage in conduct that would, if the Commissioner were a court of record, constitute a contempt of court (subclause 66(2)).
The maximum penalty for these offences is 3 months imprisonment.
The PJCHR considered that the proportionality of clause 66 could be assisted
were the Bill amended to remove subclause 66(1) (which would retain only the contempt of the Commission offence) and provide that the conduct that the offence seeks to criminalise must reach such a level that the Commission is effectively unable to operate (p. 29).
The PJCHR also recommended that the statement of compatibility in the EM ‘be updated to provide an assessment of the compatibility of the measure with the rights to freedom of assembly and freedom of expression’ (p. 29).
Offences relating to unauthorised publication, use or disclosure etc
If a person knowingly presents false or misleading information or documents at a hearing, including omissions of evidence, a penalty of 2 years imprisonment could be imposed under subclause 67(1).
Under subclause 68(1), a person would commit an offence if they received whole or part of a draft inquiry report, including preliminary findings or recommendations, and discloses any element of that information. A 2-year imprisonment penalty could apply.
The EM states this penalty aligns with section 23(1) of the IGAC Act and is intended to ‘encourage persons to take care that they do not inappropriately disclose draft inquiry reports, as such conduct may undermine the inquiry process and cause harm to individuals or entities’ (p. 93).
Clause 69 provides that it is an offence for a person to publish information in contravention of a non-publication directive under subclause 54(1). The maximum penalty for this offence is 1 year imprisonment. The offence would not apply where the information has already lawfully been made public, with the defendant bearing an evidential burden.
Clause 70 would make it an offence for an entrusted person (as defined in clause 7) or former entrusted person to disclose protected information (as defined in clause 7) that is not for the purpose of the Commissioner’s functions. The maximum penalty would be 2 years imprisonment.
Administrative procedures
Part 6 outlines administrative procedures in relation to staffing and reporting.
The Interim Commissioner’s submission (p. 8) recommended the Commissioner be appointed by the Governor-General. Additionally, he recommended the appointee should not have served in the ADF within the last 5 years prior to appointment.
Clause 72 would ensure the Commissioner is appointed by the Governor-General. The Minister must be satisfied that the person has suitable qualifications, training or experience and was recommended by a panel using a merit-based process for assessing applicants after public advertising of the position. Additionally, the person to be appointed as Commissioner must not have served as a member of the ADF in the last 5 years. The Commissioner would be appointed for a period of 5 years but could be reappointed (subclauses 72(4)-(5)).
Subclause 81(1) would allow the Commissioner to appoint a Deputy Commissioner to assist in the performance of the Commissioner's functions. A Deputy Commissioner could also be appointed to inquire into a specified matter following a request by the Minister (subclause 81(2)). More than one Deputy Commissioner can be appointed (subclause 81(4)).
Subclause 82(1) would allow the Commissioner to appoint one or more Assistant Commissioners.
Clauses 83 - 86 would allow the Commissioner to engage DVSC staff (under the Public Service Act 1999), contractors, consultants and persons from other Commonwealth, state or territory agencies to assist with the Commissioner’s functions.
Annual report requirements
Clause 87 would include annual report requirements for the Commissioner and outlines the minimum information requirements such as the number of inquiries undertaken over a 12‑month period, the number of summons’ and notices served, the number of times premises had been entered and documents accessed remotely, and the number of search warrants applied for. Certain information must be excluded from the report, including intelligence, operationally sensitive or personal and private information.
Miscellaneous
Part 7 includes miscellaneous items including provisions dealing with delegation of functions and powers by the Commissioner, eligible judges, protections and accountability. For further explanation see the EM.
Clause 95 mirrors existing section 110ZLE of the Defence Act. The Minister would be required to commission an independent review into the operation of the Bill as soon as practicable after the end of 3 years after the Bill commences. The report must be provided to the Minister within 6 months beginning on the day the review commences, and the Minister must table a copy of the report in Parliament within 15 sitting days after receiving the report.
Links
The links to the Bill, its Explanatory Memorandum and second reading speech can be found on the Bill’s home page, or through the Australian Parliament website.
When Bills have been passed and have received Royal Assent, they become Acts, which can be found at the Federal Register of Legislation website.
All hyperlinks in this Bills Digest are correct as of February 2026.
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