{"id":"BILL-r7419","name":"Defence and Veterans—€™ Service Commissioner Bill 2025","slug":"defence-and-veterans-service-commissioner-bill-2025","collection":"bill","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":446052,"registerId":"commonwealth-BILL-r7419-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-05-05","status":"royal_assent","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[],"analysis":{"summary":{"status_summary":"The Defence and Veterans’ Service Commissioner Bill 2025 received royal assent on 1 April 2026 and is now law.","complexity_score":5,"likely_questions":["What functions does the Commissioner perform under the Act?","When does the Act commence and what is the process for inquiries?"],"complexity_factors":["establishes standalone statutory commission with refined inquiry functions","includes coercive powers and offence provisions for special inquiries","transitions commission from Defence Act to new legislation with commencement rules"],"plain_english_summary":"The Defence and Veterans’ Service Commissioner Bill 2025 establishes an independent Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission to monitor, inquire into and report on matters relating to suicide prevention and wellbeing outcomes for veterans. This includes oversight of the Commonwealth’s implementation of the Government’s response to the recommendations of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide. The bill transitions the Commission from provisions in the Defence Act 1903 to a standalone Act and refines the functions and powers of the Commissioner.\n\nThe Commissioner’s functions cover inquiring into data and trends on suicide and suicidality among veterans, systemic factors in Commonwealth administration of policies and programs, the state of the defence and veteran ecosystem, and progress on Royal Commission recommendations. Inquiries can be initiated by the Commissioner or requested by the Minister, who must consider factors such as existing inquiries and available resources. The Commissioner must comply with ministerial requests but has independence in how inquiries are conducted.\n\nInquiry procedures require written notice to the Minister and publication on the Commission’s website unless it would affect the inquiry. Submissions can be invited, with options for confidentiality, and draft reports allow for responses from affected parties. Final reports include findings and recommendations, and those from ministerial or Royal Commission inquiries must be provided to the Minister, tabled in Parliament and published. The Government must respond to recommendations within three months or fifteen sitting days.\n\nSpecial inquiries allow the Commissioner to use powers such as summoning witnesses, requiring information and documents, and entering premises occupied by Commonwealth entities. These powers are supported by offences for non-compliance, with maximum penalties of two years imprisonment in some cases. Protections are provided for witnesses against detriment and for certain information disclosures. The bill also sets rules for handling sensitive information, including operationally sensitive and intelligence information.\n\nThis legislation affects veterans, defined as current or former Australian Defence Force members, and their families. It impacts Commonwealth entities and officials who may be subject to inquiries or required to respond to recommendations. The Commissioner is appointed by the Governor-General following a merit-based process with public advertising and must not have served in the Australian Defence Force in the last five years. The Commission includes the Commissioner, Deputy and Assistant Commissioners, staff and contractors.\n\nThe bill received royal assent on 1 April 2026 as Act number 27 of 2026. It commences on the earlier of a date fixed by proclamation or six months after assent. An independent review of the operation of the Act must be conducted after three years, with the report tabled in Parliament."},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":8,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This legislation does not materially change the original policy scope set by prior measures and the Royal Commission recommendation: it preserves the DVSC’s core purpose of independent oversight and system‑level inquiry into suicide prevention and wellbeing for veterans. The change is chiefly structural and procedural — moving the DVSC into standalone legislation and refining powers, processes and administrative arrangements (including adding families explicitly, widening the category of persons who may assist the Commission, strengthening independence provisions, and specifying coercive powers and offences). Those refinements broaden operational reach and clarify procedures but do not represent a significant departure from the entity’s original mandate."},"complexity_factors":["7 substantive Parts plus Schedules in consequential/transitional Bill (multi‑instrument structure)","Numerous defined terms concentrated in clause 7 that drive application (e.g. veteran, entrusted person, protected information, operationally sensitive information, intelligence information)","Extensive cross‑references to multiple Acts (Defence Act, IGIS Act, PGPA Act, Criminal Code Act, IGAC Act precedents) and to other Commonwealth inquiry frameworks","Dual inquiry pathways (Commissioner‑initiated clause 16; Minister‑requested clause 17) with overlapping duties and procedural safeguards creating conditional logic","Special inquiry coercive powers (clauses 30–36) with multiple, conditioned powers: summons, production, oath, entry, remote access, search warrants","A suite of offences and penalties with varied burdens of proof and reasonable‑excuse provisions (clauses 57–70), including extended extra‑territorial jurisdiction (Category B)","Complex information handling and exclusion rules for operationally sensitive/intelligence/classified material (clauses 28–29; clause 46 and Consequential schedule amendments to IGIS Act)","Interplay with legal professional privilege and self‑incrimination protections where use immunity but not derivative immunity is provided (clauses 60–62) and noted human rights scrutiny","Procedural fairness and publication constraints for draft/final reports, confidentiality requests and redaction rules (clauses 20–26, 50–51)","Transitional arrangements to carry over actions and investigations from Part VIIIE of the Defence Act to the new Act (Consequential Bill Schedule 2)"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this law does (mechanics first)\n\n- Creates a standalone Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission (DVSC) and a statutory Commissioner, moving the entity out of Part VIIIE of the Defence Act into its own Act (consequential and transitional provisions repeal Part VIIIE and preserve ongoing matters).\n- Sets out the DVSC’s object: to drive improvement in suicide prevention and wellbeing outcomes for veterans and to monitor and report on the Commonwealth’s implementation of the Government response to the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide (clause 3).\n- Gives the Commissioner broad functions to monitor, inquire into and report on systemic matters affecting veterans (clause 10), and to exercise all powers reasonably necessary for those functions (clause 11).\n- Enables the Commissioner to start inquiries on their own initiative (clause 16), and requires the Commissioner to carry out inquiries or provide advice when requested in writing by the Minister (clause 17), subject to specified matters the Minister must consider before making a request (clause 17(2)).\n- Creates a special‑inquiry regime with coercive information‑gathering powers (summonses, compulsory production of documents, swearing witnesses, entry to Commonwealth premises and contractors’ premises, remote access, and search warrants) and criminal penalties for non‑compliance (clauses 30–36; offences and penalties in Part 5).\n- Sets rules for hearings (public and private), how submissions can be invited and handled (including confidentiality and redaction), what can be put in final reports, and processes for excluding and handling classified or operationally sensitive material (clauses 19–29; 41–46; 29).\n- Creates criminal offences and protections: failure to comply with summonses/requirements, provision of false or misleading information, destruction of documents, unlawful disclosure of draft reports or protected/classified material (clauses 57–70). Many offences carry maximum penalties up to 2 years imprisonment; some lesser offences carry shorter penalties.\n- Preserves and adjusts legal privilege and self‑incrimination rules: legal professional privilege can be accepted or rejected by the Commissioner (clauses 60–61); there is a use immunity for compelled information but no explicit derivative use immunity (clause 62; see EM discussion and PJCHR comments).\n- Strengthens witness protections against detriment and threats beyond employment dismissal (clause 64) and provides for annual reporting and an independent review after 3 years (clauses 87 and 95).\n- Sets appointment, term, and eligibility rules for the Commissioner (Governor‑General appointment after merit‑based process; 5‑year term; cannot have served in the ADF in the previous 5 years) and allows Deputy and Assistant Commissioners and staff to be engaged (clauses 72; 81–86).\n\nWho is affected\n\n- Veterans (defined to include current and former ADF members) and their families: they are the focus of the Commission’s monitoring and inquiries (clause 7 definition; clause 10(1)(f)(ii) includes families).\n- Commonwealth entities, public servants, and contractors: may be required to provide information, give evidence, allow entry to premises or remote access to systems, and comply with subpoenas and notices (clauses 30–36, 44–46).\n- Persons asked to give evidence (witnesses) and organisations that make submissions: subject to confidentiality rules, publication controls and criminal penalties for improper disclosure (clauses 20–21; 68–70).\n- Defence contractors and private firms that hold Commonwealth information: obligations to comply could impose administrative and compliance costs and may interact with contract confidentiality clauses.\n- The Commonwealth budget: the Act is funded from Commonwealth appropriations (initial establishment and operational funding were allocated in Budget documents referenced in the EM and Bills Digest).\n\nWhy it matters (stated purpose and practical trade‑offs)\n\n- Stated purpose: the Act implements the Royal Commission’s recommendation to establish an independent statutory body to oversee system reform across the Defence and veteran ecosystem and to improve suicide prevention and wellbeing outcomes (clause 3; Royal Commission recommendation 122 as described in the EM).\n\n- Practical effects and trade‑offs to watch (attributable to the bill’s mechanics):\n  - Independence vs ministerial responsiveness: the Commissioner is expressly insulated from direction about how to conduct inquiries (clause 12), but the Minister retains a power to request inquiries which the Commissioner must comply with (clause 17). That creates a practical tension between political responsiveness and operational independence; the Bill tries to manage it by requiring the Minister to have regard to certain matters before requesting an inquiry (clause 17(2)).\n  - Information access and legal protections: the Commissioner has coercive powers to obtain material held by Commonwealth agencies and contractors (clauses 31–36). Those powers reduce barriers to evidence gathering but limit some usual protections (e.g. legal professional privilege may be rejected in specific circumstances — clauses 60–61 — and self‑incrimination is limited by a use immunity rather than a fuller derivative use immunity — clause 62). The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights noted those privacy and privilege intrusions and suggested proportionality safeguards (PJCHR comments in EM).\n  - Compliance burden on agencies and contractors: Commonwealth entities and their contractors must allocate time and resources to respond to notices, allow premises access, and assist authorised officials (clauses 34–35; clause 63 makes obstruction an offence). This is a direct compliance cost and an operational one where sensitive systems or operational activity are involved.\n  - Confidentiality and speech constraints: the Bill criminalises disclosure of draft reports and certain protected information (clauses 68–70). That can preserve inquiry integrity but may chill publication or whistleblowing unless routed through the Commissioner’s processes.\n  - Concentrated benefits, diffuse costs: beneficiaries of the Commission’s work are veterans and families (diffuse beneficiaries). The most discrete group affected by enforcement and compliance burdens are Commonwealth agencies, staff and contractors who face specific obligations and potential penalties.\n  - Budgetary and opportunity costs: the Commonwealth funds the DVSC. The digest and EM record initial establishment and operational allocations; some funding was drawn from Defence resources in recent budget updates. That reallocates resources that could otherwise be used for other Defence or veteran services.\n  - Overlap and coordination risk: the Bill requires consideration of contemporaneous inquiries (e.g. Inspector‑General of the ADF) to avoid prejudice (clause 17(2)). Practical implementation will require active coordination protocols to avoid duplication, conflicting evidence powers, or contradictory public statements.\n\nWho pays, who decides, what behaviour changes\n\n- Who pays: the Commonwealth (Commonwealth budget appropriations). The Bills Digest and EM record dedicated establishment and operational funding allocated in recent budget rounds.\n- Who decides: the Commissioner decides inquiries to commence and how to conduct them (clause 16; clause 12 on independence); the Minister can request inquiries and selects a Commissioner appointment process participant (clause 17; clause 72 requires Governor‑General appointment following merit process). Courts (via search warrants) and the ASIO Minister (in national security cases) have defined roles for limiting entry powers (clause 34; clause 36). Parliament receives and can review reports (clause 26 and requirement to table independent review after 3 years — clause 95).\n- Behaviour changes required: Commonwealth entities, contractors and witnesses will need to comply with notices, produce documents, make staff available for hearings, and create/maintain records in forms the DVSC can access. Agencies may tighten internal record‑handling and legal compliance processes; contractors may renegotiate confidentiality and compliance clauses or change how they store Commonwealth data.\n\nImplementation and compliance risks highlighted by the material\n\n- Administrative friction and capacity: the DVSC will need staff, secure systems and processes to handle classified information and large evidence sets (clauses 46; 29; Part 6 staffing provisions). The EM and interim Commissioner submissions urged clearer administrative rules in primary legislation to reduce operational ambiguity.\n- Legal and human rights friction: limits on privilege and self‑incrimination, and the criminalisation of certain disclosures, attracted scrutiny from scrutiny and human rights committees (EM and PJCHR comments). The absence of a derivative use immunity and tight controls on privilege were specifically noted as issues that may require legislative or procedural care.\n- Coordination with other oversight bodies: the Bill builds in some protections against prejudice to other inquiries (clause 17(2)), but practical overlap remains an implementation risk.\n\nSource citations in this summary: clauses 3, 7, 10–13, 16–19, 20–29, 30–36, 41–46, 50, 54, 57–70, 72, 81–87, 95; consequential Schedule 1 repealing Part VIIIE of the Defence Act and Schedule 2 transitional provisions (see Consequential and Transitional Provisions Bill).\n\nOverall bottom line (mechanics then purpose): the Act migrates the existing Defence and Veterans’ Services Commission out of the Defence Act into a standalone statute, formalises the Commissioner’s independent monitoring and inquiry powers focused on suicide prevention and wellbeing for veterans (including families), grants coercive powers for special inquiries with associated criminal penalties and protections, and sets administrative, information‑handling and reporting rules. The Government and oversight committees frame this as implementing the Royal Commission’s recommendation for an independent oversight entity; the Bill balances investigatory reach with statutory safeguards but introduces notable compliance costs for Commonwealth entities and contractors and raises questions about privilege, use immunity and coordination with other oversight bodies (as discussed in the explanatory materials)."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/defence-and-veterans-service-commissioner-bill-2025","history":"/api/acts/defence-and-veterans-service-commissioner-bill-2025/history","analysis":"/api/acts/defence-and-veterans-service-commissioner-bill-2025/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/defence-and-veterans-service-commissioner-bill-2025/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/defence-and-veterans-service-commissioner-bill-2025/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/defence-and-veterans-service-commissioner-bill-2025/documents"}}