Reduces maximum terms for two statutory heads from 7 years to 5 years (ACIAR CEO; First/Second Parliamentary Counsel) (Schedule 1, item 17; Schedule 2, item 3).
Allows relevant ministers to put in writing a "performance standard" for four senior statutory office holders (OCIAR CEO, Austrade CEO, First/Second Parliamentary Counsel); those standards are expressly not legislative instruments (so they are not subject to tabling/disallowance) (Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act s.51(5); ACIAR Act s.24(4); Parliamentary Counsel Act s.4(3); each provision states the performance standard is not a legislative instrument).
Gives ministers new express power to suspend the appointments of the heads of Austrade, ACIAR and the Director of Safeguards for fixed periods (initially up to 3 months, with specified routes to extend up to 12 months while certain inquiries are underway) and requires the ASNO Director’s suspension or extension to be publicly notified (Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act s.58A; ACIAR Act s.29BA; Nuclear Non‑Proliferation (Safeguards) Act s.47A).
Adds or clarifies grounds on which those office holders may be terminated, bringing in a common list of discretionary grounds in most cases (misbehaviour, incapacity, serious misconduct, unsatisfactory performance, certain absences, paid outside work without approval, failure to disclose interests), while preserving some existing special protections for ASNO (see Schedule 1 Divisions 3–4, Schedule 2 Part 4).
Describes examples that amount to "serious misconduct" in each Act (breach of the APS Code of Conduct judged by the Minister to be sufficiently serious; unlawful discrimination; findings or opinions in relevant corruption investigation reports that indicate corrupt conduct) (see, e.g., Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act s.59(1A); ACIAR Act s.29C(1A); Parliamentary Counsel Act s.10(1A); Safeguards Act s.48(1A)).
The Commonwealth Entities Legislation Amendment Act 2026 amends four principal Acts to revise appointment, suspension and termination arrangements for statutory office holders. Schedule 1 addresses the Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985, the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Act 1982 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987. Schedule 2 addresses the Parliamentary Counsel Act 1970. For the Austrade CEO, item 2 of Schedule 1 inserts a power for the Minister to determine a performance standard in writing, which is not a legislative instrument. Items 3 to 5 insert new section 58A allowing the Minister to suspend the CEO for up to three months if the Minister believes suspension is in the interests of the Commission, with extensions possible up to twelve months during inquiries, and remuneration continuing during suspension. Items 6 to 16 expand termination grounds in section 59 to include serious misconduct, defined in new subsection 59(1A) to cover serious breaches of the APS Code of Conduct, unlawful discrimination and findings of corrupt conduct from National Anti-Corruption Commission investigation reports. Unsatisfactory performance becomes a discretionary ground under subsection 59(3) having regard to any performance standard. The definition of paid work replaces paid employment, and the CEO must not engage in paid work outside duties without ministerial approval. For the ACIAR CEO, item 17 of Schedule 1 reduces the maximum term of appointment from seven years to five years under subsection 24(2). Items 19 to 32 introduce equivalent performance standard, suspension and termination provisions, including new section 29BA for suspension and expanded grounds in section 29C. For the Director of Safeguards, items 33 to 43 insert new section 47A for suspension with a public notice requirement, and replace subsection 48(1) to retain misbehaviour and incapacity while adding serious misconduct, defined in subsection 48(1A) without an unsatisfactory performance ground. For the First and Second Parliamentary Counsel, Schedule 2 Part 1 inserts new section 3A allowing the Minister to give general written directions to the Office of Parliamentary Counsel, which are not legislative instruments. Part 2 reduces maximum tenure from seven to five years. Parts 3 to 6 introduce performance standards under subsection 4(3), expand termination grounds in section 10 to include conviction of an indictable offence, serious misconduct defined in subsection 10(1A) to cover bullying or harassment, and unsatisfactory performance, while replacing section 9 with a paid work prohibition. All amendments apply to existing and future appointments, with specific transitional rules for conduct occurring on or after commencement dates.
Official source available
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Amends the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Act 1982, Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 and Parliamentary Counsel Act 1970 to update the statutory framework for the appointment, suspension and termination of certain statutory office holders in the Foreign Affairs and Trade and Attorney-General’s portfolios.
Parliamentary progress
Progress
House of Representatives
Introduced and read a first time
11 Feb 2026
Second reading moved
11 Feb 2026
Second reading debate
03 Mar 2026
Referred to Federation Chamber
03 Mar 2026
Second reading debate
03 Mar 2026
Second reading agreed to
03 Mar 2026
Reported from Federation Chamber
04 Mar 2026
Third reading agreed to
04 Mar 2026
Senate
Introduced and read a first time
04 Mar 2026
Second reading moved
04 Mar 2026
Second reading debate
23 Mar 2026
Second reading debate
24 Mar 2026
Second reading agreed to
24 Mar 2026
Committee of the Whole debate
24 Mar 2026
Third reading agreed to
24 Mar 2026
Finally passed both Houses
24 Mar 2026
Assent
Act no: 13
Year: 2026
26 Mar 2026
Notes
Documents and transcripts
Text of bill
First reading
As passed by both Houses
Explanatory memoranda
Explanatory memorandum
Transcript of speeches
All second reading speeches
Minister's second reading speech
Proposed amendments
Replaces older references to "employment" outside the office with a broader definition of "paid work" and requires ministerial approval for such outside paid work (various inserts of "paid work" and new "Other paid work" offences/requirements: e.g. Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act s.55; ACIAR Act s.28; Parliamentary Counsel Act s.9; Safeguards Act s.45A).
Creates an explicit power for the Attorney‑ or responsible Minister to give written, general directions to the Office of Parliamentary Counsel (OPC) about its functions; OPC must comply except where a direction would relate to the First Parliamentary Counsel’s functions under the Public Service Act or the PGPA Act; such directions are not legislative instruments and need not be published (Parliamentary Counsel Act s.3A).
Why the government says it was done
The Act updates appointment, suspension and termination arrangements for four statutory office holders to (the government’s claim) improve accountability where "conduct or performance are unacceptable" and to align some of these roles with the arrangements that apply to many other statutory office holders.
How the Act changes who decides and who pays
Who decides: Ministers gain explicit power to set non‑legislative performance standards, to suspend certain office holders (for set periods), and in some cases to terminate appointments (the Act distinguishes whether the Minister or the Governor‑General carries out termination depending on the office) (see, e.g., Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act s.59; ACIAR Act s.29C; Parliamentary Counsel Act s.10).
Who pays during suspension: suspended office holders continue to receive remuneration and allowances while suspended (e.g. s.58A(3); s.29BA(3); s.47A(3)).
What behaviour the law is likely to change (mechanisms, not judgements)
Increases executive (ministerial) control and discretion over standards of performance and temporary removal from duties by giving ministers formally expressed, non‑legislative levers (performance standards and suspension powers) (see s.51(5); s.58A; s.29BA; s.47A; s.3A).
Shortens some appointments, increasing the frequency of reappointments and therefore more frequent performance reviews for those roles (Schedule 1, item 17; Schedule 2, item 3).
Narrows the scope for office holders to do paid outside work without approval, which reduces their ability to supplement income or undertake external professional work during their term (see new "Other paid work" provisions).
Official rationale versus concrete trade‑offs and implementation issues
The official rationale (as stated in explanatory materials) is improved accountability and alignment with ordinary SOH (statutory office holder) arrangements. That claim maps directly to the Act’s mechanisms: ministers can set and use performance standards and can suspend or seek termination for specified conduct (performance standard provisions and suspension/termination provisions cited above).
Costs and incentives: the Act increases ministerial discretion to judge performance and misconduct (the performance standard is a tool the Minister may use when forming an opinion about termination). That discretion creates incentives for closer oversight and, plausibly, quicker removal where a minister judges performance unsatisfactory — but it also creates managerially concentrated decision‑making (power concentrated in ministers) and increases tenure uncertainty for the affected office holders (see performance standard and termination clauses: Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act s.59(3); ACIAR Act s.29C(3); Parliamentary Counsel Act s.10(4)).
Opportunity cost and administrative burden: departments and ministers must draft, maintain and (internally) use performance standards; offices must adjust HR and compliance systems to manage suspension, inquiries and the new paid‑work approval processes. These are direct administrative costs to the offices affected (see performance standard provisions and "Other paid work" sections).
Bureaucratic discretion and implementation risk: performance standards and ministerial directions under the OPC Act are explicitly not legislative instruments (they are not subject to tabling or disallowance) and there is no general publication obligation. That design reduces parliamentary oversight and increases scope for opaque application of standards (see s.51(6); s.24(5); s.4(4) Parliamentary Counsel Act; s.3A(3) OPC directions). The Act requires public notice for ASNO suspensions only (Safeguards Act s.47A(10)); suspensions for other offices need not be published by the minister under the new text.
Procedural fairness: the explanatory material states that procedural fairness requirements will apply to termination decisions. The Act also builds in inquiry‑linked extension rules (allowing suspension to be extended where specified inquiries are underway) (see each s.58A(7)–(8), s.29BA(7)–(8), s.47A(7)–(8)). Those provisions tie expanded suspension power to the existence of inquiries by the APS Commissioner, corruption investigations or minister‑requested inquiries, which is a concrete procedural safeguard around extensions.
Effects on private enterprise, competition and markets: the Act primarily affects senior public office holders and their governance. Direct effects on private firms and markets are limited. Two routes for indirect effects are visible as mechanisms:
OPC directions (Parliamentary Counsel Act s.3A) could change priorities, timing or resourcing for law drafting and publication; that can have downstream effects on businesses that rely on the timing or content of legislation or on procurement tied to legislative milestones.
Limits on paid outside work reduce the ability of affected office holders to work part‑time for private parties (potentially limiting the supply of experienced senior public lawyers or managers into part‑time private roles while they serve).
Concentrated benefits and diffuse costs: the clear and concentrated beneficiary of the changes is the executive (ministers and the employing department) which gains clearer management tools (performance standards, suspension). Costs are borne by the statutory office holders (shorter terms, more uncertainty, constraints on outside work) and — diffusely — by stakeholders who value transparent, predictable processes (because standards and directions are not disallowable or required to be published).
Bottom line (neutral summary)
This Act standardises and tightens the mechanisms by which ministers and the Governor‑General can suspend, set standards for, and terminate four senior statutory office holders. It does so by creating non‑legislative performance standards, explicit ministerial suspension powers with specified extension rules tied to inquiries, clarified examples of "serious misconduct", limits on paid outside work and an explicit ministerial directions power for OPC. The concrete trade‑offs are increased ministerial discretion and managerial tools in exchange for reduced statutory transparency (performance standards and directions are not legislative instruments), and increased tenure/operational uncertainty for the affected office holders (reduced maximum terms, clearer grounds for termination).
Main concepts
Statutory office holders are persons appointed under legislation to lead Commonwealth entities with defined functions and a degree of independence from direct ministerial control. The Act introduces or refines concepts of tenure, limiting appointments and reappointments to a maximum of five years for the ACIAR CEO and Parliamentary Counsel positions under amended subsection 24(2) of the ACIAR Act and subsection 5(1) of the Parliamentary Counsel Act. Suspension is a new or expanded power allowing the relevant Minister to remove an office holder from duties temporarily for up to three months, extendable during inquiries into conduct, while preserving remuneration and allowances, as set out in new sections 58A, 29BA and 47A. Performance standards are written determinations by the Minister that provide an objective measure for assessing whether performance has been unsatisfactory, enabling discretionary termination, though these standards are explicitly not legislative instruments and carry no publication or tabling obligation. Serious misconduct is defined to encompass serious breaches of the APS Code of Conduct where the Minister is satisfied termination is justified, unlawful discrimination, findings of corrupt conduct in National Anti-Corruption Commission reports, and for Parliamentary Counsel also serious or repeated bullying or harassment. Termination grounds are expanded to make some mandatory, such as bankruptcy-related matters, and others discretionary, including unsatisfactory performance having regard to any performance standard and absence from duty. Paid work replaces earlier references to paid employment, requiring ministerial approval for any external work undertaken for financial gain or reward. Ministerial directions for the Office of Parliamentary Counsel must be of a general nature only and do not apply to the First Parliamentary Counsel's functions under the Public Service Act 1999 or the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013. These concepts align some arrangements with those in other Commonwealth statutes while introducing novel elements around performance standards.
Who it affects
The Act directly affects the Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Trade and Investment Commission, the Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, the Director of Safeguards within the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, and the First Parliamentary Counsel and Second Parliamentary Counsel within the Office of Parliamentary Counsel. These office holders lead entities responsible for international agricultural research, trade and investment promotion, nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation regulation, and legislative drafting and publishing services. Ministers in the Foreign Affairs and Trade portfolio and the Attorney-General's portfolio gain new or clarified powers to set performance standards, issue suspensions, determine serious misconduct and, for the Office of Parliamentary Counsel, give general directions. Staff employed by these entities are indirectly affected because the office holders hold direct management responsibilities and are now subject to clearer accountability mechanisms for conduct and performance. The entities themselves face revised governance frameworks that may influence operational independence and internal decision-making processes. Future appointees and reappointees to these positions will be subject to the five-year maximum term and the new suite of suspension and termination provisions from the relevant commencement dates. The Australian Public Service Commissioner and the National Anti-Corruption Commission are referenced in inquiry and investigation provisions that can trigger extended suspensions or termination processes. No other statutory office holders or entities are amended by this Act.
What people will want to know
People will want to know the practical effect on appointment lengths. The ACIAR CEO and Parliamentary Counsel positions now have a five-year maximum term instead of seven years, applying to new appointments and reappointments made on or after commencement. People will ask whether ministers can remove office holders more easily. Ministers may suspend the Austrade CEO, ACIAR CEO or Director of Safeguards for up to three months if they believe it is in the entity's interests, with extensions during inquiries, and may terminate for unsatisfactory performance after considering any performance standard. People will ask whether performance standards are public. The standards are determined in writing but are not legislative instruments and there is no requirement to publish or table them. People will ask what happens to pay during suspension. Remuneration and allowances continue throughout any suspension period. People will ask why the Director of Safeguards has no unsatisfactory performance termination ground. The Explanatory Memorandum notes international obligations requiring regulatory independence for the safeguards function, so termination remains limited to misbehaviour, incapacity or serious misconduct. People will ask whether the changes apply to current office holders. The amendments apply to existing appointments, with conduct-based provisions triggered only for conduct occurring on or after the relevant commencement dates. People will ask about transparency of ministerial directions to the Office of Parliamentary Counsel. Directions must be general in nature and the Minister may publish them at discretion but is not required to do so.
Status and what happens next
The Bill received royal assent on 26 March 2026 and is now the Commonwealth Entities Legislation Amendment Act 2026, Act number 13 of 2026. Schedule 1 commenced on 27 March 2026, the day after assent. Schedule 2 Parts 1 to 3 commenced on 9 April 2026, fourteen days after assent. Schedule 2 Parts 4 to 6 commenced immediately after Parts 1 to 3 on the same date. All provisions are now in force. No further parliamentary stages remain. The Federal Register of Legislation contains the official electronic version of the Act. No proposed amendments were circulated during passage and the Senate Selection of Bills Committee did not refer the Bill to a committee after the Government successfully moved that it not be referred. The Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights made no comment on the Bill. Entities and ministers may now exercise the new powers, and performance standards or directions may be issued in writing at any time. Office holders must comply with the new restrictions on paid work and the expanded termination grounds apply to future conduct.
Powers, duties and rights created
The Act creates new ministerial powers to determine performance standards in writing for the Austrade CEO under item 2 of Schedule 1, the ACIAR CEO under item 20 of Schedule 1, and the First and Second Parliamentary Counsel under item 6 of Schedule 2. These powers are discretionary and the resulting standards are not legislative instruments. New suspension powers are created allowing the Minister to suspend the Austrade CEO, ACIAR CEO or Director of Safeguards by written notice for up to three months where the Minister believes suspension is in the entity's interests, with extension powers during inquiries, as set out in new sections 58A, 29BA and 47A. For the Director of Safeguards the Minister must publish notice of any suspension or extension. A new power allows the Minister to give general written directions to the Office of Parliamentary Counsel about the performance of its functions under new section 3A, with a requirement for the Office to comply except in relation to the First Parliamentary Counsel's Public Service Act or Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act functions. Duties created include an obligation on each affected office holder not to engage in paid work outside official duties without ministerial approval, replacing earlier employment restrictions. Rights preserved include continuation of remuneration and allowances during any suspension period. Existing rights to procedural fairness in termination decisions are confirmed in the Explanatory Memorandum. The Governor-General retains the power to terminate appointments on the expanded grounds, acting on ministerial advice. No new rights of review or appeal are created by the Act.
Money, penalties and enforcement
The Act does not introduce new financial penalties, fines or criminal offences. Remuneration and allowances for suspended office holders continue unaffected, as stated in the suspension provisions and confirmed in the Explanatory Memorandum. No appropriation or funding changes are made. Enforcement occurs through existing mechanisms of suspension and termination rather than civil or criminal penalties. The Minister or Governor-General may terminate appointments for the expanded grounds, including unsatisfactory performance having regard to any performance standard, serious misconduct defined to include serious APS Code of Conduct breaches or corrupt conduct findings, and other matters such as bankruptcy or failure to disclose interests under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act. Mandatory termination applies in bankruptcy-related circumstances for the Parliamentary Counsel positions. The absence of performance standards or directions being legislative instruments means they are not subject to disallowance or automatic publication requirements, limiting parliamentary oversight of enforcement thresholds. Application provisions in each Division specify that conduct-based termination grounds apply only to conduct occurring on or after commencement, while suspension powers apply to suspensions occurring on or after commencement regardless of appointment date. No new reporting or auditing obligations are imposed on the entities in relation to the use of these powers.
Pressure points and controversies
The official materials records that the Opposition supported the second reading but sought referral to a Senate committee to examine whether the changes are consistent with governance arrangements for other statutory office holders, whether operational issues prompted the reforms, and whether similar measures might be extended to other bodies. The Opposition expressed concern that performance standards are not legislative instruments, not disallowable, and not required to be published or tabled, and that suspension decisions for most entities are not required to be tabled, shifting practical control to the executive with reduced parliamentary oversight. An Independent member questioned whether the Bill represented the best use of parliamentary time given other national priorities. The Senate Selection of Bills Committee could not reach agreement on referral and a Government amendment to avoid referral was passed. The Bills Digest notes that three of the four entities had recently received adverse audit findings or public criticism concerning financial management, procurement and grants administration, yet states it is not clear that these issues prompted the Bill or that the governance changes would have prevented the shortcomings. Legal and policy trade-offs identified in the official materials include balancing enhanced executive accountability mechanisms against the statutory independence traditionally afforded to regulatory and specialist office holders, particularly the Director of Safeguards where unsatisfactory performance is deliberately excluded as a termination ground to preserve international treaty obligations. Another trade-off is between ministerial flexibility to set non-public performance standards and expectations of transparency in the exercise of significant powers over statutory appointments. The official materials does not record stakeholder submissions or public reactions beyond parliamentary debate.
What changes if it passes
With royal assent granted, the new framework is now operative. The ACIAR CEO and Parliamentary Counsel positions are subject to a five-year maximum term for all future appointments and reappointments. Ministers may issue written performance standards for the Austrade CEO, ACIAR CEO and Parliamentary Counsel to guide assessments of unsatisfactory performance leading to possible termination. Ministers may suspend the Austrade CEO, ACIAR CEO or Director of Safeguards for up to three months, extendable during inquiries, with remuneration continuing. The Director of Safeguards suspension or extension must be publicly notified. Termination grounds are expanded across all positions to include serious misconduct, defined to capture serious Code of Conduct breaches, corrupt conduct findings and, for Parliamentary Counsel, bullying or harassment. Unsatisfactory performance is a discretionary termination ground for three positions but not for the Director of Safeguards. Office holders must obtain ministerial approval before engaging in any paid work outside their duties. The Minister may issue general written directions to the Office of Parliamentary Counsel, which must comply except in relation to its Public Service Act and Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act functions. These changes apply immediately to conduct and suspensions occurring after the respective commencement dates, providing ministers with additional levers to address performance or conduct concerns while preserving procedural fairness requirements in termination decisions.
Social post angles
Headline: Five-year terms now apply to ACIAR and Parliamentary Counsel leaders. Explanation: The Act reduces maximum appointment length from seven years to five years for these statutory office holders, aligning them with most other Commonwealth positions. 2. Headline: Ministers gain new suspension powers over Austrade, ACIAR and safeguards heads. Explanation: Written notice can suspend these office holders for up to three months if the Minister believes it serves the entity's interests, with extensions during inquiries. 3. Headline: Performance standards introduced but kept private for three key roles. Explanation: Ministers may set written standards to assess unsatisfactory performance, yet these are not legislative instruments and need not be published or tabled. 4. Headline: Serious misconduct definition expanded for easier termination. Explanation: The Act now includes serious Code of Conduct breaches, corrupt conduct findings and bullying or harassment as explicit grounds for ending appointments. 5. Headline: No unsatisfactory performance ground for nuclear safeguards Director. Explanation: International treaty obligations require regulatory independence, so termination for the Director of Safeguards remains limited to misbehaviour, incapacity or serious misconduct. 6. Headline: Paid work outside duties now requires ministerial approval. Explanation: All affected office holders must obtain consent before taking external paid work, replacing narrower employment restrictions. 7. Headline: General ministerial directions possible for Office of Parliamentary Counsel. Explanation: The Minister may issue written directions on functions, though they must be general in nature and publication is at ministerial discretion. 8. Headline: Remuneration continues during any suspension period. Explanation: Suspended office holders retain pay and allowances, ensuring financial stability while inquiries or reviews proceed.
No proposed amendments have been circulated.
Schedules of amendments
No documents at present
Bills digest
Bills Digest
Notes
An electronic version of this Act is available on the Federal Register of Legislation (www.legislation.gov.au)
The Commonwealth Entities Legislation Amendment Bill 2026 (the Bill) proposes to amend appointment, suspension and termination arrangements for the statutory officer holder (SOH) positions that lead four Commonwealth entities: Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR); Australian Trade and Investment Commission (Austrade); Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO); Office of Parliamentary Counsel (OPC).
Most of the Bill’s proposed governance changes will more closely align arrangements with the majority of SOH positions created in other legislation. Such measures include: reducing the maximum term of appointment from 7 years to 5 years; and inserting grounds for suspension or termination that are already found in other legislation.
On the other hand, provisions to enable ministers to set performance standards for SOH positions would appear to be novel, and performance standards would not be legislative instruments.
In that context, it is not clear why the circumstances of these particular SOH positions are being changed, or why the changes are necessary at this particular time. In recent months, 3 of the 4 entities affected by the Bill have faced adverse audit findings or other public criticism. However, it is not clear that these issues have led to the current Bill nor whether governance changes proposed in the Bill would necessarily have prevented the reported shortcomings.
The Senate Selection of Bills Committee reported it could not reach agreement on referral of the Bill to committee. A Government amendment to not refer the Bill to committee was passed in the Senate. The Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights had no comment on the Bill.
Introductory Info
Date of introduction: 11 February 2026
House introduced in: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Attorney-General
Commencement: Schedule 1 commences on the day after Royal Assent. Schedule 2, Parts 1 to 3 commence 14 days after Royal Assent. Schedule 2, Parts 4 to 6 commence immediately after Parts 1 to 3.
This Bills Digest replaces a preliminary Digest published on 25 February 2026 to assist in early consideration of the Bill.
Purpose of the Bill
The purpose of the Commonwealth Entities Legislation Amendment Bill 2026 (the Bill) is to amend appointment, suspension and termination arrangements for statutory office holders in 4 Commonwealth Entities: the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR); the Australian Trade and Investment Commission (Austrade); the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO); and the Office of Parliamentary Counsel (OPC).
In her second reading speech, the Attorney-General, Michelle Rowland stated that the existing arrangements for these statutory office holders ‘have limited provisions for accountability where conduct or performance are unacceptable’:
The amendments would expand and clarify the grounds for termination of the statutory office holders and introduce a power to suspend relevant office holders from their duties …
These amendments will ensure statutory office holders with direct management responsibilities for staff can be removed from office where their behaviour is considered serious misconduct.
Statutory office holders should also be held accountable for their performance. If their performance is unsatisfactory, then the government should have options to terminate them from their position.
Structure of the Bill
Schedule 1 of the Bill would amend the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Act 1982 (ACIAR Act), the Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985 (Austrade Act) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 (Safeguards Act).
Schedule 2 of the Bill would amend the Parliamentary Counsel Act 1970 (OPC Act).
Background
Statutory office holders
A statutory office holder (SOH) is a person appointed to a specific position established by legislation.
The relevant legislation sets out distinct functions to be performed and specific powers to be exercised by the SOH with a degree of independence from the direct control of the Government. Typically, functions and powers may include investigation, regulation, or other specialist roles, particularly of a technical nature. Provisions in legislation will also include arrangements for appointment (including tenure) and termination.
Subject to specific regulations or express exclusions, SOH are bound by the Code of Conduct in the Public Service Act 1999 (section 14) and the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act), which contains governance and accountability rules for the use of public resources.
This Bill would amend four Acts that establish SOH positions that perform CEO-type roles. This is in contrast to other types of SOH positions that may include, for example, appointees to statutory committees.
Tenure of office and reappointments
Appointment to an SOH position is by a minister or the Governor-General. For most SOH positions, legislation generally permits an appointment period of up to 5 years, usually with the possibility of reappointment. In some cases, the second appointment must be less than 5 years.
Suspension of appointment
The Acts Interpretation Act 1901 provides an authority to suspend or remove a SOH. Subsection 33(4) provides that ‘where an Act confers upon any person or authority a power to make appointments to any office or place, the power shall be construed as including … a power to remove or suspend any person appointed, and to appoint another person temporarily in the place of any person so suspended …’. Subsection 33(4) further provides that:
… where the power of such person or authority to make any such appointment is only exercisable upon the recommendation or subject to the approval or consent of some other person or authority, such power to make an appointment to act in an office or place or such power of removal shall only be exercisable upon the recommendation or subject to the approval or consent of such other person or authority.
Section 28 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 provides an example of a circumstance in which the appointing authority (in this case, the Governor-General) must follow a process that includes the concurrence of another authority (the Parliament).
Termination, and grounds for termination
The legislation under which a SOH is appointed or holds office will usually contain provisions relating to the circumstances in which a SOH may be removed from office. Typically, grounds for termination include misbehaviour, physical/mental incapacity, bankruptcy, outside employment and failure to disclose interests.
Legislation that includes ‘unsatisfactory performance’ or similar as a ground for termination for a SOH includes Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 subsection 44(3), Australian Research Council Act 2001 subsection 40A(3), Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority Act 2008 subsection 32(2), Creative Australia Act 2023 paragraph 72(1)(c), Housing Australia Act 2018 paragraph 25(e), Safe Work Australia Act 2008 subsection 57(3) and Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985 subsection 59(3).
Ministerial directions
Commonwealth legislation often includes provision for a minister to give general directions about the performance of functions to SOHs. Such provisions are often qualified to clarify that directions must be general in nature and must not relate to individual people or cases.
The capacity to make ministerial directions can reflect the relative independence of a SOH from government control. For example, the Attorney-General may give directions and guidelines to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (subject to certain transparency provisions) (section 8 of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983) but there is no provision in the National Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2022 for the Attorney-General to give directions to the National Anti-Corruption Commissioner.
Recent developments involving entities affected by the Bill
In recent months there have been adverse audit findings or other criticisms of 3 of the 4 entities affected by the Bill, as outlined below. However, it is not clear that these issues have led to the current Bill nor whether governance changes proposed in the Bill would necessarily have prevented the reported shortcomings.
ACIAR
The Australian Government Organisations Register (AGOR) describes ACIAR as the Australian Government’s specialist agricultural research-for-development agency within the Australian aid program. In Audits of the Financial Statements of Australian Government Entities for the Period Ended 30 June 2025, the Auditor-General noted in relation to ACIAR:
Section 83 of the Australian Constitution states that money cannot be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) except under an appropriation made by law. During 2024-25 potential breaches of section 83 of the Constitution were identified. These potential breaches related to departmental and administered employee entitlements being misclassified and the incorrect funding being used for associated payments. [p. 139] [emphasis added]
ACIAR was not the only agency identified in the report as breaching section 83.
OPC
AGOR describes OPC as the Commonwealth's principal provider of professional legislative drafting and publishing services. In Procurement and Contract Management of the New Federal Register of Legislation Project the Auditor-General reported in December 2025 on OPC’s development of a new Federal Register of Legislation, the authorised whole-of-government website for Commonwealth legislation and related documents. The report found:
The new Federal Register of Legislation was launched on 1 January 2024, four years later than planned and at an estimated cost more than double the original budget. … OPC did not fully comply with the CPRs [Commonwealth Procurement Rules] and did not demonstrate the achievement of value for money. … AusTender reporting requirements specified in the CPRs were not met for nine of the 13 procurements. [T]here was no written contract for three of the procurements (23 per cent) and the contract for a further nine procurements (69 per cent) did not include performance requirements. [pp. 8, 9]
The report also observed that ‘OPC’s approach to managing probity risks and procurement record keeping was not to an appropriate standard’:
The ANAO identified that there was at least one instance where a conflict of interest existed but had not been declared. Specifically, a member of the evaluation panel was related to, and engaged socially with, one of the candidates. The decision-maker was not advised of this probity issue and there were no records documenting how this conflict had been managed. This procurement process resulted in the award of two contracts for back end developers valued at $253,440 and $284,449. … A probity plan was documented, as a schedule to the procurement evaluation plan, for one of the procurements. There was no probity plan documented for the remaining 12 contracts examined. [p. 31] [emphasis added]
Austrade
AGOR notes that Austrade assists Australian businesses, education institutions, tourism operators, governments and citizens to develop international markets, promote international education, and strengthen Australia's tourism industry.
An activity administered by Austrade is the Export Market Development Grant (EMDG) program. Previously a reimbursement scheme, since 2020 the EMDG has been providing grants to Australian Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and their representative bodies to market and promote their goods and services globally and undertake export training. In September 2025, ABC News reported:
Austrade is facing criticism of its grants scheme for exporters, which last year changed to a "first-come, first-served" application process.
Tens of millions of dollars in funding to help Australian businesses access overseas markets was exhausted within hours under the new tiered system, industry consultants tell ABC News.
Policy position of non-government parties/independents
The Bill was debated in the House of Representatives on 3 March 2026 (Hansard - House of Representatives 3 March 2026, pp. 6-8 and 98-105) and passed on the voices on 4 March 2026 (p. 5).
Speaking for the Opposition, Julian Leeser stated that the Coalition would not oppose the Bill’s second reading in the House but will seek a Senate committee referral to scrutinise the Bill ‘before finalising our position’.
This bill is presented as a governance modernisation measure, aligning certain statutory office holders with contemporary accountability standards. … Individually, many of these elements are not unprecedented. The concern is the combined effect and what it does to the balance of power. Taken together, this bill creates a clearer executive pathway: the minister can set the standards, assess performance, suspend and ultimately terminate. In other words, the powers are transferred from being clearly set out by the parliament to being set by the relevant minister, all without strong parliamentary oversight. A critical point is that several of these levers were deliberately placed outside strong parliamentary oversight. For example, the performance standards are not legislative instruments, they're not disallowable and they're not required to be published or tabled, and suspension decisions for most entities are not required to be tabled. So, while parliament passes the framework, the executive gains greater practical control over how key accountability thresholds are set and applied. …
We're not opposing accountability, but the questions we need to ask are: What problem is this bill actually solving? Why only these four agencies,why them, and why now? Why are the new performance standards not subject to tabling, publication or disallowance? Are the suspension and termination safeguards strong enough to protect procedural fairness and independence? Does this architecture preserve the right balance between executive control and parliamentary oversight? That's why we're not opposing the bill's second reading but we are seeking committee scrutiny before finalising our position. [emphasis added]
Independent MP, Allegra Spender stated:
This legislation, I believe, is perfectly unobjectionable. … The question I have for the government is: at a time when inflation is high, when productivity is in the doldrums, when house prices mean young people are struggling to get into the housing market and achieve the same outcomes as their parents, when social cohesion is under pressure, when trust in government is at a low ebb and when Australia's clean energy transition is happening more slowly than we would like, is this legislation really the best use of our parliamentary time? Is tweaking the employment contracts of four government appointed officials really an issue at the top of the government's precious parliamentary agenda? I would genuinely hope that this sort of bill would come in a big omnibus bill of uncontentious pieces of legislation that we could push through parliament, so we can focus on more important things, but in this case it hasn't. [emphasis added]
On 5 March 2025, the Senate Selection of Bills Committee reported it was unable to reach agreement on the referral of the Bill to a committee. A Government amendment to not refer the Bill to committee was passed in the Senate. In the response, the Opposition unsuccessfully moved an amendment to refer the Bill to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee. In arguing for the Opposition amendment, Senator Anne Ruston stated:
A committee inquiry would allow the parliament to test whether these changes are appropriate and consistent with governance arrangements that apply to other Commonwealth statutory office holders. A Senate inquiry will provide an opportunity to clarify whether specific operational and management issues prompted these reforms and whether the government intends to extend similar measures to other statutory bodies into the future …
Finally, a Senate inquiry would allow affected agencies to provide submissions and evidence to ensure the parliament has a full understanding of the policy, rationale and implications of this bill.
Key issues and provisions
The SOH positions affected by the Bill are: ACIAR CEO, ASNO Director-General (ASNO DG), Austrade CEO, and OPC’s First Parliamentary Counsel (1PC) and Second Parliamentary Counsel (2PC).
Tenure of office
The ASNO DG and Austrade CEO are currently appointed for periods not exceeding 5 years.
For the ACIAR CEO and OPC’s 1PC and 2PC, the Bill would reduce the maximum term of appointment from 7 years to 5 years (item 17 of Schedule 1 and item 3 of Schedule 2). This approach would align these 3 SOH positions with the majority of SOH positions. The Explanatory Memorandum notes that the 5-year maximum terms would apply to appointments and reappointments made on or after the provisions commence (pp. 15, 29).
Suspension
As discussed above, subsection 33(4) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 provides authority for a Minister to suspend or remove a SOH. The Bill would add additional requirements in relation to several SOH positions.
The Bill would enable the Minister to suspend the appointments of the ACIAR CEO, Austrade CEO and ASNO DG for 3 months ‘if the Minister believes that the suspension would be in the interests of’ ACIAR, Austrade or ASNO, respectively (items 4, 22 and 33 of Schedule 1). This period may be extended by up to 3 months, or by up to 12 months if an inquiry is being undertaken into the conduct of the relevant SOH, which may include whether the SOH has breached the APS Code of Conduct, or a corruption investigation (within the meaning of the National Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2022) involving the conduct of the SOH. If the Minister suspends the appointment of the ASNO DG or extends a period of suspension applying to the ASNO DG, the Minister must publish notice of the suspension or extension.
The provisions would apply regardless of whether the SOH was appointed before, on or after commencement of the amendments (items 5, 23 and 35 of Schedule 1).
The Explanatory Memorandum states that the office holders would be paid remuneration and allowances while suspended (pp. 8, 17, 23) and that the new powers for suspension of duties ‘are consistent with suspension clauses in other Commonwealth statutes for statutory office holders’ (p. 4).
Termination and performance standards
Additional grounds for termination
The Bill would add additional grounds for termination for the SOH positions although, as explained below, it would not add the same provisions to every Act. However, the Explanatory Memorandum notes that for all affected SOH positions ‘procedural fairness requirements would apply in relation to any proposed termination decision’ (pp. 10, 19, 25, 32).
The Bill would expand and clarify the grounds on which the appointments of OPC SOHs may be terminated. As noted by the Explanatory Memorandum:
Termination would remain mandatory in respect of bankruptcy-related grounds. The new list of discretionary grounds for termination would comprise conviction of an indictable offence, physical or mental incapacity, serious misconduct, unsatisfactory performance, absence from duty in certain circumstances, engaging in paid work outside official duties without the consent of the Minister and failing to disclose interests under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act). [p. 2] [emphasis added]
These provisions would bring the OPC positions into alignment with usual grounds for termination of other SOH positions, although some Acts refer to ‘paid employment’ and some refer to ‘paid work’.
Of the Acts affected by the Bill, only the Austrade Act currently includes reference to the Minister terminating the appointment of the SOH on the grounds of unsatisfactory performance, with current subsection 59(3) providing the Minister must terminate the Austrade CEO’s appointment if, in the Minister’s opinion, their performance ‘has been unsatisfactory for a significant period of time’. The Bill would amend this provision to provide the Minister with discretion as to whether to terminate the CEO’s appointment for unsatisfactory performance (item 9 of Schedule 1).
The Bill would also add ‘unsatisfactory performance’ as a ground where the Governor-General may terminate the appointments of the ACIAR CEO, and OPC’s 1PC and 2PC (item 25 of Schedule 1 and item 12 of Schedule 2). This would be where, in the Minister’s opinion, having regard to any performance standard (discussed below), the performance of the SOH had been unsatisfactory.
ASNO performs domestic regulatory functions to ensure that Australia is in compliance with international treaty commitments in relation to weapons of mass destruction and non-proliferation. The Explanatory Memorandum observes that:
There are a range of international obligations and guidance which require a high degree of regulatory independence for the Australian Safeguards Office and the Director of Safeguards. Consistent with these requirements, the Bill does not propose a ground for terminating the appointment of the Director of Safeguards on the basis of unsatisfactory performance. [p. 25] [emphasis added]
Termination of the ASNO Director is dealt with in existing section 48 of the Safeguards Act. Item 36 of Schedule 1 to the Bill would repeal and replace subsection 48(1) to retain misbehaviour, or physical or mental incapacity as grounds for termination and enable the Governor-General to terminate the appointment of the Director of Safeguards (ie the ASNO DG) for ‘serious misconduct’. The Explanatory Memorandum explains that, under new subsection 48(1A) at item 39 of Schedule 1, conduct or behaviour amounts to serious misconduct if:
the conduct or behaviour constitutes a breach of the APS Code of Conduct, and the Minister is satisfied that the breach is serious enough to justify termination of the Director’s appointment, or
an investigation report (within the meaning of the [National Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2022]) includes a finding or opinion that the Director of Safeguards has engaged, is engaging or will engage in corrupt conduct (within the meaning of that Act) or conduct that could constitute or involve corrupt conduct. [p. 26]
Performance standards
As noted above, the Bill will introduce a termination ground where ‘in the Minister’s opinion, having regard to the performance standard (if any)’ the performance of the relevant SOH ‘has been unsatisfactory’.
The Bill would enable relevant ministers, in writing, to set performance standards for the ACIAR CEO, the Austrade CEO, and OPC’s 1PC and 2PC, although the relevant ministers would not be obliged to determine such performance standards (items 2 and 20 of Schedule 1 and item 6 of Schedule 2). Provisions to enable ministers to set performance standards for SOH positions would appear to be novel.
The Explanatory Memorandum outlines how the performance standard could form the basis of a termination process for the Austrade CEO (a similar process is outlined for the ACIAR CEO (p. 19) and the OPC SOH positions (p. 36)):
Before the Minister could exercise the discretion to terminate the appointment of the CEO of Austrade [on the basis of unsatisfactory performance], the Minister must have formed the view that the CEO’s performance has been unsatisfactory, having regard to any performance standard that exists. Unsatisfactory performance is not required to endure for any particular period of time. A performance standard would support the Minister in reaching an opinion about the performance of the CEO by providing an objective measure against which to assess that performance. [p. 11] [emphasis added]
Any performance standard made would not be a legislative instrument or a disallowable instrument. The Explanatory Memorandum contends that:
Treatment of a performance standard as a legislative instrument, which would entail meeting publication, registration and tabling requirements under the Legislation Act, could hinder appointment arrangements and performance, as well as undermine the discretion of the Minister to form an opinion about termination. [p. 16, with almost identical wording at pp. 7 and 30].
The provisions contain no obligation for ministers or the relevant SOHs to publish, or make publicly available, any performance standard which is made.
Ministerial directions
Item 1 of Schedule 2 to the Bill would introduce a new power for the Minister to give written directions to OPC about the performance of its functions (proposed section 3A of the OPC Act). As discussed above, such directions ‘must be of a general nature only’.
The OPC must comply with any ministerial directions, however this will not apply to the extent that it relates to the 1PC’s performance of functions or exercise of powers under the Public Service Act or the PGPA Act.
As with the performance standards, any directions made will not be legislative instruments and accordingly will not be subject to parliamentary scrutiny or disallowance.
Notably, the Minister ‘may’ make public or give notice regarding a direction in ‘any manner the Minister considers appropriate’. This indicates that transparency concerning the content of any directions made may depend on ministerial discretion. This is not the case for some other SOHs. For example, the Agriculture Minister may give general directions to the Director of Biosecurity by legislative instrument under section 543 of the Biosecurity Act 2015. While these directions are not disallowable instruments they would be made available on the Federal Register of Legislation.
Links
The links to the Bill, its Explanatory Memorandum and second reading speeches can be found on the home page for the Commonwealth Entities Legislation Amendment Bill 2026 or through the Australian Parliament website.
When Bills have been passed and have received Royal Assent, they become Acts, which can be found at the Federal Register of Legislation website.
All hyperlinks in this Bills Digest are correct as of March 2026.
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An Act to amend the law relating to the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, the Australian Safeguards Office, the Australian Trade and Investment Commission and the Office of Parliamentary Counsel, and for related purposes
Contents
1 Short title 2
2 Commencement 2
3 Schedules 2
Schedule 1,Foreign Affairs and Trade agencies 4
Part 1,CEO of Austrade 4
Division 1,Performance standard 4
Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985 4
Division 2,Suspension of appointment 4
Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985 4
Division 3,Termination of appointment 7
Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985 7
Division 4,Definition of serious misconduct 8
Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985 8
Division 5,Engaging in paid work 9
Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985 9
Part 2,CEO of the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research 11
Division 1,Tenure of office 11
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Act 1982 11
Division 2,Performance standard 11
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Act 1982 11
Division 3,Suspension of appointment 12
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Act 1982 12
Division 4,Termination of appointment 14
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Act 1982 14
Division 5,Definition of serious misconduct 15
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Act 1982 15
Division 6,Engaging in paid work 16
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Act 1982 16
An Act to amend the law relating to the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, the Australian Safeguards Office, the Australian Trade and Investment Commission and the Office of Parliamentary Counsel, and for related purposes
[Assented to 26 March 2026]
The Parliament of Australia enacts:
1 Short title
This Act is the Commonwealth Entities Legislation Amendment Act 2026.
2 Commencement
(1) Each provision of this Act specified in column 1 of the table commences, or is taken to have commenced, in accordance with column 2 of the table. Any other statement in column 2 has effect according to its terms.
Commencement information
Column 1
Column 2
Column 3
Provisions
Commencement
Date/Details
Sections 1 to 3 and anything in this Act not elsewhere covered by this table
The day this Act receives the Royal Assent.
26 March 2026
Schedule 1
The day after this Act receives the Royal Assent.
27 March 2026
Schedule 2, Parts 1 to 3
The day after the end of the period of 14 days beginning on the day this Act receives the Royal Assent.
9 April 2026
Schedule 2, Parts 4 to 6
Immediately after the commencement of the provisions covered by table item 3.
9 April 2026
Note: This table relates only to the provisions of this Act as originally enacted. It will not be amended to deal with any later amendments of this Act.
(2) Any information in column 3 of the table is not part of this Act. Information may be inserted in this column, or information in it may be edited, in any published version of this Act.
3 Schedules
Legislation that is specified in a Schedule to this Act is amended or repealed as set out in the applicable items in the Schedule concerned, and any other item in a Schedule to this Act has effect according to its terms.
Schedule 1,Foreign Affairs and Trade agencies
Part 1,CEO of Austrade
Division 1,Performance standard
Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985
1 Subsection 3(1)
Insert:
performance standard means the performance standard determined under subsection 51(5).
2 At the end of section 51
Add:
Performance standard
(5) The Minister may, in writing, determine a performance standard for the CEO.
Note: Unsatisfactory performance may lead to termination of the CEO’s appointment: see subsection 59(3).
(6) The performance standard is not a legislative instrument.
Division 2,Suspension of appointment
Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985
3 Paragraph 56(b)
After “CEO”, insert “is suspended from office,”.
4 After section 58
Insert:
58A Suspension
(1) The Minister may, by notice in writing, suspend the appointment of the CEO if the Minister believes that the suspension would be in the interests of the Commission.
(2) The appointment is suspended for such period (not exceeding 3 months) as the Minister considers appropriate in all of the circumstances. That period must be specified in the notice.
(3) The suspension of the appointment of the CEO does not affect any entitlement of the CEO to be paid remuneration and allowances.
Extension of suspension
(4) Before the end of the period of suspension (including that period as previously extended under this subsection), the Minister may, by notice in writing, extend the period of suspension if:
(a) the Minister believes that the extension would be in the interests of the Commission; or
(b) subsection (7) applies.
(5) The suspension is extended for such period as the Minister considers appropriate in all of the circumstances. The period of suspension, as extended, must be specified in the notice.
(6) The period of suspension, as extended, must not exceed:
(a) if subsection (7) applies,12 months; or
(b) otherwise,3 months.
(7) For the purposes of paragraphs (4)(b) and (6)(a), this subsection applies if:
(a) when the Minister extends the period of suspension:
(i) an inquiry to which subsection (8) applies is being conducted; and
(ii) the Minister is satisfied that extending the period of suspension is necessary for the purposes of the conduct of the inquiry, the Minister considering the findings or report of the inquiry or action being taken in response to the findings or report; or
(b) both:
(i) an inquiry to which subsection (8) applies was being conducted at any time in the 4 weeks before the Minister extends the period of suspension; and
(ii) when the Minister extends the period of suspension, the Minister is satisfied that extending the period of suspension is necessary for the purposes of the Minister considering the findings or report of the inquiry or action being taken in response to the findings or report.
(8) This subsection applies to an inquiry if:
(a) the inquiry commences before the end of 3 months starting at the start of the period of suspension; and
(b) the inquiry is any of the following:
(i) an inquiry by the Australian Public Service Commissioner under section 41A of the Public Service Act 1999 into whether the CEO has breached the APS Code of Conduct;
(ii) a corruption investigation (within the meaning of the National Anti‑Corruption Commission Act 2022) into a corruption issue involving conduct of the CEO;
(iii) an inquiry, conducted at the request or direction of the Minister, into whether the CEO’s conduct or behaviour amounts to serious misconduct by the CEO.
(9) Subsections (4) to (8) do not limit the application of subsection 33(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 in relation to a notice under subsection (1) of this section.
5 Application of amendments
The amendments made by this Division apply in relation to suspending an appointment if the suspension occurs on or after the commencement of this item, whether the appointment was made before, on or after that commencement.
Division 3,Termination of appointment
Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985
6 Subsection 59(1)
Repeal the subsection, substitute:
(1) The Minister may terminate the appointment of the CEO:
(a) for misbehaviour; or
(b) if the CEO is unable to perform the duties of the CEO’s office because of physical or mental incapacity; or
(c) if the CEO’s conduct or behaviour amounts to serious misconduct by the CEO.
7 Subsection 59(2)
Omit “may”, substitute “must”.
8 At the end of subsection 59(2)
Add:
; or (d) the CEO fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with section 29 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (which deals with the duty to disclose interests) or rules made for the purposes of that section.
9 Subsection 59(3)
Repeal the subsection, substitute:
(3) The Minister may terminate the appointment of the CEO if, in the Minister’s opinion, having regard to the performance standard (if any), the performance of the CEO has been unsatisfactory.
10 Application of amendments
(1) In this item:
new law means the Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985, as amended by this Part.
(2) Paragraph 59(1)(c) of the new law applies in relation to serious misconduct that occurs on or after the commencement of this item. For the purposes of this subitem, serious misconduct to which paragraph 59(1A)(c) of the new law applies is taken to occur when the investigation report is given to the Minister.
(3) Item 7 of this Schedule applies:
(a) to the extent it relates to paragraph 59(2)(a) of the Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985,in relation to a matter mentioned in that paragraph that occurs on or after the commencement of this item; and
(b) to the extent it relates to paragraph 59(2)(b) of the Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985,in relation to:
(i) an absence of 14 consecutive days if any of the 14 days occur on or after the commencement of this item; or
(ii) an absence of 28 days in any 12 months if any of the 28 days occur on or after the commencement of this item; and
(c) to the extent it relates to paragraph 59(2)(c) of the Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985,in relation to engaging in paid work (including paid employment) on or after the commencement of this item.
(4) Paragraph 59(2)(d) of the new law applies in relation to a failure to comply that occurs on or after the commencement of this item.
(5) Subsection 59(3) of the new law applies in relation to the performance of the CEO during a period if all of the period occurs on or after the commencement of this item.
(6) For the purposes of the amendments made by this Division, it does not matter whether the CEO was appointed before, on or after the commencement of this item.
Division 4,Definition of serious misconduct
Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985
11 Subsection 3(1)
Insert:
APS Code of Conduct means the Code of Conduct (within the meaning of the Public Service Act 1999).
serious misconduct has a meaning affected by subsection 59(1A).
12 After subsection 59(1)
Insert:
(1A) Without limiting the circumstances in which the CEO’s conduct or behaviour amounts to serious misconduct by the CEO, the CEO’s conduct or behaviour amounts to serious misconduct by the CEO in the following circumstances:
(a) both:
(i) the conduct or behaviour constitutes a breach of the APS Code of Conduct; and
(ii) the Minister is satisfied that the breach is serious enough to justify termination of the CEO’s appointment;
(b) the conduct or behaviour constitutes unlawful discrimination (within the meaning of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986);
(c) an investigation report (within the meaning of the National Anti‑Corruption Commission Act 2022) includes a finding or opinion that the CEO has engaged, is engaging or will engage in:
(i) corrupt conduct (within the meaning of that Act); or
(ii) conduct that could constitute or involve corrupt conduct.
Division 5,Engaging in paid work
Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985
13 Subsection 3(1)
Insert:
paid work means work for financial gain or reward (whether as an employee, a self‑employed person or otherwise).
14 Section 55
Repeal the section, substitute:
55 Other paid work
The CEO must not engage in paid work outside the duties of the CEO without the Minister’s approval.
15 Paragraph 59(2)(c)
Omit “employment”, substitute “work”.
16 Application of amendments
The amendments made by this Division apply in relation to the CEO engaging in paid work (including paid employment) on or after the commencement of this item, whether the CEO was appointed before, on or after that commencement.
Part 2,CEO of the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research
Division 1,Tenure of office
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Act 1982
17 Subsection 24(2)
Omit “7 years”, substitute “5 years”.
18 Application of amendments
The amendment made by this Division applies in relation to an appointment that is made on or after the commencement of this item.
Division 2,Performance standard
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Act 1982
19 Section 3
Insert:
performance standard means the performance standard determined under subsection 24(4).
20 At the end of section 24
Add:
Performance standard
(4) The Minister may, in writing, determine a performance standard for the CEO.
Note: Unsatisfactory performance may lead to termination of the CEO’s appointment: see subsection 29C(3).
(5) The performance standard is not a legislative instrument.
Division 3,Suspension of appointment
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Act 1982
21 Paragraph 29(b)
After “CEO”, insert “is suspended from office,”.
22 After section 29B
Insert:
29BA Suspension of appointment
(1) The Minister may, by notice in writing, suspend the appointment of the CEO if the Minister believes that the suspension would be in the interests of the Centre.
(2) The appointment is suspended for such period (not exceeding 3 months) as the Minister considers appropriate in all of the circumstances. That period must be specified in the notice.
(3) The suspension of the appointment of the CEO does not affect any entitlement of the CEO to be paid remuneration and allowances.
Extension of suspension
(4) Before the end of the period of suspension (including that period as previously extended under this subsection), the Minister may, by notice in writing, extend the period of suspension if:
(a) the Minister believes that the extension would be in the interests of the Centre; or
(b) subsection (7) applies.
(5) The suspension is extended for such period as the Minister considers appropriate in all of the circumstances. The period of suspension, as extended, must be specified in the notice.
(6) The period of suspension, as extended, must not exceed:
(a) if subsection (7) applies,12 months; or
(b) otherwise,3 months.
(7) For the purposes of paragraphs (4)(b) and (6)(a), this subsection applies if:
(a) when the Minister extends the period of suspension:
(i) an inquiry to which subsection (8) applies is being conducted; and
(ii) the Minister is satisfied that extending the period of suspension is necessary for the purposes of the conduct of the inquiry, the Minister considering the findings or report of the inquiry or action being taken in response to the findings or report; or
(b) both:
(i) an inquiry to which subsection (8) applies was being conducted at any time in the 4 weeks before the Minister extends the period of suspension; and
(ii) when the Minister extends the period of suspension, the Minister is satisfied that extending the period of suspension is necessary for the purposes of the Minister considering the findings or report of the inquiry or action being taken in response to the findings or report.
(8) This subsection applies to an inquiry if:
(a) the inquiry commences before the end of 3 months starting at the start of the period of suspension; and
(b) the inquiry is any of the following:
(i) an inquiry by the Australian Public Service Commissioner under section 41A of the Public Service Act 1999 into whether the CEO has breached the APS Code of Conduct;
(ii) a corruption investigation (within the meaning of the National Anti‑Corruption Commission Act 2022) into a corruption issue involving conduct of the CEO;
(iii) an inquiry, conducted at the request or direction of the Minister, into whether the CEO’s conduct or behaviour amounts to serious misconduct by the CEO.
(9) Subsections (4) to (8) do not limit the application of subsection 33(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 in relation to a notice under subsection (1) of this section.
23 Application of amendments
The amendments made by this Division apply in relation to suspending an appointment if the suspension occurs on or after the commencement of this item, whether the appointment was made before, on or after that commencement.
Division 4,Termination of appointment
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Act 1982
24 Subsection 29C(1)
Repeal the subsection, substitute:
(1) The Governor‑General may terminate the appointment of the CEO:
(a) for misbehaviour; or
(b) if the CEO is unable to perform the duties of the CEO’s office because of physical or mental incapacity; or
(c) if the CEO’s conduct or behaviour amounts to serious misconduct by the CEO.
25 At the end of section 29C
Add:
(3) The Governor‑General may terminate the appointment of the CEO if, in the Minister’s opinion, having regard to the performance standard (if any), the performance of the CEO has been unsatisfactory.
26 Application of amendments
(1) In this item:
new law means the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Act 1982, as amended by this Part.
(2) Paragraph 29C(1)(c) of the new law applies in relation to serious misconduct that occurs on or after the commencement of this item. For the purposes of this subitem, serious misconduct to which paragraph 29C(1A)(c) of the new law applies is taken to occur when the investigation report is given to the Minister.
(3) Subsection 29C(3) of the new law applies in relation to the performance of the CEO during a period if all of the period occurs on or after the commencement of this item.
(4) For the purposes of the amendments made by this Division, it does not matter whether the CEO was appointed before, on or after the commencement of this item.
Division 5,Definition of serious misconduct
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Act 1982
27 Section 3
Insert:
APS Code of Conduct means the Code of Conduct (within the meaning of the Public Service Act 1999).
serious misconduct has a meaning affected by subsection 29C(1A).
28 After subsection 29C(1)
Insert:
(1A) Without limiting the circumstances in which the CEO’s conduct or behaviour amounts to serious misconduct by the CEO, the CEO’s conduct or behaviour amounts to serious misconduct by the CEO in the following circumstances:
(a) both:
(i) the conduct or behaviour constitutes a breach of the APS Code of Conduct; and
(ii) the Minister is satisfied that the breach is serious enough to justify termination of the CEO’s appointment;
(b) the conduct or behaviour constitutes unlawful discrimination (within the meaning of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986);
(c) an investigation report (within the meaning of the National Anti‑Corruption Commission Act 2022) includes a finding or opinion that the CEO has engaged, is engaging or will engage in:
(i) corrupt conduct (within the meaning of that Act); or
(ii) conduct that could constitute or involve corrupt conduct.
Division 6,Engaging in paid work
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Act 1982
29 Section 3
Insert:
paid work means work for financial gain or reward (whether as an employee, a self‑employed person or otherwise).
30 Section 28
Repeal the section, substitute:
28 Other paid work
The CEO must not engage in paid work outside the duties of the CEO without the Minister’s approval.
31 Paragraph 29C(2)(c)
Omit “employment”, substitute “work”.
32 Application of amendments
The amendments made by this Division apply in relation to the CEO engaging in paid work (including paid employment) on or after the commencement of this item, whether the CEO was appointed before, on or after that commencement.
Part 3,Director of Safeguards
Division 1,Suspension of appointment
Nuclear Non‑Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987
33 After section 47
Insert:
47A Suspension of appointment
(1) The Minister may, by notice in writing, suspend the appointment of the Director if the Minister believes that the suspension would be in the interests of the Australian Safeguards Office.
(2) The appointment is suspended for such period (not exceeding 3 months) as the Minister considers appropriate in all of the circumstances. That period must be specified in the notice.
(3) The suspension of the appointment of the Director does not affect any entitlement of the Director to be paid remuneration and allowances.
Extension of suspension
(4) Before the end of the period of suspension (including that period as previously extended under this subsection), the Minister may, by notice in writing, extend the period of suspension if:
(a) the Minister believes that the extension would be in the interests of the Australian Safeguards Office; or
(b) subsection (7) applies.
(5) The suspension is extended for such period as the Minister considers appropriate in all of the circumstances. The period of suspension, as extended, must be specified in the notice.
(6) The period of suspension, as extended, must not exceed:
(a) if subsection (7) applies,12 months; or
(b) otherwise,3 months.
(7) For the purposes of paragraphs (4)(b) and (6)(a), this subsection applies if:
(a) when the Minister extends the period of suspension:
(i) an inquiry to which subsection (8) applies is being conducted; and
(ii) the Minister is satisfied that extending the period of suspension is necessary for the purposes of the conduct of the inquiry, the Minister considering the findings or report of the inquiry or action being taken in response to the findings or report; or
(b) both:
(i) an inquiry to which subsection (8) applies was being conducted at any time in the 4 weeks before the Minister extends the period of suspension; and
(ii) when the Minister extends the period of suspension, the Minister is satisfied that extending the period of suspension is necessary for the purposes of the Minister considering the findings or report of the inquiry or action being taken in response to the findings or report.
(8) This subsection applies to an inquiry if:
(a) the inquiry commences before the end of 3 months starting at the start of the period of suspension; and
(b) the inquiry is any of the following:
(i) an inquiry by the Australian Public Service Commissioner, under regulations made for the purposes of paragraph 41(2)(p) of the Public Service Act 1999, into whether the Director has breached the APS Code of Conduct;
(ii) if, as mentioned in paragraph 48(1A)(a) of this Act, the Australian Public Service Commissioner has determined that a breach of the APS Code of Conduct by the Director has occurred,an inquiry, conducted at the request or direction of the Minister, into whether the breach is serious enough to justify termination of the Director’s appointment;
(iii) a corruption investigation (within the meaning of the National Anti‑Corruption Commission Act 2022) into a corruption issue involving conduct of the Director.
(9) Subsections (4) to (8) do not limit the application of subsection 33(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 in relation to a notice under subsection (1) of this section.
Public notice
(10) If the Minister:
(a) suspends the appointment of the Director under subsection (1); or
(b) extends a period of suspension under subsection (4);
the Minister must publish notice of the suspension or extension.
34 Paragraph 50(b)
After “Director” (first occurring), insert “is suspended from office,”.
35 Application of amendments
The amendments made by this Division apply in relation to suspending an appointment if the suspension occurs on or after the commencement of this item, whether the appointment was made before, on or after that commencement.
Division 2,Termination of appointment
Nuclear Non‑Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987
36 Subsection 48(1)
Repeal the subsection, substitute:
(1) The Governor‑General may terminate the appointment of the Director:
(a) for misbehaviour; or
(b) if the Director is unable to perform the duties of the Director’s office because of physical or mental incapacity; or
(c) if the Director’s conduct or behaviour amounts to serious misconduct by the Director.
37 Application of amendments
(1) In this item:
new law means the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987, as amended by this Part.
(2) Paragraph 48(1)(c) of the new law applies in relation to serious misconduct that occurs on or after the commencement of this item. For the purposes of this subitem:
(a) serious misconduct to which paragraph 48(1A)(a) of the new law applies is taken to occur when the determination that a breach of the APS Code of Conduct by the Director has occurred is made; and
(b) serious misconduct to which paragraph 48(1A)(b) of the new law applies is taken to occur when the investigation report is given to the Minister.
(3) For the purposes of the amendments made by this Division, it does not matter whether the Director was appointed before, on or after the commencement of this item.
Division 3,Definition of serious misconduct
Nuclear Non‑Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987
38 Subsection 4(1)
Insert:
APS Code of Conduct means the Code of Conduct (within the meaning of the Public Service Act 1999).
serious misconduct has the meaning given by subsection 48(1A).
39 After subsection 48(1)
Insert:
(1A) The Director’s conduct or behaviour amounts to serious misconduct by the Director if:
(a) all of the following subparagraphs apply:
(i) regulations made for the purposes of paragraph 41(2)(p) of the Public Service Act 1999 confer on the Australian Public Service Commissioner the function of inquiring into an alleged breach of the APS Code of Conduct by the Director;
(ii) under those regulations, the Commissioner inquires into an alleged breach of the APS Code of Conduct by the Director and determines that a breach of the APS Code of Conduct by the Director has occurred;
(iii) the Minister is satisfied that the breach is serious enough to justify termination of the Director’s appointment; or
(b) an investigation report (within the meaning of the National Anti‑Corruption Commission Act 2022) includes a finding or opinion that the Director has engaged, is engaging or will engage in:
(i) corrupt conduct (within the meaning of that Act); or
(ii) conduct that could constitute or involve corrupt conduct.
Division 4,Engaging in paid work
Nuclear Non‑Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987
40 Subsection 4(1)
Insert:
paid work means work for financial gain or reward (whether as an employee, a self‑employed person or otherwise).
41 After section 45
Insert:
45A Other paid work
The Director must not engage in paid work outside the duties of the Director without the Minister’s approval.
42 Paragraph 48(2)(c)
Omit “employment”, substitute “work”.
43 Application of amendments
The amendments made by this Division apply in relation to the Director engaging in paid work (including paid employment) on or after the commencement of this item, whether the Director was appointed before, on or after that commencement.
Schedule 2,Office of Parliamentary Counsel
Part 1,Ministerial directions
Parliamentary Counsel Act 1970
1 After section 3
Insert:
3A Minister may give directions to Office of Parliamentary Counsel
(1) The Minister may give written directions to the Office of Parliamentary Counsel about the performance of its functions.
(2) A direction under subsection (1) must be of a general nature only.
(3) The Minister may publish or give notice of a direction under subsection (1) in any manner the Minister considers appropriate.
(4) The Office of Parliamentary Counsel must comply with a direction under subsection (1).
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply to the extent that the direction relates to the First Parliamentary Counsel’s performance of functions or exercise of powers under the following Acts in relation to the Office of Parliamentary Counsel:
(a) the Public Service Act 1999;
(b) the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013.
(6) A direction under subsection (1) is not a legislative instrument.
Part 2,Tenure of office
Parliamentary Counsel Act 1970
2 Subsection 5(1)
Omit “(1)”.
3 Subsection 5(1)
Omit “7 years”, substitute “5 years”.
4 Application of amendments
The amendment made by item 3 applies in relation to an appointment that is made on or after the commencement of this item.
Part 3,Performance standard
Parliamentary Counsel Act 1970
5 After section 1
Insert:
1A Definitions
In this Act:
performance standard means a performance standard determined under subsection 4(3).
6 At the end of section 4
Add:
Performance standard
(3) The Minister may, in writing, determine a performance standard for the First Parliamentary Counsel or a Second Parliamentary Counsel.
Note: Unsatisfactory performance may lead to termination of the First Parliamentary Counsel’s or a Second Parliamentary Counsel’s appointment: see subsection 10(4).
(4) A performance standard is not a legislative instrument.
Part 4,Termination of appointment
Parliamentary Counsel Act 1970
7 Subsection 10(1)
Repeal the subsection, substitute:
(1) The Governor‑General may terminate the appointment of the First Parliamentary Counsel or of a Second Parliamentary Counsel if:
(a) the First Parliamentary Counsel or Second Parliamentary Counsel is convicted of an indictable offence; or
(b) the First Parliamentary Counsel or Second Parliamentary Counsel is unable to perform the duties of the First Parliamentary Counsel’s or Second Parliamentary Counsel’s office because of physical or mental incapacity; or
(c) the First Parliamentary Counsel’s or Second Parliamentary Counsel’s conduct or behaviour amounts to serious misconduct by the First Parliamentary Counsel or Second Parliamentary Counsel.
8 Subsection 10(2)
Omit “shall”, substitute “must”.
9 Subsection 10(2)
After “if”, insert “the First Parliamentary Counsel or Second Parliamentary Counsel”.
10 Paragraphs 10(2)(a) and (b)
Repeal the paragraphs.
11 Paragraph 10(2)(c)
Repeal the paragraph, substitute:
(a) becomes bankrupt; or
(b) applies to take the benefit of any law for the relief of bankrupt or insolvent debtors; or
(c) compounds with the First Parliamentary Counsel’s or Second Parliamentary Counsel’s creditors; or
(d) makes an assignment of the First Parliamentary Counsel’s or Second Parliamentary Counsel’s remuneration for the benefit of the First Parliamentary Counsel’s or Second Parliamentary Counsel’s creditors.
12 At the end of section 10
Add:
(3) The Governor‑General may terminate the appointment of the First Parliamentary Counsel or of a Second Parliamentary Counsel if:
(a) the First Parliamentary Counsel or Second Parliamentary Counsel is absent, except on leave of absence, for:
(i) 5 consecutive days; or
(ii) 10 days in any 12 months; or
(b) the First Parliamentary Counsel or Second Parliamentary Counsel engages, except with the Minister’s approval, in paid work outside the duties of the First Parliamentary Counsel’s or Second Parliamentary Counsel’s office (see section 9); or
(c) the First Parliamentary Counsel or Second Parliamentary Counsel fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with section 29 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (which deals with the duty to disclose interests) or rules made for the purposes of that section.
(4) The Governor‑General may terminate the appointment of the First Parliamentary Counsel or of a Second Parliamentary Counsel if, in the Minister’s opinion, having regard to the performance standard (if any) for the First Parliamentary Counsel or Second Parliamentary Counsel, the performance of the First Parliamentary Counsel or Second Parliamentary Counsel has been unsatisfactory.
13 Application of amendments
(1) In this item:
new law means the Parliamentary Counsel Act 1970, as amended by this Schedule.
(2) Paragraph 10(1)(a) of the new law applies in relation to a conviction for an indictable offence if the conviction occurs on or after the commencement of this item, whether the offence occurred before, on or after that commencement.
(3) Paragraph 10(1)(c) of the new law applies in relation to serious misconduct that occurs on or after the commencement of this item. For the purposes of this subitem, serious misconduct to which paragraph 10(1A)(d) of the new law applies is taken to occur when the investigation report is given to the Minister.
(4) The repeal of paragraph 10(2)(a) of the Parliamentary Counsel Act 1970 by item 10 of this Schedule does not apply in relation to:
(a) an absence of 14 consecutive days if all of the 14 days occur before the commencement of this item; or
(b) an absence of 28 days in any 12 months if all of the 28 days occur before the commencement of this item.
(5) The repeal of paragraph 10(2)(b) of the Parliamentary Counsel Act 1970 by item 10 of this Schedule applies in relation to misbehaviour that occurs on or after the commencement of this item.
(6) Paragraph 10(3)(a) of the new law applies in relation to:
(a) an absence of 5 consecutive days if any of the 5 days occur on or after the commencement of this item; or
(b) an absence of 10 days in any 12 months if any of the 10 days occur on or after the commencement of this item.
(7) Paragraph 10(3)(b) of the new law applies in relation to engaging in paid work on or after the commencement of this item.
(8) Paragraph 10(3)(c) of the new law applies in relation to a failure to comply that occurs on or after the commencement of this item.
(9) Subsection 10(4) of the new law applies in relation to the performance of the First Parliamentary Counsel or a Second Parliamentary Counsel during a period if all of the period occurs on or after the commencement of this item.
(10) For the purposes of the amendments made by this Part, it does not matter whether a First Parliamentary Counsel or a Second Parliamentary Counsel was appointed before, on or after the commencement of this item.
Part 5,Definition of serious misconduct
Parliamentary Counsel Act 1970
14 Section 1A
Insert:
APS Code of Conduct means the Code of Conduct (within the meaning of the Public Service Act 1999).
serious misconduct has a meaning affected by subsection 10(1A).
15 After subsection 10(1)
Insert:
(1A) Without limiting the circumstances in which the First Parliamentary Counsel’s or a Second Parliamentary Counsel’s conduct or behaviour amounts to serious misconduct by the First Parliamentary Counsel or Second Parliamentary Counsel, the First Parliamentary Counsel’s or a Second Parliamentary Counsel’s conduct or behaviour amounts to serious misconduct by the First Parliamentary Counsel or Second Parliamentary Counsel in the following circumstances:
(a) both:
(i) the conduct or behaviour constitutes a breach of the APS Code of Conduct; and
(ii) the Minister is satisfied that the breach is serious enough to justify termination of the First Parliamentary Counsel’s or Second Parliamentary Counsel’s appointment;
(b) the conduct or behaviour constitutes unlawful discrimination (within the meaning of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986);
(c) the conduct or behaviour constitutes serious or repeated bullying or harassment of a person;
(d) an investigation report (within the meaning of the National Anti‑Corruption Commission Act 2022) includes a finding or opinion that the First Parliamentary Counsel or Second Parliamentary Counsel has engaged, is engaging or will engage in:
(i) corrupt conduct (within the meaning of that Act); or
(ii) conduct that could constitute or involve corrupt conduct.
Part 6,Engaging in paid work
Parliamentary Counsel Act 1970
16 Section 1A
Insert:
paid work means work for financial gain or reward (whether as an employee, a self‑employed person or otherwise).
17 Section 9
Repeal the section, substitute:
9 Other paid work
The First Parliamentary Counsel or a Second Parliamentary Counsel must not engage in paid work outside the duties of the First Parliamentary Counsel or Second Parliamentary Counsel without the Minister’s approval.
18 Application of amendments
The amendments made by this Part apply in relation to the First Parliamentary Counsel or a Second Parliamentary Counsel engaging in paid work (including engaging in practice as a barrister or solicitor or engaging in paid employment) on or after the commencement of this item, whether the First Parliamentary Counsel or Second Parliamentary Counsel was appointed before, on or after that commencement.