{"id":"BILL-r7438","name":"Commonwealth Entities Legislation Amendment Bill 2026","slug":"commonwealth-entities-legislation-amendment-bill-2026","collection":"bill","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":446057,"registerId":"commonwealth-BILL-r7438-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-05-05","status":"royal_assent","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[],"analysis":{"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":6,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"The enacted Act implements the Bill’s core objective: updating appointment, suspension and termination arrangements for four specified statutory office holders. It does not materially expand the original scope beyond that targeted purpose. The law stays narrowly focused on these four offices and reforms how ministers and the Governor‑General may set standards, suspend and terminate those office holders; it does, however, introduce novel features (non‑legislative performance standards and an OPC directions power) that change how oversight is exercised without broadening the set of offices or creating wider regulatory programmes."},"complexity_factors":["Amends four separate Acts across two Schedules (ACIAR Act, Austrade Act, Safeguards Act, Parliamentary Counsel Act) with different commencement timings.","Introduces a novel, non‑legislative \"performance standard\" concept in three Acts and a common approach in the fourth (multiple, non‑disallowable instruments).","Suspension regime with conditional extensions tied to specified inquiry types (APS Commissioner inquiries, corruption investigations, minister‑requested inquiries) and different publication requirements (ASNO must be published; others need not).","Varied termination arrangements: mixture of Minister and Governor‑General termination powers, mandatory vs discretionary grounds, and entity‑specific exclusions (eg. ASNO limited on 'unsatisfactory performance').","Multiple new defined terms and replacements (adds 'paid work' across Acts; inserts 'APS Code of Conduct' definition; updates 'serious misconduct' definitions with entity‑specific clauses).","Several application/transitional clauses specifying exactly when new grounds or definitions take effect (creates temporal complexity for incidents straddling commencement dates).","Explicit carve‑outs for procedural interactions with other statutes (cross‑references to Acts Interpretation Act 1901, Public Service Act 1999, PGPA Act 2013, National Anti‑Corruption Commission Act 2022).","OPC ministerial directions and non‑publication options create an internal accountability/oversight trade‑off that increases interpretive and compliance work for departments.","Administrative compliance tasks increased (drafting and maintaining performance standards, managing suspension notices, handling paid‑work approvals).","Staggered commencement dates (some parts commence day after assent, others after 14 days) increase transitional governance complexity."],"plain_english_summary":"**What this Act changes (mechanically)\n\n- Reduces maximum terms for two statutory heads from 7 years to 5 years (ACIAR CEO; First/Second Parliamentary Counsel) (Schedule 1, item 17; Schedule 2, item 3).\n- Allows relevant ministers to put in writing a \"performance standard\" for four senior statutory office holders (OCIAR CEO, Austrade CEO, First/Second Parliamentary Counsel); those standards are expressly not legislative instruments (so they are not subject to tabling/disallowance) (Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act s.51(5); ACIAR Act s.24(4); Parliamentary Counsel Act s.4(3); each provision states the performance standard is not a legislative instrument).\n- Gives ministers new express power to suspend the appointments of the heads of Austrade, ACIAR and the Director of Safeguards for fixed periods (initially up to 3 months, with specified routes to extend up to 12 months while certain inquiries are underway) and requires the ASNO Director’s suspension or extension to be publicly notified (Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act s.58A; ACIAR Act s.29BA; Nuclear Non‑Proliferation (Safeguards) Act s.47A).\n- Adds or clarifies grounds on which those office holders may be terminated, bringing in a common list of discretionary grounds in most cases (misbehaviour, incapacity, serious misconduct, unsatisfactory performance, certain absences, paid outside work without approval, failure to disclose interests), while preserving some existing special protections for ASNO (see Schedule 1 Divisions 3–4, Schedule 2 Part 4).\n- Describes examples that amount to \"serious misconduct\" in each Act (breach of the APS Code of Conduct judged by the Minister to be sufficiently serious; unlawful discrimination; findings or opinions in relevant corruption investigation reports that indicate corrupt conduct) (see, e.g., Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act s.59(1A); ACIAR Act s.29C(1A); Parliamentary Counsel Act s.10(1A); Safeguards Act s.48(1A)).\n- Replaces older references to \"employment\" outside the office with a broader definition of \"paid work\" and requires ministerial approval for such outside paid work (various inserts of \"paid work\" and new \"Other paid work\" offences/requirements: e.g. Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act s.55; ACIAR Act s.28; Parliamentary Counsel Act s.9; Safeguards Act s.45A).\n- Creates an explicit power for the Attorney‑ or responsible Minister to give written, general directions to the Office of Parliamentary Counsel (OPC) about its functions; OPC must comply except where a direction would relate to the First Parliamentary Counsel’s functions under the Public Service Act or the PGPA Act; such directions are not legislative instruments and need not be published (Parliamentary Counsel Act s.3A).\n\nWhy the government says it was done\n\n- The Act updates appointment, suspension and termination arrangements for four statutory office holders to (the government’s claim) improve accountability where \"conduct or performance are unacceptable\" and to align some of these roles with the arrangements that apply to many other statutory office holders.\n\nHow the Act changes who decides and who pays\n\n- Who decides: Ministers gain explicit power to set non‑legislative performance standards, to suspend certain office holders (for set periods), and in some cases to terminate appointments (the Act distinguishes whether the Minister or the Governor‑General carries out termination depending on the office) (see, e.g., Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act s.59; ACIAR Act s.29C; Parliamentary Counsel Act s.10).\n- Who pays during suspension: suspended office holders continue to receive remuneration and allowances while suspended (e.g. s.58A(3); s.29BA(3); s.47A(3)).\n\nWhat behaviour the law is likely to change (mechanisms, not judgements)\n\n- Increases executive (ministerial) control and discretion over standards of performance and temporary removal from duties by giving ministers formally expressed, non‑legislative levers (performance standards and suspension powers) (see s.51(5); s.58A; s.29BA; s.47A; s.3A).\n- Shortens some appointments, increasing the frequency of reappointments and therefore more frequent performance reviews for those roles (Schedule 1, item 17; Schedule 2, item 3).\n- Narrows the scope for office holders to do paid outside work without approval, which reduces their ability to supplement income or undertake external professional work during their term (see new \"Other paid work\" provisions).\n\nOfficial rationale versus concrete trade‑offs and implementation issues\n\n- The official rationale (as stated in explanatory materials) is improved accountability and alignment with ordinary SOH (statutory office holder) arrangements. That claim maps directly to the Act’s mechanisms: ministers can set and use performance standards and can suspend or seek termination for specified conduct (performance standard provisions and suspension/termination provisions cited above).\n\n- Costs and incentives: the Act increases ministerial discretion to judge performance and misconduct (the performance standard is a tool the Minister may use when forming an opinion about termination). That discretion creates incentives for closer oversight and, plausibly, quicker removal where a minister judges performance unsatisfactory — but it also creates managerially concentrated decision‑making (power concentrated in ministers) and increases tenure uncertainty for the affected office holders (see performance standard and termination clauses: Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act s.59(3); ACIAR Act s.29C(3); Parliamentary Counsel Act s.10(4)).\n\n- Opportunity cost and administrative burden: departments and ministers must draft, maintain and (internally) use performance standards; offices must adjust HR and compliance systems to manage suspension, inquiries and the new paid‑work approval processes. These are direct administrative costs to the offices affected (see performance standard provisions and \"Other paid work\" sections).\n\n- Bureaucratic discretion and implementation risk: performance standards and ministerial directions under the OPC Act are explicitly not legislative instruments (they are not subject to tabling or disallowance) and there is no general publication obligation. That design reduces parliamentary oversight and increases scope for opaque application of standards (see s.51(6); s.24(5); s.4(4) Parliamentary Counsel Act; s.3A(3) OPC directions). The Act requires public notice for ASNO suspensions only (Safeguards Act s.47A(10)); suspensions for other offices need not be published by the minister under the new text.\n\n- Procedural fairness: the explanatory material states that procedural fairness requirements will apply to termination decisions. The Act also builds in inquiry‑linked extension rules (allowing suspension to be extended where specified inquiries are underway) (see each s.58A(7)–(8), s.29BA(7)–(8), s.47A(7)–(8)). Those provisions tie expanded suspension power to the existence of inquiries by the APS Commissioner, corruption investigations or minister‑requested inquiries, which is a concrete procedural safeguard around extensions.\n\n- Effects on private enterprise, competition and markets: the Act primarily affects senior public office holders and their governance. Direct effects on private firms and markets are limited. Two routes for indirect effects are visible as mechanisms:\n  - OPC directions (Parliamentary Counsel Act s.3A) could change priorities, timing or resourcing for law drafting and publication; that can have downstream effects on businesses that rely on the timing or content of legislation or on procurement tied to legislative milestones.\n  - Limits on paid outside work reduce the ability of affected office holders to work part‑time for private parties (potentially limiting the supply of experienced senior public lawyers or managers into part‑time private roles while they serve).\n\n- Concentrated benefits and diffuse costs: the clear and concentrated beneficiary of the changes is the executive (ministers and the employing department) which gains clearer management tools (performance standards, suspension). Costs are borne by the statutory office holders (shorter terms, more uncertainty, constraints on outside work) and — diffusely — by stakeholders who value transparent, predictable processes (because standards and directions are not disallowable or required to be published).\n\nBottom line (neutral summary)\n\n- This Act standardises and tightens the mechanisms by which ministers and the Governor‑General can suspend, set standards for, and terminate four senior statutory office holders. It does so by creating non‑legislative performance standards, explicit ministerial suspension powers with specified extension rules tied to inquiries, clarified examples of \"serious misconduct\", limits on paid outside work and an explicit ministerial directions power for OPC. The concrete trade‑offs are increased ministerial discretion and managerial tools in exchange for reduced statutory transparency (performance standards and directions are not legislative instruments), and increased tenure/operational uncertainty for the affected office holders (reduced maximum terms, clearer grounds for termination)."},"summary":{"status_summary":"The bill received royal assent on 26 March 2026 and is now Act No. 13 of 2026.","complexity_score":4,"likely_questions":["What is the process for setting and using performance standards for these statutory office holders?","How do the new suspension powers interact with existing arrangements under the Acts Interpretation Act?"],"complexity_factors":["Amends four separate acts with specific provisions for each","Introduces novel performance standards that are not legislative instruments"],"plain_english_summary":"The Commonwealth Entities Legislation Amendment Bill 2026 updates the statutory framework for the appointment, suspension and termination of certain statutory office holders in the Foreign Affairs and Trade and Attorney General portfolios. It amends the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Act 1982, the Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 and the Parliamentary Counsel Act 1970. The changes apply to the chief executive of the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, the chief executive of Austrade, the director general of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office and the First and Second Parliamentary Counsel.\n\nFor the chief executive of the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research and the First and Second Parliamentary Counsel, the maximum term of appointment is reduced from seven years to five years. This applies to appointments and reappointments made on or after the commencement of the relevant provisions. The chief executives of Austrade and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office already have a maximum term of five years. The bill introduces powers for ministers to suspend the appointments of the chief executives of the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, Austrade and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office for an initial period of three months if the minister believes it is in the interests of the entity. This period can be extended by up to three months or by up to twelve months if an inquiry is being conducted into the office holder's conduct. For the director general of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, the minister must publish notice of any suspension or extension.\n\nAdditional grounds for termination are added across the positions. These include unsatisfactory performance, where the minister forms the opinion having regard to any performance standard set for the role. Ministers may set performance standards in writing for the chief executives of the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, Austrade and the First and Second Parliamentary Counsel, although these standards are not legislative instruments. Serious misconduct is also added as a ground for termination for some positions, including where there is a serious breach of the APS Code of Conduct or a finding of corrupt conduct.\n\nFor the Office of Parliamentary Counsel, the bill adds a power for the minister to give written directions of a general nature about the performance of its functions. The Office of Parliamentary Counsel must comply with these directions, except to the extent they relate to the First Parliamentary Counsel's functions under the Public Service Act or the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act. These directions are not legislative instruments. The amendments affect the statutory office holders and the four entities they lead by providing expanded mechanisms for accountability on performance and conduct. Procedural fairness requirements apply to termination decisions. The changes align some arrangements with those applying to most other statutory office holders while introducing performance standards as a novel element for these positions.\n\nThe bill received royal assent on 26 March 2026 and is now Act number 13 of 2026. Schedule 1 commences the day after royal assent. Schedule 2 parts one to three commence fourteen days after royal assent, with parts four to six commencing immediately after those parts."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/commonwealth-entities-legislation-amendment-bill-2026","history":"/api/acts/commonwealth-entities-legislation-amendment-bill-2026/history","analysis":"/api/acts/commonwealth-entities-legislation-amendment-bill-2026/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/commonwealth-entities-legislation-amendment-bill-2026/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/commonwealth-entities-legislation-amendment-bill-2026/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/commonwealth-entities-legislation-amendment-bill-2026/documents"}}