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Why it matters (purpose statements and effects)

• The ostensible purpose of the listing is to give effect to Australia’s autonomous sanctions in relation to Syria by identifying the specific persons and entities to which the sanctions rules apply (see section 3 and the schedule entries showing roles and connections).
• Once listed, the named persons/entities become subject to the sanctions regime (for example: asset freezes, prohibition on providing funds or economic resources, bans on certain supplies or services, and related civil or criminal prohibitions under the Regulations and Act). The instrument itself does not set those prohibitions out in detail; it activates the sanctions rules by making the designations/declarations (s3).

Practical mechanisms and who decides

• The instrument operates by naming individuals and entities in the schedules and by cross‑referencing the regulatory provisions that carry legal effect (s3).
• The substantive decision to impose the legal prohibitions on these named persons/entities is effected by the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 once the listing instrument declares them designated/declared (see paragraph 6(a) and 6(b) as applied in s3). The listing instrument is therefore the mechanical step that ties named persons/entities to the sanctions rules.

Costs, incentives and trade‑offs (implementation and compliance implications)

• Who pays: the immediate financial and operational burden falls on the listed persons and entities (loss of access to funds, freezing of assets in Australia, prohibition on receiving services from Australian persons). Secondary costs fall on Australian businesses and financial institutions required to screen, freeze and report dealings (increased compliance costs, possible loss of business if previously engaged with a listed party).
• Behaviour changes and incentives: Australian firms must increase due diligence and may avoid entire markets or counterparties to reduce sanction risk. Listed parties may attempt to reroute transactions through intermediaries or foreign jurisdictions (substitution/evasion risk).
• Trade‑offs and opportunity costs: compliance and enforcement divert government and private resources; Australian exporters and service suppliers face lost opportunities if they previously traded with listed entities.
• Compliance burden: the schedule’s length and the use of multiple aliases and passport/ID details (where provided) increase the administrative work for screening systems and for banks, freight operators and lawyers who must check counterparty details (see many alternate names and identifying details in Schedule 1).
• Bureaucratic discretion and implementation risk: the instrument is a fixed list; changes (additions/removals/continuations) depend on further instruments or ministerial action under the Regulations. That centralised listing power concentrates decision authority in the administrative process that prepares and makes listing instruments. Continuation clauses (ss 5, 5A, 5B, 5C) show that administrative steps are used to preserve effect across amendments, which creates risk of delay or complexity in record‑keeping if items are moved between parts.

Effects on private enterprise, competition and contracts

• Direct effects: companies or individuals on the list cannot generally receive funds or services from Australian persons, and Australian businesses are prohibited from providing certain goods, services or financial accommodation. This reduces contract freedom between Australian parties and the listed parties.
• Indirect/market effects: Australian competitors of the listed entities may gain competitive advantage where the sanction prevents listed companies from operating in markets that intersect with Australia. However, some listed entities are Syrian government agencies or domestic conglomerates; the practical competitive effects within Australia are limited except where those entities operate internationally with Australian counterparts.
• Substitution effects: listed parties may attempt to shift business to non‑Australian suppliers or use intermediaries in third countries (raising enforcement and intelligence costs).

Concentrated benefits, diffuse costs and capture risk (where the source supports it)

• Concentrated benefits: the main beneficiaries of the sanctions (in the narrow sense) are Australian policy objectives that seek to deny economic resources to the listed individuals/entities; any commercial winners are likely narrow (competitors to the listed parties who can lawfully capture displaced business).
• Diffuse costs: compliance costs and risk are spread across many Australian private actors (banks, lawyers, importers, insurers) and may be small individually but non‑trivial in aggregate.
• Capture risk and rent‑seeking: the instrument itself is a listing exercise; the schedule demonstrates targeting of politically connected private companies and state bodies. The instrument does not create a new domestic subsidy or regulatory privilege, so the usual forms of domestic rent‑seeking are not created by the text. However, the presence of large sanctioned conglomerates (e.g. Cham Holding listed in Schedule 1 Part 2) means commercial rivals outside the sanctioned group could benefit indirectly.

Implementation risks and unintended consequences

• Evasion risk: the long list of aliases and cross‑border addresses indicates a practical risk that listed parties may use alternate legal persons or foreign intermediaries to continue transactions.
• Administrative complexity: continuation provisions (ss 5, 5A, 5B, 5C) and references to earlier instruments (2017, 2020, 2023) increase the record‑keeping burden and raise the risk of inconsistent public information if websites/lists are not synchronised.
• Third‑party hardship: non‑listed third parties — e.g. employees of a listed commercial entity or non‑Australian counterparties — may experience disruption because banks or insurers will de‑risk their relationships.

Key legal hooks in the instrument

• Section 3: ties the schedule entries to paragraphs 6(a) and 6(b) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 — the operative link that makes the schedule effective.
• Sections 5, 5A, 5B, 5C: continuation clauses that preserve the effect of prior listings when amendment instruments were made (they reference earlier instruments and schedule parts).
• Schedule 1 (Parts 1 and 2): the substantive named lists (individuals and entities). These schedules are the operative content that activates the sanctions regime for the listed parties.

Bottom line

• Mechanically this instrument is a statutory list: it names particular Syrian individuals and organisations so that Australia’s autonomous sanctions regime applies to them (s3). The practical consequences fall on the listed persons/entities (restrictions on funds, trade and services) and on Australian private actors who must screen, freeze and potentially refuse dealings with those listed. Continuation clauses preserve listings across amendments, so the instrument is primarily a maintenance and expansion of the sanctions target list rather than a change in the underlying sanction powers (see ss 5, 5A, 5B, 5C and Schedule 1).

5A Continuation of effect on and after date of making of the Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons—Syria and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction) Amendment (Continuation of Effect) Instrument 2020

(1) The designation, under paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011, of each person mentioned in items 1 to 40, 42 to 64, 67 to 79, 81 to 85, 87 to 91 and 93 to 95 of Part 1 of Schedule 1, as in force immediately before the date of making of the Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons—Syria and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction) Amendment (Continuation of Effect) Instrument 2020, continues to have effect. (2) The declaration, under paragraph 6(1)(b) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011, of each person mentioned in items 1 to 40, 42 to 64, 67 to 79, 81 to 85, 87 to 91 and 93 to 95 of Part 1 of Schedule 1, as in force immediately before the date of making of the Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons—Syria and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction) Amendment (Continuation of Effect) Instrument 2020, continues to have effect. (3) The designation, under paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011, of each entity mentioned in Part 2 of Schedule 1, as in force immediately before the date of making of the Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons—Syria and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction) Amendment (Continuation of Effect) Instrument 2020, continues to have effect.

5B Continuation of effect of designations and declarations on and after date of making of the Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons — Syria) Amendment (No. 1) Instrument 2023

5B Continuation of effect of designations and declarations on and after date of making of the Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons – Syria) Amendment (No. 1) Instrument 2023

(1) The designation, under paragraph 6(a) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011, of the persons mentioned in items 96 to 118 in Part 1 of Schedule 1 continues to have effect. (2) The declaration, under paragraph 6(b) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011, of the persons mentioned in items 96 to 118 in Part 1 of Schedule 1 continues to have effect. (3) The designation, under paragraph 6(a) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011, of the entities mentioned in items 29 to 42 in Part 2 of Schedule 1 continues to have effect.

Note: Item numbers 96 to 118 in Part 1 of Schedule 1 were previously listed in Part 1A of Schedule 1. Item numbers 29 to 42 in Part 2 of Schedule 1 were previously listed in Part 3 of Schedule 1. The designations and declarations of these persons and entities were previously continued in effect in the Autonomous Sanctions Legislation Amendment (Syria and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction) Instrument 2020.

5C Continuation of effect of designations and declarations on and after date of making of the Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons — Syria) Amendment (No. 1) Instrument 2023

5C Continuation of effect of designations and declarations on and after date of making of the Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons – Syria) Amendment (No. 1) Instrument 2023

(1) The designation, under paragraph 6(a) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011, of the persons mentioned in items 1 to 11, 14 to 23, 25 to 34, 36 to 40, 42 to 60, 62 to 64, 67, 69 to 78, 81 to 85, 87 to 91, 93 and 95 in Part 1 of Schedule 1 continues to have effect. (2) The declaration, under paragraph 6(b) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011, of the persons mentioned in items 1 to 11, 14 to 23, 25 to 34, 36 to 40, 42 to 60, 62 to 64, 67, 69 to 78, 81 to 85, 87 to 91, 93 and 95 in Part 1 of Schedule 1 continues to have effect. (3) The designation, under paragraph 6(a) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011, of the entities mentioned in items 1 to 14 and 16 to 28 in Part 2 of Schedule 1 continues to have effect.

Part 1 Designated and declared persons

Part 1—Designated and declared persons

This is an opening excerpt, not the complete document.