Australian Sports Commission Act 1989

The Act organises a set of interlocking concepts that define the Commission’s identity, scope and operational boundaries. These concepts are statutory objects, functions and powers; institutional form and governance; funding and financial controls; operational planning and accountability; industrial/appointment rules for officials; and interfaces with other statutory regimes.

Objects and functions: Section 6 lists six objects: leadership in sport development (s 6(1)(a)), increased participation and performance (s 6(1)(b)), provision of resources and facilities to pursue sporting excellence alongside education/vocational skills (s 6(1)(c)), coach development (s 6(1)(d)), fostering international co‑operation (s 6(1)(e)), and encouraging private funding to supplement Commonwealth assistance (s 6(1)(f)). The functions list in s 7 operationalises those objects: advising and co‑ordinating (s 7(1)(a)-(b)); promoting equality of access (s 7(1)(c)); talent and coach development (s 7(1)(d)); research and sports medicine/science (s 7(1)(e)-(g)); facilities management (s 7(1)(h)); information dissemination (s 7(1)(j)); international access (s 7(1)(k)); fundraising and money administration (s 7(1)(m)-(n)); intergovernmental and other cooperation (s 7(1)(p)-(q)); and anti‑doping cooperation (s 7(1)(r)). The Act permits functions to be performed inside or outside Australia (s 7(2)) and in cooperation with states, territories and other organisations (s 7(3)).

Institutional form and brand: The Commission is a body corporate with a common seal (s 5). When performing specified elite‑performance functions it shall operate under the name Australian Institute of Sport (s 9). The Australian Sports Foundation is a separate company established to raise funds for sport and is tied to the Commission’s purposes and constrained in its powers so as not to exceed those of the Commission except as necessary to perform functions for the Commission (s 10).

Governance and accountability: Membership composition and appointment mechanics are in s 13. The Minister appoints the Chair, Deputy, Secretary of the Department and other members; terms of office and part‑time/full‑time statuses are prescribed (s 13(1)-(4)). The Minister may give directions to the Commission on policies and practices, subject to consultation and mandatory publication and tabling (s 11). The Act builds in PGPA Act requirements,corporate plans and reporting obligations are integrated (s 23 and cross‑references to the PGPA Act), and annual reporting must include particular financial and operational details (s 48).

Financial controls and commercial activity: Funding is via parliamentary appropriation (s 43). The Finance Minister has influence over payment timing (s 43(2)), and only the Finance Minister may arrange loans from the Commonwealth (s 46). The Commission may charge fees for access, services and event admission (s 8(2)), accept gifts and sponsorship, manufacture and distribute branded goods and acquire property (s 8(1)). There are controls on contracts and leases: Ministerial written approval is required for contracts exceeding $500,000 or leases of land for ten years or more (s 47). The Commission and the Australian Sports Foundation are, subject to regulations, exempt from Commonwealth, State and Territory taxation on income, property and transactions (ss 50-51).

Operational planning and delegation: Corporate plans prepared under the PGPA Act must be submitted for Ministerial approval and laid before Parliament (s 23). The Commission must prepare annual operational plans that set out programmes and resource allocation and submit and obtain Ministerial approval (s 26). Delegation of powers is permitted with statutory carve‑outs: the Commission may delegate most powers to members, committees, the Executive Director, Director or employees but cannot delegate certain core powers, including establishing committees, corporate planning and appointments to key executive offices (s 54). The Minister may also delegate many of their powers under the Act, with specified exceptions (s 56).

Regulatory interfaces and privacy: The Act contains cross‑references that bind the Commission to other statutes: the PGPA Act governs corporate entity duties and reporting (note to s 5; ss 23, 27), the Remuneration Tribunal Act sets pay entitlements for specified officeholders (s 17, s 33), provisions reference the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 on acting appointments (s 20 notes), and the Sport Integrity Australia Act 2020 is engaged in two ways: the Commission’s functions must not overlap the Chief Executive Officer of Sport Integrity Australia (s 7(4A)), and the Commission may disclose information to that CEO in relation to sports doping and safety matters and associated matters, with personal information so disclosed treated as protected information under the Sport Integrity Australia Act (s 57A).

Legal protections and obligations: Officials are protected from civil actions for acts done in good faith in performance or purported performance of Commission functions (s 57). The Act imposes a duty to segregate trust money and to deal with trust funds only in accordance with trust terms (s 52). Regulations may impose limited penalties (s 58).

These concepts create an institutional architecture for public stewardship of sport that mixes public funding, ministerial oversight, statutory planning and corporate‑style commercial powers.

Primary actors affected by the Act are the Australian Sports Commission, the Australian Institute of Sport as the Commission’s operating name for certain functions (s 9), the Australian Sports Foundation (s 10), the Minister responsible for the Commission, Commission members and key executives (Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, Secretary of the Department, Executive Director, Director), Sport Integrity Australia’s Chief Executive Officer, the Finance Minister and Parliament. Secondary affected groups include state and territory authorities, sports organisations and associations, athletes, coaches, community groups and private sponsors or commercial partners.

• The Commission and its executives and staff. The Commission is the statutory actor created and empowered by the Act (s 5). The Executive Director manages the Commission’s affairs subject to Commission direction (s 29(1)), and the Director oversees Institute functions under the Executive Director’s direction (s 31). Employees are appointed by the Executive Director on terms set by the Commission (s 41). Those roles are directly regulated in terms of appointment, tenure, remuneration, leave and outside employment (ss 28-39, 41-42).

• The Minister. The Minister appoints the Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson and other appointed members (s 13(2)); may give written directions to the Commission on policies and practices (s 11); must be given written notice and an opportunity for the Chairperson to discuss proposed directions before issuing them (s 11(2)); and must cause directions to be published in the Gazette and laid before Parliament (s 11(3)). The Minister also has veto/approval roles over corporate and operational plans (ss 23, 25-26), and may convene Commission meetings (s 21(3)).

• Parliament and the Finance Minister. Parliament funds the Commission through appropriation (s 43). The Finance Minister may direct timing and amounts of payments (s 43(2)) and is the only minister authorised to lend money to the Commission on behalf of the Commonwealth (s 46). Parliament receives corporate plans and is the recipient of required tabling of directions and plans (ss 11(3), 23).

• The Australian Sports Foundation and private donors/sponsors. The Foundation’s statutory purpose is to raise money for the development of sport in Australia (s 10(3)); the Commission is authorised to raise money through the Foundation (s 7(1)(m)). The Foundation’s powers are limited to those necessary to perform its functions in relation to the Commission and otherwise constrained not to exceed the Commission’s powers (s 10(4)). Private sponsors and donors are affected because the Commission is authorised to obtain commercial sponsorship and participate in marketing arrangements and to distribute and sell branded goods (s 8(1)(j)-(k),(m)) and encourage private funding (s 6(1)(f)).

• Sporting organisations, athletes and community groups. The Commission’s functions include advising the Minister and coordinating sport development (s 7(1)(a)-(b)); developing programs to promote equality of access and participation (s 7(1)(c)); and providing access to resources and facilities to persons and groups, “to the extent that it is practicable” (s 12). Those provisions create operational expectations for programs, training, facilities and pathways, and a discretionary obligation to facilitate community access.

• Sport Integrity Australia. The Act both protects against functional overlap with the Chief Executive Officer of Sport Integrity Australia (s 7(4A)) and provides for disclosure of information to that CEO where it relates to doping and safety matters or otherwise assists that CEO’s functions (s 57A). Personal information disclosed is treated as protected information under the Sport Integrity Australia Act (s 57A(2)). These clauses create an information‑sharing and delineation interface between two statutory bodies.

• General public interacting with Commission land and marks. Regulations may restrict entry to Commission land and regulate conduct, along with provisions controlling use of Commission emblems, logos or names and providing for their protection (s 58(c)-(d)). The regulations may prescribe small penalties (not exceeding 5 penalty units) for breaches (s 58(e)). Thus users of facilities and commercial third parties who might use Commission marks are affected.

• States, Territories and other Commonwealth agencies. The Commission is required to consult and cooperate with appropriate Commonwealth, State and Territory authorities and other persons (s 7(1)(p)). Additionally, the Act extends to external Territories (s 4).

Who pays (recap): Parliament provides appropriation (s 43), but the Commission may also raise funds from private sources via the Foundation or sponsorship (s 7(1)(m); s 10), and may charge fees for access to facilities and for programs or events (s 8(2)). Borrowing by the Commission is constrained to loans arranged by the Finance Minister out of parliamentary appropriations (s 46).

Who decides (recap): The Minister controls appointments and may give directions (ss 11, 13). The Commission and its members decide on corporate policies, operations, committees and delegations within statutory constraints (ss 22, 54-55). The Finance Minister controls loans and payment timing (ss 43-46).

The Act imposes explicit duties on the Commission, its members and its executives, and grants concrete rights enabling operations. Below are the principal duties and rights with section references.

Duties imposed on the Commission and its officers

• Duty to perform statutory functions: The Commission must exercise the functions listed in s 7 in furtherance of its objects (s 6) and is required to perform functions only to the extent that they do not overlap the functions of the Chief Executive Officer of Sport Integrity Australia (s 7(4A)). The Commission may perform functions inside or outside Australia and in cooperation with other bodies (ss 7(2)-(3)).

• Duty to allow community access where practicable: The Commission must, “to the extent that it is practicable to do so having regard to the objects for which it was established and its functions,” allow individuals and community groups access to resources and facilities (s 12). This is a conditional duty,practicability and the Commission’s objects constrain it.

• Duty to prepare and comply with corporate and operational plans: The Commission must prepare corporate plans under the PGPA Act for Ministerial approval and consideration (s 23) and annual operational plans aligning with those corporate plans (s 26). The Commission must perform its functions and exercise powers in a manner consistent with and designed to give effect to any corporate plan and operational plan, to the extent practicable (s 27).

• Duty to segregate trust money and apply trust funds only as trustee: The Commission must ensure trust money is held in separate accounts and applied only in accordance with the trust terms (s 52).

• Duty to disclose interests: The Executive Director must disclose pecuniary interests in businesses or corporate bodies (s 37). The Act also incorporates PGPA Act conflict‑of‑interest provisions for committees (s 22(7) referencing section 29 of the PGPA Act).

• Duty to comply with Ministerial directions: The Commission must comply with written directions from the Minister in relation to policies and practices in performing functions and exercising powers, subject to the consultation and publication requirements in s 11.

Duties on members and executives

• Attendance and outside employment constraints: Appointed members’ appointments must be terminated if they are absent from three consecutive meetings without leave (s 19(2)(c)). Full‑time members must not engage in outside paid employment except with Ministerial approval (s 16(1)); part‑time members must not engage in paid employment that, in the Minister’s opinion, conflicts with duties (s 16(2)). The Executive Director must not engage in outside paid employment except with Commission approval (s 34).

• Resignation and termination provisions: The Chair, Deputy Chair and appointed members may resign in writing delivered to the Minister (s 15). The Minister may terminate an appointed member’s appointment for misbehaviour or incapacity (s 19(1)), and must terminate where certain statutory disqualifications occur (s 19(2)). The Act also notes that termination may occur under s 30 of the PGPA Act for contravention of official duties (note to s 19).

• Minutes and record‑keeping: The Commission must keep records of its meetings and resolutions, including those passed by signed documents under s 21(8)-(9) and must ensure members do not sign off where they have a material personal interest (s 21(10), s 21(11)).

Rights, powers and privileges

• Corporate legal capacity: The Commission is a body corporate with perpetual succession, can hold and dispose of property and sue and be sued (s 5(2)(a)-(c)). Courts must take notice of its common seal (s 5(3)).

• Broad operational powers: The Commission has an express non‑exhaustive power to do all things necessary or convenient for its functions (s 8(1)), and a detailed list allowing contracting, property dealings, facilities occupation, making grants, appointing agents, hiring people, accepting gifts, erecting works, obtaining sponsorship, manufacturing and distributing branded articles and providing goods/services at its facilities (s 8(1)(a)-(n)). It may also charge reasonable fees for use of resources, programs and events (s 8(2)).

• Delegation: The Commission may delegate most of its powers to members, committees, the Executive Director, the Director or employees, subject to express carve‑outs (s 54). The Executive Director may further delegate to the Director or staff (s 55). The Minister may also delegate many of the Minister’s powers under the Act except certain core functions (s 56).

• Financial and tax rights: The Commission is entitled to appropriated funds from Parliament (s 43). The Commission and the Australian Sports Foundation are, subject to regulations, exempt from Commonwealth, State and Territory taxation on income, property and transactions (ss 50-51). The Commission may invest surplus funds under the PGPA Act (s 45(2)).

• Protection from civil action: Members, the Executive Director and the Director are not personally liable to civil actions for acts done or omitted in good faith in performance or purported performance of Commission functions (s 57).

Constraints and procedural rights

• Ministerial oversight rights: The Minister has the statutory right to give written directions (s 11) but must follow procedural steps before doing so and must publish and table directions (s 11(2)-(3)). The Minister also has approval rights over corporate and operational plans (ss 23, 26) and must give reasons if rejecting or requesting revisions to an operational plan (s 26(2)-(3)).

• Parliamentary transparency: Corporate plans and Ministerial directions are to be laid before Parliament in specified timeframes (ss 11(3), 23(1)(b)).

• Contracting and leasing approvals: Ministerial written approval is required for contracts above $500,000 and leases of land for 10 years or more (s 47).

These duties and rights create an operational envelope in which the Commission must plan and run programs while remaining accountable to the Minister and Parliament and operating within financial controls.

The Act provides a mix of enforcement mechanisms, reporting obligations and limited penalty powers. It relies principally on administrative oversight,Ministerial directions, approvals and reporting,rather than criminal sanctions in the Act itself. The following enforcement and penalty mechanisms are present in the text.

Administrative enforcement

• Ministerial directions and compliance: Section 11 allows the Minister to issue written directions to the Commission regarding policies and practices in the performance of its functions and the exercise of powers, and the Commission must comply. The procedure requires prior notice and an opportunity for the Chairperson to discuss the proposed direction (s 11(2)), and the Minister must publish directions in the Gazette and lay them before both Houses of Parliament within 15 sitting days (s 11(3)). The principal enforcement lever is therefore the Minister’s procedural power to set policy direction and require compliance.

• Ministerial approvals linked to limits: The requirement for Ministerial approval of corporate plans (s 23), variations of corporate plans (s 25), operational plans (s 26) and specific large contracts and long leases (s 47) gives the Minister practical control over significant financial and strategic actions. The Minister can request operational plan revisions and must give written reasons for such requests (s 26(2)-(3)). Non‑compliance with the Minister’s approval regime would expose the Commission to administrative sanctions under the PGPA Act or political and parliamentary accountability, given the tabling obligations (ss 23, 26, 48).

• Financial controls via the Finance Minister: The Finance Minister can direct timing and amounts of payments from appropriation (s 43(2)) and is the only authorised lender for loans to the Commission from the Commonwealth (s 46). This centralises control over borrowing and cash flow and is an enforcement lever via control of funds.

Statutory termination and removal

• Termination of members: The Minister may terminate an appointed member for misbehaviour or physical or mental incapacity (s 19(1)). Termination is mandatory where prescribed disqualifying events occur: bankruptcy or insolvency actions; absences without leave from three consecutive meetings; unapproved outside employment by full‑time members; or part‑time members engaging in conflicting paid employment in the Minister’s opinion (s 19(2)(a), (c)-(e)). The Act notes that termination may also occur under s 30 of the PGPA Act for breaches of general duties (note to s 19).

Legal immunities and civil enforcement

• Personal liability protections: Members, the Executive Director and the Director are not liable to actions for damages in respect of acts or omissions done in good faith in the performance or purported performance of any function or exercise of any power of the Commission (s 57). This creates a defence against civil liability for good‑faith official acts and reduces the risk of personal civil suits as an enforcement mechanism.

Criminal or civil penalties in the Act and delegated regulations

• Regulations may include limited penalties: The Governor‑General may make regulations including ones that regulate entry to Commission land and use of Commission emblems and may prescribe penalties not exceeding five penalty units for offences against those regulations (s 58(c)-(e)). The Act does not itself create offences with prescribed penalties beyond this delegated regulation power. The maximum is deliberately constrained by the Act to a small monetary sanction (five penalty units) for breaches of regulations made under s 58.

Reporting and transparency obligations as soft enforcement

• Annual reporting requirements: The Commission’s annual report under the PGPA Act must include particulars of financial transactions of the Australian Sports Foundation, particulars of Ministerial directions applicable during the reporting period, an assessment of performance against the operational plan, significant capital work and property transactions and operational plan variations approved by the Minister during the period (s 48). These reporting obligations operate as accountability mechanisms: they expose the Commission’s conduct to parliamentary and public scrutiny and create reputational enforcement.

Other enforcement interactions

• Interface with other Acts: The Act integrates with the PGPA Act for corporate plans and accountability (see the note to s 5 and sections 23, 25-27), with the Remuneration Tribunal Act for remuneration determinations (ss 17 and 33), and with the Sport Integrity Australia Act in information‑sharing and overlap constraints (s 7(4A), s 57A). Enforcement actions may therefore arise under those other statutory regimes where the Commission or its officials breach duties contained in them; the Act itself signposts these statutory interdependencies rather than providing standalone criminal sanctions.

Practical enforcement consequences

• Financial controls and Ministerial approvals are the primary levers to influence Commission behaviour, supported by reporting to Parliament and professional obligations of officials. The Act’s immunities for good‑faith acts reduce litigation risk for officials while the segregation of trust funds (s 52) and the requirement to apply trust money only according to trust terms create fiduciary‑style obligations that may be enforced by trust law or the PGPA Act regime in circumstances not detailed in the Act.

In short, enforcement under the Act is primarily administrative and accountability‑focused: Ministerial directions and approvals, financial control by the Finance Minister, parliamentary tabling and annual reporting, and delegated regulations with modest monetary penalties. Civil liability protections limit personal exposure for officials acting in good faith.

The Act expressly cross‑references and interfaces with several other statutes and legal regimes, prescribing both operational dependencies and limits to the Commission’s functions. The following interactions are explicit in the text provided.

Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act)

• Application: The Act states that the PGPA Act applies to the Commission and deals with matters relating to corporate Commonwealth entities, including reporting and the use and management of public resources (note to s 5). This places the Commission within the PGPA Act’s accountability, financial management and reporting framework.

• Corporate and operational planning: Sections 23 and 26 require the Commission to prepare corporate plans and operational plans in accordance with the PGPA Act (s 23 references s 35 of the PGPA Act for corporate plans). Corporate plans must be submitted to the Minister for approval and laid before Parliament (s 23). Operational plans must be consistent with the corporate plan and are subject to Ministerial request for revision and approval (s 26). Section 27 requires the Commission to perform its functions and exercise its powers consistently with plans to the extent practicable.

• Committees and disclosure rules: Section 22(7) applies rules made for s 29 of the PGPA Act regarding disclosure of interests, treating committees constituted under the Act as if they were accountable authorities under the PGPA Act. This imports PGPA conflict‑of‑interest disclosure requirements for committee members.

• Termination note: The Act notes that termination of an appointed member may also occur under s 30 of the PGPA Act for contravention of general duties (note to s 19).

Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973 / Remuneration determinations

• Pay determinations for members and executives: Section 17 and section 33 provide that remuneration for appointed members and the Executive Director is to be determined by the Remuneration Tribunal, subject to the Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973. Where no Tribunal determination exists, prescribed amounts apply. Leave entitlements are likewise subject to Tribunal determinations (ss 14(1), 35(1)).

Acts Interpretation Act 1901

• Acting appointments: Sections 20 and 39 include notes that rules that apply to acting appointments are in s 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901. The Act therefore defers to the standard Commonwealth rules governing acting appointments.

Public Service Act 1999

• Staff arrangements: Section 41(3) permits the Executive Director to arrange with an Agency Head (as defined in the Public Service Act 1999) or a body established by an Act for the services of officers or employees to be made available to the Commission. This enables secondments and service arrangements with the broader Commonwealth public service.

Sport Integrity Australia Act 2020

• Functional boundary and information sharing: Section 7(4A) limits the Commission’s functions to the extent that they do not overlap with the functions of the Chief Executive Officer of Sport Integrity Australia. Section 57A permits the Commission to disclose information to the CEO of Sport Integrity Australia if the information relates to sports doping and safety matters (as defined in the Sport Integrity Australia Act 2020) or is otherwise relevant to the CEO’s functions. Section 57A(2) provides that personal information disclosed under s 57A(1) is to be taken as protected information for the purposes of the Sport Integrity Australia Act 2020.

Privacy and protected information

• The Act’s s 57A cross‑reference converts personal information disclosed to the Sport Integrity Australia CEO into protected information under the Sport Integrity Australia Act 2020. This establishes a statutory pathway for information sharing on doping and safety matters and imposes the protective legal status on personal data disclosed in that context.

Taxation law and regulations

• Tax exemptions: Sections 50 and 51 exempt the Commission and the Australian Sports Foundation respectively from taxation under Commonwealth, State and Territory laws, subject to subsection (3) in each section permitting regulations to specify exceptions. The regulations may therefore reintroduce taxation in relation to specified laws if provided for.

Corporate and company law references

• Australian Sports Foundation company history: Section 10 references a company previously incorporated under the Companies Act 1981 (Australian Capital Territory) and its change of name to the Australian Sports Foundation, and constrains the company from changing its name after that event (s 10(1)-(2)). The Foundation’s purpose is statutorily declared (s 10(3)) and its powers are limited (s 10(4)).

Trust law

• Trust obligations: Section 52 requires segregation of trust money into separate accounts and mandates that trust money be applied only in accordance with trust powers and duties or in the manner authorised for trust money held under law. This imports basic trust principles into the Commission’s financial management.

Regulations and delegated legislative powers

• The Act vests the Governor‑General with power to make regulations not inconsistent with the Act and explicitly authorises regulations to control entry to Commission land, regulate conduct on Commission land, prohibit or regulate use of Commission emblems and prescribe penalties not exceeding 5 penalty units (s 58). Thus the Act creates a delegated law framework for facility control and intellectual property protection on Commission premises.

Interoperability and potential enforcement under other laws

• Because the Act situates the Commission under the PGPA Act and references other statutory regimes, many obligations and potential enforcement mechanisms will be exercised through those other laws (for example financial management rules and accountability under the PGPA Act, remuneration determinations under Remuneration Tribunal legislation, and enforcement of protected information rules under the Sport Integrity Australia Act).

In sum, the Act embeds the Commission within a broader statutory ecosystem. The practical effect is that the Commission’s core powers are exercised within PGPA financial and reporting controls, with the Finance Minister controlling lending and payment timing, the Remuneration Tribunal determining officeholder pay and entitlements, and Sport Integrity Australia receiving information and constrained from functional overlap. Regulations may impose limited penalties for conduct on Commission land or misuse of emblems.

The text of the Act provided includes a number of embedded cross‑references, notes and subsections that indicate legislative evolution and interaction with other Commonwealth statutes. The Act as supplied should be read with those cross‑references in mind; they signal legislative updates and statutory layering even where an explicit amendment chronology is not provided in this text. The following are the concrete textual markers of legislative change and external references evident in the Act itself.

• Cross‑references to later Commonwealth Acts: The Act contains explicit references to the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) (note to s 5 and in ss 23, 25-27), the Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973 (ss 17 and 33), the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (notes to ss 20 and 39 referencing s 33A), the Public Service Act 1999 (s 41(3) references Agency Heads), and the Sport Integrity Australia Act 2020 (s 7(4A) and s 57A). These references show that the Act now operates in conjunction with statutory regimes enacted in different years and that portions of the Act were expressed or adjusted to reflect those other statutes.

• Inserted or updated provisions reflected in text: The inclusion of section 57A, which authorises disclosure of information to the Chief Executive Officer of Sport Integrity Australia and treats disclosed personal information as protected information for the purposes of the Sport Integrity Australia Act 2020, is an internal textual feature referencing the 2020 Act. That section is a concrete textual addition linking the Commission to the Sport Integrity Australia statutory framework.

• Notes indicating application of other statutes: Several parts of the Act have notes indicating that particular provisions should be read with other statutes in mind. For example, the note to s 5 states that the PGPA Act “applies to the Commission” and deals with corporate Commonwealth entities. The notes to ss 20 and 39 indicate that acting appointment rules are in s 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901. The note to s 19 mentions that termination of an appointed member may also be affected under s 30 of the PGPA Act. These notes function as textual pointers to the statutory changes in governance and appointment practices.

• Company history language: Section 10 traces the origin of the Australian Sports Foundation to a company incorporated under an earlier Companies Act and prescribes that, after a required change of name, “the company is not authorised to change its name” (s 10(2)). That provision records a fixed corporate identity imposed by statute and indicates a legislative intervention in the corporate structure of the Foundation.

• Regulatory carve‑outs and delegations: The Act authorises the making of regulations that may exclude tax exemptions in particular laws (ss 50(3), 51(3)) and to make rules regarding access to facilities and use of emblems with modest penalty provisions (s 58). These regulatory hooks indicate the legislature preserved the capacity to modify practical effects of the Act via subordinate legislation.

What this text does not supply

• The supplied text does not include a formal history table or schedule of amendments, nor does it identify the dates on which particular provisions were inserted or amended. Consequently, the presence of references to later statutes is the primary textual evidence of legislative evolution within the provided document. The Act’s integration with statutes dating across several years demonstrates iterative legislative layering; however, the specific amendment instrument, date and explanatory material that introduced particular sections (for example s 57A) are not included here.

How to treat the markers practically

• When construing or applying the Act, treat the cross‑references and notes in the Act as statutory constraints or additions,apply the PGPA Act requirements to corporate planning and reporting, apply Remuneration Tribunal determinations to pay and leave, abide by the Acts Interpretation Act rules on acting appointments and apply Sport Integrity Australia Act rules insofar as they are referenced (for example for disclosure and protected information). If you require the precise legislative history or amending instruments and dates, those are not contained in this text and must be retrieved from parliamentary or legislative records.

In sum, the Act as provided shows an accretive amendment pattern through references to later Commonwealth statutes and added provisions (notably s 57A) that create interfaces with new statutory bodies and regimes. The document itself is current to the extent that it embeds those cross‑references and additions; a specific chronological amendment history is not within the supplied text.

The supplied text of the Act contains no references to judicial decisions, reported cases, or litigation outcomes. It does not list any case law, nor does it reproduce extracts of judicial interpretation. The Act does include notes indicating interplay with other statutory regimes and references to provisions in other statutes that bear on potential legal disputes (for example, the note referencing termination under s 30 of the PGPA Act in relation to s 19). That cross‑referencing means that litigation involving the Commission could arise under the PGPA Act, the Sport Integrity Australia Act, trust law or ordinary constitutional or administrative law principles, but the Act itself provides no account of any such cases.

What is ascertainable from the text

• No cases named: There are no case names, citations or summaries in the Act text provided. The Act therefore does not supply litigation authorities to interpret its provisions.

• Litigation vectors implied by the Act: The Act’s structure does indicate several legal fault lines where disputes are possible: Ministerial directions and the Commission’s obligation to comply (s 11) may give rise to judicial review challenges to the exercise of ministerial power; procurement, contracting and loan approvals constrained by s 47 and s 46 may give rise to contractual or administrative disputes; the segregation of trust funds (s 52) and application of trust money only in accordance with trust terms could generate trust law litigation; and the overlap prohibition with Sport Integrity Australia (s 7(4A)) could create disputes about statutory boundaries. Likewise, the immunity in s 57 for acts done in good faith raises issues about the limits of that immunity where bad faith or ultra vires conduct is alleged.

• Note‑referenced external litigation regimes: The Act’s incorporation of PGPA Act obligations and the notes referencing termination under s 30 of the PGPA Act suggest that litigation involving breaches of those duties could occur under the PGPA Act framework, but again the Act text contains no litigation history.

Practical consequence

• For any practitioner seeking precedent or judicial interpretation, the Act itself does not provide case law and one must search external legal databases and public records for decisions concerning the Australian Sports Commission or related statutory provisions under the PGPA Act or other applicable statutes. The Act points to other statutes that likely generate litigation under their own terms, but the supplied text contains no narratives of litigation, no appellate history and no reported disputes.

In short, the Act as provided contains no litigation history. It signals several legal interfaces likely to produce judicial or tribunal disputes in practice, but no adjudications are recited or cited in this document.

The Act contains several provisions that create potential pitfalls in governance, finance, delegation, compliance and information handling. The following are concrete operational "gotchas" tied to specific sections in the text.

Ministerial direction, consultation and publication obligations (s 11)

• The Minister’s power to give written directions is broad and the Commission must comply (s 11(1)). However, before issuing a direction the Minister must inform the Commission in writing that a direction is being considered and give the Chairperson an opportunity to discuss it (s 11(2)). The Minister must also publish each direction in the Gazette and lay it before each House of Parliament within 15 sitting days (s 11(3)). Gotcha: failure by the Minister to follow the required procedural steps could render a direction procedurally vulnerable; conversely, the Commission’s operational space can be substantially narrowed by directions which will be public and tabled in Parliament.

Functional overlap with Sport Integrity Australia (s 7(4A))

• The Act mandates that the Commission’s functions may only be performed to the extent that they do not overlap with functions of the Chief Executive Officer of Sport Integrity Australia. Gotcha: program design and disciplinary or anti‑doping activities need careful legal mapping to avoid encroaching on Sport Integrity Australia’s statutory functions, and disputes about overlap may arise where roles are not clearly partitioned.

Disclosure and protected information (s 57A)

• The Commission may disclose information to the CEO of Sport Integrity Australia where it relates to sports doping and safety matters or is otherwise relevant to the CEO’s functions; personal information so disclosed is to be taken as protected information under the Sport Integrity Australia Act (s 57A). Gotcha: the Commission must ensure any sharing of personal information aligns with privacy obligations and the statutory definition of “protected information” in the Sport Integrity Australia Act, and must manage records and confidentiality accordingly.

Borrowing limits vs credit arrangements (ss 46 and 8(1)(ma))

• The Commission may not borrow except by a loan from the Commonwealth arranged by the Finance Minister (s 46), but the Act separately permits the Commission, despite s 46(2), to obtain goods or services on credit by use of a credit card (s 8(1)(ma)). Gotcha: while major borrowing is controlled by the Finance Minister, the credit card carve‑out permits routine procurement on credit; improper use of credit or treating credit card facilities as a substitute for proper loan approval mechanisms may breach financial rules or PGPA Act obligations.

Contract and lease approval thresholds (s 47)

• The Commission must obtain the Minister’s written approval before entering contracts exceeding $500,000 or leases of land for ten years or more (s 47). Gotcha: step changes in procurement or long‑term property commitments beyond those thresholds require Ministerial consent; failing to secure approval or structuring arrangements to circumvent thresholds may contravene the Act.

Corporate and operational plan timings and approvals (ss 23, 26)

• Corporate plans must be submitted to the Minister not less than three months before the commencement of the plan period (or a lesser period the Minister allows in special circumstances) and must be laid before Parliament after Ministerial approval (s 23). Operational plans for each financial year must be developed and approved by the Minister, who can require revisions and must give written reasons for requests (s 26(2)-(3)). Gotcha: tight timelines and required Ministerial approvals create the risk of delayed plan implementation or misalignment between the Commission’s program schedule and funded priorities; failing to obtain or align with Ministerial approval can create governance compliance issues.

Segregation and application of trust money (s 52)

• Trust money must be kept in separate accounts and applied only in accordance with the trust terms or permitted investment rules (s 52). Gotcha: mixing trust and non‑trust funds is prohibited; failure to segregate trust monies can create legal liability and compromise donor or trust obligations.

Delegation limits (s 54)

• The Commission may delegate many powers to members, committees, the Executive Director, the Director or staff, but may not delegate certain powers (for example sections 22, 23, 25, 26, 39 and subsections 28(1), 29(1) and 30(1)) (s 54). Gotcha: boards and executives must map which powers are non‑delegable and ensure delegations are validly made by resolution; incorrect delegation can render actions ultra vires.

Non‑delegable policy areas (ss 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30)

• Powers to establish committees, prepare corporate plans, vary corporate plans, approve operational plans, and appoint the Executive Director or Director cannot be delegated under s 54. Gotcha: these are board‑level decisions requiring formal member resolution and cannot be pushed down without a valid delegation.

Tax exemption subject to regulation (ss 50-51)

• The Commission and the Foundation are exempt from tax unless regulations specify otherwise (ss 50(3), 51(3)). Gotcha: the exemptions are not absolute; subordinate regulations may limit tax immunity in particular contexts, so tax treatment must be verified against current regulations, not assumed automatic.

Personal liability protection scope (s 57)

• Members, the Executive Director and the Director are immune from liability for acts or omissions done in good faith in performance or purported performance of functions (s 57). Gotcha: immunity covers good‑faith conduct, so negligent or bad‑faith conduct, or acts outside statutory powers, may not be protected. Immunity does not shield the entity itself from accountability or sanctions under other statutory regimes.

Australian Sports Foundation constraints (s 10)

• The Foundation’s purpose is limited to raising money for sport and it is not authorised to do anything the Commission cannot do, except as necessary to perform functions in relation to the Commission (s 10(3)-(4)). Gotcha: donors, sponsors and the Foundation must ensure activities fall within these constraints; the Foundation is not a general purpose charity for unrelated activities beyond Commission functions.

Quorum and procedural decisions (s 21)

• Five members constitute a quorum (s 21(7)(a)), and the presiding officer has a casting vote in event of equal votes (s 21(7)(c)). Decisions can also be made by signed documents if a majority including the Chair sign (s 21(8)). Gotcha: decision‑making by circulated documents is available but members with material personal interests must not sign to approve relevant resolutions (s 21(10)); failing to exclude conflicted members can invalidate resolutions.

Small maximum penalties in regulations (s 58)

• Regulations may prescribe penalties not exceeding five penalty units for breaches of regulations concerning entry to Commission land or misuse of emblems (s 58(e)). Gotcha: statutory regulatory penalties under this Act are modest; more substantial sanctions for misconduct will need to be sought under other legal regimes.

Integration with PGPA Act obligations

• The Act anchors the Commission’s corporate planning and reporting in the PGPA Act (s 23 note; s 27). Gotcha: compliance requires adherence to PGPA standards and reporting schedules; failure may trigger PGPA Act remedies rather than penalties under this Act.

These “gotchas” are concrete operational and legal friction points evident in the statutory text. Practitioners should map each against current ministerial policies, PGPA obligations, and applicable regulations when advising clients or preparing actions.

Compliance under this Act is predominantly administrative and managerial, focused on planning, financial controls, ministerial engagement, reporting, delegation hygiene, and liaison with Sport Integrity Australia and other statutory regimes. The following concrete checklist maps statutory obligations to practical steps, with section references.

1. Corporate and operational planning (ss 23, 25-27)

• Prepare corporate plans in accordance with the PGPA Act and submit them to the Minister for approval at least three months before the plan period, unless the Minister approves a shorter period (s 23(1)(a)). Ensure corporate plans are laid before both Houses of Parliament within 15 sitting days after Ministerial approval (s 23(1)(b)).

• Draft annual operational plans that specify programs and resource allocations for each financial year tied to the corporate plan (s 26(1)). Submit operational plans to the Minister as soon as practicable and obtain written approval (s 26(4)).

• If the Minister requests revisions, revise the operational plan and provide written reasons if the Minister determines the plan is inconsistent with the corporate plan,the Minister must give written reasons (s 26(2)-(3)). Keep records of approvals and ministerial correspondence.

• Ensure Commission activities are carried out “to the extent practicable” in a manner consistent with corporate and operational plans (s 27). Document rationales where deviations occur and record approvals or Ministerial directions authorising departures.

2. Ministerial directions and engagement (s 11)

• Implement a process for receiving and responding to Ministerial notices about proposed directions (s 11(2)), which includes internal briefings of the Chairperson and the opportunity to discuss proposed directions with the Minister.

• Maintain a register of directions received, and ensure each direction is published in the Gazette and tabled before Parliament within 15 sitting days (s 11(3)). Coordinate communications, legal advice and operational adjustments following each direction.

3. Financial management and approvals (ss 43-47, 45)

• Ensure all Commonwealth appropriations are correctly handled in accordance with the Finance Minister’s directions about amounts and timing (s 43(2)). Coordinate with the Finance Minister’s office regarding cash flow and drawdowns.