The instrument defines several key terms. “Charge” is defined to mean a charge that reasonably relates to the costs and expenses incurred or to be incurred by APRA in relation to the matters to which the charge relates. This definition is important because it anchors the legal limit on what APRA may levy: the charge must not be arbitrary or profit-based, but must correspond to the costs APRA expects to incur. The phrase “or to be incurred” allows APRA to recover anticipated costs before they are actually spent, subject to a reasonableness standard.

“Financial sector entity” is given the meaning in section 5 of the Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act 2001. That definition captures a broad range of entities including authorised deposit-taking institutions, insurers, superannuation funds, and other institutions regulated by APRA. The instrument itself does not impose obligations on those entities; it only uses the term to identify the subject matter of the statistical information being provided to the ABS and RBA.

“EFS” is Economic and Financial Statistics, a data collection system that likely aggregates and standardises data from the ARF and SRF forms. “API” is Application Programming Interface, a technical mechanism for automated data sharing between APRA and the RBA. The RBA’s use of that API is the basis for the maintenance charge.

The instrument does not create any new concepts of substantive legal rights or obligations. It is purely a pricing schedule for services already being delivered. The concept of “cost recovery” is central: the instrument assumes that the ABS and RBA benefit from the data, and therefore should bear the cost of producing and transmitting it, rather than the data being provided for free from APRA’s general appropriation. This raises an economic question about whether the charges are efficiently set to reflect true marginal costs or whether they cross-subsidise other APRA functions. The attached schedule itemises only lump-sum amounts without any breakdown of how they were calculated, making external scrutiny of the reasonableness of the “reasonably relates” standard difficult.

The direct payers of the charges are two Commonwealth agencies: the ABS and the RBA. The ABS is charged $243,492 for statistical information plus $14,291 for EFS development costs, a total of $257,783. The RBA is charged $420,486 for statistical information plus $18,189 for EFS development costs plus $97,426 for API maintenance, a total of $536,101. These are not small sums, particularly for the RBA, which faces a combined charge of over half a million dollars.

The indirect impact falls on the financial sector entities that supply the underlying data. Although the instrument does not require them to do anything new, the cost of the data collection system is ultimately borne by taxpayers and, through the ABS and RBA, by the general government sector. However, the real economic incidence may be more nuanced. The ABS and RBA are funded by appropriations; if these charges are not offset by increased budget allocations, the agencies must absorb the cost or reduce other activities. That could mean higher taxes, reduced statistical services, or lower returns on public assets. More directly, financial sector entities that are the source of the data might see the quality or timeliness of official statistics improve, but they also face the recurring compliance burden of filling out the ARF and SRF forms, which is mandated by separate instruments.

The instrument also affects APRA itself. It is the recipient of the charges, which defray some of its operating costs. To the extent that APRA’s costs are recovered from other government agencies rather than from the regulated entities directly, the instrument reduces the amount APRA needs to recover from industry levies. That may be seen as a shifting of costs from the private sector to the public purse, or as an efficient internal cross-charge, depending on one’s view of who should pay for the production of public statistics.

Practitioners and compliance professionals in financial institutions will not have any direct obligations under this instrument. However, they should be aware that the data they submit on the listed ARF and SRF forms is being used for purposes beyond APRA’s prudential oversight - namely, for national accounts and monetary policy analysis by the ABS and RBA. This may affect how they interpret data privacy and commercial confidentiality expectations.

The instrument imposes a single duty on the ABS and the RBA: to pay the specified charges within 28 days after receipt of APRA’s invoice. This duty arises automatically upon the instrument’s registration, but the timing obligation crystallises only when APRA issues an invoice. The instrument does not specify whether APRA must issue a separate invoice for each service or may aggregate them. In practice, it is likely APRA will issue one or two invoices per financial year.

The key right is reciprocal: APRA has the right to demand payment. Under paragraph 51(1)(a) of the APRA Act, the power to fix charges is a statutory mechanism for cost recovery. The instrument itself does not set out enforcement mechanisms for non-payment, but any unpaid charge would likely be recoverable as a debt due to the Commonwealth, possibly under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 or general contract or statutory debt provisions.

Another important right is APRA’s discretionary power to waive or refund the charge, in whole or part, if satisfied it is appropriate in the circumstances. The instrument provides no criteria for what constitutes “appropriate”. This gives APRA broad administrative discretion, but also creates uncertainty for the ABS and RBA about the finality of the charges. A waiver must be in writing; oral undertakings would not be effective.

The instrument also provides that the charges are not subject to GST. This is consistent with the treatment of statutory charges and inter-government transactions under the GST Act. It simplifies accounting for both APRA and the payers, avoiding the need to factor in GST input credits.

No new duties are imposed on financial sector entities. Their obligations to submit the underlying data arise from other legislative instruments, prudential standards, and the Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act 2001. The instrument merely prices the onward transmission of that data. However, to the extent that the instrument funds improvements to the EFS collection system or data-sharing APIs, entities may benefit from more stable or efficient reporting systems.

The instrument does not prescribe any penalties for late payment or non-payment. It does not refer to interest on overdue amounts, late payment fees, or any enforcement mechanism. This is typical for a cost-recovery instrument between agencies of the Commonwealth. Enforcement would rely on the ordinary law of debt. If the ABS or RBA failed to pay, APRA could likely sue for the amount as a debt due, or the matter could be resolved through inter-departmental negotiation or escalation to the Department of Finance.

The absence of penalties may indicate that these charges are expected to be paid as a matter of routine inter-agency cooperation. However, it also means there is no explicit deterrent for delayed payment. The only lever APRA has is its discretion to waive or refund charges, but that is a positive power, not a penalty. If payment is not made, APRA might withhold further data or services, though the instrument does not authorise that.

For financial sector entities, non-compliance with the underlying data-reporting obligations under the Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act 2001 can attract civil penalties, but this instrument is not the source of those obligations. It is purely a funding mechanism.

The instrument does not create any criminal offences or infringement notices. It does not confer any review rights on the payers (such as merits review of the quantum of charges). The only avenue for a dispute over whether a charge “reasonably relates” to costs would be judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, given that the decision to fix the charge is a decision of an administrative character. But the instrument is legislative in form, so the scope for challenge may be limited. The broad definition of “charge” and the opaque calculation of the lump sums make it difficult to contest the amount.

The primary legal foundation is the APRA Act 1998. Paragraph 51(1)(a) empowers APRA to fix charges for services and facilities it provides. This instrument is a concrete exercise of that power. The APRA Act does not set any maximum or minimum charge, leaving it to APRA to determine what reasonably relates to costs. The instrument does not amend or repeal any existing provisions; it is a standalone charging schedule.

The Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act 2001 is the substantive statute that compels financial sector entities to provide the data that APRA then passes on to the ABS and RBA. That Act defines “financial sector entity” and sets out the framework for APRA to require reporting. This instrument does not alter those obligations; it merely funds the logistical step of sharing the data.

The A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 is explicitly mentioned to confirm that the charges are not subject to GST. This is consistent with the treatment of statutory charges, particularly those between government entities, as they are not consideration for a taxable supply. The instrument thus avoids any GST leakage or administrative complexity.

Public governance legislation, particularly the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013, governs how APRA manages public money. The charges collected would be public money under that Act. The instrument does not direct how APRA must spend the amounts, but the cost-recovery logic implies they will be offset against the costs of the services.

The instrument also interacts with the various prudential standards and reporting requirements that mandate the content of the ARF and SRF forms listed in the attachments. Any changes to those forms in future would likely necessitate a new charging instrument, because the instrument specifically references the “statistical information specified in Attachment 1” and Attachment 2. If the forms change, the charges may need to be recalibrated.

There is no apparent interaction with state or territory laws. The instrument is entirely Commonwealth-focused.

No amendment history is provided. The instrument is designated “No. 1 of 2025” and is dated 23 June 2025. It likely replaces an earlier instrument for the 2023-24 financial year or a similar period, but the text does not state that. It does not refer to any amending instrument or previous charging schedule. The instrument is self-contained and applies only for the 2024-25 financial year. It will expire by its own terms once the services are provided and charges paid, unless a successor instrument is made for future years.

Given that the instrument covers only one financial year, and was made in June 2025 (presumably after the financial year began on 1 July 2024), it is retrospective in a practical sense: it fixes charges for services that were already being provided during the year. This is common for cost-recovery instruments where actual costs are not known until late in the year. The instrument does not address whether it is intended to be retrospective in a legal sense; it commences on registration, which is after the start of the financial year. That may raise an issue of legal certainty, but as the charges are payable only after invoice, the timing of the instrument does not necessarily create a retrospective liability if the invoices are issued after registration.

No explanation of why the specific amounts were chosen is given. The schedule does not show a formula or cost allocation method.

The instrument is too new and too narrow to have generated any litigation. No court or tribunal decisions are referenced in the instrument. Given that it deals with inter-agency charges, any dispute would likely be resolved internally through administrative processes or a ministerial direction rather than through the courts. However, if the ABS or RBA considered a charge to be outside the statutory power because it does not “reasonably relate” to costs, they could theoretically seek judicial review. To date, no such challenge is recorded.

More broadly, the APRA Act provision (s51) has been considered in limited contexts, but not specifically regarding charging for statistical data. It is possible that similar instruments for past years have been subject to scrutiny by the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation, but the instrument does not refer to any such review.

For practitioners, the absence of litigation does not mean the instrument is immune from challenge. The delegation to Clare Gibney, Executive Director, Chief of Staff and Enterprise Services, suggests the power was exercised at a senior operational level, not by the APRA Board. If the instrument were ever challenged, the validity of the delegation under the APRA Act could be relevant, but the instrument does not reproduce the delegation instrument.

The most significant trap lies in the definition of “charge”: it must reasonably relate to costs incurred or to be incurred. The schedule gives no breakdown of how the amounts were calculated. This lack of transparency makes it difficult for the payers (and any interested party) to verify that the charges are not excessive. If APRA overestimates its costs, the ABS and RBA must pay the invoice within 28 days or risk dispute, and the only recourse is APRA’s discretion to waive or refund. There is no independent review mechanism.

Another potential issue: the instrument covers only the 2024-25 financial year but was made in June 2025, presumably after most of the year had elapsed. The services were already being provided. The ABS and RBA have likely already budgeted for these charges, but if the amounts unexpectedly increase from prior years, they may face a funding shortfall. The instrument does not indicate whether the amounts are consistent with previous years.

The waiver discretion is broad and unfettered by criteria. While this gives APRA flexibility, it also creates uncertainty for the payers. A waiver given orally would be ineffective; only a written waiver counts. This could catch out an agency that relies on an informal undertaking.

The instrument does not address what happens if APRA fails to provide the statistical information or if the data sharing APIs malfunction. The charge is for “provision” and “maintenance and support”, but there is no service-level agreement or remedy for non-performance. The ABS and RBA must pay the charges regardless of quality or timeliness, absent a waiver.

For financial sector entities, there is a risk that the data they submit via the ARF forms is shared with the ABS and RBA and then used for macroeconomic purposes without their specific consent. While the Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act permits the use of data for the purposes of that Act, the onward transmission to the ABS and RBA may be considered a secondary use. The instrument does not address confidentiality or privacy beyond the general protections in the APRA Act and the Statistics Determination 2024.

Finally, the instrument is silent on indexing or adjustment for inflation. The charges are fixed in nominal dollars for 2024-25. If actual costs rise, APRA cannot recover more without a new instrument. Conversely, if costs are lower, the payers have no automatic right to a refund unless APRA exercises its waiver power.

For the ABS and the RBA, compliance is straightforward: pay the invoiced amount within 28 days of receipt of APRA’s invoice. The instrument does not require any pre-approval or notification. The payer should verify the invoice references the correct instrument and that the amounts match the schedule. If there is a discrepancy, the payer should notify APRA in writing and seek clarification, but the obligation to pay remains unless APRA agrees to waive or amend.

APRA’s compliance obligations are to issue invoices that correctly identify the services and the charge, to accept payment within the 28-day period, and to exercise any waiver or refund in writing. APRA should maintain records demonstrating that the charges reasonably relate to its costs, should a challenge arise.

For financial sector entities, compliance with this instrument requires no action. However, they must continue to submit the ARF and SRF forms listed in Attachments 1 and 2 accurately and on time, as required by other APRA instruments. The data submitted forms the basis of the statistical information provided to the ABS and RBA. Any failure in data quality or timeliness could affect the value of the service for which the ABS and RBA are paying, but the financial entity would not be liable under this instrument.

Practitioners advising the ABS or RBA should ensure that the charge is budgeted for and that invoice processing systems can meet the 28-day deadline. They should also document any communications with APRA about potential waivers, to ensure a written record exists. If a waiver is sought, it must be obtained in writing from APRA; an oral assurance is insufficient.

From a governance perspective, the ABS and RBA should request from APRA a breakdown of the costs underlying the charges to satisfy themselves that the “reasonably relates” test is met. While the instrument does not require APRA to provide such a breakdown, asking for it may improve transparency and reduce the risk of future disputes. If the charges are found to be materially inaccurate, the payer could request a refund under APRA’s discretionary power.

There is no ongoing compliance burden beyond payment. The instrument expires at the end of the 2024-25 financial year, but the charges relate to services provided during that year, so payment obligations will be finalised when invoices are settled. A new instrument will be needed for subsequent years, and the same compliance steps will apply.