Airworthiness Directives 2004 - Revocation and Remaking - Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes

The primary affected group is operators of Boeing 767 series aeroplanes registered in Australia, whether airlines, cargo carriers, charter operators, or private owners. Each operator must ensure compliance with every applicable AD listed in Schedule 1 that is not cancelled. This includes maintaining records of compliance, performing inspections at prescribed intervals, and completing modifications or replacements. Maintenance organisations holding COA or CAR 30 approvals will be the entities performing the physical work. They must follow the instructions in each AD exactly, and their records must satisfy CASA audit requirements. Engineers and technicians who sign off AD compliance are personally exposed to regulatory liability if they certify work that does not meet the directive’s terms. Parts suppliers and repair stations that manufacture or overhaul components covered by ADs (e.g., ram air turbine actuators, PRSOV linkages, landing gear struts) must ensure their products meet the AD requirements. CASA itself is the regulator and beneficiary of the instrument; it retains enforcement powers. Importers of Boeing 767 aircraft must verify that the incoming fleet has complied with all applicable ADs, and the instrument reinforces the need for a compliance history review. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) may interact with AD compliance during incident investigations. Insurance underwriters and lessors impose contractual obligations that often require full AD compliance; this instrument provides a clear list of what is mandatory. Lawyers advising on aircraft airworthiness or accident liability must be aware of the exact AD status under Australian law. The instrument has no direct effect on passengers or the general public, but safety outcomes from AD compliance do affect them indirectly. The breadth of the schedule means that nearly every component and system on the 767 is touched, so the compliance burden is substantial, especially for older aircraft nearing the end of their economic life. Small operators with limited engineering capacity face proportionally higher compliance costs.

The key duty under the law is to comply with each mandatory airworthiness directive listed in Schedule 1 that is not cancelled. Compliance must be in accordance with the terms of the directive as remade. For example, if an AD requires a one-time inspection within a threshold number of flight cycles and a repetitive inspection thereafter, the operator must perform each inspection and rectify any discrepancy. There is no right to simply ignore an AD because no safety issue is apparent; ADs are issued based on the regulator’s assessment of unsafe conditions across the fleet. However, operators retain the right to seek an alternative means of compliance (AMOC) from CASA. If an operator can show that a different inspection method, part, or schedule provides an equivalent level of safety, CASA may approve a deviation from the AD’s specific instructions. That approval must be in writing. Similarly, operators have the right to request an extension of a compliance time if circumstances prevent timely compliance, provided the extension request is properly submitted and justified. The instrument itself does not create these rights; they arise from the CASR 1998 and CASA’s policy manuals. Another implicit right is the right to rely on the AD text as the final statement of the requirement. If an operator follows the remade AD precisely, it has satisfied its legal duty. There is no right to choose between different mandatory actions unless the AD explicitly offers options. The duty extends to record keeping. Each compliance event (inspection, modification, or replacement) must be documented in the aircraft’s continuing airworthiness records, typically in the logbook or maintenance register. This record must be retained as long as the aircraft remains in service. The duty also includes reporting unsafe conditions discovered during AD work that are not already covered by the AD. The operator or maintainer must report these to CASA promptly under regulation 39. (No specific provision for reporting is mentioned in this instrument, but the general CASR framework applies.) In cases where an AD references a service bulletin from the manufacturer (e.g., Boeing Service Bulletin), following that bulletin is usually mandatory unless the AD specifically adopts it with exceptions. The instrument does not itself confer rights on third parties, but enforceability against operators is clear.

Non-compliance with an airworthiness directive is a serious breach of the CASR 1998. The instrument does not specify penalties; those are found in the Civil Aviation Act 1988 and the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations. Generally, operating an aircraft that is not airworthy due to non-compliance with an AD is an offence. The maximum penalty for an individual can be significant (up to $10,000 or more per offence, and imprisonment for serious cases). For body corporates, penalties can reach hundreds of thousands of dollars per offence. CASA may also impose administrative sanctions, such as suspension or cancellation of an air operator’s certificate, an airworthiness certificate, or a maintenance approval. The regulator may issue a grounding order under CASR 39.003 that directs the aircraft not to fly until the AD is complied with. CASA’s enforcement powers include on-the-spot fines for minor non-compliance, written directions to comply, and prosecution in federal court. Civil liability also looms: if an accident occurs because a required AD inspection was not performed, the operator faces negligence suits and potential corporate liability. The instrument’s revocation and remaking removes any technical defence that the AD was invalidly made. By re-promulgating each directive, CASA strengthens its enforcement position. For maintenance organisations, improper certification of AD compliance can lead to loss of approved rating, and individuals can face personal liability under the Crimes Act for falsifying records. The instrument also indirectly affects insurers: a policy may exclude cover if the aircraft was not in compliance with ADs. The fact that some ADs are marked “CANCELLED” (e.g., AD/B767/21, AD/B767/26) means enforcement action for those directives is not possible, but the operator must still ensure that the cancellation is recorded accurately in its compliance register. CASA may conduct surveillance inspections focused on AD compliance, and this instrument provides a clear list of what should be on the operator’s compliance schedule. The burden of proof is on the operator to demonstrate compliance, so thorough record keeping is essential.

The instrument sits within the hierarchy of Australian aviation law. The Civil Aviation Act 1988 is the enabling statute. The Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 provide the specific power to issue ADs under Part 39. This instrument is a legislative instrument made under regulation 39.001(1). It interacts with Part 42 of CASR 1998, which deals with continuing airworthiness management. Operators who hold a Part 42 continuing airworthiness management organisation (CAMO) certificate must ensure their AD compliance schedule is up to date. The instrument also interacts with FAA regulations indirectly. Many of the listed ADs reference FAA Airworthiness Directives or FAA Supplemental Type Certificates (STCs). For example, AD/B767/148, 149, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 181, 184, and 186 all reference FAA STCs. This means the Australian AD may adopt the FAA’s requirements or cross-reference them. An operator that has complied with the underlying FAA AD must also check that the Australian AD does not impose additional or different requirements. The instrument does not repeal or override the Australian Regulation of Foreign Aircraft rules, but operators must ensure that any foreign aircraft (e.g., imported from the US) have complied with both the originating regulatory AD and the Australian AD where differences exist. The instrument also relates to state-based Work Health and Safety laws in that maintenance personnel performing AD work must follow safe practices; an AD does not excuse failure to follow WHS procedures. The instrument may also interact with privity of contract in lease agreements: lessees must maintain AD compliance as a contractual condition. The instrument itself does not modify other laws, but its revocation and remaking can affect the date and validity of compliance records for warranty or insurance purposes. Privacy laws are not engaged. The instrument has no competition or consumer law interaction. Its interaction with international treaty obligations (Chicago Convention, Annex 8 Airworthiness) is indirect; Australia’s AD system is consistent with ICAO standards, so this instrument helps maintain Australia’s certification status for Boeing 767 operations.

The instrument was made on 20 December 2004. It does not amend any previous instrument; it revokes and remakes the same ADs. The instrument’s own text contains no internal amendment history. However, each individual AD referenced in Schedule 1 has its own amendment history noted in the AD name (for example, AD/B767/1 Amdt 1, AD/B767/8 Amdt 3, AD/B767/85 Amdt 4, AD/B767/167 Amdt 2). These amendments reflect prior changes to the AD text before this re-issuance. The instrument itself is not an amendment to the ADs; it reissues them in their most recent state. The fact that the instrument was made by a delegate rather than the full CASA board indicates it is a routine administrative step. There is no mention of consultation, explanatory memorandum, or regulatory impact statement. Given the purpose is revocation and remaking without substantive change, no amendment to the underlying requirements occurred at this date. After this instrument, further amendments to individual ADs would need to be made through new AD instruments under the same delegation. The instrument also reflects a clean-up of the AD register: some cancelled ADs are included for completeness (AD/B767/21, 26, 33, etc.), ensuring the register shows every AD that was ever made for the Boeing 767, even if no longer in force. The placeholder AD/B767/165 (“This AD yet to be issued”) indicates that a pending directive was anticipated but not finalised. The instrument’s own amendment history is limited to this single action; it has not been itself amended. Future regulators could revoke and replace this entire instrument, but as of the date of the source, it is the sole legal basis for the listed ADs being in force.

The source text contains no information about litigation history. As this is an administrative re-issuance without substantive change, it is unlikely to have generated its own litigation. ADs in general, including those for Boeing 767 aircraft, have prompted legal actions in other jurisdictions, typically challenging the regulator’s safety rationale, the economic impact, or the procedural validity of the AD. In Australia, there have been disputes between CASA and operators over the terms of AD compliance and the granting of AMOCs. Specific cases are not named in this instrument. The fact that CASA chose to revoke and remake these ADs suggests a desire to fortify their legal standing, possibly in response to prior procedural challenges or to ensure consistency with current administrative law requirements. There have been cases in the Federal Court of Australia where operators argued that ADs were not validly made because the delegate’s authority was defective or the instrument was not registered. This revocation and remaking would cure such defects. The instrument also removes any argument that the prior ADs had lapsed or were not legally effective. For the Boeing 767 fleet specifically, there has been litigation in the United States regarding safety issues covered by some of these ADs (e.g., fuel system safety, thrust reverser failures), but no Australian case is referenced. The instrument’s “CANCELLED” notations may reflect prior litigation or accident investigation findings that led to withdrawal. For example, AD/B767/136 “Multiple Engine Power Losses - CANCELLED” likely related to a known safety issue that was subsequently addressed by other means. Absent specific case law, the instrument remains an uncontested administrative act.

Several traps exist for the unwary. First, CANCELLED ADs are still listed in Schedule 1. The instrument says it makes each AD in Schedule 1 as a separate instrument. For a cancelled AD, the “latest published edition” likely contains text that says “This directive is cancelled, no requirements apply.” But an operator who assumes a cancelled AD is removed entirely could be misled if the instrument reinstates it as a positive legal requirement. The safe approach is to treat cancelled ADs as having no operative requirement, but the operator must keep the record of cancellation. Second, the placeholder AD/B767/165 (“This AD yet to be issued”) is also remade. If a future AD is eventually issued under that number, the operator must track it. Third, the instrument does not include the actual text of each AD. It merely lists AD names and numbers. The operator must obtain the full text from CASA’s register or from the manufacturer. Relying on memory or an outdated copy could lead to non-compliance if the latest published edition contains changed wording. Fourth, multiple amendments are referenced (e.g., Amdt 2, Amdt 4). The remade AD includes all amendments up to that point. An operator using an older amendment may miss a critical revision. Fifth, the cross-reference to FAA STCs (e.g., AD/B767/148 through 156, 181, 184, 186) means that the operator must have a copy of that STC and any associated instructions. If the STC has been withdrawn or revised in the US, the Australian AD text will determine what is mandatory here. Sixth, the instrument is signed on 20 December 2004, close to the Christmas break. Operators should not assume that compliance dates are aligned to that date; each AD has its own compliance times. Seventh, AD/B767/29 “Configuration, Maintenance & Procedures Standard for Extended Range” (Amdt 5) imposes special requirements for ETOPS operations. Operators using the aircraft for long-haul overwater flights must integrate this AD with the ETOPS approval under Part 121. Eighth, the list includes AD/B767/145 “Airworthiness Limitations” (Amdt 1). That AD likely incorporates the manufacturer’s airworthiness limitations section, which changes over time. The operator must track subsequent revisions even if the AD is not amended. Ninth, the delegation signature is by David Villiers. An operator challenging the validity of the instrument could try to argue the delegate lacked authority, but the instrument is presumed valid. Tenth, record keeping must reflect the new instrument number and date of remaking even though the technical content is unchanged. This is a common audit pitfall.

Compliance with this instrument requires a systematic approach. The operator must first obtain the complete set of ADs referred to in Schedule 1 that are not cancelled. These should be the exact text of the latest published edition as at the date of this instrument (20 December 2004). If the operator’s copies are older, they must be replaced. The operator should then cross-reference each AD against the aircraft’s current compliance matrix to ensure that all required actions have been performed and are up to date. For each AD, the operator must note the compliance method: repetitive inspections, one-time modifications, replacement of parts, operational limitations, or record retention. For repetitive ADs, the operator must incorporate the intervals into the aircraft’s maintenance schedule (e.g., 10,000 flight cycles, 50,000 flight hours, or calendar time). The CAMO or Part 42 department is responsible for tracking these intervals and scheduling the work. For one-time ADs, the operator must verify that the action was completed previously or perform it now if overdue. The aircraft may need to be grounded until compliance is achieved. For ADs that call for modifications, the operator must procure the approved parts and follow the instructions. If a service bulletin is referenced, the operator must follow it unless the AD states otherwise. For cancelled ADs, the operator should note in the compliance records that the AD is cancelled and no action is required. The placeholder AD/B767/165 should be treated as a pending item that may become active later. The operator must maintain a register of AD compliance that lists each AD number, title, amendment level, compliance date, method, and reference to the work order or logbook entry. This register must be available for CASA inspection at any time. If the operator discovers that a required AD action has not been performed, it must either ground the aircraft until compliance is achieved or seek an alternative means of compliance (AMOC) from CASA with justification. The AMOC request should include why the current method is impractical and why the proposed alternative provides equivalent safety. The operator should also review the FAA STCs listed in certain ADs (AD/B767/148 etc.) and confirm that the equipment installed matches the approved design change. If the STC has been superseded in the US, the operator must still comply with the Australian AD text. Finally, the operator’s continuing airworthiness management system must include a process for monitoring future amendments to these ADs. Even though this instrument remakes them in their 2004 form, CASA may issue further amendments later. Compliance costs will depend on the aircraft’s age, modification status, and maintenance history. Older aircraft may require many overdue tasks; the operator should prioritise those with safety-critical deadlines. Keeping all records electronically with reference to this instrument is prudent for audits and potential transfer of the aircraft to another operator.