What it does
This instrument is an airworthiness directive directed at a defined subset of Eurocopter AS 332 (Super Puma) helicopters. Mechanically, it does three things.
First, it identifies which aircraft are in scope, by model and serial number. The AD applies to "AS 332 C, C1, L, L1 and L2 helicopters with serial numbers below S/N 2680 and helicopters with serial numbers from S/N 9000 (inclusive) to S/N 9009 (inclusive), and equipped with tail gear box (TGB) attachment fittings, all part numbers" (Applicability). That language limits the directive to particular airframe types and two serial-number bands, and it requires that the helicopter be equipped with the specified TGB attachment fittings for the AD to bite.
Second, it prescribes the action required. The AD instructs operators to carry out "Action in accordance with the technical requirements of French DGAC Airworthiness Directive (AD) UF-2007-027" (Requirement). The Australian instrument does not itself set out the step‑by‑step technical tasks, instead incorporating by reference the DGAC technical requirements.
Third, it fixes the compliance timing. The AD states compliance "As specified in the requirements document with a revised effective date of the 12 December 2007" and declares "This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 12 December 2007" (Compliance). The instrument therefore imposes a mandatory obligation to complete the referenced actions by the stated effective date, or as otherwise specified in the referenced requirements document.
The AD also contains a technical background that explains why the action is required. It describes a manufacturing anomaly in the structure fitting for the TGB aft attachment bolt: the blind hole intended to provide clearance for the bolt in the structure fitting is missing, causing interference between the end of the threaded section of the bolt and the fitting during a scheduled maintenance check (750-hour inspection). That interference "does not enable correct axial tightening of the TGB casing, even if the torque load applied to the attachment screw is correct." The AD links this interference to a failure mode in which "insufficient tightening can cause damage to the TGB attachment and give rise to crack initiation under the head of the attachment bolt before the TBO of the TGB is reached" and states the worst-case consequence, the loss of the TGB and hence "the risk of losing the helicopter during take-off and landing phases" (Background). The AD is signed by the CASA delegate and dated 10 December 2007.