AD/JETSTREAM/106 Amdt 1 - Main Landing Gear Radius Rod

The AD centres on a narrowly defined safety hazard and prescribes identification, removal or rectification, and a prohibition on certain installations without authorised inspection and marking. The key concepts are as follows.

Applicability: the AD applies to Jetstream Series 3100 and 3200 aircraft, all serial numbers (Applicability). The phrase “all serial numbers” for airframes is qualified by the Requirement, which narrows the mandated action to specific radius rods identified by serial number in the referenced ASB (Requirement).

Affected component and defect: the hazardous component is the main landing gear radius rod. APPH Ltd supplied a batch of incorrectly manufactured Buffer Springs, part number 184818, which, if fitted in a radius rod, could allow that rod to jam in an unlocked position. The AD states the functional consequence: potential main landing gear collapse (Background).

Identification mechanism: the AD relies on an external technical document for precise identification , paragraph 2.B of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited ASB 32-A-JA090640 Revision 2 or a later EASA-approved revision (Requirement). The AD therefore delegates to the ASB the list of serial numbers that are the precise locus of regulatory action.

Remedial actions: two remedial paths are mandated. Where an affected radius rod is installed, the AD requires replacement with a serviceable unit before further flight (Requirement). For future installations, the AD prohibits fitting a listed radius rod unless it has been sent to an authorised overhaul agency for inspection and rectification as necessary, and appropriately marked per APPH Ltd Service Bulletin 1847-32-14 and/or 1862-32-14, or later approved revisions (Requirement).

Temporal and administrative framing: the AD sets 14 August 2009 as the effective/compliance date and is issued as Amendment 1 to AD/JETSTREAM/106. Amendment 1 adds identification of an additional seven affected radius rods via ASB Revision 2 (Compliance; Background). The AD cross-references EASA Emergency AD 2009-0181-E and therefore situates itself within a coordinated regulatory response (Requirement note).

Authority and communication: the AD is signed and dated by the Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (signature block). The AD includes references to both the aircraft manufacturer’s ASB and the component manufacturer’s Service Bulletins as the technical instruments for compliance.

In sum, the main concepts are: a discrete components defect (Buffer Spring p/n 184818); reliance on serial-number identification in a manufacturer ASB; mandatory removal/replacement before further flight; a prohibition on installing affected parts without authorised overhaul, rectification and marking; and a fixed effective/compliance date.

This AD affects a narrowly circumscribed set of actors identified in the source text.

Aircraft operators: owners and operators of British Aerospace BAe 3100 (Jetstream) Series 3100 and 3200 aircraft are directly affected because the AD applies to those aircraft “all serial numbers” (Applicability). The AD makes operators responsible for determining whether one of the affected radius rods is installed, and for ensuring removal and replacement before further flight if an affected rod is present (Requirement; Compliance).

Maintenance organisations and MROs: organisations performing maintenance, repair and overhaul on Jetstream main landing gear systems will be affected. The AD requires that affected radius rods be sent to an “authorised overhaul agency” for inspection and rectification, if necessary, and marking in accordance with APPH Ltd Service Bulletins 1847-32-14 and/or 1862-32-14 (Requirement). Those agencies will therefore carry the technical burden of inspection and rectification work and of applying whatever marking process the Service Bulletins require.

Parts suppliers and distributors: the Background identifies that APPH Ltd supplied a batch of incorrectly manufactured Buffer Springs p/n 184818 to parts distributors and MRO facilities in North America. Distributors that supplied or hold stock of these springs or of affected radius rods are relevant actors because the AD prohibits further installation of affected radius rods unless the overhaul-and-marking route has been followed (Background; Requirement).

Regulatory authority and delegated officials: the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) is the issuing authority, and the AD is signed by a Delegate of CASA (signature block). The reference to EASA Emergency AD 2009-0181-E indicates coordination or cross-reference to an overseas regulator’s emergency directive (Requirement note). The Delegate’s signature signals that a CASA official has exercised delegated power to issue the AD, and therefore that compliance is a regulatory requirement from CASA.

Aircraft operators’ passengers and insurers: while not named, stakeholders with an interest in aircraft airworthiness , such as passengers and insurers , have an indirect stake because the AD addresses a failure mode that could cause main landing gear collapse (Background). The AD’s instructions to remove, replace or require authorised overhaul and marking affect the continued airworthiness status of affected aeroplanes.

Materially affected parts and documents: APPH Ltd (as component manufacturer) and BAE Systems (Operations) Limited ASB 32-A-JA090640 Revision 2 are named as the technical sources used to identify affected serial numbers and the rectification/marking procedures (Requirement; Background). The authorised overhaul agencies that perform inspection/rectification and marking are the only entities permitted to render affected radius rods fit for reinstallation under the AD.

In short, the AD places obligations primarily on operators and maintenance organisations, with a secondary effect on parts distributors, component manufacturers, and the regulator. The AD’s structure means that responsibility for identification and immediate remedial action rests with operators, while remedial capability (inspection, rectification and marking) is concentrated in authorised overhaul agencies.

The AD prescribes clear duties and establishes limited conditional rights relating to reinstatement of parts into service.

Primary duties on operators:

• Identification: Operators must determine whether an affected radius rod is installed on each applicable aircraft by checking serial numbers against paragraph 2.B of ASB 32-A-JA090640 Revision 2, or a later EASA-approved revision (Requirement). This places an immediate record-check and physical inspection duty on operators and maintenance crews.
• Removal and replacement: Where an affected radius rod is found installed, the operator must, before further flight, replace it with a serviceable unit (Requirement; Compliance). The timing duty is categorical , “before further flight” after the effective date.
• Installation prohibition unless authorised: From the effective date, operators (and any maintenance personnel fitting parts) are prohibited from installing any radius rod identified in the ASB unless it has been sent to an authorised overhaul agency for inspection and rectification (if necessary), and marked in accordance with APPH Ltd Service Bulletin 1847-32-14 and/or 1862-32-14, or later approved revisions (Requirement).

Duties on maintenance and overhaul agencies:

• Inspection and rectification: Authorised overhaul agencies must inspect and, where necessary, rectify the affected radius rod to restore it to a serviceable condition. The AD references the APPH Service Bulletins for the marking procedure, implying that authorised agencies must be familiar with and implement those technical requirements (Requirement).
• Marking: After inspection and any rectification, the overhaul agency must mark the radius rod in accordance with APPH Ltd Service Bulletin 1847-32-14 and/or 1862-32-14, or later approved revisions (Requirement). The marking is a precondition of legal installation.

Rights and constraints:

• Right to fit non-affected parts: The AD allows replacement with a “serviceable unit.” It does not prohibit fitting new or other serviceable radius rods that are not listed in the ASB, provided those units do not carry the affected serial numbers (Requirement).
• Conditional right to re-install affected parts: The AD creates a conditional right to install a radius rod that is identified in the ASB, but only after it has been processed by an authorised overhaul agency, rectified if necessary, and marked per the APPH Service Bulletins (Requirement). This is not a unilateral right; it is contingent on third-party action and documentation (marking).

Record-keeping implication: while the AD text does not explicitly state record-keeping duties, the identification-by-serial-number requirement and the marking condition imply an evidentiary linkage between a part’s serial number and its eligibility to be installed or retained on an aircraft. Operators will therefore need to maintain traceability records , serial numbers and the status of any overhaul/marking , to demonstrate compliance with the AD.

Scope limits: the AD’s duties are limited to the radius rods identified by serial number in the ASB. The applicability statement (Jetstream Series 3100 and 3200, all airframe serial numbers) establishes that the aircraft types covered are broad, but the actual duty to remove or to refuse installation attaches only if the part serial number is among those listed in the ASB (Applicability; Requirement).

Procedural hierarchy: the AD incorporates and defers to the technical content of the BAE Systems ASB and APPH Service Bulletins. Compliance therefore requires adherence to the procedures and serial-number lists contained in those documents or later approved revisions (Requirement). The AD does not itself set out technical inspection or rectification steps; it mandates compliance with the referenced documents.

The AD text contains no express penalty provisions or enforcement procedures. The document is framed as an airworthiness directive issued by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and signed by the Delegate (signature block), and it sets mandatory actions and a compliance deadline (“before further flight after 14 August 2009”) (Compliance; Requirement). The AD therefore imposes binding obligations, but the text does not specify civil or criminal penalties, infringement notices, or administrative sanction mechanisms within its own wording.

Given that the AD is a regulatory instrument from CASA (as indicated by the signature), compliance is presented as mandatory. The AD’s statement that replacement is required “before further flight” creates a clear operational mandate; continued flight with an identified affected radius rod after the effective date would, on the face of the AD, be non-compliant with the directive’s terms (Requirement; Compliance). The AD does not describe how CASA will detect or prove non-compliance, how notices will be issued, or what remedial enforcement steps CASA may take. The AD also does not reference any certification revocation, air operator certificate conditions, or inspector-level enforcement actions.

Because the AD relies on external technical documents for identification and rectification (ASB 32-A-JA090640 Revision 2; APPH Service Bulletins 1847-32-14 and/or 1862-32-14), enforcement in practice will likely fall back on demonstrable adherence to those documents and the AD’s timing mandate. The AD’s lack of internal penalty clauses means that any sanctions, if applied, would be drawn from CASA’s broader regulatory powers, enforcement policies, or aviation safety legislation , none of which are cited or reproduced in the AD text provided.

The AD does cross-reference EASA Emergency AD 2009-0181-E (Requirement note). That cross-reference signals alignment with an EASA action, but the AD text does not set out any cooperative enforcement procedures between CASA and EASA or any reciprocal enforcement mechanics.

In short, the AD sets binding technical and timing obligations but does not itself articulate penalties or enforcement processes. The instrument leaves unspecified the mechanisms by which CASA will monitor, investigate or sanction non-compliance; readers must treat those enforcement details as outside the AD’s text.

The AD explicitly integrates and defers to external technical instruments rather than restating technical procedures or lists. The text references the following external documents, thereby making interaction with those documents integral to compliance.

BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Alert Service Bulletin 32-A-JA090640 Revision 2 (or a later EASA-approved revision): The AD makes the ASB the operative identification mechanism for affected radius rod serial numbers by directing operators to paragraph 2.B of that ASB (Requirement). The AD does not reproduce the serial-number list; instead it imports that list by reference. This means that the AD’s scope and the identity of impacted parts are dynamically linked to the content of that ASB and to any later EASA-approved revisions of it.

APPH Ltd Service Bulletins 1847-32-14 and 1862-32-14 (or later approved revisions): The AD conditions future installations of identified radius rods on inspection/rectification and specific marking per these APPH Service Bulletins (Requirement). The AD therefore interacts with those Service Bulletins by making their marking procedures a precondition of lawful installation.

EASA Emergency AD 2009-0181-E: The AD notes this EASA Emergency AD in a parenthetical note (Requirement). This cross-reference indicates that the issue prompted coordinated regulatory action at EASA, and that the CASA AD aligns or refers to the EASA emergency measure. The AD does not reproduce the EASA text, but it imports its relevance by reference.

Regulatory hierarchy and delegated authority: The AD is signed by the Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (signature block). That signature demonstrates that the AD is issued under the authority delegated within CASA’s governance framework. The AD does not cite the statute or regulation that authorises CASA or its Delegate to issue Airworthiness Directives; those source statutes or regulations are not reproduced in the AD. Therefore, any legal query about the Delegation power or judicial review would need reference to CASA’s enabling legislation and administrative law principles outside the AD’s text.

Interaction with operator manuals and airworthiness records: Although not spelled out in the AD, the serial-number identification, replacement “before further flight” requirement, and overhaul marking condition necessarily interact with operators’ continuing airworthiness records, maintenance release processes, and possibly airworthiness directives in operators’ manuals or maintenance control documentation. The AD does not prescribe record-keeping form or retention periods; it simply imports an identification and rectification obligation. Those practical record interactions will be governed by the operator’s regulatory obligations under other CASA instruments and statutes, which are not stated in the AD.

No conflict clauses or supersessions are included in the AD text. The document does not explicitly state whether it supersedes earlier ADs, amends other instruments, or interacts with service life limits. The only change expressly recorded is that Amendment 1 introduces ASB Revision 2 adding seven serial numbers (Background).

In sum, the AD’s legal effect is to make compliance with specific external technical documents a condition of lawful operation and installation for the parts identified. The AD interacts with those external documents by importing them into its mandatory framework. The AD does not itself set out the broader statutory enforcement regime, nor does it reproduce enabling statutory provisions; those interactions remain external to the AD text.

The document is an amendment to AD/JETSTREAM/106, specifically titled AD/JETSTREAM/106 Amdt 1. The AD includes the following explicit amendment-related statements.

• Title and amendment number: The document header and internal repetition identify the instrument as “AD/JETSTREAM/106 Amdt 1” (document headings).
• Purpose of Amendment 1: The Background explains that “Amendment 1 is issued to introduce ASB 32-A-JA090640 Revision 2, which identifies an additional seven affected radius rods by serial number” (Background). Thus, Amendment 1 does not alter the central mitigation approach but expands the list of affected parts by reference to a specific ASB revision.
• Effective/compliance date: The AD states that compliance is required “before further flight after 14 August 2009” and that “This Amendment becomes effective on 14 August 2009” (Compliance). The AD is dated 13 August 2009 and signed by the Delegate, indicating that the instrument was executed the day before the stated effective date (signature block; Compliance).
• Relation to prior AD: The text does not reproduce the original AD/JETSTREAM/106 in full, nor does it specify the original AD’s text. Amendment 1 is presented as an incremental change, specifically adding serial numbers through ASB Revision 2. There is no textual description of other substantive changes to the original AD (Background).
• Reference to EASA action: The Requirement’s note “Note: EASA Emergency AD 2009-0181-E refers” suggests that the original safety action has also been addressed by EASA through an emergency AD, and that Amendment 1 remains consistent with or cognisant of that emergency action (Requirement note).
• Administrative sign-off: The AD is signed by David Villiers, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, indicating the authorising official for Amendment 1 (signature block).

The AD’s amendment history, as contained in the text, is therefore limited to Amendment 1’s incorporation of ASB 32-A-JA090640 Revision 2 to identify seven additional affected radius rod serial numbers, together with the effective date for compliance. No other amendments, rescissions, or prior amendment dates are included in the text provided.

The AD text includes no reference to any litigation, appeals, court decisions, or administrative review proceedings related to AD/JETSTREAM/106 or its Amendment 1. There are no cases named, no recorded objections, and no citations to judicial authority in the document.

The only legal-administrative indication present is the signature of the Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, which evidences administrative promulgation of the AD (signature block). The AD cross-references an EASA Emergency AD (Requirement note), but it does not state whether any legal challenge has been mounted in relation to that EASA measure.

Given the absence of any litigation-related material in the text, the document itself provides no direct evidence of judicial or administrative proceedings, stays, injunctions, or enforcement litigation arising from this AD or its subject matter. Any enquiry into litigation history would therefore require research beyond the AD text to CASA records, court dockets, or administrative law sources; such materials are not present in the AD as provided.

Several practical and legal pitfalls are implicit in the AD’s structure and wording; these merit attention when implementing the directive.

Serial-number dependence and dynamic lists: The AD does not list the serial numbers itself; it requires operators to consult paragraph 2.B of BAE Systems ASB 32-A-JA090640 Revision 2 or later EASA-approved revisions to identify affected radius rods (Requirement). That reliance on an external, potentially updated document means that operators who fail to consult the correct ASB revision could miss affected parts. Amendment 1 adds serial numbers by introducing ASB Revision 2 (Background), which shows that the list can and did change. Operators must therefore ensure they consult the latest EASA-approved ASB revision to identify newly listed serial numbers.

“Before further flight” timing: The AD makes compliance categorical , replacement of an affected radius rod with a serviceable unit must occur before further flight after 14 August 2009 (Compliance). For an operator who discovers an affected rod on an aircraft already in service, the timing requires immediate action that could ground the aircraft until a serviceable unit or approved rectified rod is fitted. Operators who interpret “before further flight” as allowing a short grace period risk non-compliance.

Definition of “serviceable unit”: The AD requires replacement with a “serviceable unit” but does not define that term within the AD text. The AD does, however, stipulate that affected radius rods can only be installed if sent to an authorised overhaul agency for inspection/rectification and marking per APPH Service Bulletins (Requirement). Operators should therefore treat “serviceable unit” cautiously and ensure they can evidence the unit’s provenance as not being one of the ASB-listed serial numbers, or that an authorised overhaul agency has inspected and marked the part.

Authorised overhaul agencies and marking: The AD conditions installation on the part having been sent to an “authorised overhaul agency” and marked according to APPH Service Bulletins 1847-32-14 and/or 1862-32-14 (Requirement). The AD does not define “authorised overhaul agency,” neither specifying who grants the authorisation nor whether CASA, APPH, BAE Systems, or another body performs that authorisation. The AD also does not reproduce the marking instructions; operators must obtain and follow the APPH service bulletins. Failure to confirm an overhaul agency’s authorisation status or to follow precise marking procedures could render otherwise rectified parts non-compliant with the AD.

Geographical supply chain note: The Background identifies distribution of affected Buffer Springs p/n 184818 to parts distributors and MROs in North America (Background). Operators with parts inventory or maintenance supply chains spanning regions should be alert to cross-border part movements and to whether parts were subject to the implicated batch. The AD’s reliance on serial-number identification means that inventory management errors (missing serial numbers, mislabelled parts) could cause misidentification.

Cross-reference to EASA Emergency AD: The AD’s brief note referencing EASA Emergency AD 2009-0181-E signals regulatory coordination, but the AD does not reproduce the EASA AD text or state whether any differences exist between CASA’s and EASA’s measures (Requirement note). Operators engaged in international operations should verify whether there are any jurisdictional variations or additional obligations arising from the EASA Emergency AD.

No penalties stated: The AD contains no explicit penalty or enforcement clauses (Penalties and enforcement). Operators and maintenance organisations should not assume that the absence of stated penalties means the AD is non-mandatory. The AD’s compliance requirement and CASA signature evidence regulatory force; however, the absence of explicit enforcement mechanics means operators must ensure independent proof of compliance (inspection records, marked parts, service bulletin references) to demonstrate conformity if challenged.

Record-keeping implied but not specified: The AD’s reliance on serial-number checks and marking implies a need for robust record-keeping, but the AD does not prescribe the form, retention period, or evidence standards for records. Operators must treat traceability as a de facto requirement even though the AD does not spell it out.

The AD establishes a short, concrete compliance pathway; implementation requires both immediate operational steps and co-ordination with authorised technical service providers.

Immediate operator actions:

1. Consult the referenced ASB: Obtain paragraph 2.B of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Alert Service Bulletin 32-A-JA090640 Revision 2, or any later EASA-approved revision, and verify whether any radius rod(s) installed on each Jetstream Series 3100 and 3200 aircraft are listed by serial number in that paragraph (Requirement). Because Amendment 1 introduces Revision 2 to add serial numbers (Background), ensure the version consulted is at least Revision 2 or later EASA-approved revision.
2. Inspect and identify serial numbers: Physically inspect each aircraft’s main landing gear radius rods to confirm the serial numbers. The AD makes identification by serial number the trigger for remedial action (Requirement).

Corrective actions where an affected radius rod is found: 3. Replace before further flight: If a listed serial-numbered radius rod is found installed, replace it with a serviceable unit before further flight after 14 August 2009 (Requirement; Compliance). Plan for aircraft downtime and parts logistics accordingly. 4. Source a serviceable unit: Ensure the replacement radius rod is not one of the serial numbers listed in the ASB, or, if it is, ensure it has been processed per steps below.

Processing an affected radius rod for re-installation: 5. Send to authorised overhaul agency: If an operator wishes to return an identified radius rod to service rather than replace it with a non-affected unit, send the part to an “authorised overhaul agency” for inspection and rectification, if necessary, as required by the AD (Requirement). Confirm with CASA, APPH, or BAE Systems what constitutes an “authorised” agency if there is any uncertainty; the AD requires authorisation but does not define who authorises. 6. Ensure rectification per APPH Service Bulletins: The authorised overhaul agency must inspect and carry out necessary rectification measures and must mark the part in accordance with APPH Ltd Service Bulletin 1847-32-14 and/or 1862-32-14, as applicable, or later approved revisions (Requirement). Obtain and retain copies of the relevant APPH Service Bulletins and any approved revisions used. 7. Record the marking and overhaul: After overhaul and marking, maintain records linking the part serial number to the overhaul agency’s inspection report, any rectification performed, and the marking applied, so that the installation trace is demonstrable in the event of audit or inspection. The AD does not specify record formats or retention periods, so adopt robust traceability practices consistent with continuing airworthiness procedures.

Operational readiness and planning: 8. Grounding and scheduling: Anticipate that discovery of an affected radius rod will require immediate removal and replacement and will therefore affect flight schedules. Ensure availability of replacement parts or of authorised overhaul services and plan logistics accordingly. 9. Inventory and supplier checks: Inspect spares inventory and confirm whether any stored radius rods or Buffer Springs p/n 184818 correspond to the batch identified in the Background (Background). Segregate suspect stock and coordinate with distributors or APPH to confirm part status. 10. Cross-reference EASA AD: Note the AD’s reference to EASA Emergency AD 2009-0181-E (Requirement note). Where aircraft operate internationally or parts were obtained through overseas suppliers, obtain and reconcile the EASA AD text to ensure consistency across jurisdictions.

Documentation for proof of compliance: 11. Maintain ASB and SB copies: Retain copies of BAE Systems ASB 32-A-JA090640 Revision 2 (or later EASA-approved revision) and APPH Service Bulletins 1847-32-14 and/or 1862-32-14 (or later approved revisions) as the AD makes compliance dependent on those documents (Requirement). 12. Create a compliance checklist: Record serial numbers checked, dates of inspection, parts removed, replacement part serial numbers, overhaul agency identity and reports, and the marking applied. While the AD does not specify record-keeping procedures, such documentation will be the practical means to demonstrate compliance. 13. Communicate with regulators if uncertain: If the operator has any uncertainty about what constitutes an “authorised overhaul agency,” the interpretation of “serviceable unit,” or which ASB revision is EASA-approved, seek clarification from CASA or from the aircraft/component manufacturer. The AD itself does not resolve these definitional questions.

Summary steps: consult the ASB for serial numbers, inspect and identify parts, remove and replace any affected radius rod before further flight, and only reinstall an affected radius rod after authorised overhaul, rectification and marking per APPH Service Bulletins. Retain comprehensive records linking serial numbers to inspections, overhauls and marking to evidence compliance with the AD’s requirements.