This Airworthiness Directive requires Embraer EMB‑120 operators to inspect and functionally test the Secondary Flight Idle Stop System (SFISS): daily visual checks of FLT IDLE STOP SOL circuit breakers (CB0582/CB0583), scheduled SFISS functional tests simulating in‑flight and on‑ground conditions, and mandatory immediate rectification of any failure before further flight. Incorporating Embraer SB 120‑76‑0018 Revision 1 (or later) removes these specific inspection/testing/training duties.
The operator and their maintenance organisation pay for inspections, tests, training and repairs; the Civil Aviation Safety Authority enforces compliance. The amendment adds mandatory crew training and reliability upgrades and tightens rectification/test rules.
This instrument is an Airworthiness Directive (AD/EMB-120/7 Amdt 1) that prescribes mandatory inspection, functional testing, training and modification actions for Embraer EMB‑120 (Brasilia) series aeroplanes to address failures in the flight idle stop systems. Mechanically, it requires daily verification that two Secondary Flight Idle Stop System (SFISS) circuit breakers, CB0582 and CB0583, are closed (Requirements 1 and 2); periodic functional testing of the SFISS and related primary flight idle stop system according to a prescribed procedure (Requirement 3(a)-(g)); incorporation of an Embraer operations bulletin into flight-crew training (Requirement 4); and, for aircraft that have incorporated an earlier Embraer SB 120‑76‑0018 original issue, additional SFISS reliability improvements in accordance with Embraer SB 120‑76‑0022 (Requirement 5). The AD sets compliance intervals (for example, daily checks prior to the first flight, and functional tests at each Line Check not exceeding 100 hours time in service, subject to other triggers) and identifies terminating action options (incorporation of Embraer SB 120‑76‑0018 Revision 1 or later, per Note 4) that remove the need for some recurring requirements.
The AD states the safety rationale provided by the manufacturer: reports of simultaneous propeller overspeed events on both engines when power levers were inadvertently moved into the Beta range in flight, and investigation revealing both SFISS circuit breakers were open (Background). The amendment explicitly revises test requirements to require immediate rectification where the SFISS is defective, adds a training requirement (incorporation of Embraer Operations Bulletin OP120‑004/99), recognises that incorporation of a revised SFISS (SB 120‑76‑0018 Revision 1) provides terminating action for the inspection and training requirements, and mandates reliability improvements for aircraft that incorporated the SB original issue (Background, Note 4, Requirement 5).
Current sections
Direct links to the current provisions in AD/EMB-120/7 Amdt 1 - Flight Idle Stop System.
3
Requirement: Aircraft not incorporating
Requirement: Aircraft not incorporating Embraer Service Bulletin (SB) 120-76-0018 (any revision status)
Requirement: Aircraft not incorporating Embraer Service Bulletin (SB) 120-76-0018 (any revision status)
For aircraft on which an inspection window has been installed on the Left Lateral Console Panel that permits visibility of the Flight Idle Stop Solenoid Breakers:
Using an appropriate light source, perform a visual check to verify that both “FLT IDLE STOP SOL” circuit breakers CB0582 and CB0583 for Engine 1 and Engine 2 are closed.
Note 1: This check may be performed by a flight crewmember.
Note 2: Instructions for installation of an Inspection Window can be found in Embraer Service Bulletin 120-076-0014 dated 29 July 1992.
2. For aircraft without an inspection window installed on the Left Lateral Console Panel:
Perform a visual inspection to verify that both “FLT IDLE STOP SOL” circuit breakers CB0582 and CB0583 for Engine 1 and Engine 2 are closed.
3. Conduct a functional test of the Secondary Flight Idle Stop System (SFISS) for Engine 1 and Engine 2 by performing the following:
(a) Move both power levers to the “MAX” position.
(b) Turn the aircraft power switch “ON”.
(c) Open both “AIR/GROUND SYSTEM” circuit breakers CB0283 and CB0286 to simulate in flight conditions with weight-off-wheels. Wait for at least 15 seconds, then move both power levers back toward the propeller reverse position with flight idle gate triggers raised. Verify that the power lever for each engine cannot be moved below the flight idle position, even though the flight idle gate trigger on each power lever is raised.
(d) Move both power levers to the “MAX” position.
Embraer EMB-120 (Brasilia) Series Aeropl
Embraer EMB-120 (Brasilia) Series Aeroplanes
Embraer EMB-120 (Brasilia) Series Aeroplanes
AD/EMB-120/7 Amdt 1 (Continued)
(e) Close both “AIR/GROUND SYSTEM” circuit breakers CB0283 and CB0286 to simulate the aircraft on the ground with weight-on-wheels. Wait for at least 15 seconds, then move both power levers back toward the propeller reverse position with the flight idle gate triggers in the normal flight position. Verify that the power lever for each engine cannot be moved below the flight idle position.
(f) Raise the flight idle gate triggers and verify the power levers can be moved below the flight idle position.
(g) Failure to satisfy the requirements of either test (c), test (f) indicates a failure of the SFISS, which must be rectified before further flight.
Failure to satisfy the requirements of test (e) indicates a failure of the primary flight idle stop system, which must be rectified before further flight.
If required application can be made under CAR (1998) Part 21.197 for a special flight permit to ferry an aircraft to a place where rectification of the discrepant flight idle stop system can be accomplished.
Note 3: The tests prescribed in Requirement 3 essentially reflect the requirements of Brazilian CTA Telegraphic AD T92-08-04 and FAA Emergency AD T92-16-51.
4. Incorporate the requirements of Embraer Operations Bulletin OP120-004/99 into the flight crew-training program.
Note 4: Incorporation of Embraer SB 120-76-0018, Revision 1 (or later revision) constitutes terminating action for Requirements 1 through 4.
For aircraft incorporating Embraer SB 12
For aircraft incorporating Embraer SB 120-76-0018 (Original Issue)
For aircraft incorporating Embraer SB 120-76-0018 (Original Issue)
5. Incorporate the SFISS reliability improvements in accordance with Embraer SB 120-76-0022, Original Issue, Revision 1 or Revision 2.
Upon compliance with Requirement 5, the SFISS configuration may be considered to be equivalent to that specified in Embraer Service Bulletin 120-76-0018, Revision 1, and no further action with respect to this Airworthiness Directive is required.
Note 5: For Requirement 5, CTA AD 90-07-04 R4, COMPLIANCE (c) also refers
Compliance: Requirements 1 & 2:
Prior to the first flight of each day.
Source text
Sourced from the Federal Register of Legislation (legislation.gov.au), CC BY 4.0.
Requirement: Aircraft not incorporating Requirement: Aircraft not incorporating Embraer Service Bulletin (SB) 120-76-0018 (any revision status)
Requirement: Aircraft not incorporating Embraer Service Bulletin (SB) 120-76-0018 (any revision status)
For aircraft on which an inspection window has been installed on the Left Lateral Console Panel that permits visibility of the Flight Idle Stop Solenoid Breakers:
Using an appropriate light source, perform a visual check to verify that both “FLT IDLE STOP SOL” circuit breakers CB0582 and CB0583 for Engine 1 and Engine 2 are closed.
Note 1: This check may be performed by a flight crewmember.
Note 2: Instructions for installation of an Inspection Window can be found in Embraer Service Bulletin 120-076-0014 dated 29 July 1992.
2. For aircraft without an inspection window installed on the Left Lateral Console Panel:
Perform a visual inspection to verify that both “FLT IDLE STOP SOL” circuit breakers CB0582 and CB0583 for Engine 1 and Engine 2 are closed.
3. Conduct a functional test of the Secondary Flight Idle Stop System (SFISS) for Engine 1 and Engine 2 by performing the following:
(a) Move both power levers to the “MAX” position.
(b) Turn the aircraft power switch “ON”.
(c) Open both “AIR/GROUND SYSTEM” circuit breakers CB0283 and CB0286 to simulate in flight conditions with weight-off-wheels. Wait for at least 15 seconds, then move both power levers back toward the propeller reverse position with flight idle gate triggers raised. Verify that the power lever for each engine cannot be moved below the flight idle position, even though the flight idle gate trigger on each power lever is raised.
(d) Move both power levers to the “MAX” position.
Embraer EMB-120 (Brasilia) Series Aeropl Embraer EMB-120 (Brasilia) Series Aeroplanes
Embraer EMB-120 (Brasilia) Series Aeroplanes
AD/EMB-120/7 Amdt 1 (Continued)
(e) Close both “AIR/GROUND SYSTEM” circuit breakers CB0283 and CB0286 to simulate the aircraft on the ground with weight-on-wheels. Wait for at least 15 seconds, then move both power levers back toward the propeller reverse position with the flight idle gate triggers in the normal flight position. Verify that the power lever for each engine cannot be moved below the flight idle position.
(f) Raise the flight idle gate triggers and verify the power levers can be moved below the flight idle position.
(g) Failure to satisfy the requirements of either test (c), test (f) indicates a failure of the SFISS, which must be rectified before further flight.
The AD becomes effective on 6 September 2001 and was notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 15 August 2001. It is signed by a Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (Eugene Paul Holzapfel, 27 July 2001). The tests and procedures in Requirement 3 are stated to reflect earlier Brazilian and US emergency directives (Note 3).
Main concepts
The directive organises risk-control around three core concepts: detection (visual verification of circuit-breaker state), functional verification (operational testing of secondary and primary flight idle stop systems under simulated flight and ground conditions), and corrective/terminating measures (immediate rectification of failures, training changes, and hardware/service‑bulletin incorporation).
Detection: Requirements 1 and 2 require a visual check that both “FLT IDLE STOP SOL” circuit breakers CB0582 and CB0583 for Engine 1 and Engine 2 are closed. For aircraft with an inspection window installed on the Left Lateral Console Panel, the check is to be performed through that window using an appropriate light source; for aircraft without the window, a visual inspection is required (Requirement 1-2). Note 1 explicitly allows a flight crewmember to perform the check, and Note 2 references SB 120‑076‑0014 (dated 29 July 1992) for installation instructions for an inspection window.
Functional verification: Requirement 3 prescribes a multi-step functional test of the SFISS for each engine. The prescribed procedure includes moving power levers to MAX, turning aircraft power on, opening the “AIR/GROUND SYSTEM” circuit breakers CB0283 and CB0286 to simulate weight-off-wheels, waiting at least 15 seconds, and attempting to move power levers below flight idle with flight idle gate triggers raised; the requirement also prescribes the simulation of ground (weight-on-wheels) conditions by closing those AIR/GROUND circuit breakers and verifying that power levers cannot be moved below flight idle when gates are in the normal flight position, and verifying that raising the flight idle gate triggers permits movement below flight idle (Requirement 3(a)-(g)). The AD specifies which test failures indicate SFISS failure (tests (c) and (f)) and which indicate primary flight idle stop system failure (test (e)), and directs rectification before further flight in each case (Requirement 3(g)).
Corrective/terminating measures: The AD requires incorporation of Embraer Operations Bulletin OP120‑004/99 into flight‑crew training (Requirement 4), with a six‑month deadline unless already complied with. Note 4 identifies that incorporation of Embraer SB 120‑76‑0018 Revision 1 or later constitutes terminating action for Requirements 1-4. For aircraft that had earlier incorporated SB 120‑76‑0018 original issue, Requirement 5 requires incorporation of SFISS reliability improvements per Embraer SB 120‑76‑0022 (Original Issue, Revision 1 or 2), after which the SFISS configuration may be regarded as equivalent to SB 120‑76‑0018 Revision 1 and no further action under this AD is necessary. Compliance schedules for each requirement are specified (Compliance section).
Cross-references: The AD notes that the tests in Requirement 3 reflect Brazilian CTA Telegraphic AD T92‑08‑04 and FAA Emergency AD T92‑16‑51 (Note 3), and that Requirement 5 also refers to CTA AD 90‑07‑04 R4 COMPLIANCE (c) (Note 5). The AD authorises the use of a special flight permit under CAR (1998) Part 21.197 to ferry an aircraft to a place where rectification can be accomplished, where applicable (Requirement 3(g)).
Who it affects
Operators and owners of Embraer EMB‑120 (Brasilia) series aeroplanes are directly affected. The AD imposes operational and maintenance actions that must be carried out by the responsible operator, flight crew and maintenance organisations.
Operators/owners: They are required to ensure that the inspections (Requirements 1 and 2), functional tests (Requirement 3), training incorporation (Requirement 4) and any applicable SB modifications (Requirement 5) are carried out within the prescribed intervals and deadlines. The Compliance section specifies timing obligations: Requirements 1 and 2 must be satisfied prior to the first flight of each day; Requirement 3 is required at each Line Check but not to exceed 100 hours time‑in‑service since the last functional test, immediately after any maintenance where the aircraft is jacked, and prior to further flight if the SFISS circuit breakers were reset following the daily inspection; Requirements 4 and 5 must be completed no later than six months after the effective date unless already complied with (Compliance: Requirements 1 & 2; Requirement 3; Requirement 4; Requirement 5).
Flight crew: Note 1 explicitly permits a flight crewmember to perform the circuit breaker visual check. Requirement 4 requires incorporation of Embraer Operations Bulletin OP120‑004/99 into the flight crew training programme; thus flight crew training curricula must be amended within six months unless already done.
Maintenance organisations and engineers: They must perform the prescribed functional tests and any rectification work required by test failures. Maintenance actions that jack the aircraft trigger an immediate Requirement 3 functional test after the maintenance (Requirement 3(b)). Maintenance must also incorporate service bulletins where chosen as terminating action (SB 120‑76‑0018 Revision 1 or SB 120‑76‑0022 as applicable) and follow Embraer SB 120‑076‑0014 instructions if installing inspection windows.
Regulatory/administrative actors: The AD is issued under the authority of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) delegate (signature recorded). The AD becomes effective on 6 September 2001 and was gazetted (Gazette notification 15 August 2001), which makes it part of the official regulatory instrument set communicated to the industry (signature and Gazette notice recorded in the text). The AD also refers to CAR (1998) Part 21.197 as the mechanism for special flight permits to ferry aircraft for rectification if necessary (Requirement 3(g)). The text does not specify particular enforcement mechanisms or penalties beyond the directive requirements and the availability of a ferry permit; it does, however, require rectification before further flight where failures are found (Requirement 3(g)).
Aircraft configurations: The AD differentiates aircraft by whether they have an inspection window installed (affecting how the daily visual check is to be performed), and whether they have already incorporated Embraer SB 120‑76‑0018 (Original Issue) or later revisions (which determine whether Requirement 5 applies and whether terminating action is available) (Requirements 1-5, Note 4, Note 2).
Key duties and rights
Duties imposed by the AD are specific and procedural. The text creates prescriptive operational duties for operators, maintenance organisations and flight crew; it also defines options that an operator may exercise as terminating actions.
Mandatory inspection duties:
Prior to the first flight of each day, operators must verify visually that both SFISS circuit breakers CB0582 and CB0583 are closed (Requirements 1 and 2; Compliance: Requirements 1 & 2). For aircraft with an inspection window, that check is to be performed through the Left Lateral Console Panel inspection window using appropriate lighting (Requirement 1). For aircraft without that window, a direct visual inspection is required (Requirement 2). Note 1 permits a flight crewmember to perform the check.
Mandatory functional test duties:
Operators must conduct the functional test of the SFISS for both engines according to the procedural steps in Requirement 3(a)-(g). The AD sets the frequency and triggers for the functional test: at each Line Check but not to exceed 100 hours TIS since the last test, immediately after maintenance where the aircraft is jacked, and prior to further flight if CB0582/CB0583 were reset following the daily inspection (Requirement 3; Compliance: Requirement 3).
Immediate rectification duty:
The AD requires immediate rectification for failures found during the tests: failures of the SFISS (as indicated by tests (c) or (f)) or failures of the primary flight idle stop system (as indicated by test (e)) must be rectified before further flight (Requirement 3(g)). If rectification cannot be completed on site, the AD allows application for a special flight permit under CAR (1998) Part 21.197 to ferry the aircraft to a rectification location (Requirement 3(g)).
Training duty:
Operators must incorporate the requirements of Embraer Operations Bulletin OP120‑004/99 into the flight crew training programme, no later than six months after the effective date unless previously accomplished (Requirement 4; Compliance: Requirement 4). The AD states that this training requirement addresses inadvertent selection of Beta range in flight (Background).
Modification/reliability improvement duties and terminating action:
For aircraft that have incorporated Embraer SB 120‑76‑0018 original issue, operators must incorporate SFISS reliability improvements as per Embraer SB 120‑76‑0022 (Requirement 5). Upon compliance with Requirement 5, the SFISS configuration may be considered equivalent to SB 120‑76‑0018 Revision 1, and no further action under this AD is required for those aircraft (Requirement 5). Note 4 states that incorporation of SB 120‑76‑0018 Revision 1 (or later) is terminating action for Requirements 1-4. Compliance time for Requirements 4 and 5 is “no later than 6 months after the effective date” unless previously accomplished.
Rights/options:
Operators have the option to pursue terminating action by incorporating SB 120‑76‑0018 Revision 1 or later, thereby removing the need for the recurring checks and training mandated by Requirements 1-4 (Note 4). Operators of aircraft that have incorporated the SB original issue have a further path to equivalence by complying with SB 120‑76‑0022 (Requirement 5). Where immediate rectification cannot be performed, an operator may apply for a special flight permit under CAR (1998) Part 21.197 to ferry the aircraft to a location where rectification can be accomplished (Requirement 3(g)).
Scope limitations in the AD text:
The AD prescribes what must be done, when, and how to interpret specific test outcomes, but does not specify ancillary matters such as recordkeeping format, cost recovery mechanisms, or civil penalty amounts. The directive is prescriptive with respect to the technical and operational steps and timing; other administrative or enforcement consequences are not detailed in the text provided.
Penalties and enforcement
The AD text prescribes mandatory safety actions and compliance timelines but does not set out specific monetary penalties or enforcement procedures within the text provided. The instrument contains explicit operational constraints and direct consequences for test failures , namely, that failures of either the SFISS (tests (c) and (f)) or the primary flight idle stop system (test (e)) "must be rectified before further flight" (Requirement 3(g)). The AD also identifies an avenue for conditional continuation of operations in the narrow case where rectification requires ferrying the aircraft: an application under CAR (1998) Part 21.197 for a special flight permit to ferry to a place where rectification can be accomplished (Requirement 3(g)).
Regulatory signalling and publication: The AD is signed by a Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Eugene Paul Holzapfel, and the AD is noted as being notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 15 August 2001. These facts indicate official issuance and publication, but the AD text does not contain its own enforcement clause or specify statutory penal consequences for non‑compliance within the text supplied.
Operational enforcement mechanisms implicit in the AD:
Mandatory requirements tied to airworthiness and pre‑flight fitness for flight (for example, "must be rectified before further flight") create operational grounds for grounding an aircraft that fails the prescribed tests. That operational constraint functions as a practical enforcement mechanism: where requirements are not met, the aircraft cannot lawfully be flown in compliance with the AD as written. The AD also sets deadlines for modification and training (six months for Requirements 4 and 5), which create fixed compliance windows.
Administrative recourse where rectification is not immediately possible:
The AD provides a regulatory route,the special flight permit under CAR (1998) Part 21.197,for movement of the aircraft to a place of repair where rectification can be performed. The text does not describe the criteria for grant or denial of such a permit or the terms under which it may be issued.
Limitations in the AD text regarding enforcement detail:
The AD does not list inspectors, penalties, infringement processes, or criminal/civil penalty schedules. It does not describe administrative enforcement steps, corrective action plans, surveillance or audit regimes, or recordkeeping obligations. Those matters, if applicable, would be governed by broader aviation regulation or CASA enforcement policy rather than by this AD’s text. The AD’s mandatory technical requirements and the requirement to rectify defects prior to further flight are the principal enforceable prescriptions present in the instrument.
How it interacts with other laws
The AD references and interoperates with other regulatory instruments and manufacturer service documents, and it situates itself within the broader regulatory framework through cross‑references. The AD explicitly cites CAR (1998) Part 21.197 as the mechanism for applying for a special flight permit to ferry an aircraft to a place of rectification when required (Requirement 3(g)). That cross‑reference creates an interaction with the Civil Aviation Regulations 1998 for the narrow purpose of ferrying non‑compliant aircraft under controlled conditions.
Manufacturer service material and foreign directives: The AD prescribes incorporation of Embraer operations and service bulletins as compliance or terminating options. Embraer Operations Bulletin OP120‑004/99 must be incorporated into flight‑crew training (Requirement 4). Note 2 references Embraer Service Bulletin 120‑076‑0014 for instructions to install the inspection window used for daily visual checks where applicable (Requirement 1, Note 2). The AD also mandates or recognises Embraer Service Bulletins as follows:
Embraer SB 120‑76‑0018 Revision 1 or later constitutes terminating action for Requirements 1-4 (Note 4).
For aircraft that have incorporated SB 120‑76‑0018 Original Issue, Embraer SB 120‑76‑0022 (Original Issue, Revision 1 or 2) must be incorporated to provide the SFISS reliability improvements (Requirement 5).
International AD alignment: The AD declares that the tests prescribed in Requirement 3 “essentially reflect” Brazilian CTA Telegraphic AD T92‑08‑04 and FAA Emergency AD T92‑16‑51 (Note 3). That statement indicates the AD was drafted to align with comparable foreign airworthiness directives addressing the same hazard; it also cross‑references CTA AD 90‑07‑04 R4 for Requirement 5 (Note 5). Those references show coordination or harmonisation with foreign authorities’ corrective action pathways, but the AD text does not import foreign legal effects, it only aligns technical requirements.
Remedial/operational interactions: The AD’s instruction that failures must be rectified before further flight means that an operator must ensure repairs are performed in accordance with approved maintenance data and any applicable regulatory approvals. The AD does not itself prescribe the content of approved maintenance data beyond referring to the specific Embraer SBs and Operations Bulletin where applicable; compliance therefore requires operators to draw on and follow the referenced manufacturer documents or approved equivalent procedures.
Scope of regulatory interaction provided in the text:
The AD specifies technical and timing requirements and cites other regulatory pathways (CAR Part 21.197 ferry permit) and manufacturer documents for installation and modifications. It does not specify how compliance will be recorded or audited, nor does it elaborate on penalty provisions under other statutes or regulations. Those enforcement and administrative interactions fall outside the AD’s text and would be found in the broader aviation regulatory framework or CASA enforcement instruments.
Amendment history
The document before you is an amendment labelled AD/EMB‑120/7 Amdt 1. The AD records both the amendment effective date and the original issue effective date. Specifically, the amendment becomes effective on 6 September 2001 (Compliance section) and the original issue of this Airworthiness Directive became effective on 16 August 1992 (final paragraph).
What the amendment changes:
The Background section explains the content of this amendment: it revises the SFISS test requirements to require immediate rectification if the SFISS is found defective; it adds a requirement for additional flight‑crew training to address inadvertent selection of Beta range in flight; it makes reference to a new SFISS that provides terminating action for the test and training provisions in the AD (Embacher SB 120‑76‑0018 Revision 1), and it requires reliability improvements to a certain version of the new SFISS (Requirement 5). These statements identify the amendment’s substantive direction: making tests more prescriptive about rectification, adding training obligations, creating terminating actions tied to service bulletin incorporation, and imposing follow‑on reliability improvements for certain earlier SB configurations.
Service bulletin sequencing and notes:
Note 4 in the AD records that incorporation of Embraer SB 120‑76‑0018 Revision 1 (or later) constitutes terminating action for Requirements 1 through 4. Conversely, for aircraft that already incorporated the SB 120‑76‑0018 original issue, the amendment requires additional reliability improvements to reach equivalency (Requirement 5). Note 5 links Requirement 5 to CTA AD 90‑07‑04 R4 COMPLIANCE (c), indicating that the amendment cross‑references earlier CTA material for particular compliance content.
Key dates and administrative steps in the amendment:
The AD sets deadlines for compliance: Requirements 1 and 2 must be performed prior to the first flight of each day (Compliance: Requirements 1 & 2); Requirement 3 functional tests are to be performed at each Line Check but not to exceed 100 hours since the last functional test, immediately following any maintenance where the aircraft is jacked, and prior to further flight if circuit breakers were reset (Compliance: Requirement 3); Requirement 4 and Requirement 5 must be accomplished no later than six months after the effective date unless already done (Compliance: Requirements 4 and 5). The AD is signed by a CASA delegate on 27 July 2001 and the AD is noted as being gazetted on 15 August 2001.
Historical linkage to earlier directives:
The AD notes that the Requirement 3 tests essentially reflect the requirements of Brazilian CTA Telegraphic AD T92‑08‑04 and FAA Emergency AD T92‑16‑51 (Note 3), indicating a history of cross‑jurisdictional action on the same safety hazard. The original AD effective date of 16 August 1992 is recorded, showing that this 2001 amendment updates and tightens earlier requirements that have been in effect since 1992.
Litigation history
The AD text contains no litigation history, no case references, and no record of judicial or administrative challenges. The document records the administrative provenance,signed by a Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (Eugene Paul Holzapfel) on 27 July 2001, and notified in the Commonwealth Gazette on 15 August 2001,and gives effective dates for both the amendment and the original issue (6 September 2001 and 16 August 1992 respectively). Beyond these administrative facts, the AD does not report any appeals, challenges, or court decisions arising from its issuance nor reference any disputes or judicial interpretation.
Because the source does not mention any litigation, no conclusions about dispute outcomes, judicial review, or enforcement actions can be drawn from this text alone. If a practitioner requires litigation history, they will need to consult external case databases, regulatory enforcement records, or legal repositories not contained in this AD text to determine whether the AD has been the subject of legal proceedings or whether CASA or operators have been engaged in litigation concerning its application or enforcement.
Gotchas
The AD contains several operational details and cross‑references that may be easy to miss but have material consequences for compliance and operations.
Who may perform the daily check: Note 1 explicitly permits a flight crewmember to perform the visual check of CB0582 and CB0583 (Requirement 1). That allowance reduces the need for maintenance scheduling for the daily check, but it does not reduce the operator’s responsibility to ensure the check is carried out correctly according to the AD.
Differences depending on inspection window: Requirement 1 applies where an inspection window has been installed on the Left Lateral Console Panel; Requirement 2 applies where no inspection window is present. If an operator elects to install the inspection window, instructions are contained in Embraer SB 120‑076‑0014 (Note 2). The operational practicalities differ: windowed aircraft permit a simpler, through‑panel visual check, whereas non‑windowed aircraft require a direct inspection.
Triggered functional testing: Failure or resetting of circuit breakers as a result of the daily inspection triggers Requirement 3(c)-(d): the AD requires a functional test “prior to further flight” if the circuit breakers CB0582 and CB0583 are required to be reset as a result of Requirement 1 or 2 inspections (Requirement 3; Compliance: Requirement 3(c)). That means a seemingly minor action,resetting a breaker following a daily inspection,creates an immediate requirement for a functional test before flying.
Distinct failure indications and outcomes: Tests (c) and (f) indicate SFISS failure; test (e) indicates primary flight idle stop system failure. All failures must be rectified before further flight (Requirement 3(g)). Operators must follow the AD’s diagnostic mapping precisely; treating one failure as the other may lead to non‑compliance with the AD’s rectification requirement.
Frequency constraints: Requirement 3 requires functional tests at each Line Check but not to exceed 100 hours time‑in‑service since the last functional test; additionally tests are required immediately after maintenance where the aircraft is jacked. These multiple temporal triggers require operators to integrate the test into maintenance and operational scheduling to avoid inadvertent exceedance.
Terminating actions are conditional: Incorporation of Embraer SB 120‑76‑0018 Revision 1 (or later) is terminating action for Requirements 1-4 (Note 4). However, aircraft that already incorporated SB 120‑76‑0018 original issue are not automatically exempt; they must instead incorporate Embraer SB 120‑76‑0022 to achieve equivalence (Requirement 5). Operators must check which SB revision their aircraft have installed before assuming terminating action applies.
Cross‑reference dependencies: Note 5 states that Requirement 5 also refers to CTA AD 90‑07‑04 R4 COMPLIANCE (c). The AD text therefore binds some compliance content to external CTA material. Failing to consult the referenced CTA AD where required could result in incomplete compliance with Requirement 5.
Ferry permit limited to rectification movement: The AD permits application for a special flight permit under CAR (1998) Part 21.197 to ferry an aircraft to a location where rectification can be performed, but does not authorise continued commercial service without rectification (Requirement 3(g)). The availability of a permit is an operational exception, not a broad waiver.
Administrative dates: Requirements 4 and 5 have a six‑month compliance deadline measured from the effective date of the AD unless previously accomplished (Compliance: Requirement 4; Requirement 5). Operators must record effective dates and plan modifications and training within that six‑month window.
No penalty table included: The AD prescribes mandatory action and rectification but does not include penalty amounts or enforcement procedure text. Operators should not assume the absence of stated penalties means non‑enforcement; the AD establishes mandatory technical obligations that interact with broader regulatory enforcement frameworks.
Careful cross‑checking of installed service bulletin revisions, physical aircraft configuration (inspection window installed or not), and precise adherence to the functional test steps and their diagnostic mapping are material to compliance. Small procedural slips,resetting a breaker without performing the required functional test, or relying on an original‑issue SB when a later revision is required for terminating action,create immediate obligations to rectify before flight.
How to comply
This section translates the AD’s requirements into a procedural checklist based strictly on the text. Follow each applicable step verbatim to meet the directive’s prescriptions.
Identify aircraft configuration and applicable SB status
Confirm whether the aircraft has an inspection window installed on the Left Lateral Console Panel (Requirement 1; Note 2).
Confirm which Embraer service bulletin revisions (if any) have been incorporated: SB 120‑76‑0018 (Original Issue or Revision 1/later), SB 120‑76‑0022, and SB 120‑076‑0014 (Note 4; Requirement 5; Note 2).
Prior to the first flight of each day, visually verify that both “FLT IDLE STOP SOL” circuit breakers CB0582 and CB0583 for Engines 1 and 2 are closed.
If the inspection window is installed, use an appropriate light source to visualise through the window (Requirement 1).
If no inspection window is installed, perform a direct visual inspection of the circuit breakers (Requirement 2).
Note that a flight crewmember is permitted to perform this check (Note 1).
Actions if circuit breakers are not closed or must be reset
If CB0582 and/or CB0583 are found open and need resetting, before further flight perform the functional test specified in Requirement 3 (Requirement 3(c); Compliance: Requirement 3(c)).
If the SFISS or primary system tests fail, rectify the defect before further flight (Requirement 3(g)). If rectification cannot be performed at the aircraft’s present location, apply for a special flight permit under CAR (1998) Part 21.197 to ferry the aircraft to a place where rectification can be accomplished (Requirement 3(g)).
Functional test procedure and frequency (Requirement 3; Compliance: Requirement 3)
Procedure:
a. Move both power levers to the MAX position (Requirement 3(a)).
b. Turn the aircraft power switch ON (Requirement 3(b)).
c. Open both AIR/GROUND SYSTEM circuit breakers CB0283 and CB0286 to simulate in‑flight (weight‑off‑wheels). Wait at least 15 seconds, then move both power levers back toward propeller reverse with flight idle gate triggers raised. Verify that each power lever cannot be moved below flight idle even with gate triggers raised (Requirement 3(c)).
d. Return both power levers to MAX (Requirement 3(d)).
e. Close CB0283 and CB0286 to simulate on‑ground (weight‑on‑wheels). Wait at least 15 seconds, then move both power levers back toward propeller reverse with flight idle gate triggers in the normal flight position. Verify that power levers cannot be moved below flight idle (Requirement 3(e)).
f. Raise the flight idle gate triggers and verify the power levers can be moved below flight idle (Requirement 3(f)).
g. If tests (c) or (f) fail, the SFISS is failed; if test (e) fails, the primary flight idle stop system is failed. Any such failure must be rectified before further flight (Requirement 3(g)).
Frequency:
Perform the functional test at each Line Check but not to exceed 100 hours time‑in‑service since the last functional test (Compliance: Requirement 3(a)).
Also perform immediately following any maintenance where the aircraft is jacked (Compliance: Requirement 3(b)).
Perform prior to further flight if circuit breakers CB0582 and CB0583 had to be reset during the daily inspection (Compliance: Requirement 3(c)).
Training incorporation (Requirement 4; Compliance: Requirement 4)
Incorporate Embraer Operations Bulletin OP120‑004/99 into the flight crew training programme to address inadvertent selection of Beta range in flight.
Unless already accomplished, complete incorporation within six months after the AD’s effective date (Compliance: Requirement 4).
If an operator prefers to remove the need for recurring inspections and training requirements (Requirements 1-4), incorporate Embraer SB 120‑76‑0018 Revision 1 or later. Note 4 states this is terminating action for Requirements 1-4.
For aircraft that have incorporated SB 120‑76‑0018 Original Issue, incorporate SFISS reliability improvements in accordance with Embraer SB 120‑76‑0022 (Original Issue, Revision 1 or 2) as required by Requirement 5. Upon compliance with Requirement 5, the SFISS configuration may be considered equivalent to SB 120‑76‑0018 Revision 1 and no further action under this AD is required.
Unless previously accomplished, complete Requirements 4 and 5 no later than six months after the effective date of the AD (Compliance: Requirements 4 and 5).
Cross‑reference other documentation
For installation of the inspection window, follow Embraer SB 120‑076‑0014 dated 29 July 1992 (Note 2).
For compliance details tied to Requirement 5, consult CTA AD 90‑07‑04 R4 as referenced (Note 5).
Recognise that the functional test steps reflect earlier foreign ADs (Note 3) and ensure any maintenance or modification work is done in accordance with approved maintenance data and procedures.
Use of the ferry permit if rectification is not possible on site
If rectification cannot be completed on site, an application under CAR (1998) Part 21.197 can be made for a special flight permit to ferry the aircraft to a location where rectification can be completed (Requirement 3(g)). This is a narrowly defined route to move the aircraft for repair, not an authorisation to continue normal operations without rectification.
Practical notes for operators
Integrate the daily visual check into pre‑flight procedures and assign responsibility (flight crew permitted to perform the check per Note 1).
Ensure scheduling of Line Checks and any maintenance involving jacking accounts for the functional test requirement so that required tests occur on schedule.
Verify installed SB revisions before assuming terminating action or equivalence has been achieved.
Records and evidence (not specified in AD)
The AD text does not prescribe a specific recordkeeping regime. However, given the AD’s operationally prescriptive nature and fixed compliance times, operators should ensure they maintain clear evidence of performance of the daily checks, functional tests, training updates, and SB incorporations to demonstrate compliance, and to support any application for a ferry permit under CAR (1998) Part 21.197 if used.
Following this sequence will align operational practice with the AD’s explicit prescriptions. Where the AD cross‑references external documents (manufacturer SBs, CTA ADs, CAR Part 21.197), consult those documents for the specific procedural and administrative details referenced by the AD text.
Failure to satisfy the requirements of test (e) indicates a failure of the primary flight idle stop system, which must be rectified before further flight.
If required application can be made under CAR (1998) Part 21.197 for a special flight permit to ferry an aircraft to a place where rectification of the discrepant flight idle stop system can be accomplished.
Note 3: The tests prescribed in Requirement 3 essentially reflect the requirements of Brazilian CTA Telegraphic AD T92-08-04 and FAA Emergency AD T92-16-51.
4. Incorporate the requirements of Embraer Operations Bulletin OP120-004/99 into the flight crew-training program.
Note 4: Incorporation of Embraer SB 120-76-0018, Revision 1 (or later revision) constitutes terminating action for Requirements 1 through 4.
For aircraft incorporating Embraer SB 12 For aircraft incorporating Embraer SB 120-76-0018 (Original Issue)
For aircraft incorporating Embraer SB 120-76-0018 (Original Issue)
5. Incorporate the SFISS reliability improvements in accordance with Embraer SB 120-76-0022, Original Issue, Revision 1 or Revision 2.
Upon compliance with Requirement 5, the SFISS configuration may be considered to be equivalent to that specified in Embraer Service Bulletin 120-76-0018, Revision 1, and no further action with respect to this Airworthiness Directive is required.
Note 5: For Requirement 5, CTA AD 90-07-04 R4, COMPLIANCE (c) also refers
Compliance: Requirements 1 & 2:
Prior to the first flight of each day.
Embraer EMB-120 (Brasilia) Series Aeropl Embraer EMB-120 (Brasilia) Series Aeroplanes
Embraer EMB-120 (Brasilia) Series Aeroplanes
AD/EMB-120/7 Amdt 1 (Continued)
Requirement 3:
(a) At each Line Check but not to exceed 100 hours time in service since the last functional test of the SFISS;
(b) Immediately following any maintenance where the aircraft is jacked; and
(c) Prior to further flight, if circuit breakers CB0582 and CB0583 are required to be reset as a result of Requirement 1 or 2 inspections.
Requirement 4:
Unless previously accomplished, no later than 6 months after the effective date of this Directive.
Requirement 5:
Unless previously accomplished, no later than 6 months after the effective date of this Directive.
This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 6 September 2001.
Background: The manufacturer received reports of propeller overspeed events simultaneously affecting both engines when the power levers were inadvertently moved into the Beta range in flight. Investigation revealed that both circuit breakers of the Secondary Flight Idle Stop System (SFISS) were open. The additional maintenance requirements mandated by this Directive will enhance the reliability of the SFISS.
This amendment to the Directive:
Revises the SFISS test requirements to require immediate rectification if the SFISS is found defective;
Adds a requirement for additional flight crew training to address inadvertent selection of Beta range in flight;
Makes reference to a new SFISS that provides terminating action for the test and training provisions in the AD; and
Requires reliability improvements to a certain version of the new SFISS.
Embraer EMB-120 (Brasilia) Series Aeropl Embraer EMB-120 (Brasilia) Series Aeroplanes
Embraer EMB-120 (Brasilia) Series Aeroplanes
AD/EMB-120/7 Amdt 1 (Continued)
The original issue of this Airworthiness Directive became effective on 16 August 1992.
Eugene Paul Holzapfel
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 27 July 2001
The above AD is notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 15 August 2001.