{"id":"F2006B09524","name":"AD/EMB-120/7 Amdt 1 - Flight Idle Stop System","slug":"ad-emb-120-7-amdt-1-flight-idle-stop-system","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":54122,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B09524-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-02","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"Requirement: Aircraft not incorporating ","sectionType":"part","heading":"Requirement: Aircraft not incorporating Embraer Service Bulletin (SB) 120-76-0018 (any revision status)","content":"# Requirement: Aircraft not incorporating Embraer Service Bulletin (SB) 120-76-0018 (any revision status)\n\n    For aircraft on which an inspection window has been installed on the Left Lateral Console Panel that permits visibility of the Flight Idle Stop Solenoid Breakers:\n\nUsing an appropriate light source, perform a visual check to verify that both “FLT IDLE STOP SOL” circuit breakers CB0582 and CB0583 for Engine 1 and Engine 2 are closed.\n\nNote 1: This check may be performed by a flight crewmember.\n\nNote 2: Instructions for installation of an Inspection Window can be found in Embraer Service Bulletin 120-076-0014 dated 29 July 1992.\n\n    2. For aircraft without an inspection window installed on the Left Lateral Console Panel:\n\nPerform a visual inspection to verify that both “FLT IDLE STOP SOL” circuit breakers CB0582 and CB0583 for Engine 1 and Engine 2 are closed.\n\n    3. Conduct a functional test of the Secondary Flight Idle Stop System (SFISS) for Engine 1 and Engine 2 by performing the following:\n\n    (a) Move both power levers to the “MAX” position.\n\n    (b) Turn the aircraft power switch “ON”.\n\n    (c) Open both “AIR/GROUND SYSTEM” circuit breakers CB0283 and CB0286 to simulate in flight conditions with weight-off-wheels. Wait for at least 15 seconds, then move both power levers back toward the propeller reverse position with flight idle gate triggers raised. Verify that the power lever for each engine cannot be moved below the flight idle position, even though the flight idle gate trigger on each power lever is raised.\n\n    (d) Move both power levers to the “MAX” position.","sortOrder":0},{"sectionNumber":"Embraer EMB-120 (Brasilia) Series Aeropl","sectionType":"part","heading":"Embraer EMB-120 (Brasilia) Series Aeroplanes","content":"# Embraer EMB-120 (Brasilia) Series Aeroplanes\n\nAD/EMB-120/7 Amdt 1 (Continued)\n\n    (e) Close both “AIR/GROUND SYSTEM” circuit breakers CB0283 and CB0286 to simulate the aircraft on the ground with weight-on-wheels. Wait for at least 15 seconds, then move both power levers back toward the propeller reverse position with the flight idle gate triggers in the normal flight position. Verify that the power lever for each engine cannot be moved below the flight idle position.\n\n    (f) Raise the flight idle gate triggers and verify the power levers can be moved below the flight idle position.\n\n    (g) Failure to satisfy the requirements of either test (c), test (f) indicates a failure of the SFISS, which must be rectified before further flight.\n\nFailure to satisfy the requirements of test (e) indicates a failure of the primary flight idle stop system, which must be rectified before further flight.\n\nIf required application can be made under CAR (1998) Part 21.197 for a special flight permit to ferry an aircraft to a place where rectification of the discrepant flight idle stop system can be accomplished.\n\nNote 3: The tests prescribed in Requirement 3 essentially reflect the requirements of Brazilian CTA Telegraphic AD T92-08-04 and FAA Emergency AD T92-16-51.\n\n    4. Incorporate the requirements of Embraer Operations Bulletin OP120-004/99 into the flight crew-training program.\n\nNote 4: Incorporation of Embraer SB 120-76-0018, Revision 1 (or later revision) constitutes terminating action for Requirements 1 through 4.","sortOrder":1},{"sectionNumber":"For aircraft incorporating Embraer SB 12","sectionType":"part","heading":"For aircraft incorporating Embraer SB 120-76-0018 (Original Issue)","content":"# For aircraft incorporating Embraer SB 120-76-0018 (Original Issue)\n\n    5. Incorporate the SFISS reliability improvements in accordance with Embraer SB 120-76-0022, Original Issue, Revision 1 or Revision 2.\n\nUpon compliance with Requirement 5, the SFISS configuration may be considered to be equivalent to that specified in Embraer Service Bulletin 120-76-0018, Revision 1, and no further action with respect to this Airworthiness Directive is required.\n\nNote 5: For Requirement 5, CTA AD 90-07-04 R4, COMPLIANCE (c) also refers\n\nCompliance: Requirements 1 & 2:\n\nPrior to the first flight of each day.","sortOrder":2}],"analysis":{"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":6,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The amendment expands and tightens the original 1992 AD: it requires immediate rectification of any SFISS failure (stricter than before), adds mandatory flight crew training (Embraer OP120-004/99), recognises SB 120-76-0018 Revision 1 (or later) as terminating action, and mandates reliability improvements for an earlier SFISS configuration. In short, scope broadened from periodic tests to include training, stricter rectification obligations, and mandated upgrades."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple conditional paths depending on whether Embraer SB 120-76-0018 (any revision) or later revisions have been incorporated (terminating action).","Different inspection methods where an inspection window is installed versus where it is not (visual access variance).","Several specific circuit breakers implicated (CB0582, CB0583 for FLT IDLE STOP SOL; CB0283, CB0286 for AIR/GROUND SYSTEM) with different roles in tests.","Functional test sequence requires specific actions and timing (power lever positions, power switch on, opening/closing breakers, wait periods) that operators must follow exactly.","Multiple compliance timings: daily (prior to first flight), at each Line Check (not to exceed 100 hours), after jacking maintenance, and after any breaker resets.","Mandatory incorporation of operations bulletin into flight crew training and a separate requirement to implement reliability improvements for a particular SFISS configuration.","Immediate rectification requirement before further flight increases operational disruption risk and creates potential need for special flight permits under CAR Part 21.197 to ferry aircraft for repair.","References and equivalence to other service bulletins, CTA/Federal ADs and amendments create cross-document compliance dependencies."],"plain_english_summary":"This Airworthiness Directive requires Embraer EMB‑120 operators to inspect and functionally test the Secondary Flight Idle Stop System (SFISS): daily visual checks of FLT IDLE STOP SOL circuit breakers (CB0582/CB0583), scheduled SFISS functional tests simulating in‑flight and on‑ground conditions, and mandatory immediate rectification of any failure before further flight. Incorporating Embraer SB 120‑76‑0018 Revision 1 (or later) removes these specific inspection/testing/training duties.\n\nThe operator and their maintenance organisation pay for inspections, tests, training and repairs; the Civil Aviation Safety Authority enforces compliance. The amendment adds mandatory crew training and reliability upgrades and tightens rectification/test rules."},"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"A positive credit balance is required for all requests, including BYOK, so fallback providers remain available. Add credits at https://vercel.com/d?to=%2F%5Bteam%5D%2F%7E%2Fai%3Fmodal%3Dtop-up to continue.","source":"analysis-cron"},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":4,"scope_assessment":{"changed":true,"description":"The original 1992 directive appears to have been a straightforward maintenance check. This 2001 amendment significantly expanded the scope by adding: (1) mandatory flight crew training requirements (moving beyond pure maintenance into operational procedures), (2) a new permanent modification pathway with reliability improvements, (3) more sophisticated testing protocols with immediate rectification requirements, and (4) cross-references to international regulatory actions (Brazilian CTA and FAA ADs). The directive evolved from a simple inspection requirement into a comprehensive safety management system covering maintenance, testing, training, and aircraft modification."},"complexity_factors":["Multiple conditional pathways based on aircraft modification status (two distinct configuration branches: aircraft with/without SB 120-76-0018, and sub-branch for Original Issue vs Revision 1)","Cross-references to external technical documents (5 different Embraer Service Bulletins and Operations Bulletins, plus Brazilian CTA and FAA ADs)","Nested testing procedures with specific circuit breaker identifiers (CB0582, CB0583, CB0283, CB0286) and precise timing requirements (15-second waits)","Different compliance timeframes for different requirements (daily, 100 hours, 6 months, or immediate)","Technical aviation terminology throughout (Beta range, flight idle gate triggers, weight-on-wheels simulation) requiring domain knowledge","Dual failure modes with different rectification requirements (SFISS failure vs primary system failure)"],"plain_english_summary":"This CASA Airworthiness Directive requires operators of Embraer EMB-120 aircraft to ensure the Secondary Flight Idle Stop System (SFISS) preventing in‑flight selection of propeller Beta range is functional. It mandates daily visual checks of the SFISS circuit breakers, periodic functional tests, and updated pilot training, with the option to install an improved SFISS modification to remove recurring checks.\n\nIt affects Australian-registered EMB-120 owners, operators, and maintenance organisations to prevent propeller overspeed and potential loss of control."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-emb-120-7-amdt-1-flight-idle-stop-system","history":"/api/acts/ad-emb-120-7-amdt-1-flight-idle-stop-system/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-emb-120-7-amdt-1-flight-idle-stop-system/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-emb-120-7-amdt-1-flight-idle-stop-system/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-emb-120-7-amdt-1-flight-idle-stop-system/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-emb-120-7-amdt-1-flight-idle-stop-system/documents"}}