AD/B767/117 - Landing Gear Control Lever Module Adjacent Wiring Inspection

Mandatory airworthiness directive: The instrument is an AD, issued by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority delegate under subregulation 39.1(1) of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1998. It is framed as a corrective action that the delegate "considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition", and it is binding on the identified aircraft in the applicability paragraph.

Applicability: The AD applies narrowly to "Model 767 aeroplanes listed in Boeing Service Bulletin (SB) 767-32A0163 Revision 1 dated 1 October 1998." The AD therefore ties its scope explicitly to the list in that Boeing service bulletin; aircraft not listed in the SB are outside the AD's textual applicability.

Detailed visual inspection: The AD specifies a particular inspection standard by quoting a definition, "For the purposes of this Directive, a detailed visual inspection is defined as: 'An intensive examination of a specific structural area, system, installation, or assembly to detect damage, failure, or irregularity. Available lighting is normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at an intensity deemed appropriate by the inspector. Inspection aids such as mirrors, magnifying lenses, etc. may be used. Surface cleaning and elaborate access procedures may be required.'" This definition is incorporated into the directive as Note 1 and therefore forms part of the inspection method prescribed.

Damage categories and layers: The AD distinguishes three physical elements to be inspected and, if necessary, repaired or replaced: the wire expando sleeve, the varglas layer that wraps wire bundles, and the wire bundles themselves. Requirement 1 focuses on the expando sleeve and lists specific damage forms to detect: "cut, abrasion, fraying, and arcing." Subsequent requirements set out inspection and remedial sequencing depending on which layer shows damage.

Sequence logic and timing: The AD sets a decision tree: an initial inspection within 90 days, then conditional actions before further flight. The AD requires immediate corrective action, in many cases "before further flight", making any required repairs and rewrapping a precondition to the aircraft flying again after the inspection reveals problems.

Reference to manufacturer's procedures: Throughout, compliance must be "in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 767-32A0163 ... or SB 767-32A0163, Revision 1." The AD therefore delegates the technical content of the inspection and repair procedures to Boeing's ASB/SB, while adopting the SBs as mandatory compliance documents.

Notes and procedural advice: Note 2 states that SB Revision 1 "specifies the preferred procedures for separating the wire bundles into two groups for wrapping, which is an easier method for accomplishing those actions." The AD therefore incorporates procedural preferences from the SB to ease performance of the required work.

Relation to other regulator action: The AD explicitly references FAA AD 2000-03-21 Amdt 39-11581 as a related instrument (Note after Requirement 7). The Background grounds the AD in two in-service incidents reported to the FAA; the AD references those incidents as causation for the directive.

Authority and instrument lifecycle: The AD was signed by the CASA delegate, Eugene Paul Holzapfel, on 7 April 2000, notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 19 April 2000, and became effective on 18 May 2000 (signature and final paragraphs). The sequence shows administrative promulgation dates: delegate signing, Gazette notification, and effective date.

Aircraft operators and holders: The primary parties affected are operators and registered owners of Model 767 aeroplanes "listed in Boeing Service Bulletin (SB) 767-32A0163 Revision 1 dated 1 October 1998." The AD imposes mandatory inspections and repair obligations on those operators; the Compliance section gives a 90-day window for the initial inspection and requires remedial actions before further flight once triggered.

Maintenance organisations and licensed engineers: Aircraft maintenance organisations and licensed engineers will perform the "detailed visual inspection" and any repair, wrapping and rewrapping operations. The AD prescribes specific inspection standards and repair/replacement actions "in accordance with" Boeing ASB or SB; maintenance personnel must therefore be capable of following those Boeing procedures and have access to the materials and skills required to repair/rewrap expando sleeves and varglas layers.

Parts suppliers and materials: The AD requires replacement with "new varglas layer" in some outcomes (Requirement 6 and 7), and repair and wrapping of expando sleeves. Suppliers of varglas, expando sleeves and associated fastenings are therefore part of the compliance chain. If operators do not stock materials, lead times for parts may influence aircraft downtime.

Pilots and operational planners: Because most remedial steps are mandated "before further flight" when damage is found, flight crews and schedulers are affected by potential aircraft grounding while inspections and repairs are completed. The initial Requirement 1 has a 90-day compliance window, which gives operators some scheduling flexibility for the first inspection, but any damage found creates immediate operational constraints.

Regulator and delegation: The AD is issued under CASA authority and signed by a CASA delegate; CASA is the enforcing body. The AD references FAA action, which indicates interaction with other regulators for a common safety concern, but the binding instrument here is CASA's AD.

Insurance and compliance assurance functions: Insurers and internal compliance/audit teams for airlines will note that the AD imposes mandatory action; failure to comply may affect airworthiness certification and insurance coverage. The AD itself does not state insurance consequences, but it defines required maintenance that supports continued airworthiness.

Third parties and aftermarket modifiers: Organisations involved in aircraft modification, wire routing, or retrofits near the landing gear control lever module may be affected in future work by the need to maintain the protective measures (varglas layer, expando sleeve) or to avoid reintroducing interference.

Geographic scope: The AD is a Commonwealth of Australia instrument; it cites related FAA action but applies to aircraft registered or operated within Australia that meet the applicability language. The applicability is defined by reference to the Boeing SB list, not by registration per se.

Duties imposed by the AD:

• Perform a one-time detailed visual inspection of the wire expando sleeve adjacent to the landing gear control lever module, "to detect damage (ie cut, abrasion, fraying, and arcing)" as specified in Requirement 1. The inspection must be completed "within 90 days after the effective date of this Directive" (Compliance).
• If no damage to the expando sleeve is detected, wrap the wire expando sleeve "in accordance with ASB 767-32A0163 or SB 767-32A0163 Revision 1" before further flight (Requirement 2).
• If the expando sleeve is damaged, perform a detailed visual inspection of the varglas layer in accordance with the ASB/SB (Requirement 3).
• If the varglas is intact, repair and wrap the expando sleeve in accordance with the ASB/SB before further flight (Requirement 4).
• If the varglas layer is damaged, inspect the wire bundles for damage in accordance with the ASB/SB (Requirement 5).
• If the wire bundles are undamaged, rewrap the bundles with new varglas layer and repair and wrap the expando sleeve per the ASB/SB before further flight (Requirement 6).
• If wire bundle damage exists, repair the wires, rewrap the bundles with new varglas and repair and wrap the expando sleeve per the ASB/SB before further flight (Requirement 7).

Method and technical standard:

• All inspections and remedial steps are required to be performed "in accordance with" Boeing ASB 767-32A0163 or SB 767-32A0163 Revision 1, meaning that the technical method, materials and procedural sequence are those specified by Boeing in those documents (Requirement heading and repeated throughout the requirements).

Inspection standard definition:

• The AD prescribes the meaning of "detailed visual inspection" via Note 1, including the use of supplemental lighting, inspection aids such as mirrors and magnifying lenses, and possibly surface cleaning and elaborate access procedures. This sets a minimum procedural expectation for the inspection quality.

Timing obligations:

• The initial inspection must be done "within 90 days after the effective date of this Directive." All follow-on corrective actions are required "before further flight" once triggered by inspection findings (Compliance).

Right to rely on specified SBs:

• The AD identifies Boeing ASB/SB as the prescriptive documents to be followed. Operators and maintainers therefore have the right to follow those specified manufacturer's procedures to meet the AD's obligations; the AD does not in its text present alternative procedures or equivalence routes.

Authority and discretion:

• The AD is issued by a CASA delegate under subregulation 39.1(1) of CAR 1998. The AD states that it "requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken", which shows the delegate's assessment of necessary corrective actions. The AD text does not set out any administrative appeal, alternative method of compliance (AMOC) process, or variation procedure within the instrument itself; no such rights or processes are described in the AD text.

Documentation and record-keeping:

• The AD does not specify record-keeping particulars in its text. The relevant duties to perform inspections and repairs are nonetheless clear; documenting compliance to satisfy airworthiness authorities will be necessary in practice, but the AD text does not prescribe the form or retention of such records.

Scope of obligation:

• Applicability is limited to the models listed in the Boeing SB Revision 1; operators of other 767 models not listed are not directly bound by this AD text. The AD does not expand applicability beyond the SB list.

No explicit penalties or enforcement mechanisms specified:

• The AD sets mandatory actions and compliance times but does not specify civil or criminal penalties or the enforcement process within the text; the issuing authority and the compliance language indicate that non-compliance would be a breach of the AD, but the instrument does not itself enumerate penalty provisions.

The AD text prescribes mandatory actions and compliance timeframes but does not itself set out penalties, fines or the procedural enforcement mechanisms that CASA may apply for non-compliance. The AD is issued under subregulation 39.1(1) of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1998; the AD states that the CASA delegate "issues the following Airworthiness Directive" and requires that the actions set out "be taken" in specified circumstances and times, which establishes statutory direction rather than voluntary guidance (prefatory paragraph).

What the AD does say about enforcement and effect:

• Compliance is mandatory, with explicit deadlines: the one-time detailed visual inspection within 90 days after the AD's effective date, and any triggered repairs or wrapping "before further flight" (Compliance section).
• The AD became effective on 18 May 2000; from that date the stated obligations apply to the applicable aircraft until performed as required.

What the AD does not specify:

• The directive text does not detail penalties for failure to comply, nor does it spell out administrative follow-up procedures, audits, or sanctions. The instrument is silent in its text about how CASA will monitor or enforce compliance, or about any process for seeking relief or alternative methods of compliance.

Operational enforcement mechanisms implied by the instrument:

• By making corrective action a precondition to "further flight" when damage is found, the AD creates an operational enforcement point: aircraft discovered with relevant damage must be repaired before they can be flown. This creates immediate operational leverage to secure compliance, given that moving the aircraft without completing "before further flight" requirements would conflict with the AD's terms.
• The AD's adoption of Boeing ASB/SB as the technical standard creates a traceable technical baseline that CASA inspectors or auditors can check against an operator's maintenance records and the work performed.

Reference to other regulator action:

• The AD notes that "FAA AD 2000-03-21 Amdt 39-11581 refers." That cross-reference indicates harmonisation with an FAA action which may be enforced by the FAA against US-registered aeroplanes; however, within the AD text the Australian enforcement instrument is CASA's directive.

Practical enforcement pathways not in the AD:

• The AD does not specify the use of Notices of Proposed Cancellation, grounding orders, or other specific administrative tools. It also does not specify remedial enforcement actions that CASA may take for persistent non-compliance. The absence of those details in the AD means that enforcement practice will follow CASA's broader regulatory framework and procedures outside the AD text.

Reference to Civil Aviation Regulations: The AD is issued under subregulation 39.1(1) of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, as stated in the preamble. The AD therefore functions as a delegated regulatory instrument within the CAR 1998 framework. The AD itself does not reproduce the wider CAR provisions, but it invokes the regulator's statutory power to require actions to correct an unsafe condition.

Manufacturer service bulletin incorporation: The AD mandates work "in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 767-32A0163, dated 5 March 1998, or SB 767-32A0163, Revision 1, dated 1 October 1998." In doing so the AD incorporates manufacturer technical documents by reference as the operative technical standard. This means compliance with the AD requires following Boeing's procedures; it also means changes to those manufacturer documents after the AD's issue could matter for maintenance practice but do not alter the AD's textual requirements as stated.

Interaction with FAA action: The AD states "FAA AD 2000-03-21 Amdt 39-11581 refers." That indicates that the FAA has issued a related or corresponding directive. For operators with multi-jurisdictional activity or aircraft registered in other countries, operators will need to reconcile Australian AD obligations with actions taken by other applicable authorities; the AD itself does not harmonise procedures beyond adopting Boeing documents and noting the FAA AD.

Airworthiness and operational rules: The AD makes certain repairs and preventative wraps "before further flight" in specific situations. That creates an immediate intersection with operational rules and airworthiness certification: an aeroplane that has not completed required "before further flight" work will not be in compliance with the AD and therefore not meeting the AD-defined airworthiness directive. The AD does not explicitly restate how airworthiness certificates, flight releases or permission to ferry would be managed, but the "before further flight" requirement is the operative constraint.

Contractual and maintenance obligations: Because the AD requires maintenance in a specified manner, existing maintenance contracts, warranties or supplier agreements may be invoked to carry out the work. The AD directs adherence to Boeing ASB/SB procedures, which may interact with contractual obligations between operators and maintenance providers. The AD text does not itself modify commercial contracts but imposes a technical obligation that the parties must meet.

Records, audits and regulatory oversight: The AD does not specify record-keeping requirements, but because it is an AD under CAR 1998 it interacts implicitly with obligations to maintain maintenance logs and records under the broader regulatory framework. The AD is a compliance standard that CASA may audit against under its general regulatory powers, though those audit powers are not detailed in the AD text.

No express conflict resolution or AMOC instructions: The AD does not provide an alternative method of compliance or an explicit procedure for approval of deviations from the Boeing ASB/SB within the AD text. Where an operator might seek an alternative approach, resolution would need to be sought through CASA procedures external to the AD text; the AD does not describe that pathway.

Gazette notification and effective date timeline: The AD displays the administrative sequence: delegate signature 7 April 2000, Gazette notification 19 April 2000, effective date 18 May 2000. Those dates interact with statutory timelines for compliance and with any other obligations triggered by the CAR 1998 when an AD is promulgated.

Textual and document history contained in the AD:

• The AD itself is titled "AD/B767/117 Landing Gear Control Lever Module Adjacent Wiring Inspection 5/2000." It is identified as an AD issued in 2000 and dated 5/2000 in its heading, with the delegate signing on 7 April 2000 and the effective date being 18 May 2000 (signature and closing paragraphs). The AD was notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 19 April 2000.

Service Bulletin references and revisions:

• The AD makes compliance conditional on Boeing documentation; it references Boeing Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 767-32A0163 dated 5 March 1998, and Boeing Service Bulletin (SB) 767-32A0163 Revision 1 dated 1 October 1998. Requirement language offers either the Alert SB or the Revision 1 SB as the prescriptive documents to follow.
• Note 2 expressly comments that "Service Bulletin 767-32A0163, Revision 1, dated 1 October 1998, specifies the preferred procedures..." That indicates that the Revision 1 SB contains procedural updates or preferences relative to the earlier ASB.

Relation to FAA action:

• The AD includes a Note that "FAA AD 2000-03-21 Amdt 39-11581 refers." This indicates the FAA issued a related AD in 2000; the Australian AD records that cross-reference. The AD text does not specify amendments to the AD itself beyond referencing these documents and the FAA AD.

No amendments to the AD in the provided text:

• The AD text as provided does not record any subsequent amendments to AD/B767/117. The provided instrument is the original directive as issued in 2000, and contains no internal indication of later changes, superseding ADs, or revocation. The AD incorporates Boeing SB Revision 1 as the operative procedural document but does not itself present multiple versions.

Practical implication of the SB revision:

• By listing SB Revision 1, the AD effectively updated the technical reference to the manufacturer’s preferred method, as Note 2 clarifies that Revision 1 "specifies the preferred procedures for separating the wire bundles into two groups for wrapping". That procedural note is likely intended to ease compliance operations, but the AD text does not log any separate amendment beyond this incorporation.

Administrative promulgation dates:

• Delegate signing: 7 April 2000 (signature block).
• Gazette notification: 19 April 2000 (final paragraph).
• Effective date: 18 May 2000 (closing sentence).

Absent further amendment records in the AD text:

• The document as provided contains no further amendment history entries, repeals, or later version identifiers. Any subsequent amendments, supersessions or revocations would need to be checked against later CASA AD publications; they are not present in the provided text.

The AD text itself does not record any litigation history, court decisions, or judicial challenges. The document lists the factual background of two in-service incidents reported to the United States FAA , one in which "the landing gear failed to extend a Boeing 767 aeroplane", and a second in which "the landing gear control cable was severed on a second in-service aeroplane" , and it states that these incidents were determined to be caused by interference between the landing gear control lever and adjacent wire bundles (Background). The AD cites these incidents as the factual predicate for the directive.

No court decisions or legal challenges are recited in the text:

• The text contains neither references to litigation, nor to judicial interpretation of the AD, nor to appeals against CASA's issuance of the AD. The AD does not mention administrative appeals or any judicial review actions.

Consequences for litigation analysis:

• Because the source contains no litigation history, a legal researcher using only this document cannot report on any subsequent court or tribunal consideration of the AD, its scope, enforceability, or disputes about compliance. Any such litigation history would need to be sourced from court records or subsequent legal reporting, which are not part of the supplied document.

Claims about compliance disputes:

• The AD text does not describe any disputes between operators and CASA, nor any contested factual findings underlying the AD. The Background presents the incidents and the causal determination as established facts for the purpose of the AD, but does not attach record citations that would support judicial contestation.

Note on evidentiary provenance:

• The AD states that the FAA "has been advised of reports" of the incidents and that "these incidents were determined to be caused by interference," but the AD does not include underlying investigation reports or technical analysis in the text. That evidential material, which might be central to any litigation or challenge, is not appended to the AD as supplied.

Applicability determined by Boeing SB list: The AD's applicability is phrased as "Model 767 aeroplanes listed in Boeing Service Bulletin (SB) 767-32A0163 Revision 1 dated 1 October 1998." That means the AD’s effect depends on whether a given aircraft appears on the SB list; operators must check the Boeing SB Revision 1 to confirm applicability. A common operational pitfall is assuming the AD covers all 767 models rather than only those listed in the SB.

Timing differences for inspection and remediation: Requirement 1 must be done "within 90 days after the effective date of this Directive", but all other requirements (2 through 7) are mandated "before further flight" when triggered. Operational planners should note that the initial inspection has a window, but a finding of damage creates an immediate grounding requirement until the remedial steps are completed. Failure to appreciate this sequencing can lead to unexpected aircraft downtime.

"Detailed visual inspection" has procedural expectations: The AD defines a detailed visual inspection in Note 1, including the potential need for supplementary lighting, mirrors or magnifying lenses, surface cleaning and "elaborate access procedures". Treating the inspection as a cursory walkthrough is insufficient; maintainers must be prepared for potential access work and the use of inspection aids. Underestimating the access or cleaning work can lead to incomplete inspections and subsequent non-compliance.

Service bulletin incorporation and scope of methods: The AD mandates actions "in accordance with ... ASB 767-32A0163 or SB 767-32A0163 Revision 1." That places the technical method in Boeing's documents. Operators who deviate from the SB procedures without CASA approval may be non-compliant even if they believe their methods are equivalent. The AD text does not describe an alternative method of compliance process, so operators should assume Boeing procedures are the required baseline unless otherwise directed by CASA.

Materials and parts specifics are prescriptive: Requirements 6 and 7 require rewrapping "with new varglas layer" and repair and wrap of the wire expando sleeve. Operators must therefore ensure access to appropriate varglas material and spares. A gotcha is the absence in the AD of alternative materials or acceptable substitutes; the AD expects conformity with Boeing SB-mandated materials.

Two-layer inspection logic: If the expando sleeve is undamaged, Requirement 2 directs wrapping the expando sleeve. If the expando sleeve is damaged, inspectors must then look at the varglas layer and potentially the wires themselves. Failure to follow that branching logic precisely could result in incomplete remediation.

Note 2 preference on separating wire bundles: SB Revision 1 "specifies the preferred procedures for separating the wire bundles into two groups for wrapping", which is characterised as an easier method. Operators who follow older or alternate wrapping techniques may face extra labour or access complexity. Checking Revision 1 procedures before planning work can reduce labour time.

"Before further flight" may have practical exceptions that the AD does not describe: The AD requires remedial actions before further flight but does not provide any conditional ferry or limited flight exceptions in the text. If operators need to move an aircraft to a maintenance facility, they must obtain appropriate regulatory approvals outside the AD text; the AD does not authorise ferry flights.

Record keeping not specified: The AD does not state the form or retention period for records of the inspections and repairs. Operators should therefore anticipate that CASA or auditors will expect thorough maintenance records consistent with statutory maintenance record requirements, even though the AD text itself is silent on this point.

Cross-jurisdiction compliance: The AD references the FAA AD, but operators that operate internationally must reconcile Australian requirements with any other applicable authorities. The AD does not provide guidance on harmonising different authorities' ADs; failing to coordinate can cause duplicated work or conflicting procedural expectations.

Undefined enforcement specifics: The AD does not set out penalties; operators should not assume lenience. The AD imposes explicit technical obligations; practical enforcement and consequences for non-compliance will be addressed under CASA's broader regulatory powers, which are not detailed in this AD.

Step 1 , confirm applicability:

• Obtain Boeing Service Bulletin 767-32A0163 Revision 1 dated 1 October 1998 and confirm whether the specific Model 767 aeroplane is listed. The AD applies only to those aeroplanes "listed in Boeing Service Bulletin (SB) 767-32A0163 Revision 1" (Applicability).

Step 2 , schedule the initial inspection:

• Plan to perform the one-time detailed visual inspection of the wire expando sleeve adjacent to the landing gear control lever module within 90 days of the AD's effective date (Requirement 1; Compliance). The AD's effective date is 18 May 2000; the Compliance clause mandates the 90-day window measured from that date.

Step 3 , perform the detailed visual inspection per the AD and Boeing SB:

• Carry out the inspection "in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 767-32A0163, dated 5 March 1998, or SB 767-32A0163, Revision 1, dated 1 October 1998" (Requirement 1).
• Use the definition of "detailed visual inspection" provided in Note 1: supplement available lighting, use inspection aids such as mirrors and magnifying lenses, and perform surface cleaning or elaborate access procedures if required.

Step 4 , follow the AD's decision tree based on inspection findings:

• If no damage to the wire expando sleeve is detected (no cut, abrasion, fraying, or arcing), wrap the wire expando sleeve in accordance with the Boeing ASB/SB, and complete that work before further flight (Requirement 2).
• If expando sleeve damage is detected, perform a detailed visual inspection of the varglas layer in accordance with the Boeing ASB/SB (Requirement 3).
• If the varglas layer is undamaged, perform the repair and wrap of the expando sleeve per Boeing ASB/SB, before further flight (Requirement 4).
• If the varglas is damaged, perform a detailed visual inspection of the wire bundles in accordance with the ASB/SB (Requirement 5).
• If the wire bundles are undamaged, rewrap the bundles with new varglas layer, and repair and wrap the expando sleeve in accordance with Boeing ASB/SB, before further flight (Requirement 6).
• If wire bundle damage is detected, repair the wires, rewrap the bundles with new varglas, and repair and wrap the expando sleeve in accordance with Boeing ASB/SB, before further flight (Requirement 7).

Step 5 , use Boeing SB Revision 1 preferred procedures:

• The AD notes that SB Revision 1 "specifies the preferred procedures for separating the wire bundles into two groups for wrapping, which is an easier method for accomplishing those actions." Use those preferred procedures where practicable to reduce labour and access complexity (Note 2).

Step 6 , material and tooling readiness:

• Ensure availability of materials specified in the Boeing ASB/SB, including new varglas layer where required (Requirements 6 and 7), appropriate expando sleeve repair materials and any specified bonding or fastening agents. Make arrangements for inspection aids noted in Note 1, and allow time for surface cleaning and access.

Step 7 , ensure maintenance personnel competence:

• Assign licensed engineers or appropriately qualified maintenance staff familiar with Boeing ASB/SB procedures to perform the inspections and repairs. The AD sets the inspection standard; the personnel performing the work must be capable of meeting that standard.

Step 8 , schedule to minimise downtime:

• Although the initial inspection has a 90-day window, any detection of damage triggers "before further flight" work. Plan inspections at times and locations where access to parts, materials and repair hangars is available to avoid prolonged grounding if damage is found.

Step 9 , document compliance:

• While the AD does not specify record formats, retain inspection reports, repair records, parts usage documentation and reference to the Boeing ASB/SB that was followed, so that CASA audits or other regulatory checks can verify compliance. Include dates, personnel names/authorisations and part numbers for replaced materials.

Step 10 , coordinate with regulatory processes if deviation is needed:

• If an operator considers an alternative method of compliance or needs a ferry flight to reach a repair facility, those departures from the AD's strict "in accordance with" and "before further flight" requirements will require engagement with CASA. The AD text does not set out an AMOC procedure; seek CASA guidance or written approval for any deviation prior to acting.

Step 11 , note related regulatory references:

• Be aware that FAA AD 2000-03-21 Amdt 39-11581 is referenced; if operating internationally or with cross-registered aircraft, coordinate compliance to satisfy all applicable authorities.

Step 12 , final checks and return to service:

• After completing repairs and rewrapping as required, perform any post-repair inspections or functional checks required by the Boeing ASB/SB, document completion, and only return the aircraft to service once these steps are complete in accordance with the AD's "before further flight" requirements.

Adhering strictly to the Boeing ASB/SB procedures as incorporated by the AD, and maintaining thorough documentary evidence of the inspections and any repairs, will satisfy the AD's textual requirements. If circumstances require deviation from the AD's methods or timing, seek CASA approval before proceeding.