{"id":"F2006B03298","name":"AD/B767/117 - Landing Gear Control Lever Module Adjacent Wiring Inspection","slug":"ad-b767-117-landing-gear-control-lever-module-adjacent-wiring-inspection","collection":"legislative_instrument","jurisdiction":"commonwealth","status":"in_force","isInForce":true,"actNumber":null,"makingDate":null,"administeringDepartment":null,"currentVersion":{"id":42735,"registerId":"commonwealth-F2006B03298-current","compilationNumber":null,"startDate":"2026-04-01","status":"InForce","reasons":null,"registeredAt":null},"sections":[{"sectionNumber":"1","sectionType":"section","heading":"AD/B767/117 - Landing Gear Control Lever Module Adjacent Wiring Inspection","content":"COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 \\- 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\n![](image.001.png)  \n![](image.002.png)  \nBoeing 767 Series Aeroplanes\n\nAIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE\n\n![](image.002.png)\n\n![](image.002.png)  \nFor the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.\n\nAD/B767/117 Landing Gear Control Lever Module\n\nAdjacent Wiring Inspection\n\n  \n5/2000\n\nApplicability: Model 767 aeroplanes listed in Boeing Service Bulletin (SB) 767-32A0163 Revision 1 dated 1 October 1998.\n\nRequirement: 1. Perform a one-time detailed visual inspection to detect damage (ie cut, abrasion, fraying, and arcing) of the wire expando sleeve of the wire bundles adjacent to the landing gear control lever module, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 767-32A0163, dated 5 March 1998, or SB 767-32A0163, Revision 1, dated 1 October 1998.\n\nNote 1: For the purposes of this Directive, a detailed visual inspection is defined as: \"An intensive examination of a specific structural area, system, installation, or assembly to detect damage, failure, or irregularity. Available lighting is normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at an intensity deemed appropriate by the inspector. Inspection aids such as mirrors, magnifying lenses, etc. may be used. Surface cleaning and elaborate access procedures may be required.\"\n\n    2. If damage of the wire expando sleeve is not detected during the Requirement 1 inspection, wrap the wire expando sleeve in accordance with ASB 767-32A0163 or SB 767-32A0163 Revision 1.\n\n    3. If any damage of the wire expando sleeve is detected during the Requirement 1 inspection, perform a detailed visual inspection to detect damage of the varglas layer in accordance with ASB 767-32A0163 or SB 767-32A0163 Revision 1.\n\n    4. If damage of the varglas layer is not detected during the Requirement 3 inspection, repair and wrap the wire expando sleeve in accordance with ASB 767-32A0163 or SB 767-32A0163 Revision 1.\n\n    5. If any damage of the varglas layer is detected during the Requirement 3 inspection, perform a detailed visual inspection to detect damage of the wire bundles in accordance with ASB 767-32A0163 or SB 767-32A0163 Revision 1.\n\n    6. If damage of the wire bundles is not detected during the Requirement 5 inspection, rewrap the wires with new varglas layer, and repair and wrap the wire expando sleeve in accordance with ASB 767-32A0163 or SB 767-32A0163 Revision 1.\n\nCOMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 \\- 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY\n\nSCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES\n\n    7. If any damage of the wire bundles is detected during the Requirement 5 inspection, repair the wires, rewrap the wire bundles with new varglas layer, and repair and wrap the wire expando sleeve in accordance with ASB 767-32A0163 or SB 767- 32A0163 Revision 1.\n\nNote 2: Service Bulletin 767-32A0163, Revision 1, dated 1 October 1998, specifies the preferred procedures for separating the wire bundles into two groups for wrapping, which is an easier method for accomplishing those actions.\n\nNote: FAA AD 2000-03-21 Amdt 39-11581 refers.\n\nCompliance: For Requirement 1 \\- Within 90 days after the effective date of this Directive.\n\nFor Requirement 2 \\- Before further flight. For Requirement 3 \\- Before further flight. For Requirement 4 \\- Before further flight. For Requirement 5 \\- Before further flight. For Requirement 6 \\- Before further flight. For Requirement 7 \\- Before further flight.\n\nThis Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 18 May 2000.\n\nBackground: The United States Federal Aviation Administration has been advised of reports that the landing gear failed to extend a Boeing 767 aeroplane, and that the landing gear control cable was severed on a second in-service aeroplane. These incidents were determined to be caused by interference between the movement of the landing gear control lever and the adjacent wire bundles.\n\nThis Directive is intended to prevent interference and/or chafing and electrical arcing between the landing gear control lever, the landing gear control cable and wire bundles adjacent to the landing gear control lever module. Interference could result in the inability to extend the landing gear prior to landing.\n\n![Signature of Eugene Paul Holzapfel, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.](image.003.png)  \n\nEugene Paul Holzapfel\n\nDelegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 7 April 2000\n\n![](image.002.png)\n\nThe above AD is notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 19 April 2000.","sortOrder":0}],"analysis":{"flash_summary_failed":{"failed":true,"reason":"Unauthenticated. Configure AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY or use a provider module. Learn more: https://ai-sdk.dev/unauthenticated-ai-gateway","source":"analysis-cron"},"flash_summary":{"complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This AD remains tightly focused on inspecting and repairing the wire expando sleeve, varglas layer and wire bundles adjacent to the landing gear control lever module on the specific Boeing 767s listed in the Boeing service bulletin. It follows directly from the reported incidents described in the Background and does not expand beyond that technical corrective purpose. The AD’s scope is limited to that localized wiring/assembly and to the aircraft models listed in the referenced Boeing SB."},"complexity_factors":["7 sequential requirements with conditional branching (Requirements 1–7)","One defined inspection standard ('detailed visual inspection') with discretionary elements (Note 1)","External normative references to Boeing ASB 767-32A0163 and SB 767-32A0163 Revision 1 (implementation depends on external documents)","Cross‑reference to FAA AD 2000-03-21","Applicability tied to an external list of aeroplanes in the Boeing SB (scope determined outside the AD)","Two short implementation notes (Note 1 on inspection standard; Note 2 on preferred wrapping method) that affect practical work and access requirements","Simple compliance timing structure (one initial deadline, then 'before further flight' for follow-ups) — reduces complexity"],"plain_english_summary":"**What this instrument does (mechanically)**\n\n- Requires operators of certain Boeing 767 aeroplanes to carry out a one‑time, detailed visual inspection of the wire expando sleeve and adjacent wiring near the landing gear control lever module, following the procedures in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 767-32A0163 or Service Bulletin (SB) 767-32A0163 Revision 1. (Requirement 1.)\n- If no damage is found on the expando sleeve, the sleeve must be wrapped per the Boeing bulletin. (Requirement 2.)\n- If damage to the expando sleeve is found, additional stepwise inspections and actions are required: inspect the varglas layer (Requirement 3); if the varglas layer is OK, repair and wrap the expando sleeve (Requirement 4); if the varglas layer is damaged, inspect the wire bundles (Requirement 5); if the bundles are undamaged, rewrap with new varglas and repair/wrap the expando sleeve (Requirement 6); if the bundles are damaged, repair the wires, rewrap with new varglas, and repair/wrap the expando sleeve (Requirement 7). All repairs and wrapping are to follow the Boeing ASB/SB.\n- The initial inspection must be done within 90 days of the Directive becoming effective; any follow‑up repairs or wrapping required by the conditional steps must be completed before the aircraft’s next flight. (Compliance.)\n\n**Who is affected**\n\n- Operators and maintenance organisations responsible for Boeing 767 aeroplanes listed in Boeing SB 767-32A0163 Revision 1 (the AD ties applicability to that SB). The AD is enforced by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and was issued by the CASA delegate. (Applicability; signature block.)\n\n**Why it matters (stated purpose and testing that claim)**\n\n- Stated purpose: the AD addresses incidents where landing gear did not extend and where the landing gear control cable was severed because wire bundles adjacent to the landing gear control lever interfered with lever movement. The AD says it is intended to prevent interference, chafing and electrical arcing that could cause inability to extend the landing gear. (Background; opening paragraph.)\n\n- Practical test of that stated purpose against costs and implementation mechanics:\n  - Who pays: aircraft operators bear inspection and repair labour and parts costs; licensed maintenance organisations will perform the work. (Requirements 1–7; Compliance.)\n  - Timing and operational impact: the initial inspection must be completed within 90 days; any required repairs or wrapping must be done before further flight. That creates the possibility of aircraft grounding until repairs are completed, imposing scheduling and revenue costs on operators. (Compliance; Requirements 2–7.)\n  - Procedures and discretion: the AD mandates following Boeing ASB/SB procedures. Inspectors must apply a \"detailed visual inspection\" standard (Note 1), which allows some inspector judgement (lighting, mirrors, access) and may require cleaning or elaborate access; this introduces discretion about when an item is considered damaged and therefore whether further actions are required. (Requirement 1; Note 1.)\n  - Parts and logistics risk: implementation depends on availability of repair materials (e.g., varglas, sleeve materials) and on access to the wiring bundles; the SB specifies a preferred method for separating bundles into two groups to make wrapping easier (Note 2). If parts or skilled maintenance capacity are limited, operators may face delays. (Notes 1–2; Requirements 4–7.)\n  - Regulatory cross‑reference and harmonisation: the AD references Boeing service documentation and the FAA AD 2000-03-21. That ties the Australian compliance path to manufacturer and U.S. FAA materials. (Note: FAA AD 2000-03-21 referenced.)\n\n**Immediate, concrete effects on behaviour and choices**\n\n- Operators must inspect specified wiring and take the sequence of remedial steps dictated by the AD and Boeing bulletins. This changes maintenance scheduling and may divert maintenance resources and materials to affected aircraft. Maintenance organisations must follow Boeing's steps when carrying out repairs and wrapping. CASA enforces compliance through the AD mechanism; ultimate judgement during inspection rests with the inspecting engineer applying the \"detailed visual inspection\" standard.\n\n**Section citations (where the above points come from)**\n- Applicability: \"Model 767 aeroplanes listed in Boeing Service Bulletin (SB) 767-32A0163 Revision 1\" (Applicability).\n- Inspection and action steps: Requirements 1–7 and accompanying Notes 1–2.\n- Compliance timing: Compliance paragraph (Requirement 1 within 90 days; Requirements 2–7 before further flight).\n- Purpose/background: Background section describing incidents and intended prevention of interference/chafing/arcing.\n\n(Neutral statement: the AD is narrowly targeted to detect and correct physical damage to wiring and protective layers adjacent to the landing gear control lever module, and it does so by mandating a specific inspection and conditional repair/wrap sequence implemented under Boeing's service procedures.)"},"kimi_summary":{"content_quality":"ok","complexity_score":3,"scope_assessment":{"changed":false,"description":"This is a standard single-issue Airworthiness Directive addressing a specific unsafe condition (landing gear control cable interference). It has not expanded beyond its original safety purpose."},"complexity_factors":["Sequential conditional logic with 7 numbered requirements that depend on findings from previous inspections (if-then-else structure)","Cross-references to external Boeing technical documents (Service Bulletin 767-32A0163 and Alert Service Bulletin 767-32A0163) which contain the actual procedural details","One defined term ('detailed visual inspection') with a specific technical definition spanning 3 sentences","Nested compliance deadlines: 90 days for initial inspection, but 'before further flight' for all repair requirements","Reference to corresponding FAA directive (AD 2000-03-21) indicating harmonisation with US regulations"],"plain_english_summary":"This CASA safety order mandates a one-time inspection of wiring near the Boeing 767 landing‑gear control lever and required repairs if any damage (sleeve, insulation, or conductor) is found. It applies to operators of affected 767s and their maintenance teams, must be done within 90 days, and any repairs must be completed before the aircraft next flies. Issued after two incidents where wiring damage prevented gear deployment, compliance is mandatory."}},"importantCases":[],"_links":{"self":"/api/acts/ad-b767-117-landing-gear-control-lever-module-adjacent-wiring-inspection","history":"/api/acts/ad-b767-117-landing-gear-control-lever-module-adjacent-wiring-inspection/history","analysis":"/api/acts/ad-b767-117-landing-gear-control-lever-module-adjacent-wiring-inspection/analysis","conflicts":"/api/acts/ad-b767-117-landing-gear-control-lever-module-adjacent-wiring-inspection/conflicts","importantCases":"/api/acts/ad-b767-117-landing-gear-control-lever-module-adjacent-wiring-inspection/important-cases","documents":"/api/acts/ad-b767-117-landing-gear-control-lever-module-adjacent-wiring-inspection/documents"}}