AD/AL 250/85 Amdt 1 - Fuel Nozzle Screen

The directive centers on a safety defect mechanism: contamination of the fuel nozzle screen, followed by collapse of that screen, which has been associated with engine power loss and uncommanded engine shutdown. The background section explicitly ties the AD to "10 reports of engine power loss with accompanying collapse of the fuel nozzle screen, due to fuel contamination," and states the AD "was issued to minimize the risk of sudden loss of engine power and uncommanded shutdown of the engine due to fuel contamination and collapse of the screen in the fuel nozzle." The AD therefore treats screen contamination as a hazard that may propagate to the entire fuel system and to engine performance.

Key technical concepts embedded in the AD are the differentiation of fuel nozzle part numbers across suppliers and the mapping of manufacturer part numbers to Rolls‑Royce vendor part numbers. Table 3 lists fuel nozzle part numbers requiring inspection within 50 operating hours after the effective date; Table 3 identifies RRC original part numbers (for example 6874959, 6894610, 6898531) and provides corresponding RRC vendor part numbers (for example 5232815, 5233465, 5233585). Table 3 also lists Goodrich Delavan PMA part numbers (47069, 47101, 49445) and marks corresponding RRC vendor P/N as N/A. Table 4 contains additional part numbers subject to inspection within 150 operating hours after 17 March 2005 and includes corresponding RRC vendor P/Ns.

The AD defines "serviceable fuel nozzle" by exclusion: a nozzle that has a part number not specified in, or addressed by, this AD. This is a modelling choice by the issuer that frames compliance as a part‑number exercise rather than an explicit physical characteristic test for what constitutes an acceptable nozzle design. Practically, operators will need to rely on part‑number cross‑referencing to determine whether a nozzle may remain in service or must be removed.

The AD explicitly links the technical guidance to Rolls‑Royce Corporation Alert Commercial Engine Bulletins (CEBs), Revision 1 dated 30 August 2004, listed in Table 2. The AD also references related FAA airworthiness directives: it supersedes FAA AD 2004‑24‑09 and refers to FAA AD 2006‑16‑04 Amdt 39‑14704 (27 July 2006). The amendment stage of this AD was prompted by discovery that several part numbers were omitted from the original AD, and that omission would have allowed certain P/N fuel nozzles back into service unintentionally; the amendment therefore re‑clasps those P/Ns within the scope of required removal.

Conceptually, the directive operates through three mechanisms: compulsory inspection (information acquisition), mandatory cleaning if contamination is present (remediation), and compulsory parts removal and replacement where certain P/Ns are identified (hardware substitution). The interaction between those mechanisms produces operational consequences: potential aircraft downtime for inspection and cleaning, inventory and replacement parts requirements, and maintenance scheduling to meet the operating‑hour windows in Tables 3 and 4.

The AD affects several categories of economic actors and decision‑makers referenced or implied in the directive text. Directly, operators of aircraft powered by Rolls Royce (Allison) 250‑B and 250‑C series engines listed in Table 1 are within scope. That includes commercial operators, private owners and fleet managers who operate helicopters or turboprop aircraft equipped with the specified engine variants listed in Table 1: for example models annotated in the table such as -B15A, -B17F/2, -C20R/4, -C30R, -C47B and many others across the B and C series entries. Those operators must ensure inspections and replacements occur within the compliance windows set out in the AD.

Maintenance providers and approved maintenance organisations are implicated. The AD prescribes a technical inspection of fuel nozzle screens and, if contamination is present, inspection and cleaning of the entire aircraft fuel system. The AD explicitly points to Rolls‑Royce CEBs (Table 2) as informational sources. That imposes requirements on line and base maintenance facilities to follow prescribed procedures, to interpret part‑number mappings in Tables 3 and 4, and to source and install replacement parts that meet the AD definition of "serviceable."

Parts manufacturers and distributors are affected because several nozzle part numbers are removed from service. Operators will need alternative parts not "specified in, or addressed by, this AD." Table 3 lists specific RRC P/Ns and Goodrich Delavan PMA P/Ns. Distributors of those listed nozzles will see demand drop for the banned P/Ns and potential increase for alternative "serviceable" P/Ns.

Regulators and certifying authorities are indirectly implicated; the AD notes it supersedes FAA AD 2004‑24‑09 and refers to FAA AD 2006‑16‑04. Although the AD text does not itself set out enforcement mechanisms, CASA as the issuer is the decision maker in issuing the directive and the delegate (James Coyne) signed it. Any operator subject to Australian aviation safety regulation will be required to take steps to comply with this AD as part of ongoing airworthiness responsibilities.

Supply‑chain stakeholders such as overhaul shops, MRO inventory managers and parts procurement teams will face operational impacts: scheduling inspections within operating‑hour windows (50 operating hours for Table 3 P/Ns after the effective date; 150 operating hours after 17 March 2005 for Table 4 P/Ns), potentially grounding aircraft until cleaning and replacements are completed, and ensuring the availability of alternative nozzles that do not bear the affected P/Ns. The AD’s definition of "serviceable" frames procurement as a P/N screening exercise rather than a performance test, which directs economic activity toward part‑number verification.

Finally, insurers and risk managers will be attentive to the AD because the subject matter directly concerns engine reliability and the stated risk of sudden engine power loss. The AD’s background reference to ten reports of engine power loss frames the hazard the directive targets, which will inform risk assessments and underwriting decisions even though the text does not explicitly mention insurance.

The AD enumerates precise duties for operators and maintenance organisations. The primary duties are: perform a one‑time inspection of the screens in fuel nozzles for contamination (Requirement 1); where contamination is found, inspect and clean the entire aircraft fuel system (Requirement 2); remove from service fuel nozzles listed in Table 3 and Table 4, and replace them with a serviceable fuel nozzle (Requirement 3). The AD defines "serviceable fuel nozzle" as a nozzle with a part number not specified in, or addressed by, the AD. The Compliance section provides timing and sequencing for performance of these duties.

Timing duties: For fuel nozzles with P/Ns listed in Table 3, the inspection must be conducted within 50 operating hours after the effective date of this amendment, unless already done. For P/Ns listed in Table 4, the inspection must be completed within 150 operating hours after 17 March 2005, unless previously accomplished. The Compliance block also directs that if contamination is found, cleaning of the entire aircraft fuel system must be performed before further flight after the effective date of this AD. There is an additional duty to address the nozzle at the next fuel nozzle overhaul after the effective date.

Rights. The AD itself does not create explicit procedural rights such as appeal mechanisms, waivers or exemptions in its text. It does, however, provide definitional clarity about what a "serviceable fuel nozzle" means for the purpose of this AD, which functions as a right to retain parts not named in the AD. The AD also lists Rolls‑Royce CEBs in Table 2 as sources of information, which operators may use as technical guidance in satisfying the AD. The AD does not, in the text provided, set out any formal rights to alternative compliance methods; any such relief would typically require interaction with the issuing authority (CASA) outside the AD text.

Scope limits. The AD explicitly lists the affected engine models in Table 1 and the specific nozzle P/Ns in Tables 3 and 4. If a nozzle has a P/N not specified in those tables and not otherwise addressed by the AD, the nozzle is defined as "serviceable" under the AD’s ordinary reading. Practitioners should note that "serviceable" is defined by part‑number exclusion, not by an explicit technical performance threshold in the AD text. The AD does not state whether a nozzle that has been physically modified carries a different status.

Technical guidance linkage. Table 2 lists specific Rolls‑Royce Alert Commercial Engine Bulletins (CEBs), Revision 1 dated 30 August 2004, and the AD states that information pertaining to this subject can be found in those CEBs. That directs operators toward an authoritative technical procedure for inspection and cleaning. The AD also references FAA ADs, noting that it supersedes FAA AD 2004‑24‑09 and refers to FAA AD 2006‑16‑04 Amdt 39‑14704, which indicates an alignment with parallel regulatory actions.

Duties not specified. The AD does not stipulate recordkeeping requirements, nor does it set out explicit enforcement penalties or administrative process in the text provided. It also does not provide detailed instructions on how to determine operating hours, how to handle parts already exchanged between jurisdictions, or how to treat nozzles with ambiguous part‑number markings. These lacunae create practical decision points for operators and maintainers that typically require reference to general continuing airworthiness rules and interaction with CASA or the aircraft’s approved maintenance organisation.

The AD text provided does not specify criminal, civil or administrative penalties for non‑compliance, nor does it detail enforcement processes or appeal mechanisms. The directive sets out required actions and effective dates, but it does not include a clause specifying fines, suspension, or other sanctioning measures within the text included here.

Because the AD is issued by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and signed by a CASA delegate, its performance obligations are framed as mandatory airworthiness directives. In typical regulatory practice (not stated in the text), failure to comply with an AD may render the aircraft non‑compliant with its airworthiness obligations, which can have operational and regulatory consequences. The AD itself, however, limits what it asserts: it imposes compliance obligations and sets deadlines but omits explicit penalties or enforcement procedures in the provided material.

The AD does contain cross‑references that point to regulatory context: it supersedes FAA AD 2004‑24‑09 and refers to FAA AD 2006‑16‑04 Amdt 39‑14704 dated 27 July 2006. Those references imply a coordinated regulatory approach between jurisdictions, and they place the AD within the landscape of internationally recognised airworthiness directives. Enforcement in practice is ordinarily exercised by the regulator that issued the AD, which can include audits, airworthiness reviews, and action under underlying aviation safety regulation, although those enforcement mechanisms and statutory bases are not set out in the AD text provided.

Practitioners should be aware that the AD imposes discrete, time‑limited duties (for example, the inspection within 50 operating hours for Table 3 P/Ns). Non‑performance within the stated windows would leave operators exposed to the operational risks the AD addresses, and to whatever regulatory enforcement CASA applies under its broader powers. The AD does not specify a procedure for seeking relief, such as an alternative method of compliance or a temporary exemption; any such process would need to be pursued directly with CASA on the regulator’s standard administrative channels.

Finally, the AD explicitly identifies the technical literature to be used,the Rolls‑Royce CEBs listed in Table 2,which establishes a de facto baseline of technical conformity. If an operator were to deviate from those CEBs, the AD does not itself describe whether that would be treated as non‑compliance or require pre‑approval of an alternative method; those governance matters fall outside the text of the directive as provided.

The AD situates itself in a network of technical and regulatory instruments. It explicitly references and supersedes other airworthiness directives: the Note in the directive states that FAA AD 2006‑16‑04 Amdt 39‑14704 dated 27 July 2006 is referred to, and that this AD supersedes FAA AD 2004‑24‑09. The AD also lists Rolls‑Royce Corporation Alert Commercial Engine Bulletins (CEBs), Revision 1 dated 30 August 2004, in Table 2 as the related technical publications. Those cross‑references create a direct interaction with both foreign regulatory instruments and manufacturer technical guidance.

Mechanically, the AD requires actions that will interact with an operator’s continuing airworthiness obligations under broader aviation regulations. The AD specifies inspection, cleaning and mandatory removal of certain nozzle P/Ns and replacement with a nozzle not specified in the AD. While the AD text does not itself cite the enabling statute or CASA’s enforcement or certification regulations, in practice ADs operate within the corporate framework of aviation safety law where operators must maintain aircraft in an airworthy condition. The AD’s compliance windows (50 operating hours for Table 3 P/Ns after the effective date; 150 operating hours after 17 March 2005 for Table 4 P/Ns) will intersect with operators’ maintenance schedules and legal obligations to maintain accurate maintenance logs, though the AD does not specify recordkeeping mechanics.

The AD’s reference to the OEM CEBs ties manufacturer guidance into regulatory compliance. The AD states that information pertaining to the subject can be found in specified Rolls‑Royce CEBs, thereby directing operators to follow the manufacturer’s technical procedures to meet the AD’s requirements. This creates an operational dependency: technical compliance with the AD is read against specific manufacturer documents, and that affects interactions with procurement, overhaul, and maintenance contractual arrangements.

There is also an international regulatory coordination dimension. The AD’s reference to FAA ADs indicates parallel or prior actions by the U.S. regulator; the directive supersedes an earlier FAA AD and refers to a later FAA amendment. That means parts, maintenance actions and compliance evidence used in another jurisdiction may be relevant to compliance in Australia and vice versa. Operators moving aircraft across jurisdictions will need to align compliance actions with the applicable ADs to avoid inconsistent obligations.

Finally, the AD does not include specific provisions on interactions with parts‑supply law, warranties, or aftermarket PMA approvals. However, Table 3 lists Goodrich Delavan PMA part numbers (47069, 47101, 49445) as subject to inspection, with corresponding RRC vendor P/N shown as N/A. That creates an immediate field of interaction between PMA part usage, OEM vendor parts, and the AD’s part‑number exclusion definition of "serviceable." The AD therefore changes the compliance landscape for operators and parts suppliers by effectively reassigning permissible part numbers in maintenance practice, subject to any broader legal constraints on parts approvals and approvals of PMA parts.

All interactions described here draw from the AD text and its explicit references to manufacturer CEBs and FAA ADs in the document. The AD itself does not set out the enabling statutory provisions for CASA’s authority, nor does it explain administrative remedies for conflicts between jurisdictions; those remain matters outside the AD text provided.

The AD as provided shows a clear lineage: the original issue of the airworthiness directive became effective on 17 March 2005. The instrument before you is AD/AL 250/85 Amdt 1, an amendment to the original AD. The amendment was signed 14 August 2006 and explicitly becomes effective on 28 September 2006. The background text explains the reason for the amendment: discovery that several part numbers of fuel nozzles were inadvertently left out of AD/AL 250/85. The remainder of the background states that, as worded, the earlier AD allowed certain P/N fuel nozzles back into service and that those fuel nozzles must not be allowed back into service; the amendment therefore re‑captures those P/Ns within the AD’s prohibitions.

The AD’s Note records a relationship to FAA actions: it refers to FAA AD 2006‑16‑04 (Amdt 39‑14704, 27 July 2006) and states that this AD supersedes FAA AD 2004‑24‑09. Those references map the AD to earlier and contemporaneous FAA regulatory responses to the same technical issue and indicate that the Australian amendment aligns with the evolution of regulatory responses internationally.

On the technical information side, Table 2 lists a set of Rolls‑Royce Alert Commercial Engine Bulletins, all at Revision 1 and all dated 30 August 2004. The AD uses those CEBs as the manufacturer’s alerts that contain information pertaining to the subject. The CEB dates show that the manufacturer’s technical guidance pre‑dated the original AD effective date and the amendment; the AD ties compliance to that existing manufacturer literature.

The stated chronology in the AD text is as follows: (1) manufacturer CEBs issued on 30 August 2004; (2) original AD effective 17 March 2005; (3) FAA amendment 27 July 2006; (4) CASA delegate signs amendment on 14 August 2006; (5) this amendment effective 28 September 2006. The amendment explicitly targets an omission in the original AD rather than a newly discovered technical failure mode. The background indicates the core safety rationale , reports of engine power loss via screen collapse , was the motivating cause for the original AD, while the amendment is corrective and scope‑expanding to ensure the original safety goal is met.

The AD’s text contains both the original actions (inspection, cleaning, replacement) and new timing constraints, for example the 50 operating hours window for Table 3 fuel nozzle P/Ns after the effective date of the amendment. Practitioners needing to prepare compliance plans should track this amendment history because it affects which P/Ns are within scope and the applicable compliance dates. The AD’s amendment therefore changes the legal status of parts that may previously have been treated as out of scope, and it imposes additional forced inventory and replacement obligations on operators.

The AD text provided contains no litigation history. There are no mentions of judicial decisions, court challenges, or administrative appeals recorded within the document. The directive is administrative in nature and signed by a CASA delegate, but the text does not report any prior or subsequent litigation about the content, scope, or enforcement of AD/AL 250/85 or its amendment.

Because the document itself is silent on disputes or legal challenges, there are no source‑grounded case names, orders, or decisions to summarise here. Any assertion about lawsuits, regulatory appeals or enforcement proceedings would extend beyond the explicit content of the AD. Practitioners seeking litigation history would need to consult CASA enforcement records, court registries, or industry news archives; those sources are outside the document supplied.

Within the AD, references are made to related FAA ADs (FAA AD 2006‑16‑04 and superseded FAA AD 2004‑24‑09) and to Rolls‑Royce CEBs. Those cross‑references indicate regulatory coordination but do not imply litigation. The absence of litigation references in the directive suggests the instrument was issued as a regulatory safety measure without recorded concurrent court cases at the time the amendment was signed.

If a reader requires evidence of enforcement actions, legal challenges, or precedential administrative rulings related to this AD, that material is not included in the text provided and would have to be obtained from CASA public records or judicial databases. The AD alone does not supply a litigation record.

There are several practical pitfalls and interpretation traps embedded in the directive text that practitioners should watch for.

1. Serviceable by exclusion. The AD defines "serviceable fuel nozzle" as a nozzle with a part number not specified in, or addressed by, this AD. That formulation means compliance hinges on accurate part‑number identification. Practitioners must not assume physical similarity or supplier branding suffices; they must verify part numbers precisely. The AD’s corrective purpose arose because part numbers had been inadvertently omitted from the original AD and could have been returned to service. The amendment corrects that omission. Misreading the definition of "serviceable" could allow contaminated or disallowed nozzles to remain in service.

2. Multiple part‑number lists and compliance windows. The AD splits affected nozzles across Table 3 and Table 4, with different operating‑hour windows: Table 3 P/Ns require inspection within 50 operating hours after the amendment’s effective date; Table 4 P/Ns require inspection within 150 operating hours after 17 March 2005 (the original AD effective date). This fractured schedule creates bookkeeping complexity. Operators must map each nozzle on each aircraft to the appropriate table and compute operating hours relative to the correct date. Confusion between "effective date" of the amendment and "effective date" of the original AD can lead to missed deadlines.

3. Ambiguity over "before further flight" wording. The Compliance section contains the phrase "Before further flight after the effective date of this AD." The AD elsewhere requires cleaning the entire fuel system if contamination is found and says that such cleaning must be done before further flight. Practitioners must interpret whether the "before further flight" phrase applies only to contamination‑driven cleaning or to broader removal and replacement obligations. The operative reading in the AD is that contamination triggers immediate grounding and cleaning, but the AD’s layout can cause misinterpretation of sequencing obligations.

4. PMA part numbers and RRC vendor mapping. Table 3 includes Goodrich Delavan PMA P/Ns (47069, 47101, 49445) with "N/A" in the corresponding RRC vendor P/N column. That creates a governance issue for operators using PMA parts: the AD includes PMA P/Ns in the inspection list, but does not supply a direct RRC vendor equivalent for those entries. Operators using PMA parts must therefore ensure their PMA parts are not among the listed P/Ns or else treat them as subject to removal.

5. Supply and logistics pressure. The AD requires removal and replacement of specified nozzles. The directive does not state how many nozzles per engine or aircraft are affected in any given installation. Operators may need multiple replacements per aircraft and may face supply shortages for "serviceable" P/Ns not addressed by the AD. The AD contains no supply mitigation or grace period beyond the operating‑hour windows. Replacement parts must be located quickly to avoid operational disruption.

6. Reliance on manufacturer CEBs without explicit delegation. The AD points to Rolls‑Royce CEBs (Table 2) as the source of information. Those documents are a primary technical resource. However, the AD does not replicate CEB procedures verbatim, and some maintainers may lack the CEBs or interpret them differently. Failure to follow the listed CEBs could be treated as non‑compliance with the AD’s intent even though the AD does not itself mandate a particular CEB procedure line by line.

7. Missing enforcement language. Because the AD text does not set out penalties, operators may under‑estimate regulatory risk. That absence is not a safe harbour: non‑compliance will typically have regulatory consequences under CASA’s broader remit. Practitioners should not treat the absence of explicit penalties in the AD as permission to defer compliance.

8. Recordkeeping and auditability. The AD does not prescribe recordkeeping procedures within the text provided. Inspectors and auditors will expect documentary evidence that inspections and replacements were performed within the applicable operating‑hour windows, especially because compliance depends heavily on precise timing. Operators should not assume the AD relieves them of standard maintenance record obligations.

9. Overlooked variants in Table 1. The list of engine models in Table 1 is extensive. Operators may operate variant engines not obviously listed and must not assume a close variant is excluded. Accurate cross‑matching to Table 1 is required.

10. Retroactive compliance windows. Table 4 sets a compliance window referencing 17 March 2005. For assets that have been modified, exchanged or imported since that date, tracing whether inspection was "previously accomplished" may be difficult.

These items are drawn from the AD text and its tables and are presented to highlight interpretative and operational risks that arise directly from how the AD is framed.

Compliance steps derive directly from the Requirement and Compliance sections of the AD and the technical references it lists. Below is a source‑grounded, step‑by‑step practical checklist based on the AD’s text.

1. Identify applicability. Confirm whether the aircraft engine is one of the Rolls Royce (Allison) 250‑B or 250‑C series engines listed in Table 1. Only engines listed in Table 1 fall within the AD’s scope.

2. Inventory fuel nozzle part numbers. For each affected engine, list the installed fuel nozzle part numbers and cross‑reference them against Table 3 (fuel nozzles to be inspected within 50 operating hours) and Table 4 (fuel nozzles to be inspected within 150 operating hours after 17 March 2005). Pay special attention to PMA parts such as the Goodrich Delavan P/Ns in Table 3.

3. Schedule inspections within the stated operating‑hour windows. For P/Ns in Table 3, perform the one‑time inspection of the fuel nozzle screens for contamination within 50 operating hours after the effective date of this amendment (28 September 2006), unless the inspection has already been done. For P/Ns in Table 4, perform the inspection within 150 operating hours after 17 March 2005 unless already accomplished. Accurately compute operating hours and document the calculation.

4. Conduct the screen inspection. Perform the one‑time inspection of fuel nozzle screens for contamination as required by Requirement 1. Use the Rolls‑Royce CEBs listed in Table 2 (Revision 1 dated 30 August 2004) for the technical methods and acceptance criteria, since the AD explicitly points operators to those CEBs for information.

5. If contamination is found, inspect and clean the entire aircraft fuel system. The AD requires inspection and cleaning of the entire aircraft fuel system where contamination is found in the nozzle screen (Requirement 2). The AD also specifies that the cleaning must be done before further flight after the effective date. Use the Rolls‑Royce CEBs for the cleaning procedure to align with the AD’s stated technical guidance.

6. Remove and replace listed nozzles. For fuel nozzles listed in Table 3 and Table 4, remove the nozzle from service and replace it with a serviceable nozzle, as defined by the AD (Requirement 3). Match replacement parts against the AD’s part‑number exclusions: the replacement must have a P/N not specified in, nor addressed by, the AD.

7. Plan for overhaul timing obligations. The AD includes an action "At the next fuel nozzle overhaul after the effective date of this Directive" (Compliance item 3 in Table 4 area). Ensure that the overhaul schedule accounts for removal or inspection obligations where immediate replacement is not mandated.

8. Use the listed CEBs for technical detail. Table 2 lists Rolls‑Royce CEBs (for example CEB‑A‑313, CEB‑A‑73‑5029, etc.) as the relevant technical materials. Acquire and follow those CEBs’ revision 1 documents dated 30 August 2004 to carry out inspections, cleaning and any recommended replacement practices.

9. Document compliance and retention. While the AD text does not specify recordkeeping mechanics, maintain contemporaneous records that show: identification of engine and nozzle P/Ns; date and operating‑hour reading when the inspection was done; findings of contamination or absence thereof; any fuel system cleaning work performed; parts removed and parts installed including P/Ns; and the signatures of licensed maintenance personnel. Retain the Rolls‑Royce CEBs used as technical references alongside maintenance records.

10. Coordinate with parts suppliers. Because the AD defines serviceable nozzles by exclusion of AD‑listed P/Ns, ensure procurement teams only provide replacement nozzles whose P/Ns are not listed in Tables 3 or 4. Confirm availability proactively to avoid downtime.

11. Seek regulatory clarification when necessary. If there is uncertainty about interpretation,for example whether a particular P/N is "addressed by" the AD, or whether a nozzle with ambiguous markings falls within scope,seek clarification from CASA or from the aircraft certifying authority before returning the aircraft to service. The AD itself does not supply an alternative method of compliance in its text.

12. Align maintenance records with other jurisdictional ADs. The AD refers to FAA ADs. If parts or maintenance work were carried out under an FAA AD or another authority’s AD, maintain cross‑referenced paperwork to demonstrate that an inspection was "previously accomplished" if asserting that compliance obligation has already been met.

All actions above are drawn from the AD’s Requirements and Compliance sections and the Tables contained in the directive. The Rolls‑Royce CEBs listed in Table 2 are the manufacturer materials the AD points to as containing information "pertaining to this subject," and thus should be the operative technical references used to implement inspections, cleaning and replacements. Where the AD text is silent,on administrative enforcement, on record retention durations, or on alternative means of compliance,practitioners must rely on their broader continuing airworthiness obligations and consult CASA for procedural guidance.