Case law library
© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
Australian case law library
Search court decisions by neutral citation, case name, jurisdiction, court, judges, catchwords, and judgment summary.
Case law entry points
Start with judgments that other decisions keep coming back to, then follow the citations through the case graph.
NCAT Appeal Panel | 2014-04-09
Tenants were terminated for non-payment of rent following an uncontested hearing where the landlord's agent gave evidence and the Member recorded findings in hearing notes. The tenants sought leave to internally appeal under s 80(2)(b) but did not raise any question of law; therefore leave required. Clause 12 Schedule 4 requires showing the appellant 'may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice' because the decision was unfair, against the weight of evidence, or there is significant new evidence. The tenants relied on phone logs and asserted contact and willingness to pay. The Appeal Panel found the record disclosed arrears and necessary findings, the phone logs were not fresh or persuasive, and there was no denial of procedural fairness. Leave was refused, the appeal dismissed, and the stay of the original orders lifted.
1,627 case citations
Before: Williams J
Before: Williams J
Before: Sweeney J
Before: Slattery J
Before: Faulkner J
Before: Richardson J
Before: Chen J
Before: Ainslie-Wallace AJ
Before: Black J
Before: Black J
Before: White J
Before: Chen J
Before: Rees J
Before: Sirtes J
Before: Leeming JA at [1] Kirk JA at [33] Griffiths AJA at [88]
The Court of Appeal upheld forfeiture orders connected to a house where two brothers had concealed methylamphetamine and where the evidence supported a finding that they had refined the drug. The Court rejected a rule that the connection between property use and crime must always be labelled “substantial”. Instead, the court must assess the statutory words in context: the property or one of its features must have been purposefully used to advance or facilitate the crime, and the connection must be significant rather than remote or fortuitous. The Court considered the evidence about chemicals, equipment, residue, concealment, utilities, and surveillance sufficient to support the finding that the house was used in connection with manufacture. Because that finding was enough, the Court did not decide whether the drug storage also met the test in relation to the deemed supply offence.
Before: Muller J
Before: Baker J
Before: Muller J
Before: Price AJA
Before: Slattery J
Before: Black J
Before: Pike J
Before: Sirtes J
Before: Pike J
Before: Peden J
Before: Leeming JA
This was a decision about who should pay the costs of an abandoned application, not a decision about whether Mr Kearney needed a tutor. The Court applied the usual starting point that the unsuccessful applicant pays the other side’s costs. It found that Mr Kearney’s conduct accounted for much of the time spent on the motion and that the essential conditions he insisted on would not have been granted. The respondents nevertheless did not obtain indemnity costs: the Court considered the conduct insufficient for that more substantial departure. Mr Kearney therefore had to pay the respondents’ costs of the motion and half of their costs of arguing about costs.
Before: Ward P at [1] Leeming JA at [4] Black J at [104]
The Court of Appeal majority upheld findings that JMW, rather than Mr Bak personally, was party to a building contract for work on property owned by Mr Bak and Ms Kim. It also upheld findings concerning later transfers of JMW’s sale proceeds, the company’s insolvency, a charge over the property, compound interest, and refusal to excuse Ms Kim from liability. On the key divided issue, the majority considered Ms Kim’s failure to perform her director role causative because it enabled Mr Bak to act without her involvement. Leeming JA disagreed, concluding that the evidence did not prove she would have prevented the transfers. Both appeals were dismissed with costs.
Before: Kirk JA at [1] Stern JA at [2] Ball JA at [3]
The Court distinguished a landowner’s right to cross from adjoining land onto a public road from the ability to travel along the road reserve to reach that crossing point. Section 6 protects the former, not a general right to convenient or vehicular access. The Walkway made it harder for vehicles to reach the Land’s boundary, but did not block the boundary itself. The Court therefore dismissed the appeal, while clarifying that road-work consent and planning approval do not automatically override private rights.
Before: Brereton J
Before: Hammerschlag CJ in Eq