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Background

3. The Plaintiff has filed a Statement of Charge in support of her contempt application. The following allegations are set out in that document.

4. The Third Defendant is the daughter of the First and Second Defendants. She was the registered proprietor of a property at St Ives Chase (the St Ives property). The Plaintiff contends that on or about 17 August 2024, when these proceedings were part-heard before Weinstein J, she discovered that the Third Defendant had listed the St Ives property for sale. She was concerned that the proposed sale would create a risk that the Third Defendant might be unable to satisfy any judgment ultimately given against her. Accordingly, the Plaintiff sought that $850,000 be secured by the Third Defendant. In response, the Third Defendant executed and filed an undertaking to the Court on 23 August 2024 (the Undertaking) in the following terms:

“1. Without admission to any liability, the Third Defendant undertakes to the Court that:

i. she will notify the Plaintiff in writing within 2 business days after a contract for the sale of the Property [being the St Ives property] is exchanged, including providing a copy of the contract to the Plaintiff;

ii. she will provide the Plaintiff 3 days’ written notice before completion of any sale/transfer of the Property;

iii. upon the sale/transfer of the Property, an amount of $800,000 from the sale proceeds will be deposited into the Third Defendant’s conveyancing solicitor’s trust account (Funds);

iv. the Funds will be held in that trust account and may not be transferred, used or dealt with unless:

1. the Plaintiff provides consent in writing for the Funds to be dealt with; or

2. the Court makes an order in these proceedings permitting the use of the Funds or that the Third Defendant is released from her undertaking;

3. the use of the Funds is solely for the purpose of paying the purchase price for the acquisition of any real property in Australia under the name of the third defendant.

2. In relation to paragraph 1 (iii) above, the Third Defendant is to provide the Plaintiff with written confirmation showing that the amount of $800,000 is held in the trust account.

3. In relation to 1 (iv) (3), the Third Defendant is to provide a copy of the Contract for Sale entered into with a vendor within 2 business days after the contract exchange.”

5. On 26 August 2024, the Third Defendant informed the Plaintiff that she had sold the St Ives property for $3.5 million. On 10 October 2024, she informed the Plaintiff that she had entered into a contract the previous day to purchase a property at Chapel Hill in Queensland (the Queensland p****roperty) for $1.25 million. Following further correspondence between the parties, the Third Defendant by her solicitors confirmed that she “remains bound by the previous undertaking and intends to fully comply with it in all respects”.

6. On 18 November 2024, the sale of the St Ives property completed and $800,000 was deposited into the Third Defendant’s solicitors’ trust account. A receipt evidencing that deposit was provided to the Plaintiff.

7. The Plaintiff contends that in June 2025, unbeknownst to the Plaintiff, the Third Defendant sold the Queensland property for $1.3 million, with settlement taking place on 20 August 2025.

8. On 11 June 2026, Weinstein J delivered judgment for the Plaintiff against all Defendants in the amount of $400,000 plus interest and costs: Li v Wang (No 4) [2026] NSWSC 668. On 15 June 2026, consequent upon that judgment, Campbell J made freezing orders against the Third Defendant and ordered that she disclose her assets: Li v Wang (No 5) [2026] NSWSC 697.

9. The Third Defendant disclosed her assets in an affidavit affirmed on 17 June 2026. In that affidavit the Third Defendant deposed that she sold the Queensland property in June 2025 and received about $1,237,800 after the deduction of settlement adjustments, and she invested $1,030,000 from the proceeds in a gym and exercise business in China on or about 20 August 2025.

10. The Plaintiff alleges that the Third Defendant breached the Undertaking by selling the Queensland property and then transferring the proceeds from that sale to a third party immediately upon completion. She also alleges that the Third Defendant committed a contempt by lying to the Court in her 17 June 2026 affidavit in which she affirmed that the Plaintiff’s solicitor was informed of the settlement of the purchase of the Queensland property, and that she invested the proceeds from its eventual sale in a gym and exercise business in China.

The Plaintiff’s evidence

11. The Plaintiff read the affidavit of her instructing solicitor, Li Feng, affirmed on 23 July 2026. That affidavit contains the evidence which supports the contentions in the Statement of Charge. Those allegations appear to be supported by documentation or are verifiable by reference to public records.

12. The affidavit of Mr Feng records that on 6 July 2026 he received a letter from the Third Defendant’s bankruptcy trustee which disclosed that she listed family members as creditors for sums in excess of $2.5 million. Mr Feng expressed his belief, based on the matters set out in his affidavit, that the Third Defendant is dishonest and is likely to abscond from Australia to China.

Legal principles

13. Part 55 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW) concerns contempt proceedings in the Court. The Court’s power to issue an arrest warrant in such proceedings is found in r 10, which provides as follows:

10 Arrest

Where—

(a) notice of a motion for punishment of a contempt has been filed or proceedings have been commenced for punishment of a contempt, and

(b) it appears to the Court that the contemnor is likely to abscond or otherwise withdraw himself from the jurisdiction of the Court,

the Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the contemnor and his detention in custody until he is brought before the Court to answer the charge, unless he, in the meantime, gives security in such manner and in such sum as the Court directs, for his appearance in person to answer the charge and to submit to the judgment or order of the Court.

14. The principles which inform the exercise of the Court’s power to issue a warrant for the arrest of an alleged contemnor were considered by Kunc J in Huang v Liao [2021] NSWSC 1706 at [29]–[32]. His Honour there relevantly explained:

“29. There is no doubt that the Court can issue a warrant for an alleged contemnor’s arrest under SCR Part 55 r 10 (set out in [2] above): see, for example, the detailed consideration of the procedures involved in ASIC v Michalik (No 2) (2004) 52 ACSR 115; [2004] NSWSC 1260 per Palmer J (Michalik). Three steps are involved.

30. First, when the matter came before me in the Duty List, I granted leave to the plaintiffs to file in Court a notice of motion seeking declarations that Ms Liao is in contempt, accompanied by a statement of charge setting out the allegations (in large part reflected in the Court’s findings of fact set out in [6] to [20] above) in support of the conclusion that Ms Liao is in contempt of the Restraining Orders, the November 2021 Orders and the 3 December Order. That filing satisfies SCR Pt 55 r 10(a).

31. Second, SCR Pt 55 r 10(b) requires that ‘it appears to the Court that the contemnor is likely to abscond or otherwise withdraw himself from the jurisdiction of the Court’. …

32. The third aspect of an application such as this is that even if SCR Pt 55 r 10(a) and (b) are satisfied (as was the case here), the Court retains a discretion whether or not to act: ‘the Court may issue a warrant’. Even when the charge of contempt is brought by a party rather than the Court, there is always a public element that must be considered. In some cases, the degree of seriousness or nature of the contempt, or some other feature of the case generally, may persuade the Court to stay its hand. …”

Consideration

15. In her written submissions, the Plaintiff relies on the following matters in support of the application:

16. the Third Defendant owned several real properties in Australia but no longer owns any. She sold the Queensland property without the knowledge of the Plaintiff while judgment was reserved;

17. on 20 August 2025, the Third Defendant transferred virtually her entire net worth to China. As at 17 June 2026 she had $1,519.72 in her Australian bank accounts;

18. the Third Defendant’s sale of the Queensland property and dissipation of the proceeds contravened the Undertaking;

19. there is no evidence that the Third Defendant invested the proceeds in a gym and exercise business in China. Rather, she stated in an email that “all investment agreement [sic] are oral”. This submission supports the charge that the Third Defendant lied in her 17 June 2026 affidavit;

20. on 2 July 2026, soon after judgment was entered against her, the Third Defendant stated that she had applied for bankruptcy;

21. the Third Defendant is unemployed;

22. the Plaintiff observed removalists and cleaners at the Third Defendant’s last known residential address on or about 20 June 2026;

23. most of the Third Defendant’s family lives in China. Her father provides her with financial support;

24. the Second Defendant does not own real property in Australia and has only $100 in her bank account;

25. the Third Defendant’s husband is her only family member who lives in Australia. There is no evidence whether he owns any real property. In a prior affidavit, the Third Defendant deposed that he worked as an Uber driver and cleaner but mostly did not work. She deposed that she and her husband had hardly any income and were completely dependent on their respective parents for financial support;

26. in Li v Wang (No 4), Weinstein J made adverse findings about the Third Defendant’s character and credibility. His Honour found that she was an evasive and dishonest witness, was willing to (and did) lie to three separate financial institutions to obtain financial advantage, and was willing to (and did) give false information to the Department of Home Affairs;

27. the Plaintiff understands that the Third Defendant has a young child, although the Plaintiff does not know where the child resides; and

28. the Third Defendant’s conduct indicates that she has a motive to escape the reach of the Court. The administration of justice, and the public interest in deterring others from breaching orders or undertakings to the Court, would be undermined if enforcement of the Undertaking were rendered nugatory by her fleeing the jurisdiction and avoiding answering the serious allegations of contempt.

29. Having considered the evidence and the principles which inform the exercise of the Court’s discretion, I reach the following conclusions.

30. First, a Notice of Motion for punishment of a contempt has been filed. This satisfies r 10(a).

31. Secondly, it appears to me that the Third Defendant is likely to abscond to China. Rule 10(b) is therefore satisfied. This is not the occasion to determine the allegations of contempt, or to make concluded findings on an ex parte application in which the Third Defendant has not been heard. However, the whole of the evidence at this stage gives rise to an appearance the Third Defendant has attempted to shield her assets from the Plaintiff to frustrate the Plaintiff’s claim and any judgment the Plaintiff might obtain. She owns no property in the jurisdiction and has few family ties here. By contrast, almost all of her family and her sole source of financial support are in China. Furthermore, removalists and cleaners were recently observed at her last known residential address. Finally, the findings made by Weinstein J in these proceedings support an inference that the Third Defendant is a dishonest person who is willing to lie to the Australian Government (among others) and misconduct herself to obtain financial advantage.

32. Thirdly, I consider that it is in the interests of justice to issue the warrant. It is hardly a foregone conclusion that the charges brought against the Third Defendant will ultimately be proved to the requisite standard, particularly where the Undertaking concerned the St Ives property rather than the Queensland property. But the charges are very serious and, if proved, there is a real possibility that the Third Defendant will be punished by committal to a correctional centre. In circumstances where it appears that she is likely to abscond from the jurisdiction, it is in the public interest that she be apprehended to prevent her from frustrating the Court’s processes and evading the determination of the charges put against her.

Conclusion

20. For those reasons, on 24 July 2026 the Court issued a warrant under my hand for the arrest of the Third Defendant and her production before the Court in answer to the allegations of contempt.

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