Zonnevylle v Secretary, Department of Education

Catchwords: APPEAL – application to vary interlocutory order - whether application can be used as a mechanism of appeal – application dismissed
APPEALS — bias — application for recusal —application dismissed
APPEALS – referral of question of law to the Supreme Court – question of law arising in proceedings – referral not made
APPEALS — procedure — further evidence on appeal - appellant made application for the issue of summonses for a named person to give evidence and produce documents – application dismissed

Legislation Cited: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), ss 32, 36, 41, 48, 50, 54
Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW), r 25
Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 110

Cases Cited: Department of Education v Zonnevylle [2020] NSWCATAD 96
Farrrugia v The Hour Glass (Australia) Pty Ltd [2025] NSWCATAP 288
Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages v FJG & FJH; Attorney General of New South Wales as Intervenor [2022] NSWCATAP 270
Zonnevylle v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice, 2025/00002180, 21 January 2025, unreported)
Zonnevylle v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice (No 2) [2025] NSWCATAP 161
Zonnevylle v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2026] NSWCATAP 1

Texts Cited: None cited

Category: Procedural rulings

Parties: Peter Zonnevylle (Appellant)
Secretary, Department of Education (Respondent)

Representation: Appellant (Self-Represented)
Crown Solicitor (Respondent)

File Number(s): 2026/00277072

Publication restriction: Nil

REASONS FOR DECISION

Overview

1. This is an internal appeal from a decision of the Tribunal made on 19 March 2026 under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) (GIPA Act) refusing to grant leave to Peter Zonnevylle (Mr Zonnevylle) to make an access application on Secretary, Department of Education (the Secretary) (the Decision).

2. Mr Zonnevylle has lodged the following six applications:

3. on 24 September 2026, an application in which he is seeking orders in relation to the service of documents, clarification of a procedural direction and the referral of questions of law to the Supreme Court (the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application);

4. on 2 October 2026, an application in which he is seeking orders for an extension of time for compliance with a procedural direction and consequential relief (the 2 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application);

5. on 7 October 2026, an application in which he is seeking orders in relation to the service of documents and for the issue of a summons (the First 7 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application):

6. on 7 October 2026, an application in which he is seeking orders for an extension of time for submissions, an adjournment of the hearing of the appeal and consequential relief (the Second 7 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application);

7. on 9 October 2026, an application in which he is seeking orders for an adjournment of the hearing of the appeal and my disqualification (the First 9 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application);

8. on 9 October 2026, an amended application in which he is seeking the orders in the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application apart from clarification of a procedural direction (the Second 9 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application).

9. I have decided that the First 9 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application so far as Mr Zonnevylle seeks an order for my disqualification and the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application and the First 7 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application so far as orders are sought for the issue of summonses should be dismissed. The 2 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application should be granted. The balance of the First Zonnevylle Application, the Second 7 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application and the balance of the First 9 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application should be listed for hearing on 23 October 2026 at 10.15 AM in Sydney at the same time as the hearing of the appeal.

10. Before identifying and considering the issues arising for determination in relation to these Applications, I have summarised the background to the appeal and the history of the appeal. In considering the five Applications I have understood that Mr Zonnevylle uses:

11. the acronym “SRNLPA” as a reference to himself;

12. the acronym “GSE Act” as a reference to the Government Sector Employment Act 2013 (NSW);

13. “Brazel” as a reference to Michelle Brazel, the Principal Registrar of the Tribunal.

The background to the appeal

5. On 3 April 2020, the Tribunal made an order under s 110(1) of the GIPA Act that Mr Zonnevylle is not permitted to make an access application under the Act to the Department of Education, the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, the Department of Justice and every other agency, insofar as an application requests government information concerning the operation, administration or personnel of any agency carrying out the functions of any such agency regardless of machinery of government changes without first obtaining the approval of the Tribunal: Department of Education v Zonnevylle [2020] NSWCATAD 96.

6. On 6 January 2026, Mr Zonnevylle as the applicant commenced proceedings 2026/00005421 against the Secretary as the respondent by lodging an application in which he sought an order granting approval to make an access application under the GIPA Act on NSW Education (the 6 January 2026 Zonnevylle Application).

7. On 8 January 2026, the Tribunal made procedural directions for the lodgement and service of submissions and documents by Mr Zonnevylle and the Secretary in relation to the 6 January 2026 Zonnevylle Application (the 8 January 2026 Directions).

8. On 4 February 2026, the Tribunal made procedural directions extending the time for compliance by Mr Zonnevylle and the Secretary with the 8 January 2026 Directions (the 4 February 2026 Directions).

9. On 19 March 2026, the Tribunal in Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division constituted by Senior Member M Tibbey made the Decision for the reason that Mr Zonnevylle had not lodged any material in compliance with the 8 January 2026 Directions as varied by the 4 February 2026 Directions.

The history of the appeal

10. On 6 July 2026, Mr Zonnevylle as the appellant commenced this appeal against the Secretary as the respondent by lodging the following documents:

11. a Notice of Appeal in which he stated the Decision was received on 8 June 2026;

12. an Affidavit of himself affirmed on 2 July 2026 in which he sets out the circumstances in which he became aware of the Decision.

13. On 20 July 2026, the Appeal Panel constituted by Principal Member S de Jersey at the call over made procedural directions for the appeal which was listed for hearing on 23 October 2026 at 10:15 AM in Sydney for a half day (the 20 July 2026 Directions) including:

“6 Any issue of whether the Appeal Panel should:

- extend the time for filing the Notice of Appeal

is to be determined at the hearing of the appeal.

7 The current service arrangements with the appellant are confirmed as - all communications, correspondence and document lodgements from the appellant to NCAT will only be accepted if delivered by Australia Post and addressed to The Registrar, AEOD, OD and Appeals, PO Box K1026 Haymarket, NSW 1240. NCAT will also use Australia Post to communicate with the appellant. All correspondence will be issued to the appellant’s residential address only.”

12. On 18 August 2026, Mr Zonnevylle lodged a document headed “Statement & Submissions of Peter Zonnevylle” dated 17 August 2026 in which he relevantly states that he did not receive the Decision “before Jun. 2026”.

13. On 16 September 2026, the Secretary lodged a document headed “Submissions of Respondent” in which she relevantly concedes that if Mr Zonnevylle did not receive the Decision until 8 June 2026 then he should be granted an extension to bring the appeal.

14. On 24 September 2026, Mr Zonnevylle lodged the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application in which he:

15. in section 3 headed “Orders” states:

“1. An amendment to the tribunals orders (as attached)

2. Request for clarification of the tribunals orders (as attached)

3. CAT Act Sect.54 referral of questions of law to the NSW Supreme Court (as attached)

4. Stay on proceedings until the above matters resolved on grounds of procedural fairness

2. in section 4 headed “Grounds for Application” refers to three attached documents.

3. Mr Zonnevylle in the first attachment to the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application requests that the Tribunal:

“1. amend the current communication and service arrangements so that NCAT communicates with the SRNLPA by email;

2. permit the SRNLPA to communicate with and lodge documents with NCAT in person or by postal/comparable delivery;

3. ensure that time-sensitive Tribunal notices, directions and orders are communicated to the SRNLPA by email so that the SRNLPA is not deprived of part of the response period through postal delivery delays;

4. confirm whether the March 2024 communication restriction has been reviewed since its imposition and, if not, undertake a current review;

5. confirm receipt and status of the SRNLPA’s previous application seeking amendment of the communication restriction;

6. ensure that the SRNLPA’s outstanding application is placed before the appropriate decision-maker;

7. ensure that the operation of the communication arrangement does not result in procedural disadvantage to the SRNLPA; and

8. provide the SRNLPA with written confirmation of the determination of this application.”

16. Mr Zonnevylle in the second attachment to the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application requests clarification of direction 6 of the 20 July 2026 Directions.

17. Mr Zonnevylle in the third attachment to the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application:

18. in section A headed “Orders” states:

“The SRNLPA requests that the Appeal Panel:

1. pursuant to s 54(1) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (“NCAT Act”), refer the questions of law identified in Part F of this application to the Supreme Court of New South Wales for the opinion of the Court;

2. pursuant to s 54(2) of the NCAT Act, refer the proposed questions to the President for written consent to the referral;

3. pending determination of the questions referred to the Supreme Court, make no determination in the present proceedings that is inconsistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court on those questions, in accordance with s 54(4) of the NCAT Act;

4. alternatively, if the Appeal Panel considers that any proposed question requires reformulation, identify the appropriate formulation of the question of law arising from the circumstances set out in this application and consider referring that question to the Supreme Court; and

5. make such consequential directions as are necessary to ensure that the SRNLPA is not procedurally disadvantaged pending determination of this application and, if a reference is made, pending determination of the reference.

2. in section F headed “Questions of Law Proposed for Referral” states:

“The SRNLPA proposes that the following questions, or such reformulated questions as the Appeal Panel considers appropriate, be referred to the Supreme Court under s 54 of the NCAT Act.

Question 1- Lawfulness of the service arrangement

Whether, having regard to the NCAT Act, applicable procedural rules and principles of procedural fairness, NCAT may lawfully impose or confirm a communication arrangement requiring a party to receive all Tribunal communications exclusively by ordinary post where that arrangement has the practical effect of causing the party to receive time-sensitive Tribunal communications later than another party who receives the same communications electronically.

Question 2- Procedural fairness

Whether the maintenance or confirmation of such an arrangement, in circumstances where the affected party has expressly objected to it and raised the issue at a callover, is consistent with the requirements of procedural fairness where the arrangement may materially reduce the effective period available to that party to respond to a Tribunal direction.

Question 3- Consideration of the Appellant’s objection

Whether an Appeal Panel, having been expressly informed at a callover that an appellant objects to an existing communication restriction, and having indicated that the matter will be discussed with the Registry following the callover, may lawfully confirm the existing communication arrangement without determining the appellant’s objection or application seeking amendment of that arrangement.

Question 4- Procedural detriment

Whether the receipt by one party of a time-sensitive Tribunal communication later than the opposing party, as a consequence of a Tribunal-imposed or Tribunal confirmed postal-only communication arrangement, constitutes a procedural irregularity or denial of procedural fairness where the affected party thereby loses part of the period allowed by the Tribunal to respond.

Question 5- Consequence of the detriment

If the circumstances described above constitute a procedural irregularity or denial of procedural fairness, what is the legal consequence under the NCAT Act, including whether the Tribunal is required to take steps to restore the affected party’s effective opportunity to respond.

Question 6-Prior notification and continuing operation

Whether, in determining the lawfulness and procedural fairness of continuing to apply a postal-only communication arrangement, it is legally relevant that the affected party had previously notified NCAT, including the President, that substantially similar postal-delivery practices had caused delay and procedural disadvantage in other proceedings.

Also, as this is has not been a solitary instance of this issue

Question 7- Lawfulness of the registrys conduct

Whether the Registry’s failure, after receiving actual notice of recurring delivery delays and their consequential prejudice to a party, to adopt a reasonably reliable method of communicating time-critical orders or notices constituted an unlawful failure to afford that party a reasonable opportunity to respond, particularly where an order dated 16 September was not received until 18 September and required submissions by 23 September, thereby materially reducing the practical period available for compliance.”

18. On 25 September 2026, the Registrar sent a letter dated 25 September 2026 to the parties requesting comments on the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application by 2 October 2026 at 5:00 PM and whether or not they object to a hearing being dispensed with (the 25 September 2026 NCAT Letter).

19. On 2 October 2026, Mr Zonnevylle lodged the 2 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application in which he:

20. in section 3 headed “Orders” states:

“1. That the time for the SRNLPA to provide comments, submissions and supporting documents concerning the SRNLPA’s General Application pursuant to the directions made on 25 September 2026 be extended from 5pm on Friday, 2 October 2026 to at least 4 weeks thereafter.

2. Alternatively, that the SRNLPA be afforded a period of 14 clear days from 28 September 2026, being the date upon which the SRNLPA actually received the directions.

3. hat the SRNLPA’s General Application not be determined until the SRNLPA has been afforded that period to respond.

4. That the Tribunal record that the SRNLPA did not receive the directions dated 25 September 2026 until 28 September 2026.

5. Such further or other directions as the Tribunal considers appropriate with full & detailed reasons”

2. in section 4 headed “Grounds for Application” states that it is his response to the 25 September 2026 NCAT Letter.

3. On 2 October 2026, the Registrar sent a letter dated 2 October 2026 to the parties requesting comments on the 2 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application including any additional material sought to be considered in relation to the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application by 12 October 2026 at 10:00 AM and whether or not they object to a hearing being dispensed with (the 2 October 2026 NCAT Letter).

4. On 7 October 2026, Mr Zonnevylle lodged the First 7 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application in which he:

5. in section 3 headed “Orders” states:

“1. The tribunal provide all notices / correspondence / orders to the respondent / respondents legal representative using exactly the same delivery method & delivery schedule as that used for the SRNLPA

2. The tribunal is to summons the principal registrar, GSE Act employed Michelle Brazel for cross-examination by the SRNLPA at the substantive hearing

3. The tribunal is to summons the Jun.1,2026 telephone call recording between the SRNLPA & the NCAT registry and provide this to both parties prior to the substantive hearing

4. The tribunal is to summons the Jun.1,2026 telephone call recording transcript between the SRNLPA & the NCAT registry provide this to both parties prior to the substantive hearing”

2. in section 4 headed “Grounds for Application” states:

“1. Ensuring procedural fairness equity in proceedings

2. a. any registry decision on the summonsing of GSE Act

employed Brazel is tainted with a clear conflict of interest as GSE Act employed Brazel would be either:

i. deciding her own summons

ii. have significant influence over any delegated decision within the registry

b. the issue of the delivery of notices / correspondence / orders to the SRNLPA under GSE Act employed Brazels direction in inextricably interwoven with the substantive matter before the tribunal

c. the Jun.1,2026 telephone call recording between the SRNLPA & the NCAT registry provides an insight into GSE Act employed Brazels approach to GSE Act Sect. 7 Government Sector Core Values; NCAT policies & principles; DCJ Code of Ethical Conduct obligations”

22. On 7 October 2026, Mr Zonnevylle lodged the Second 7 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application in which he:

23. in section 3 headed “Orders” states:

“1. The tribunal is to adjourn the substantive hearing date

2. The tribunal is extend the SRNLPAs submission time by a further 4 weeks minimum

3. The tribunal is not to schedule a new hearing date until

- the presidential review &

- the de jersey clarification of July 20,2026 orders &

- all other applications & - all other complaints & procedural fairness issues

have been properly addressed”

2. in section 4 headed “Grounds for Application” states:

“1. Ensuring procedural fairness equity in proceedings

2. The tribunal is aware that the SRNLPA is a

- self represented

- time poor & resource poor party in proceedings

Unlike the respondent, the SRNLPA

- does not get paid for work associated with these proceedings

- works full time in an unrelated industry for his livelihood which takes priority in business hours

- substantially works on submissions / etc after hours I in “spare” time

- does not get (substantially well) paid for work for these proceedings done during business hours

- does not have the very significant & substantial resources available & used by the respondent

- does not have the benefit of substantial taxpayer funds being used for exclusive & specialist legal services being used by the respondent which appears to breach the NSW attorney generals I DCJs “core work” policy. & prinicpals concerning use of the crown solicitors office by NSW government agencies

4 weeks work by the respondent clearly & reasoably does not equate to 4 weeks by untrained non-legal professiona self-represented parties

3. de jerseys July 20,2026 clearly sought & has resulted in the significant conflation of matters before the tribunal in these proceedings, actually (not hypothetically) prejudicing the SRNLPA

4. Further the SRNLPA alleges that the SRNLPA has been subjected to repeated harassment by the NCAT GSE Act employed principal registrar Michelle Brazel

This harassment in inextricably interwoven with the substantive matter before the tribunal.

There is a considerable history concerning this issue which is relevant to the SRNLPAs submissions.

5. As the tribunal is alleged to be highly biased towards NSW government agencies & the CSO in particular (apparently the NCAT president is a former NSW crown solicitor & ther are / have been numerous former CSO GSE Act employed solicitors appointed in NCAT), the SRNPLA bears the significant disadvantage of hgaving to provide higher “evidence1 standards to those NSW agencies I CSO which is a unfair advantage exploited by those same NSW agencies / CSO”

23. On 9 October 2026, Mr Zonnevylle lodged the First 9 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application in which he:

24. in section 3 headed “Orders” states:

“1. The tribunal is to confirm a full list of all the SRNLPAs

a. Applications

b. Submissions

c. Documents / correspondence

received in proceedings & action taken for each respective document

The SRNLPA has serious & legitimate concerns that the registry is prejudicing legitimate & relevant matters raised by the SRNLPA which are not being brought to the attention of the relevant member or the NCAT president.

2. The tribunal is required to decide whether a question of law / error of law arises in these proceedings as a result of the (systemic & defective) method in which the tribunal has & is delivering time sensitive orders I directions to the SRNLPA which appears to confirm:

a. Inequity in the treatment of parties

b. Procedural unfairness to the SRNLPA

c. Unwanted & unnecessary burden on the SRNLPAs meagre resources (particularly time) to be sidetracked into making further applications & submissions

d. Unwanted & unnecessary expenses imposed on the SRNLPA to respond to the unwanted & unnecessary issues arising from procedural unfairness issues

e. likely breaches of mandatory conduct & legislative obligations by the GSE Act employed principal registrar Michelle Brazel

f. inaction by GSE Act employed principal registrar Michelle Brazel

g. inaction by GSE Act employed principal registray officers

h. Inaction by the tribunal members

i. Inaction by the NCAT president

3. The tribunal is required to adjourn the substantive hearing date until at all of the following issues have been fully addressed:

a. Decision for the amendment application re Jersey July 20,2026 orders

b. Clarification of July 20,2026 orders (de Jersey)

c. Full & detailed response from the NCAT Presidential concerning the presidential review request (s)

d. Decision for summons request of GSE Act employed Michelle Brazel e. Decision for summons of recording & transcript of Jun.1 ,2026 recording of telephone converstation between SRNLPA & registry

f. Decision for the Sect. 54 referral

g. Decisions for the SRNLPAs pending applications

The name of the member making those decisions / orders is required to be disclosed.

The SRNLPA rejects any proposition that these issues will be dealt with at the substantive hearing as they are:

i. relevant to the issues before the tribunal

ii. concern significant public interest matters such as the integrity of the tribunal & actual justice

iii. would. be deliberately rendered "moot11 by being dealt with at the substantive hearing

4. The tribunal is to adjourn the substantive hearing date

5. member Blake is to be prohibited from exercising any further functions including decision making in these proceedings.

The SRNLPA alleges that m.Blake has

- made false statements and

- exercised functions with a lack of good faith / bad faith

against the SRNLPA in other proceedings

These allegations will be substantiated by evidence on request of the tribunal and / or prior to the substantive hearing”

2. in section 4 headed “Grounds for Application” refers to the 2 October 2026 NCAT Letter and substantially repeats what he states in section 4 of the Second 7 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application.

3. On 9 October 2026, Mr Zonnevylle lodged the Second 9 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application in which he deletes order 2 stated in the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application.

4. On 9 October 2026, Mr Zonnevylle lodged a letter dated 19 September 2026, in which he requests clarification of direction 6 of the 20 July 2026 Directions (the First 9 October 2026 Zonnevylle Request).

5. On 9 October 2026, Mr Zonnevylle lodged a letter dated 6 October 2026, in which he requests clarification of direction 7 of the 20 July 2026 Directions (the Second 9 October 2026 Zonnevylle Request).

The issues that arise for determination

27. In determining these Applications, it is appropriate that the issues arising be considered in the following order:

28. whether I should disqualify myself from exercising any function in the appeal including hearing these Applications;

29. whether a hearing of the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application and the 2 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application should be dispensed with;

30. whether Mr Zonnevylle should be granted the requested extension of time to comment on the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application;

31. the determination of the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application and the response to the Second 9 October 2026 Zonnevylle Request;

32. the determination of the First 7 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application so far as orders are sought for the issue of summonses;

33. the determination of the balance of the First Zonnevylle Application, the Second 7 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application and the balance of the First 9 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application;

34. the response to the First 9 October 2026 Zonnevylle Request.

35. It is unnecessary to determine the Second 9 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application (as it narrows the relief sought in the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application).

Whether I should disqualify myself from exercising any function in the appeal including hearing these Applications

29. I have previously dismissed applications for recusal against me made by Mr Zonnevylle on the following occasions in other proceedings:

30. Zonnevylle v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice, 2025/00002180, 21 January 2025, unreported);

31. Zonnevylle v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2026] NSWCATAP 1.

32. As Mr Zonnevylle has adduced no evidence in support of his assertions that I have made false statements and exercised functions with a lack of good faith, and with bad faith, in other proceedings, I have decided to dismiss the First 9 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application so far as he seeks an order that I should disqualify myself from exercising any function in the appeal including hearing these Applications.

Whether a hearing of the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application and the 2 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application should be dispensed with

31. No response was received from Mr Zonnevylle or the Secretary on the issue of whether a hearing of the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application and the 2 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application should be dispensed with.

32. I am satisfied that the issues for determination in relation to each of the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application and the 2 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application can be adequately determined in the absence of the parties by considering their evidence and written submissions. Accordingly, I have decided pursuant to s 50(2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act) to make an order dispensing with a hearing of each of the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application and the 2 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application.

Whether Mr Zonnevylle should be granted the requested extension of time to comment on the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application

33. Section 41 of the NCAT Act confers power on the Appeal Panel to extend time to comply with orders of the Appeal Panel. Pursuant to s 36(2)(a) of the NCAT Act the Appeal Panel when exercising this power is to seek to give effect to the guiding principle in s 36(1) to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings.

34. I am not satisfied that the time for Mr Zonnevylle to comment on the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application should be extended to the date being at least four weeks after 2 October 2026 at 5.00 PM (which is the first alternative sought in the 2 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application). Notwithstanding the personal circumstances of Mr Zonnevylle of being self-represented and in fulltime employment, an extension of time of this length is unwarranted as it will jeopardise the hearing of the appeal on 23 October 2026 which has been fixed since 20 July 2026.

35. However, I am satisfied that the time for Mr Zonnevylle to comment on the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application should be extended to 12 October 2026 at 10.00 AM (which is substantially in accord with the second alternative sought in the 2 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application).

The determination of the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application and the response to the Second 9 October 2026 Zonnevylle Request

The amended service arrangements

36. Mr Zonnevylle in the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application seeks an order to varying direction 7 of the 20 July 2026 Directions.

37. It is well established that the Appeal Panel cannot review an interlocutory decision of the differently constituted Appeal Panel in the absence of a material change of circumstances, or the discovery of new material which could not reasonably have been put before the Appeal Panel: Farrrugia v The Hour Glass (Australia) Pty Ltd [2025] NSWCATAP 288 (Farrrugia v Hour Glass) at [39]-[43].

38. Having regard to the principles in Farrrugia v Hour Glass at [39]-[43], I am satisfied that the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application so far as Mr Zonnevylle seeks an order varying direction 7 of the 20 July 2026 Directions is in substance an appeal against that direction. It is not founded on a material change of circumstances since the call over on 20 July 2026, or the discovery of new material which could not reasonably have been put before the Appeal Panel at the call over.

39. Section 32(3)(a) of the NCAT Act states that the internal appeal jurisdiction of the Tribunal does not extend to any decision of an Appeal Panel. It follows that in the exercise of the internal appeal jurisdiction of the Tribunal I am precluded from varying direction 7 of the 20 July 2026 Directions. The submissions of Mr Zonnevylle in the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application are misconceived. It follows that I have decided to dismiss the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application so far as he seeks an order varying direction 7 of the 20 July 2026 Directions. It is inappropriate to respond to the Second 9 October 2026 Zonnevylle Request.

The clarification of direction 6 of the 20 July 2026 Directions

40. In view of the Second 9 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application, it is unnecessary to consider the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application so far as Mr Zonnevylle seeks an order clarifying direction 6 of the 20 July 2026 Directions.

The referral of questions of law to the Supreme Court

41. Section 54 of the NCAT Act deals with references of questions of law to the Supreme Court, and states:

54 References of questions of law to Supreme Court

(1) The Tribunal (including when constituted as an Appeal Panel) may, of its own motion or at the request of a party, refer a question of law arising in the proceedings to the Supreme Court for the opinion of the Court.

(2) The Tribunal may refer a question of law under this section only if the President has consented in writing to the question being referred.

(3) The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine any question of law referred to it under this section, but may decline to exercise that jurisdiction if it considers it appropriate to do so.

(4) If a question of law arising in proceedings has been referred to the Supreme Court under this section, the Tribunal is not—

(a) 1to give a decision in the proceedings to which the question is relevant while the reference is pending, or

(b) to proceed in a manner, or make a decision, that is inconsistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court on the question.

(5) Subsection (4) extends to the Tribunal when constituted as an Appeal Panel that is determining an internal appeal from a decision of the Tribunal in proceedings before which a question of law has been referred by the Tribunal at first instance to the Supreme Court under this section.

42. In Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages v FJG & FJH; Attorney General of New South Wales as Intervenor [2022] NSWCATAP 270 (FJG), the Appeal Panel considered references of questions of law to the Supreme Court under s 54 of the NCAT Act. The Appeal Panel relevantly:

43. explained that the exercise of this power requires consideration of three questions: whether the questions sought to be referred are questions of law in the requisite sense; if so, that such questions of law “arise” in the appeal; if those two conditions are met, whether to exercise the discretion to refer, or not refer, the questions to the Supreme Court ([9]);

44. provided guidance as to the factors that are relevant to the exercise of the discretion ([55]-[57]):

“[55] Factors in favour of referral may include:

(1) a situation where there is no existing authoritative statement from an appellate court on the question of law (although this cannot be determinative);

(2) that the decision may have an impact broader than on the immediate parties and where, regardless of the outcome, an appeal is likely;

(3) that a determination by the Supreme Court may truncate the legal process by avoiding the possibility of an appeal after a decision is made by the Appeal Panel.

[56] Factors weighing against making a referral may include:

(1) that NCAT and its Appeal Panel may resolve all the issues, including the questions of fact, justly, quickly and cheaply;

(2) where the issues to be determined “are matters which the Tribunal routinely determines” and “are not particularly novel nor do they raise matters of public interest which have not previously been dealt with by the Tribunal”;

(3) where there is a remedy available, such as to appeal against the Appeal Panel decision in the normal course;

(4) that NCAT has a clear view about its duty and role, and the proper process is generally for questions of law to be determined initially by this Tribunal. NCAT is as well-placed as anyone to determine matters of public importance. This is particularly so where it is clear from the enabling act that Parliament intended that disputes between the parties would preferably be determined by NCAT;

(5) that experience has shown that procedures that fragment the hearing and disposition of proceedings have generally been found to produce difficulty and delay rather than speed and efficiency. There have been many instances in which procedures of that kind have produced unfortunate results, as it is difficult to anticipate exactly what will be necessary for an efficient referral of a question. It is also to be borne in mind that referral of the question of law to the Supreme Court would be removing the matter into a costs jurisdiction.

[57] Ultimately, the exercise of NCAT’s discretion must be guided by consideration of what the interests of justice, informed by the guiding principle in s 36 of the NCAT Act, require.” (citations omitted)

43. I am not satisfied that the stated questions of law arise in this appeal. The submissions of Mr Zonnevylle in the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application are misconceived. It follows that I have decided to dismiss the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application so far as he seeks an order referring questions of law to the Supreme Court. Even if I had been satisfied that the stated questions of law arise in this appeal, having regard to the factors in FJG at [55]-[57], I would have decided not to refer them to the Supreme Court because they relate to direction 7 of the 20 July 2026 Directions. Further, their referral would cause considerable delay in the disposition of the appeal.

The stay of the appeal

44. As the 24 September 2026 Zonnevylle Application has been otherwise determined, it is unnecessary to consider it so far as Mr Zonnevylle seeks an order staying the appeal.

The determination of the First 7 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application so far as orders are sought for the issue of summonses

45. I have decided to refuse to issue the summonses referred to the First 7 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application pursuant to s 48(1)(b) of the NCAT Act as they can have no relevance to any issue arising in this appeal. They relate to direction 7 of the 20 July 2026 Directions which the Appeal Panel is precluded from varying pursuant to s 32(3)(a) of the NCAT Act. Even if the issue of the variation of direction 7 of the 20 July 2026 Directions arises in this appeal, I would have refused to issue the summonses because they are premature for the reasons given in Zonnevylle v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice (No 2) [2025] NSWCATAP 161 at [19]-[21] which apply equally to this appeal.

The determination of the balance of the First Zonnevylle Application, the Second 7 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application and the balance of the First 9 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application

46. As there is insufficient time to invoke the procedure in s 50(3) of the NCAT Act before the hearing of the appeal on 23 October 2026, I have decided to list the balance of the First Zonnevylle Application, the Second 7 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application and the balance of the First 9 October 2026 Zonnevylle Application for hearing on 23 October 2026 at 10.15 AM in Sydney at the same time as the hearing of the appeal.

The response to the First 9 October 2026 Zonnevylle Request

47. A question that will arise in the appeal is whether the Notice of Appeal was lodged within 28 days from the day Mr Zonnevylle was notified of the Decision as required by r 25(4)(c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW). The answer to this question will depend on whether the Appeal Panel accepts the evidence of Mr Zonnevylle that he did not receive the Decision until 8 June 2026. If the evidence of Mr Zonnevylle is accepted, then the Notice of Appeal was lodged within the prescribed time. If the evidence of Mr Zonnevylle is not accepted and the Appeal Panel finds that the Decision was delivered in the ordinary course of post after 19 March 2026, then the appeal will be incompetent unless the Appeal Panel makes an order pursuant to s 41 of the NCAT Act extending time for the lodgement of the Notice of Appeal to 8 June 2026. Direction 6 of the 20 July 2026 Directions specifies that any such issue will be determined at the hearing of the appeal.

Orders

48. I make the following orders:

49. The application of the appellant lodged on 9 October 2026 that Principal Member G Blake AM SC disqualify himself is dismissed.

50. A hearing of the applications of the appellant lodged on 24 September 2026 and 2 October 2026 is dispensed with.

51. The time is extended for the appellant to comment on his application lodged on 24 September 2026 to 12 October 2026 at 10.00 AM.

52. The application of the appellant lodged on 24 September 2026 is dismissed.

53. The application of the appellant lodged on 7 October 2026 so far as he seeks orders for the issue of summonses is dismissed.

54. The balance of the application of the appellant lodged on 7 October 2026 referred to in order (5) above, the other application of the appellant lodged on 7 October 2026 and the balance of the application of the appellant lodged on 9 October 2026 are listed for hearing on 23 October 2026 at 10.15 AM in Sydney at the same time as the hearing of the appeal.

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I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar