Zia v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1908

1. The background and procedural history to this matter was helpfully summarised in the Minister's written submissions filed on 12 August 2025, which I primarily adopt.
2. The applicant, a male national of Pakistan, first arrived in Australia in June 2019 as the holder of the student visa granted on 11 April 2019.[1]
3. The student visa was subject to a visa condition specified within cl 8202 in sch 8 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), requiring full-time enrolment in a registered course.[2]
4. On 23 August 2022, a delegate issued a Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation (NOICC) under s 116 of the Act. The NOICC stated the applicant appeared not to have complied with subcl 8202(2)(a) as Provider Registration and International Students Management System (commonly referred to as PRISMS) records indicate that he was not enrolled in a registered course between 29 July 2019 and 25 March 2022. The applicant was invited to comment and provide supporting evidence as to why the ground for cancellation did not exist or give reasons why his student visa should not be cancelled.[3]
5. On 29 August 2022, the applicant responded to the NOICC and raised the following submissions: [4]

(a) After receiving admission to study in Melbourne he realised he didn't have any friends there so moved to Sydney.

(b) At the time, he was unaware what was happening to him and as time passed, he unsuccessfully attempted to transfer his studies to an education institution in Sydney.

(c) The COVID-19 pandemic (pandemic) was a difficult time for his family as he received less financial support from his mother and was worried for her health. His father had passed away before he came to Australia and he had no one else to discuss his problems with as he did not want to upset his mother.

(d) He had never been away from home before, it was a new and unprecedented experience and he was unsure what to do. He was worried, unable to pay attention to anything else and prevented from returning home to Pakistan due to pandemic-related travel restrictions.

(e) While agreeing he had not previously substantially complied with cl 8202, he had already enrolled in a new course prior to receiving the NOICC. He believed he was complying with his other visa conditions and was committed to complying with all visa conditions in the future.

(f) Cancelling his student visa and having him return to Pakistan without having studied in Australia would be an embarrassment for his family and put an end to his late father's dream. It would be an irreparable loss to him and his family.

1. The applicant attached to his response a Certificate of Enrolment (CoE) for a Graduate Diploma of Management (Learning) course at Macallan College scheduled to commence on 4 April 2022 and end on 31 March 2024.[5]
2. In considering the applicant's response to the NOICC, the delegate found the following factors weighed in favour of cancelling the student visa: [6]

(a) The applicant only obtained enrolment at Macallan College after receiving an email from the Department of Home Affairs on 31 January 2022. This enrolment appeared to have been secured primarily to avoid possible cancellation of his student visa rather than out of a genuine intention to study. Although study may have been the applicant's original purpose for travelling to Australia, his continued stay was not consistent with that purpose.

(b) The applicant's non-compliance with cl 8202 for over two years and seven months was significant, given that maintaining enrolment is a fundamental condition of a student visa.

(c) The applicant provided no evidence of any attempt to obtain a new enrolment when he moved to Sydney, prior to being contacted by the Department.

(d) Pandemic-related restrictions ended in October 2021, yet the applicant did not obtain a new enrolment until March 2022.

(e) Financial hardship appears to have been the primary reason for the applicant's failure to maintain enrolment. While this may be a circumstance beyond his control, the student visa criteria require that the holder have sufficient funds to support their stay.

(f) The applicant could have deferred his course or explored other visa options more suitable to his circumstances.

1. The delegate found the following factors weighed against cancelling the student visa: [7]

(a) The applicant's family may experience some embarrassment and hardship if the student visa was cancelled.

(b) There was no evidence the applicant had been uncooperative with the Department.

(c) The applicant would become an unlawful non-citizen, may be subject to detention and removal and would have limited options for further visas if the student visa was cancelled.

1. On 6 September 2022, a delegate was satisfied the grounds in favour of cancelling the student visa outweighed the reasons against and thereby cancelled the student visa under s 116(1)(b) of the Act.[8]

1. On 8 September 2022, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision.[9]
2. On 7 September 2023, the Tribunal invited the applicant to attend a video hearing on 27 September 2023 (hearing invitation).[10]
3. On 27 September 2023, the applicant attended the hearing with his registered migration agent. The hearing commenced at 9.35am and at 10.55am an oral decision was made affirming the decision under review. [11]
4. On 28 September 2023, the applicant's registered migration agent made a written request for a written statement of decision and reasons.[12] Follow up emails requesting same were sent by the applicant to the Tribunal on 10 and 16 October 2023.[13]
5. On 24 January 2024, the Tribunal provided a written statement of the decision record and reasons.[14]

1. The Tribunal identified the only issue on review was whether, despite the applicant's breach of cl 8202, the student visa should not be cancelled.[15]
2. The Tribunal noted the applicant did not fully engage with the review process, only responding to the hearing invitation the day prior to the hearing and not providing any documents.[16]
3. The Tribunal held genuine concerns about the applicant's credibility noting that his evidence at hearing was inconsistent with information he provided by way of response to the NOICC.[17] Contrary to his NOICC response, the applicant told the Tribunal at hearing that:

(a) he never reached Melbourne and never attempted to transfer his studies to an educational institution in Sydney;[18] and

(b) at or around the time the student visa application was lodged, the applicant's mother informed the Department that she had approximately $140,000 available to cover his tuition fees for the package of engineering courses in which he was initially enrolled.[19]

1. The Tribunal noted that while the applicant said the pandemic distracted him and made him concerned about his mother, he did not say he was unable to study.[20] The Tribunal accepted the applicant was most probably worried about his mother during the pandemic. However, the Tribunal was not satisfied the pandemic had prevented the applicant from engaging in productive study.[21] The Tribunal noted the pandemic, in and of itself, was not a reason for an international student not to study and the applicant provided no evidence such as a medical report to establish he was unable to study.[22] It further noted pandemic restrictions had been relaxed, if not entirely removed, by October 2021 and the applicant admitted the first time he took any steps to enrol in any course of study since he arrived in Australia was when he enrolled at Macallan College in March 2022.[23] Essentially, the Tribunal found the applicant did not provide an acceptable explanation for the 'very long' period of non-enrolment which spanned some two years and eight months.[24]
2. Unlike the delegate, the Tribunal did not find the applicant re-enrolled in a Graduate Diploma of Management at Macallan College on 25 March 2022 because he had received an email from the Department on 31 January 2022 in which his contact details had been sought.[25] The Tribunal noted, however, the applicant did not say he had engaged in any studies in the course before the NOICC was served on him.[26] The applicant later told the Tribunal he had studied three subjects over four months before his student visa was cancelled but could not identify them.[27] The Tribunal found it 'incredulous' the applicant could not identify any of the three subjects he said he was studying for four months.[28]
3. The Tribunal considered whether to grant an adjournment after his registered migration agent indicated she wanted to provide a USI transcript to clarify whether the applicant had engaged in studies at Macallan College.[29] The Tribunal was not prepared to adjourn the hearing as it found the applicant, who had the benefit of receiving immigration assistance from a registered migration agent, had been afforded plenty of time and opportunity to produce such a transcript and had not explained why it had not been provided earlier.[30] The Tribunal noted the hearing invitation specifically requested relevant documents be provided prior to hearing.[31] The Tribunal did not draw any adverse inference from the lack of USI transcript.[32] Ultimately, the Tribunal was unable to make findings in the applicant's favour regarding having engaged in any studies at Macallan College.[33] Given his evidence at hearing that he engaged an education agent at the time to advise him, the Tribunal found the enrolment at Macallan College was 'most probably a strategic step' rather than a genuine attempt to engage in study.[34]
4. The Tribunal found the applicant had failed to engage in any study in a registered course since he arrived in Australia some four years earlier.[35] The Tribunal noted the applicant had not made any attempt to vary the 'no study' restriction that had been in operation since his student visa had been cancelled.[36]
5. The Tribunal doubted the applicant would engage in productive studies if given another chance as, instead of re-engaging with his studies at Macallan College, his registered migration agent informed the Tribunal the applicant wanted to revert to enrolling in an Advanced Diploma of Civil Engineering.[37]
6. The Tribunal noted the applicant worked two jobs four to five days a week as a delivery driver and in a convenience store. The Tribunal found the applicant was more concerned with engaging in remunerative work than studying.[38] The Tribunal also found the applicant would not suffer any real hardship, other than the disappointment of his mother, because of the cancellation of his student visa.[39]
7. The Tribunal determined that the reasons for cancelling the student visa clearly outweighed the reasons for not cancelling it.[40] On that basis, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate to cancel the student visa.[41]

1. On 26 October 2023, the applicant commenced proceedings by way of originating application. The applicant advanced three grounds of review (reproduced below without alteration):
   1. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal failed to consider oral and written evidence provided and made legal error.
   2. That the Administrative Appeals Tribunal did not provide written reason in time even after repeated request and breach natural justice requirement of migration act and made legal mistake.
   3. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal made legal mistakes in not considering merit of my case and affirms the decision to cancel my Student (Temporary) (class TU, subclass 500) visa.
2. The applicant appeared at the hearing before me as a litigant in person, assisted by way of an interpreter in the Urdu and English languages. Mindful of the Court's duty to litigants in person, I explained to the applicant the role of the Court in undertaking judicial review. I ensured the applicant was in possession of all relevant documents, namely, his application and supporting affidavit filed on 26 October 2023, the Court Book filed on 12 July 2024 and the Minister's written submissions filed on 12 August 2025. The applicant did not file any written submissions.

1. Relevantly, s 116 of the Act provided:

Power to cancel

(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the Minister may cancel a visa if he or

she is satisfied that:

...

(b) its holder has not complied with a condition of the visa;

...

Tribunal's decisions given orally

How and when oral decisions are taken to have been made

(1) A decision on a review that is given orally by the Tribunal is taken to have been made, and notified to the applicant for the review, on the day and at the time the decision is given orally.

Statement in relation to oral decision

(2) If a decision on a review is given orally, the Tribunal must:

(a) make an oral statement that:

(i) describes the decision of the Tribunal on the review; and

(ii) describes the reasons for the decision; and

(iii) describes the findings on any material questions of fact; and

(iv) refers to the evidence or any other material on which the findings of fact were based; and

(v) identifies the day and time the decision is given orally; or

(b) make a written statement that:

(i) sets out the decision of the Tribunal on the review; and

(ii) sets out the reasons for the decision; and

(iii) sets out the findings on any material questions of fact; and

(iv) refers to the evidence or any other material on which the findings of fact were based; and

(v) records the day and time the decision is given orally.

(3) The Tribunal has no power to vary or revoke the decision after the day and time the decision is given orally.

Written statement to be provided on request of applicant

(4) If the Tribunal makes an oral statement under paragraph (2)(a) and, within the period prescribed by regulation, the applicant makes a written request for the statement to be provided in writing, the Tribunal must:

(a) reduce the oral statement to writing; and

(b) within 14 days after the day the request is received by the Tribunal, give a copy of the written statement:

(i) to the applicant by one of the methods specified in section 379A; and

(ii) to the Secretary by one of the methods specified in section 379B.

...

Validity etc. not affected by procedural irregularities

(7) The validity of a decision on a review, and the operation of subsection (3), are not affected by:

(a) a failure to identify or record, under subsection (2), the day and time when the decision was given orally; or

(b) a failure to comply with subsection (4), (5) or (6).

1. In this judicial review proceeding, the Court's task is to determine whether the Tribunal's decision is affected by jurisdictional error as that is the only basis upon which it can be set aside: s 474 of the Act; Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476; HCA 2.
2. The Court has also scrutinised the application, the materials before the Tribunal and the Tribunal's decision to identify any jurisdictional error, noting the Court's obligations towards litigants in person as outlined in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392 at [58]- [77], [100] and [112]-[113]. At hearing before me, the applicant was asked to explain the basis of each of his grounds, especially where they were unparticularised, and to indicate whether there was anything the Tribunal had done or not done throughout the review application process, including at the Tribunal hearing, which he considered unfair or unreasonable. The applicant did not specifically elaborate on his grounds apart from making oral submissions as to why his student visa should not be cancelled. I explained to the applicant the limitations of the Court's role in judicial review, noting that it would be impermissible for me to entertain submissions that merely invited a reconsideration of the merits of his case. I further indicated that such submissions must instead identify, or at least point to, an instance or possibility that the Tribunal conducted its review in a manner giving rise to jurisdictional error.
3. I now turn to consider each of the grounds raised by the applicant.

1. By ground one, the applicant contends the Tribunal failed to consider his written and oral evidence giving rise to jurisdictional error.
2. The Minister submits as ground one is unparticularised, there is sufficient basis to dismiss it: NWWJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 176 at [37] per Perram, Derrington and Stewart JJ. The Minister further contends the Tribunal's findings were open on the material before it as it expressly considered the applicant's evidence and relevant submissions, including:

(a) the applicant's NOICC response;[42]

(b) the CoE issued by Macallan College;[43]

(c) the Bridging Visa E notice;[44]

(d) the applicant's oral evidence;[45] and

(e) the applicant's registered migration agent's oral submissions.[46]

1. At hearing, I invited the Minister's representative, Mr Pinder, to provide oral submissions in a manner that might help the applicant better understand the Minister's written submissions in relation to this ground. Mr Pinder obliged and identified where in the Tribunal's reasons the Tribunal had expressly considered relevant evidence and submissions. He drew the Court's attention to the references in the Tribunal decision where each element of documentary evidence was considered, noting the Tribunal having specifically addressed the applicant's NOICC response[47] and how its substantive findings engaged with the oral evidence and submissions.[48] He submitted the Tribunal clearly discharged its function of reviewing the evidence before it and was unable to identify any material element that had not been considered.
2. I accept the Minister's submissions on this point and find that the Tribunal did not fail to consider any material evidence or submissions before it.

Additional issue raised at hearing - adjournment request

1. I drew Mr Pinder's attention to the applicant's registered migration agent's request for an adjournment that was refused.[49] The request was made at the Tribunal hearing by the migration agent to allow an adjournment to attempt to provide a USI transcript that might substantiate the applicant's claim at hearing that he engaged in some studies at Macallan College. The adjournment request arose in the context of the applicant seeking to address one of the dispositive issues, that being his credibility. The adjournment request was refused and the Tribunal proceeded to make findings in the absence of that evidence.[50]
2. By way of response, Mr Pinder summarised the Tribunal's reasons for refusing the request at [32] to [37] of its reasons. In particular, my attention was drawn to the Tribunal's:

(a) observation that the applicant had the benefit of his migration agent for the twelve months prior to the hearing and therefore had ample time to provide a USI transcript or other records and had not done so nor explained why he had not done so;[51]

(b) indication to the applicant's migration agent at hearing that USI transcripts are issued by providers at the request of a student or their agent when there is something to record, such as an attempt by a student to engage with a course;[52]

(c) statement that it did not draw any adverse inferences from the fact the transcript had not been produced;[53]

(d) unwillingness to adjourn in circumstances where the applicant had ample opportunity to provide the transcript,[54] noting the specific request contained in the hearing invitation for relevant documents to be provided by 20 September 2023;[55] and

(e) conclusory statement that its statutory function did not prescribe or require it to provide the applicant with a hearing as a 'dry run' in which defects or deficiencies are identified and, if given further time, remedied.[56]

1. Mr Pinder contends that this is not a case where the Tribunal merely stated the applicant had sufficient time to provide a transcript, although such a finding would have been permissible in appropriate circumstances. He argues that obtaining the transcript was not something largely outside the applicant's control, as in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2012] HCA 61; (2013) 249 CLR 332; HCA 18, where additional time was sought pending the determination of another body. Mr Pinder submits that the absence of any explanation for why the applicant had not earlier taken steps to obtain and provide the transcript - despite being invited to do so - was the basis for the Tribunal's refusal of the adjournment request. He further contends that the request arose in the context of seeking to remedy a defect in the applicant's oral evidence, namely his inability to recall the subjects studied during four months at Macallan College, which bore on his credibility as a genuine student. [57] The adjournment request was therefore not directed to a separate dispositive issue, and there was an evident and intelligible justification for the Tribunal's decision not to allow additional time.
2. I accept the Minister's submissions on this point and find the Tribunal did not err in relation to its refusal of the adjournment request.
3. Accordingly, jurisdictional error has not been established by ground 1.

1. By ground two, the applicant contends that the Tribunal failed to provide a written statement of reasons within the prescribed time despite repeated requests, thereby breaching natural justice and committing a legal error.
2. The evidentiary record shows that the Tribunal delivered an oral decision on 27 September 2023. The applicant requested a written statement of reasons on 28 September 2023. Under s 368D(4) of the Act, the Tribunal was required to reduce its decision to writing and provide a copy to the applicant within 14 days of receiving the request. However, the written statement was not provided until 24 January 2024.
3. The Minister accepts the delay but submits that, under s 368D(7) of the Act, the validity of an oral decision is not affected by a failure to provide a written statement within 14 days. Mr Pinder further submits that, had the applicant filed his application in this Court out of time, the delay could have been a factor in favour of granting an extension. While that may be correct, the applicant lodged his application within time, rendering that submission tangential.
4. At the hearing, I pressed Mr Pinder on the operation of s 368D(4), which provides that the Tribunal must give a copy of the written statement to the applicant within 14 days. Mr Pinder argued that the Act, like many others, contains provisions imposing time limits for certain actions, coupled with subsequent provisions stating that non-compliance does not invalidate the decision. He submitted that the word must signals a strong expectation of compliance and that decision-makers should endeavour to meet the deadline wherever possible. However, a failure to comply does not render the decision invalid. Mr Pinder contended that the Act recognises circumstances where compliance may not be possible and allows for discretion. In his view, the primary purpose of these provisions is to indicate that delay may weigh in favour of granting an extension of time where required. Accordingly, Mr Pinder submitted that ground two is not made out because the delay in providing the written statement does not amount to jurisdictional error.
5. While I accept Mr Pinder's submissions, I note that non-compliance with s 368D(4) raises other concerns that may well give rise to error. I explored this issue further with Mr Pinder during the hearing and now turn to the nature and outcome of that inquiry.

Additional issue raised at hearing - potential discrepancies between the oral statement and written statement

1. At the hearing, I asked Mr Pinder whether there were any material discrepancies between the transcript of the Tribunal's oral reasons and its written statement of reasons, given the significant delay before the written statement was provided. Specifically, I raised whether error might arise if there were material differences between the oral reasons delivered on 27 September 2023 and the written reasons issued on 24 January 2024. I also sought clarity as to which statement of reasons should be regarded as the subject of the present review, particularly if such differences existed.
2. Mr Pinder initially submitted that the written statement need not replicate the oral reasons word for word, provided it was materially the same, and that differences in expression or refinement of language were permissible. Nevertheless, I stood the matter down to allow for a direct comparison between the transcript of the oral reasons and the written statement. Upon resumption, it became apparent during oral submissions that the Court would be assisted by further post-hearing written submissions on this issue.
3. The applicant did not file any post-hearing submissions on this point. However, the Minister provided a detailed and comprehensive written submission addressing the issue.
4. First, Mr Pinder examined judicial authority on the issue of how a Court is to approach its review in circumstances where discrepancies between oral and written reasons exists. These authorities dealt with consideration of what are the reasons for decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal where oral reasons are given at time of decision and are later given in writing pursuant to s 43(2A) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). Mr Pinder rightly acknowledged that while that provision is not perfectly analogous to s 368D of the Act, relevant principles could still be discerned that could assist the Court in the present case. My attention was drawn to Negri v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2016] FCA 879; (2016) 246 FCR 1; FCA 879 (Negri), where Bromberg J examined earlier case law relating to the reduction of oral reasons in writing. Specifically, his Honour cited Vogt v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee [2009] WASCA 202 (Vogt) at [56]-[57] and [59]:

[56] It is, of course, quite proper for the Tribunal to revise ex tempore reasons after the order to which they relate has been made authenticated, so long as the substance of the reasons is not altered. Such revisions may be made to correct mistakes of transcription, errors of grammar or infelicities of style, or where by reason of an error the reasons plainly misstate what the decision-maker meant to say, and also to clarify the reasons as expressed orally: Lam v Beesley (1992) 7 WAR 88 at 93-94; Bar-Mordecai v Rotman [2000] NSWCA 123 [194]-[195]. See also Bromley v Bromley [1965] P 111 at 116. Where in a particular case the line is to be drawn between permissible alterations and changes of substance may not always be clear-cut, however.

[57] In our opinion, in this case the change between the oral reasons and the later written reasons is one of substance and goes beyond what is permissible in the editing of reasons. ...

...

[59] As the order of the Tribunal was made and authenticated on the basis of the oral reasons, in our view it is the oral reasons to which regard must be had on the issue of penalty.

1. From this, Mr Pinder submitted the following propositions (as described in Vogt and elaborated by Bromberg J in Negri) may be discerned:
   1. In reducing its oral decision to writing, the Tribunal was permitted to revise and to edit its reasons.

i. to correct mistakes of transcription;

ii. to correct errors of grammar or infelicities of style;

1. to correct plain mistakes regarding what the decision-maker meant to say; and

iv. to clarify the reasons as expressed orally.

c. However, the Tribunal was not permitted to alter the substance of its reasons.

1. The line between permissible alterations and changes of substance may not always be clear-cut.

1. My attention was then drawn to the decision of Judge Cuthbertson of this Court in FTA18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 56 (FTA18). While more directly relevant, it is not binding on this Court. While this Court is not bound by any of its previous decisions, the public interest in consistency and predictability in judicial decision

making means that previous decisions should not be departed from unless there is a cogent basis to do so. Whether there is a cogent basis depends on the nature and circumstances of each matter and there cannot be an inflexible approach: Abbey Laboratories Pty Ltd v Virbac (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2025] FCA 1179 at [145]- [147] per Jackman J citing, inter alia, Lendlease Corporation Ltd v Pallas [2025] HCA 19; (2025) 423 ALR 23; HCA 19 at [118] per Edelman J. 2. Having considered her Honour's reasons, I see no cogent basis to depart from the conclusions reached in FTA18. Her Honour's judgment would suggest that where changes to the oral decision 'go beyond improving the manner of expression' and result in the 'substance [being] significantly altered' (at [109]), then the oral reasons should be regarded as the authentic expression of the Tribunal's decision (at [110]). I agree with that suggestion and Judge Cuthbertson's instructive and comprehensive analysis at [80]-[84]:

[80] The meaning of the phrase "reduce the oral statement to writing" in s 430D(4) of the Act has not been the subject of judicial consideration. The Minister referred the Court to the decision in R v Walker (1993) 61 SASR 260 where the meaning of the phrase "reduced into writing" was discussed by the Full Court in the context of s 29 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) which dealt with cross-examination of person as to a previous statement made by the witness in writing, or reduced into writing. It is not directed at the meaning of the phrase in the context of oral reasons for decision and the Minister does not suggest it is relevant for the purposes of this case. The Minister described the dictionary definition as unhelpful too, with the Oxford English Dictionary defining the phrase as "to put into or commit to writing".

[81] In the judicial context, the High Court in Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs v AAM17 (2021) 272 CLR 329; [2021] HCA 6 at [30] approved what Gleeson CJ writing extra-curially has observed:

There is no reason, in law or in policy, why a judicial officer who delivers a judgment ex tempore should be strictly bound to the precise manner in which the reasons were expressed. On the contrary, judges and magistrates are encouraged, where it is possible and appropriate to do so, to decide cases promptly and to give their judgments immediately. It would not advance that policy to prevent them from later improving the manner of expression of their reasons, provided, of course, that they do not alter the substance.

[82] In AAM17, the High Court also held at [32] that

where written reasons of a court are published following the giving of ex tempore reasons, those written reasons must be taken to be the authentic expression of the judgment of the court unless it is otherwise shown that those reasons had materially deviated from what had been announced in court. Such deviations might be demonstrated by calling for the transcript (or other recording) of the ex tempore judgment; by the production of notes taken by counsel or by an instructing solicitor of what was said; or even by evidence given by counsel or an instructing solicitor in lieu of such notes.

[83] What constitutes a revision of substance and the consequences of such a revision was the subject of consideration and a review of authorities in the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Lazarus (2017) 270 A Crim R 378; [2017] NSWCCA 279 where Bellew J held (citations omitted):

[122] Whilst a judge has the power to revise his or her reasons for judgment there are necessarily restrictions in his or her doing so. In Lam v Beesley ... Owen J (at 93-94) reviewed the authorities before concluding (at 95) that if changes to a judgment were such that they could lead to an appearance of altered substance (as opposed to the alteration of matters of form) in a criminal trial, that would be sufficient to render a conviction unsafe and unsatisfactory. In Bar-Mordecai v Rotman ... the Court of Appeal (Sheller, Stein and Giles JJA) confirmed (at [193]) the propriety of the process of revision of ex-tempore reasons, but emphasised that altering the substance of the reasons, or the orders that they sustain, in the course of such revision is not permissible. Both of these decisions were referred to by Beazley JA (as her Honour then was) in Todorovic v Moussa ... where her Honour concluded (at [46]) that the appropriate test in determining whether an alteration to a judgment is permissible is whether the change is one of substance in fact.

[123] In Spencer v Bamber ...Campbell JA (with whom Basten and Macfarlan JJA agreed) emphasised (at [141]) the need for written reasons to be, in substance, those that the judge had given at the time of making orders. His Honour went on to say (at [142]):

The qualification I have just referred to is that in deciding what is an "impermissible alteration", one must not only consider whether an alteration is one of substance, but also Gleeson CJ's recognition that alteration is permissible "where, because of a slip, the reasons as expressed do not reflect what the judicial officer meant to say". The circumstances in which a mistake or slip could justify corrections in draft reasons were elaborated on in Bell v Veigel at [220], where Mason P said:

It would in my view be wrong for a judge who has pronounced reasons for final judgment to make a material addition or alteration to those reasons simply because some better idea has come to mind. Sometimes, however, a judge fails to spell out what was in his or her mind referable to a particular argument, simply due to oversight. I see no reason why such an oversight could not be remedied, on application or on the judge's own motion, in a proper case.

[124] Basten JA agreed with Campbell JA and was not prepared to infer that particular propositions were in the mind of a primary judge at the time of delivering oral reasons if statements encompassing those propositions were not made. His Honour went on to explain (at [8]) that the test of whether a revision is permissible is an objective one and that a relevant consideration is the degree of conformity between the revision and the argument presented in court.

[125] In the event that a revision extends beyond the scope of what is permissible, the course commonly taken is for an appellate Court to disregard the additional reasons: Spencer at [13] per Basten JA; Talbot-Price v Jacobs at [12] per Ipp JA (with whom McColl and Basten JJA agreed); Palmer v Clarke at 165 per Kirby P (Samuels and Priestly JJA agreeing) citing Melville v Phillips (1899) 9 QLJ 114 and R v Casey; ex parte Lodge.

[84] In that case, the inclusion of the word "not" in the written version of the decision had the effect of correcting what would otherwise be an incorrect oral statement of critical principle. Bellew J held, however, that the correction was permitted in circumstances where it conformed wholly with what had been put to the judge in argument and with the several correct statements of the law made both before and after the impugned passage by the primary judge.

1. Secondly, Mr Pinder submitted if I were to find that the Tribunal's oral decision and written decision were:

(a) not substantially different, then I should treat the written reasons as the decision for the purposes of the application for judicial review;

(b) substantially different, then I should treat the oral reasons as the decision for the purposes of the application for judicial review - at least in respect of the issues in which there is a substantial difference as between the oral decision and written decision.

1. My review of the evidentiary record does not reveal any indication of significant or material discrepances between the Tribunal's oral reasons and its written reasons. Having reviewed the two sets of reasons, I agree with the Minister that the identified differences are as follows:

(a) Line 31 of page 3 of the transcript, the Tribunal used the word 'extensively' which does not appear in the written reasons.

(b) Line 10 of page 4 of the transcript has an incorrect date which the Tribunal corrected in the written reasons.

(c) Line 47 of page 5 of the transcript has the words 'if indeed he engaged in any' which does not appear in the written reasons.

(d) Paragraph 12 of the written reasons has the words 'Certainly, he has given me no oral or other evidence to support this assertion', which does not appear in the transcript.

(e) Paragraph 33 of the written reasons has the words 'or the fact that a student has been granted study dispensations on the basis of recognised prior learning', which does not appear in the transcript.

(f) Paragraph 61 of the written reasons add the word 'incredulous', which does not appear in the transcript.

1. I agree with the Minister that correcting a date amounts to correcting a plain mistake regarding what the decision-maker meant to say, and the balance of the discrepancies identified can fairly be characterised as clarifications of the reasons as expressed orally. That is because they merely elucidate the reasons as given or the findings as made by the Tribunal, and do not significantly alter or replace the reasons or findings of the Tribunal with substantially new findings or reasons.
2. I further agree with the Minister that the Tribunal's material findings are the same in each decision, with the written reasons simply clarifying the oral reasons - which are substantially the same reasons. In my view, the revisions and additions are neither impermissible nor indicate the presence of error in the Tribunal's reasons.
3. Therefore, jurisdictional error is not disclosed by this ground.

1. Ground three essentially gives rise to a complaint that the Tribunal 'made legal mistakes' in not considering the merits of the applicant's case. The applicant did not further particularise this ground at hearing despite having been afforded an opportunity to do so.
2. The Minister submits, and I agree, the Tribunal identified the applicant's claims, evidence and submissions and gave proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the case: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48; (2010) 243 CLR 164; HCA 48 at [29] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ. The Minister rightly points out that the Tribunal was not required to accept uncritically any of the applicant's claims: Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1253; (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451; FCA 1253. The Tribunal ultimately accepted parts of the delegate's findings and made independent findings of its own. My review of the evidentiary record has not revealed an instance where the Tribunal has failed to consider a claim or otherwise having erred in its performance of the merits-review function.
3. As such, jurisdictional error is not disclosed by this ground.

1. As the applicant is a litigant in person, I have also reviewed the reasons of the Tribunal to determine whether there was any self-evident jurisdictional error: BGZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1095 at [11] per Flick J. I have not identified any such jurisdictional error.

1. As jurisdictional error has not been disclosed, the application must be dismissed.
2. I will hear the parties as to costs.

I certify that the preceding sixty-six (66) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Papadopoulos.

[1] Court Book (CB) 36, 38, 89, 105.

[18] CB 105, [8]-[9]; CB 108, [41]-[42].

[19] CB 105, [10]-[11]; CB 108, [39]-[40].

[23] CB 108, [42]; CB 109, [49]-[50]; CB 111, [70].

[30] CB 107 to 108, [32]; CB 108, [34].

[47] CB 105 to 106, [8]-[18]; CB 106, [20]; CB 108, [38].

[55] CB 61; CB 107, [26]; CB 108, [35].