Zhuang v Van

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321; [1990] HCA 33

BHP Billiton Ltd v Dunning [2013] NSWCA 421

Bimson, Roads & Maritime Services v Damorange Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 734

Boreland v Brewis [2024] NSWCATAP 140

Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17

Donohoe v Alburario [2025] NSWSC 9

Hall v Hawkins [2015] NSWCATAP 197

Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531; [2010] HCA 1

Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 390; [2010] HCA 32

O'Brien v Women's Housing Company Limited [2026] NSWCATAP 3

Pholi v Wearne [2014] NSWCATAP 78

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82; [2000] HCA 57

Resource Pacific Pty Ltd v Wilkinson [2013] NSWCA 33

Ryan v BKB Motor Vehicle Repairs Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCATAP 39 at [10]

TNT Building Trades Pty Ltd v Baker [2023] NSWCATAP 178

Unique Commercial Property Group Limited v Cusumano [2024] NSWCATAP 204

Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54; [1987] HCA 25

Zonnevylle v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2026] NSWCATAP 1

1. This is an internal appeal under s 80 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) from a decision of the Tribunal dated 4 September 2025 in a dispute under the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) (RT Act).
2. In this decision, the appellants are the former tenants and the respondents are the former landlord.
3. At the appeal hearing on 9 December 2025, Ms Zhuang appeared representing herself and Ms Wang. There was no appearance by Ms Wang. Ms Van and Mr Hedger appeared representing themselves. Any reference in the decision to "the tenant" is a reference to both appellants. Any reference to "the landlord" is a reference to both respondents.
4. The parties had been in a residential tenancy agreement in respect of an apartment located in a building in Liverpool NSW. The tenancy commenced in July 2021 and ended in February 2025.
5. In March 2025, the landlords (by their managing agent) commenced Tribunal proceedings seeking compensation under s 187(1)(d) of the RT Act for the tenants' alleged breach of the tenants' obligations under s 51(3) of the RT Act in respect of the condition of the residential premises at the end of the tenancy.
6. The items claimed by the landlords were:

(1) Replacement of balcony doors;

(2) Replacement of carpet;

(3) Replacement of vanity top in bathroom;

(4) Replacement of kitchen rangehood;

(5) Repairs to toilet;

(6) Patch and paint walls;

(7) Apply fresh silicone to kitchen.

1. The Tribunal head the matter on 2 September 2025, and gave a decision with written reasons on 4 September 2025.
2. The findings of the Tribunal are summarised as follows:
3. The claims for repairs to the toilet and replacement of the bathroom vanity were dismissed because the landlords had not proved the tenants had breached s 51(3) of the RT Act in respect of these items.
4. Replacement of balcony doors-The landlord claimed $7,749 for replacement of 4 balcony doors. The Tribunal awarded the landlords $4,909.12. The landlords asserted the tenants had stuck items on the glass of the doors which, when removed, damages the protective layer of glass. The Tribunal found the tenants had breached s 51(3) of the RT Act, and it was reasonable to replace the doors. However, the Tribunal reduced the landlords' claim to reflect the fact the doors were approximately 15 years old to reflect depreciation.
5. Replacement of carpet-The landlord claimed $3,145 for replacement of the carpet. The Tribunal found the carpet was "very damaged" such that replacement was necessary but, as (accepting the evidence of the landlord) the carpet had been laid in April 2021, any compensation should reflect depreciation of a capital asset. The Tribunal was satisfied the tenants had breached s 51(3) and, after a deduction for depreciation, awarded the landlords $1,887.
6. Replacement of rangehood-The landlord claimed $540 based on a tax invoice evidencing the replacement of the rangehood. The Tribunal found the rangehood was damaged during the tenancy and that the tenants breached s 51(3) of the RT Act. After deduction for depreciation, the Tribunal awarded the landlords $220.
7. Patching and painting of walls-The landlord claimed $990 for the cost of patching, painting and repairs of walls. Having regard to the documentary evidence, particularly the ingoing inspection report and photographs, the Tribunal accepted the tenant had breached s 51(3) of the RT Act and the damage was beyond fair wear and tear. The Tribunal noted the landlord had provided a tax invoice from a tradesperson evidencing the cost of repairs. The Tribunal awarded the landlord $990.
8. Repairs to the kitchen-the landlord had claimed $110 for the cost of applying silicone to areas of the kitchen. The Tribunal was not satisfied the damage was beyond fair wear and tear and dismissed the claim.
9. The Tribunal awarded the landlord compensation under s 187(1)(d) of the RT Act of $8,006.12 for the tenants' breach of s 51(3) of the RT Act.

1. The tenant Yuan Zhuang filed a Notice of Appeal and application for a Stay of the orders under appeal on 18 September 2025. The appeal has been filed within the applicable time period under r 25(4)(b) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW).
2. The landlord filed a Reply to Appeal on 16 October 2025.
3. The tenant filed submission and documents in support of the appeal on 10 November 2025.
4. The landlord filed submissions and documents in opposition to the appeal on 8 December 2025.
5. The documents of both parties included the documents they relied upon at the Tribunal hearing. The tenant's material included a sound recording of the hearing and a transcript of the relevant parts of the hearing the tenant relied upon. The documents of the landlord included the ingoing and outgoing inspection reports and the quotations relied upon, as well as a letter from the building manager of the strata building dated 22 April 2025.
6. On 3 October 2025, Blake PM of the Appeal Panel granted a partial Stay of the money order the subject of the appeal.
7. The appeal hearing occurred on 9 December 2025. Yuan Zhuang appeared in person at the appeal hearing. The landlords Ms Van and Mr Hedger appeared in person, having determined it appropriate to represent themselves in the appeal rather than being represented by their managing agent.

1. The tenant only appeals the following findings of the Tribunal:
2. Replacement of balcony doors ($4,909.12).
3. Replacement of carpet ($1,887).
4. The tenant's grounds of appeal are summarised as follows:

(1) Denial of procedural fairness.

(2) Apprehended bias.

(3) Misapplication of the burden of proof.

(4) No evidence to support factual findings that (a) 4 glass balcony door panels required replacement, rather than 2; and (b) finding that the carpet was new.

(5) Reliance on "unreliable/irrelevant evidence".

(6) Leave to appeal, on the basis that the decision was not fair and equitable and was against the weight of evidence. Although the Notice of Appeal states that the tenant was not seeking leave to appeal; the appeal grounds and submissions refer to matters that clearly involve leave to appeal, including that the decision was against the weight of evidence. Considering the appellant is self-represented, it is appropriate to consider the issue of leave to appeal.

1. Internal appeals may be made as of right on a question of law, and otherwise with leave (that is, the permission) of the Appeal Panel: s 80 (2) of the NCAT Act.
2. An appeal is not simply an opportunity for a dissatisfied or aggrieved party to re-argue the case they put at first instance: Ryan v BKB Motor Vehicle Repairs Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCATAP 39 at [10].
3. What is an error on a question of law was extensively discussed by the Appeal Panel in Unique Commercial Property Group Limited v Cusumano [2024] NSWCATAP 204 (Cusumano) at [25]-[40]. An error on a question of law (if established) is an appeal made as of right and does not require leave. A mixed error of fact and law (if established) requires leave to appeal.
4. In Cusumano at [33], the Appeal Panel stated the categories of questions of law are "not closed"; and at [37] stated:

"[37] What constitutes a question of law is vexed and context dependent in the sense that the distinction between matters of fact and of law may turn on the circumstances in which the question arises: Targeted Property Investments Pty Ltd v Look Up Technologies Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] NSWSC 416 at [33(4)], citing Thomas and Naaz [2023] NSWCA 40 at [52] and Da Costa v The Queen [1968] HCA 51; (1968) 118 CLR 186 at 194; [1968] HCA 51".

1. It is unnecessary for the purpose of this decision to set out all the examples of an error on a question of law that were discussed in Cusumano.
2. However, an error on a question of law may arise in the circumstances including the following:

(1) Failure to provide procedural fairness at the hearing (Donohoe v Alburario [2025] NSWSC 9 at [36]- [39] Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531; [2010] HCA 1 at [60]; Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82; [2000] HCA 57 at [41] (Gleeson CJ), [142] (Kirby J) and [170] (Hayne J));

(2) No jurisdictional power to make an order (Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82; [2000] HCA 57; at [163] (Hayne J));

(3) A constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction, in the sense of a failure to consider a "substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts" that was within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to determine (see e.g. Alexandria Landfill Pty Ltd v Transport for NSW (2020) 103 NSWLR 479; [2020] NSWCA 165 at [8]- [12] and [413]; Resource Pacific Pty Ltd v Wilkinson [2013] NSWCA 33 at [1] and [9]).

(4) Applying the wrong legal principle (in isolation to the factual findings) which materially affected the outcome (Bimson, Roads & Maritime Services v Damorange Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 734 at [38]- [53] (Bimson)). However, the wrong application of the correct legal principles to the facts is an error of mixed fact and law for which leave to appeal is required under s 80(2)(b) of the NCAT Act (TNT Building Trades Pty Ltd v Baker [2023] NSWCATAP 178 at [42]- [43] and the authorities cited therein).

(5) Making a factual finding where there was no evidence at all to substantiate the factual finding: Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 390; [2010] HCA 32 at [91] per Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ. However, a wrong finding of fact does not amount to an error of law: Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54; [1987] HCA 25 per Brennan J; Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321; [1990] HCA 33 at [83]-[89]. An erroneous finding of fact, including the drawing of an inference or the erroneous failure to find a fact or failure to draw an inference, which is perverse in the sense that it is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, is not an error of law: Azzopardi v Tasman QEB (1985) 4 NSWLR 139 at 155 per Glass JA.

1. The circumstances in which the Appeal Panel may grant leave to appeal from decisions made in the Consumer and Commercial Division are limited to those set out in Cl. 12(1)(a)-(c) of Sch. 4 of the NCAT Act. In such cases, the Appeal Panel must be satisfied that the appellant may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice on the basis that:

(a) The decision of the Tribunal under appeal was not fair and equitable; or

(b) The decision of the Tribunal under appeal was against the weight of evidence; or

(c) Significant new evidence has arisen (being evidence that was not reasonably available at the time the proceedings under appeal were being dealt with).

1. In Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17 (Collins v Urban), the Appeal Panel stated at [76] that a substantial miscarriage of justice for the purposes of Cl. 12(1) of Sch. 4 may have been suffered where:

"[76]... there was a "significant possibility" or a "chance which was fairly open" that a different and more favourable result would have been achieved for the appellant had the relevant circumstance in para (a) or (b) not occurred or if the fresh evidence under para (c) had been before the Tribunal at first instance."

1. Even if the appellant establishes that it may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice in the sense explained above, the Appeal Panel retains discretion whether to grant leave under s 80(2) of the NCAT Act. The appellant must demonstrate something more than the Tribunal was arguably wrong (BHP Billiton Ltd v Dunning [2013] NSWCA 421 at [19]; Pholi v Wearne [2014] NSWCATAP 78 at [32]).
2. The discretion to grant leave to appeal was discussed by the Appeal Panel in Collins v Urban at [82]-[84]. It is usually appropriate to grant leave only in those matters that involve issues of principle; questions of general public importance; an injustice which is reasonably clear, in the sense of going beyond what is merely arguable; or the Tribunal has gone about the fact finding process in such an unorthodox manner, or in such a way that it was likely to produce an unfair result, it would be in the interests of justice for it to be reviewed.

1. The tenant's assertion that she was denied procedural fairness arises from the quantification of the replacement of balcony doors. The tenant asserts that she was denied procedural fairness, because the landlord had originally served a quotation of Balmain Village Glass Pty Ltd dated 7 April 2025 for the cost of replacing two door panels ($5,138), but one week prior to the hearing had served a second quote of Balmain Village Glass Pty Ltd dated 18 July 2025 in the amount of $7,573 which involved replacement of all of the balcony doors.
2. The tenant also disputes that the evidence in the ingoing and outgoing inspection reports did not support a finding that all of the doors required replacement. As well, the tenant takes issue with the Tribunal giving weight to a statement of the building manager, who stated that all 4 panels were damages and required replacement. The tenant asserts the statement of the building manager was made a number of months after the end of the tenancy.

1. The legal principles pertaining to denial of procedural fairness have been considered by the Appeal Panel on many occasions. One of the many authorities that has summarised the principles is Boreland v Brewis [2024] NSWCATAP 140, where the Appeal Panel stated at [59]-[62]:

"[59] In determining proceedings before it, the Tribunal is under a duty to afford procedural fairness to the parties. Procedural fairness, or the duty to act fairly, applies to courts and tribunals which are empowered to determine matters affecting the rights and interests of a person. Procedural fairness requires that the Tribunal give the parties a fair hearing, and that it be free from actual or apprehended bias. The term "procedural fairness" is synonymous with natural justice (the latter term is used in s 38(2) of the NCAT Act).

[60] It is well established that the Tribunal must conduct a hearing that gives procedural fairness to both parties, even taking into account the less formal nature of Tribunal proceedings (s 38(4) and subs (5) of the NCAT Act). What is necessary and appropriate to ensure a fair hearing depends on the particular facts and statutory context, rules of procedural fairness being flexible and adaptable so as to be appropriate in a given case so as to avoid practical injustice (SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; [2006] HCA 63 at [26] and [29]; Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252; [2010] HCA 23 at [19]- [20]; Re: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1; [2003] HCA 6 at [37]- [38]).

[61] The appellant raised a denial of procedural fairness as a ground of appeal, noting that, in respect of a self-represented non-legally trained party, the Appeal Panel must consider the substance of what is raised as the grounds of appeal (see e.g. Cominos v Di Rico [2016] NSWCATAP 5 at [13]). Whether there has been a breach of procedural fairness raises a question of law: see e.g. Kudrynski at [52]; YHY v YHZ [2024] NSWCATAP 117.

[62] Where there has been a breach of the requirement to afford the appellant procedural fairness, the question arises whether that error was material to the Tribunal's decision. A breach of procedural fairness will constitute jurisdictional error, if the error is material to the Tribunal's decision: Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 80; [2022] HCA 26 (Nathanson) at [1], [33] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ). Materiality is established if the procedural unfairness deprived the appellant of a realistic possibility of a different outcome on the application lodged in the Consumer and Commercial Division".

1. Procedural fairness principles have also been discussed in detail in O'Brien v Women's Housing Company Limited [2026] NSWCATAP 3 at [136]- [147].
2. The tenant has failed to establish she was not given a fair hearing. It was clear that the landlord was claiming compensation for breach of s 51(3) of the RT Act in respect of the scratched, marked, and damaged condition of the balcony doors. The service of an updated quote 1 week before the hearing, and it being considered by the Tribunal was not procedurally unfair to the tenant. The tenant had a reasonable opportunity to give evidence and make submission at the hearing in response to this evidence.
3. There was no error in the Tribunal taking into account quotation evidence to establish the quantum of compensation for breach of s 51(3) of the RT Act, rather than tax invoices: Hall v Hawkins [2015] NSWCATAP 197 at [79].
4. The other issues raised by the tenant in respect of the balcony doors are issues that require leave to appeal.

1. There is a further issue (which involves both the balcony door findings and the carpet findings) that, if established, constitutes an error on a question of law. The tenant asserts that she was denied procedural fairness because the Member displayed apprehended bias by reason of certain comments made by the Member at the hearing.
2. The principles regarding apprehended bias are well established and recently expressed by the Appeal Panel in Zonnevylle v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2026] NSWCATAP 1 at [9]- [11]:

"[9] As to apprehended bias, the relevant principles were set out by the Appeal Panel in Jeray v Blue Mountains Council [2025] NSWCATAP 225 at [41]- [45]:

"[41] The High Court in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63 (Ebner) definitively stated the principles with respect to apprehended bias".

[42] In QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 279 CLR 148; [2023] HCA 15 (QYFM) the High Court repeated these principles. Kiefel CJ and Gageler J at [37]-[38] made the following observations (citations omitted):

"[37] The criterion for the determination of an apprehension of bias on the part of a judge was definitively stated in Ebner by reference to previous authority and has often been repeated. The criterion is whether "a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide". The "double might" serves to emphasise that the criterion is concerned with "possibility (real and not remote), not probability".

"[38] Application of the criterion was identified in Ebner, and has been reiterated, logically to entail: (1) identification of the factor which it is said might lead a judge to resolve the question other than on its legal and factual merits; (2) articulation of the logical connection between that factor and the apprehended deviation from deciding that question on its merits; and (3) assessment of the reasonableness of that apprehension from the perspective of a fair-minded lay observer".

[43] Gordon J at [67]-[73] made the following observations (citations omitted):

"Test for apprehended bias

[67] As this Court held in Ebner v Offıcial Trustee in Bankruptcy, a judge is disqualified, subject to qualifications relating to waiver or necessity, "if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide". The Ebner test has two steps: first, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits; and second, there must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. Once those two steps are taken, the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias can then ultimately be assessed.

[68] Four aspects of the test are critical to observe. First, it is an objective test: it does not require a conclusion about the judge's actual state of mind or an assertion of actual bias. The principle gives effect to the requirement that justice should both be done and be seen to be done.

[69] Second, it is a test of possibility, not probability - whether the fair-minded lay observer might reasonably think that the judge might be biased. It has even been said that the fair-minded lay observer is generally taken to be mistaken because decision-makers will rarely be biased in the ways attributed to them, as the observer might have appreciated if fully apprised of the operation of a particular decision-maker. That said, a finding of apprehended bias is "not to be reached lightly." In determining whether an apprehension of bias arises, relevant considerations include "the legal, statutory and factual contexts in which the decision is made" and "the nature of the decision ..., what is involved in making the decision and the identity of the decision-maker."

[70] Third, the test is not prescriptive about the ways in which a reasonable apprehension might arise. "The apprehension of bias principle admits of the possibility of human frailty. Its application is as diverse as human frailty." Indeed, the apprehension may not even be of a consciously impartial mind. The test encompasses apprehension of unconscious bias: "the hypothetical observer would recognise that judges are human, not a 'passionless thinking machine' or robot just assessing information."

[71] Fourth, the adjective "lay" in relation to the fair-minded observer is critical - "[i]t would defy logic and render nugatory the principle to imbue the hypothetical observer" with the knowledge and professional self-appreciation of a lawyer (105), let alone that of an experienced judge. The fair-minded lay observer is a member of the public because the principle is concerned with maintenance of public confidence in the justice system. "[I]t is the court's view of the public's view, not the court's own view, which is determinative."

Knowledge of the fair-minded lay observer

[72] The fair-minded lay observer is taken to be aware of the nature of the decision and the context in which it was made (108), and the circumstances leading to the decision. The fair-minded lay observer is taken to have "a broad knowledge of the material objective facts," as distinct from a detailed knowledge of the law or of the character and ability of the decision-maker. In considering whether an allegation of apprehended bias on the part of a judge is made out, "the public perception of the judiciary is not advanced by attributing to a fair-minded member of the public a knowledge of the law and the judicial process which ordinary experience suggests is not the case."

"[73] As the test is objective, the state of mind of the judge in question is irrelevant. So too are the reasons for judgment given by the judge ex tempore or published by the judge after the trial. The test turns on the facts and circumstances that might give rise to the apprehension of bias at the time of the hearing and determination. ..."

[44] Edelman at [162], Gleeson J at [225]-[226], and Jagot J at [293] referred to the test in Ebner.

"[45] More recently the plurality of the High Court (Gageler CJ, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ) in Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Smith [2024] HCA 32; (2024) 98 ALJR 1163 at [92] referred to the threefold test in Ebner, citing QYFM at [38]."

[10] It is clear from this exposition of principles that there are three matters that need to be established:

(1) firstly, the identification of a factor which is said might lead me to resolve the matter other than on its legal and factual merits;

(2) secondly, the articulation of the logical connection between that factor and the apprehended deviation from deciding the question on its merits; and

(3) thirdly, an assessment of the reasonableness of that apprehension from the perspective of a fair-minded observer.

[11] I note that in Dunstan v Orr [2022] FCA 1006 at [76] Wigney J cited Hamod v New South Wales (No 11) [2008] NSWSC 967 at [20] where Harrison J said that unfavourable decisions against a party "are not, and can never be, without more sufficient to support or establish the existence or manifestation of an objective apprehension of bias".

1. The comments that the tenant has referred to as displaying apprehended bias are insufficient to establish a denial of procedural fairness by reason of apprehended bias.
2. The tenant proposes in submissions that she be held liable to pay $3,388 rather than $4,909.12 in respect of repairs to balcony doors. However, an appeal under s 80(1) of the NCAT Act is not a fresh hearing of the original dispute and the grounds of this appeal do not warrant a new hearing under s 80(3) of the NCAT Act.

1. The tenant submits that there was no evidence to support the landlord's assertion at the hearing that the carpet was "brand new." The tenant asserts that the carpet could have been 15 years old, and the Tribunal did not apply an appropriate depreciated value. The tenant also disputed that the evidence was sufficient to find that the carpet required complete replacement.
2. The tenant submitted that $500 was an appropriate amount for compensation to the landlord due to carpet damage, rather than the awarded amount of $1,572.
3. The Tribunal did not find the carpet was "new." It found that the carpet had been replaced in April 2021 and was 4 years old. That was based on the evidence of the landlord at the hearing. The Tribunal also found the extent of the damage was beyond fair wear and tear and the carpet required replacement. The Appeal Panel is not satisfied there was no evidence at all to make that factual finding at the hearing. Accordingly, any error is not an error on a question of law, but, if established, an error of a type that the tenant requires leave to appeal.

1. The Appeal Panel is not satisfied that the other matters referred to in the grounds of appeal and the tenant's submissions identify any other error on a question of law beyond the matters previously discussed. There was no misapplication of legal principle that can be identified exclusively from the factual findings. No factual findings were made without any evidence at all. No constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction is demonstrated.

1. The Appeal Panel is not satisfied that leave to appeal should be granted, applying the legal principles referred to in Collins v Urban. Whilst the tenant disagrees with the decision and there may be findings that are arguably wrong, the findings made by the Tribunal were open to it based on the evidence before it and the reasoning was legally orthodox.
2. Ms Zhuang made submissions at the appeal hearing regarding her inability to pay the amount ordered by the Tribunal, other than by way of instalments. That is not an issue relevant to determination of an internal appeal under s 80(1) of the NCAT Act.

(3) The Stay orders of the Appeal Panel dated 3 October 2025 are lifted immediately.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.