YTV v NSW Trustee and Guardian

Cases Cited: A v A [2015] NSWSC 1778
Sunshine Loans Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2026] HCA 8
Da Costa v The Queen (1968) 118 CLR 186; [1968] HCA 51
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63
Feldman v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2020) 103 NSWLR 307; [2020] NSWCA 260
Ferella & Anor v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2014] NSWCA 378
German v State Trustees Ltd [2023] VSC 7
GS v MS [2019] WASC 255
Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 255 CLR 135; [2015] HCA 20
Kudrynski v Orange City Council [2024] NSWCA 33
P v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWSC 579
QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 97 ALJR 419; [2023] HCA 15
Reid v Commercial Club (Albury) Ltd [2014] NSWCA 98
Schwartz Family Co Pty Ltd v Capitol Carpets Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 223
South Western Sydney Area Health Service v Edmonds [2007] NSWCA 16
Sun v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 220; [2016] FCAFC 52
Thomaz and Naaz Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2023] NSWCA 40
YKL v South Western Sydney Local Health District [2025] NSWCATAP 234

Texts Cited: Webpage, ‘NSW Trustee and Guardian fees’,
https://www.nsw.gov.au/departments-and-agencies/trustee-guardian/about-us/our-fees.

Category: Principal judgment

Parties: YTV (Appellant)
NSW Trustee and Guardian (Respondent)

Representation: Appellant (Self-Represented)
Respondent (No Appearance)

File Number(s): 2026/00102957

Publication restriction: Pursuant to s 65(1) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), the publication of the name of any of the parties or other people referred to in this decision including the publication of any information, picture or other material that identifies them or is likely to lead to their identification is prohibited.

reaSons for decision

1. In September 2025, following applications made by her former husband, the Guardianship Division of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) made guardianship and financial management orders in respect of the appellant, YTV. The appellant is a qualified medical practitioner but apparently is no longer registered with the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Authority.

2. Shortly after those orders were made, the appellant made an application requesting NCAT to revoke the financial management order. On 4 March 2026, following a hearing to determine that application, the Tribunal (Senior Member Organ) renewed and varied that order by excluding any Centrelink benefits or employment income received by the appellant from that order and requiring the renewed order to be reviewed within 12 months: Amanda (a pseudonym) [2026] NSWCATGD 15. The appellant now appeals from that decision.

3. The appellant contends that in finding that she is not capable of managing her financial affairs, the Tribunal misapplied the provisions of the Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) which give the Tribunal a discretion to revoke a financial management order. In addition, she contends that the Tribunal was biased and appeared to be biased against her.

4. Because of the sensitive nature of the matters discussed, in these reasons we will not refer to the appellant or her former husband by their real names but as “the appellant” and “the former husband”, respectively. For consistency, in referring to the health practitioners whose reports were considered by the Tribunal, we will use the fictious names used in the version of the reasons for the decision under appeal published on Caselaw, Amanda (a pseudonym) (the Reasons).

5. The appellant was the only party to participate in the appeal.

6. We explain below our reasons for dismissing the appeal.

Grounds of appeal

7. The decision the subject of this appeal, to vary the financial management order made in respect of the appellant, is an “internally appealable decision”: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act), s 32(4). As a party to the proceedings in which that decision was made, the appellant has a right to appeal from that decision on a question of law or, with the leave of the Appeal Panel, on any other ground: NCAT Act, s 80(2)(b).

8. An appeal is not on a question of law merely because it is asserted that an error of law was made by the Tribunal: Thomaz and Naaz Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2023] NSWCA 40 (Thomas and Naaz) at [32]. What constitutes a question of law is a “vexed and context dependent” issue and must be approached as a matter of substance and not form: Thomas and Naaz at [52]-[53]; Da Costa v The Queen (1968) 118 CLR 186; [1968] HCA 51 at [2] (Windeyer J).

9. The appellant is required to identify with precision the question of law she asserts is raised by the appeal: Ferella & Anor v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2014] NSWCA 378 at [6], [22]; Schwartz Family Co Pty Ltd v Capitol Carpets Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 223 at [13].

10. The amended Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant on 9 April 2026, and the submissions filed in support, do not clearly state a question of law. However, after considering those documents, together with the appellant’s oral submissions, and adopting the “more generous or benevolent approach” endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Kudrynski v Orange City Council [2024] NSWCA 33 at [50], [51], the following questions of law can be discerned:

11. Whether the Tribunal misapplied s 25P(2)(a) of the Guardianship Act by:

(a) requiring the appellant to discharge an evidentiary burden by proving she is capable of managing her affairs (b) misconstruing the phrase “is capable of managing … her affairs” by interpolating an “English language aptitude test” (c) misapplying the principles stated by Lindsay J in P v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWSC 579.

2. Whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness because the Tribunal appeared to be biased by making the following purported “false and dishonest” findings of fact:

(i) the appellant had not regained capacity to manage her affairs (ii) the appellant claimed that criminal charges laid against her had been thrown out because she consented to an apprehended violence order (iii) the appellant did not know the “price of what is not in my name” and proposed to seek assistance about how to budget from “benign, helpful, supportive…religious minded church goers” (iv) it is likely there would be limitations on the extent to which Centrelink would provide support to the appellant to manage her financial affairs.

3. Whether the Tribunal was biased because the reason it renewed the financial management order made in September 2025 (the FMO) was to benefit the NSW Trustee and Guardian (the NSW Trustee).

Making and reviewing a financial management order: statutory framework

11. Division 1 (“Making of financial management orders”) of Part 3A (“Financial Management”) of the Guardianship Act gives the Tribunal power to make a financial management order.

12. Contained in that Division, s 25G states that the power to make a financial management order can only be exercised if, after considering the person's capability to manage his or her own affairs, the Tribunal is satisfied of the three matters listed in paras (a), (b) and (c) of that section:

25G GROUNDS FOR MAKING FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ORDER

The Tribunal may make a financial management order in respect of a person only if the Tribunal has considered the person's capability to manage his or her own affairs and is satisfied that:

(a) the person is not capable of managing those affairs, and

(b) there is a need for another person to manage those affairs on the person's behalf, and

(c) it is in the person's best interests that the order be made.

13. If the Tribunal makes a financial management order in respect of the estate (or part of the estate) of a person, the Tribunal may appoint a suitable person as manager of the estate or commit the management of estate to the NSW Trustee: Guardianship Act, s 25M.

14. Division 2 (“Review and revocation of financial management orders”) of Part 3A (“Financial Management”) gives the Tribunal power to review and revoke financial management orders.

15. The person the subject of a financial management order (the protected person) is entitled to apply for an order revoking or varying a financial management order: Guardianship Act, s 25R(a). On an application under s 25R for revocation or variation of the financial management order, the Tribunal must review that order: Guardianship Act, s 25N(4)(b). However, the Tribunal may refuse to review a financial management order on an application under s 25R if (a) in the opinion of the Tribunal the application does not disclose grounds that warrant a review, or (b) the Tribunal has previously reviewed the order: Guardianship Act, s 25O.

16. The powers available to the Tribunal on reviewing a financial management order are contained in s 25P of the Guardianship Act:

25P Action on review

(1) On reviewing a financial management order under section 25N, the Tribunal—

(a) must vary, revoke or confirm the order, and

(b) if it considers it appropriate to do so—may take such action with respect to the appointment of the manager of the protected person’s estate as the Tribunal could take on a review of such an appointment under Division 3.

(2) The Tribunal may revoke a financial management order only if—

(a) the Tribunal is satisfied that the protected person is capable of managing his or her affairs, or

(b) the Tribunal considers that it is in the best interests of the protected person that the order be revoked (even though the Tribunal is not satisfied that the protected person is capable of managing his or her affairs).

(3) In this section, vary, in relation to a financial management order, includes to exclude (or remove an exclusion of) a specified part of the protected person’s estate from the order.

17. A “protected person” is “a person whose estate (or part of whose estate) is subject to a financial management order that is in force”: Guardianship Act, s 25D.

Ground 1: The misapplication / misconstruction grounds

The onus issue

18. The appellant contends that the Tribunal required her to discharge the burden of proving that she is capable of managing her financial affairs. Asserting that the evidence before the Tribunal was “neutral” about that issue, she contends that it can be inferred from its decision not to revoke the financial management order that the Tribunal had impermissibly required that she discharge an evidentiary burden of proof.

19. In support of the contention that the evidence about her capacity to manage her affairs was neutral, the appellant points to the report prepared by consultant psychiatrist, Dr Z, dated 27 March 2025. In that report, Dr Z recorded that on assessment, the appellant “did not exhibit any hallucinatory behaviours” and her “affect was reactive and mood was euthymic”. In addition, the appellant points to the statement made by her general practitioner, Dr Y, in a report dated 3 March 2025, “I have no clinical evidence to suggest that she is incapable of managing her own financial affairs.”

Consideration

20. The appellant correctly points out that the Guardianship Act does not require an applicant, or any other party to the proceedings, to discharge a “legal onus or burden of proof”.

21. In Sun v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 220; [2016] FCAFC 52 Flick and Raniagh JJ (Logan J agreeing) said at [63] that the concept of an “onus or burden of proof” is a “concept buried in common law rules of evidence and the practice and procedure of superior courts of law entrusted with resolving disputes between parties to litigation”. Their Honours explained that “as a general proposition … decision-making by administrative tribunals is not adversarial” and “the common law concept of ‘onus of proof’ has no application.”

22. Sun v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection concerned an appeal from a decision of the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT). The jurisdiction exercised by the Guardianship Division is protective in nature and different to that exercised by the AAT. However, the analysis of the Full Court of the Federal Court about the inapplicability of the concept of an onus of proof applies equally to the Guardianship Division. (See also, A v A [2015] NSWSC 1778 at [35].) Like the AAT, the Guardianship Division does not exercise judicial power, the rules of evidence do not apply, and proceedings are inquisitorial not adversarial in nature: see, NCAT Act, s 38(2); YKL v South Western Sydney Local Health District [2025] NSWCATAP 234 at [42]; German v State Trustees Ltd [2023] VSC 7 at [37]; GS v MS [2019] WASC 255 at [92].

23. However, the absence of a requirement that parties discharge a burden of proof does not relieve the Tribunal of the responsibility of determining the facts and issues raised by the initiating application. To be “satisfied” for the purpose of s 25P(2)(a), the Tribunal must reach an affirmative conclusion or a state of positive satisfaction that the protected person is capable of managing his or her financial affairs.

24. The discretion to revoke the FMO could only be exercised on one of two bases, relevantly, if “the Tribunal is satisfied that the protected person is capable of managing his or her affairs”: Guardianship Act, s 25P(2)(a). (The alternative basis for the exercise of that discretion — “if … the Tribunal considers that it is in the best interests of the protected person that the order be revoked …” (s 25P(2)(b)) — is not relevant to this appeal.)

25. Contrary to the submission made by the appellant, to exercise the discretion to revoke the FMO, the Tribunal was required to be satisfied that the appellant “is capable of managing … her affairs” (emphasis added): Guardianship Act, s 25P(2)(a). In contrast to exercise the discretion to make a financial management order, the Tribunal must be satisfied of three matters, relevantly, that the protected person “is not capable of managing his or her affairs” (emphasis added): Guardianship Act, s 25G(a).

26. The use of the word “not” in s 25G(a), and its omission from s 25P(2)(a), is significant. Section 25G(a) requires the Tribunal to be satisfied of a negative factual proposition, that the person “is not capable of managing his or her affairs”. Section 25P(2)(a) on the other hand, requires the Tribunal to be satisfied of an affirmative factual proposition, that the person “is capable of managing his or her affairs”.

27. Even if it is accepted, as the appellant contends, that the evidence before the Tribunal about her capacity to manage her affairs was “neutral”, by which we understand her to mean “inconclusive”, that would be insufficient for the Tribunal to reach an affirmative state of satisfaction that she “is capable of managing … her affairs”.

28. There is nothing in the Reasons to support the claim that, in evaluating the evidence about the appellant’s capacity to manage her affairs, the Tribunal did so through the prism of a “legal onus or burden of proof”. At [31], the Tribunal correctly stated that it may revoke the FMO only if “it is satisfied that [the appellant] is capable of managing her affairs; or it considers that it is in the best interests of [the appellant] that the order be revoked”. At [33], the Tribunal identified one of the questions it was required to answer as, “Is [the appellant] now capable of managing her affairs?”. After evaluating the evidence relevant to that question, at [55] the Tribunal said “I am not satisfied that the evidence establishes that [the appellant] has regained capability to manage the entirety of her financial affairs.”

29. The contention that the Tribunal required the appellant to discharge the burden of establishing she is capable of managing her affairs is rejected.

The misinterpretation issue

30. The appellant contends that the Tribunal misconstrued the phrase, “is capable of managing … her affairs” contained in s 25P(2)(a) of the Guardianship Act, by interpolating an “English language aptitude test”. Pointing out that her first language is not English, the appellant contends the Tribunal assumed from her use of the term “financial mentor” to describe her former husband, that she is not proficient in the English language, and therefore, not capable of managing her financial affairs.

Consideration

31. The first reference made by the Tribunal in the Reasons to the term “financial mentor” appears at [41]:

“When I pressed her on her future plans, [the appellant] said her ex-husband has told her she should go back to India and re-marry. She believes her ex-husband's method of accumulating wealth by living cheaply and saving, is a good one and she would follow his plan. She described [the former husband] as her ‘financial mentor’”.

32. At [51], in the context of considering whether the appellant can make “sound judgements about her welfare and interests”, the Tribunal noted that during their marriage the former husband managed the couple’s finances. Referring to the consent orders made by the Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 2) which required the parties to sell the former matrimonial home, and the offer made by the former husband to purchase the appellant’s share of that property, the Tribunal said:

“[The appellant’s] statement that she considers [the former husband] to be her financial mentor, when considered against the background of recent acrimonious family law proceedings between them, gives rise to concern that [the appellant] may not be able to consistently exercise sound judgment about protecting her own interests.”

33. Nowhere in the Reasons does the Tribunal discuss whether the appellant was, or was not, proficient in the English language. Nor could it be inferred from the Reasons that the Tribunal considered the appellant’s proficiency in spoken English relevant to any of the issues it was required to decide, less still her capacity to manage her affairs. If it is suggested that by placing the term “financial mentor” in inverted commas, the Tribunal found, or intended to convey, that the appellant was not proficient in English, we are unable to agree. The more likely explanation for the use of that punctation is that it was intended to convey a direct quote, taken from a statement made by the appellant.

34. The contention that the Tribunal misinterpreted the phrase “capable of managing … her affairs” is rejected.

The misapplication of P v NSW Trustee and Guardian issue

35. The appellant contends the Tribunal misapplied the principles stated in P v NSW Trustee and Guardian*,* specifically, the interpretation adopted by Lindsay J of the phrase “capable of managing his or her affairs” contained in ss 25G(a) and 25P(2)(a) of the Guardianship Act.

36. At [34], the Tribunal reproduced the following extract from P v NSW Trustee and Guardian at [308], [309] in which Lindsay J considered the meaning of the phrase “capable of managing his or her affairs”:

“[A] focus for attention is whether the person is able to deal with (making and implementing decisions about) his or her own affairs (person and property, capital and income) in a reasonable, rational and orderly way, with due regard to his or her present and prospective wants and needs, and those of family and friends, without undue risk of neglect, abuse or exploitation.

In considering whether the person is “able” in this sense, attention may be given to: (a) past and present experience as a predictor of the future course of events; (b) support systems available to the person; and (c) the extent to which the person, placed as he or she is, can be relied upon to make sound judgements about his or her welfare and interests: CJ v AKJ [2015] NSWSC 498 at [38]”.

37. Throughout the appeal, the appellant put the argument that the Tribunal failed to apply the definition adopted by Lindsay J in P v NSW Trustee and Guardian in several ways. Initially, she argued that because her circumstances bore no resemblance to those of the plaintiff in P v NSW Trustee and Guardian, in finding that she lacked capacity to manage her affairs the Tribunal had misconstrued the phrase “capable of managing his or her affairs”. Later, she contended that, in contrast to the approach taken by Lindsay J in P v NSW Trustee and Guardian, the Tribunal had failed to base its finding about her capacity to manage her affairs on probative evidence.

38. These arguments must be rejected because:

39. Contrary to the appellant’s assertion, the Tribunal did not find she is not capable of managing her affairs. Rather, the Tribunal said it was “not satisfied that the evidence establishes that [the appellant] has regained capability to manage the entirety of her financial affairs”.

40. The assertion that the impugned finding was not based on probative evidence is a challenge to the merits of that finding and is unrelated to the question of whether the Tribunal misinterpreted the phrase, “capable of managing his or her affairs”. We deal with that assertion below in considering the appellant’s claim of apprehended bias.

41. The argument that, because the facts in P v NSW Trustee and Guardian differed to those in the appellant’s case, the definition adopted by Lindsay J has no application, is misconceived*.*

42. This ground is not established.

The bias grounds

40. The appellant claims she was denied procedural fairness because the Tribunal appeared to be and was biased against her. The claims of apprehended and actual bias raise different issues. We will deal with each in turn.

Apprehended bias

41. The appellant claims the Tribunal made the following “false and dishonest” findings of fact and as a result appeared to be biased against her:

42. the appellant had not regained capacity to manage her affairs

43. the appellant claimed that criminal charges laid against her had been thrown out by the Local Court because she consented to an apprehended violence order

44. the appellant did not know the “price of what is not in my name” and proposed to seek assistance about how to budget from “benign, helpful, supportive … religious minded church goers”

45. it is likely there would be limitations on the extent to which Centrelink would provide support to the appellant to manage her financial affairs.

46. By the use of the word “false” to describe each of the above findings, we understand the appellant to mean those findings were unsupported by probative material. By the use of the word “dishonest”, we understand the appellant to mean that the Tribunal, constituted by an experienced lawyer, made those findings knowing them to be false.

The principles: apprehended bias

43. The test for apprehended bias, the “double might test”, is whether “a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the [decision-maker] might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the [decision-maker] is required to decide”: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63 (Ebner) at [6]; QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 97 ALJR 419; [2023] HCA 15 (QYFM) at [37]; Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 255 CLR 135; [2015] HCA 20 (Isbester) at [20].

44. The double-might test is objective. It is concerned with “possibility (real and not remote), not probability”: Ebner at [7]; QYFM at [37]; Isbester at [59].

45. The application of the double might test entails three steps:

46. identification of the factor which it is said might lead a judge to resolve the question other than on its legal and factual merits;

47. articulation of the logical connection between that factor and the apprehended deviation from deciding that question on its merits; and

48. assessment of the reasonableness of that apprehension from the perspective of the fair-minded lay observer.

(See, QYFM at [38]; Sunshine Loans Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2026] HCA 8 at [1].)

Impugned finding 1: the appellant had not regained capacity to manage her affairs

46. In support of the contention that this finding was not based on rationally probative material, the appellant points to the following medical evidence which was before the Tribunal. She asserts that evidence demonstrates she has capacity to manage her affairs:

47. Reports prepared by the appellant’s general practitioner, Dr Y, dated 25 September 2025 and 3 March 2026. In his first report, Dr Y wrote that he had referred the appellant to a psychiatrist and a psychologist. In the second report, he said there has been some improvement in the appellant’s depressive symptoms, and in recent consultations he has not observed any mania or psychosis. In both reports Dr Y said he has “no clinical evidence to suggest [the appellant] is incapable of managing her own financial affairs”.

48. A report dated 27 March 2025 prepared by consultant psychiatrist, Dr Z, addressed to Dr Y. In that report, Dr Z recorded that during a recent assessment the appellant “did not exhibit any hallucinatory behaviours” and “her affect was reactive and mood was euthymic”. Under the heading “Impression: Provisional”, Dr Z wrote “Possibly schizo-typal personality disorder with possible Type II BPAD [Bipolar Affective Disorder]”.

49. The appellant contends it was not open to the Tribunal to consider consultant psychiatrist, Dr W’s report dated 7 February 2016, apparently prepared at the request of Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Authority (AHPRA). She contends it was not open to the Tribunal to find on the basis of that report that she had “a long history of mental health issues and conduct which led to the suspension of her registration as a medical practitioner”. She contends there was no evidence before the Tribunal that the Medical Board accepted the findings of Dr W.

50. The appellant contends the decision made by the Federal Circuit and Family Court in March 2025 to appoint a litigation guardian for her in the family law proceedings between her former husband and herself was irrelevant to the question of whether she had capacity to manage her affairs. She contends the Tribunal was wrong to find that the Court’s decision to appoint a litigation guardian “gives rise to concerns that she may not be able to consistently exercise sound judgment about protecting her own interests”.

Consideration

49. In considering the question posed by s 25P(2)(a) of whether it was satisfied that the appellant is capable of managing her affairs, consistent with authority, the Tribunal considered several factors: the nature of the appellant’s financial affairs, the support likely to be available to the appellant to manage those affairs and the extent to which the appellant can be relied upon to make sound judgement about her welfare and interests: P v NSW Trustee at [308],[309].

50. At [35]-[38], the Tribunal considered the nature of the appellant’s financial affairs and recorded:

51. The appellant received Job Seeker allowance of $809 per fortnight.

52. The NSW Trustee held $57,000 in trust for the appellant.

53. Following consent orders made in August 2025 by the Federal Circuit and Family Court, the appellant was entitled to a share of the former matrimonial home.

54. Commenting on Dr Y’s report of 3 March 2025, at [43] the Tribunal said that report at its highest provides “qualified support” for the contention that the appellant can manage her financial affairs. The Tribunal observed that Dr Y said he has “no clinical evidence to indicate [the appellant] is incapable based on his observations during consultations with her and her own self-report”. The Tribunal pointed out Dr Y did not say the appellant “is now capable of managing her own affairs” (our emphasis).

55. At [44], the Tribunal noted that it is not clear what information the appellant had provided to Dr Y, for example, whether he was aware of the pending sale of the former matrimonial home, the amount the appellant is likely to receive from that sale and, if the financial management order was revoked, the appellant would be responsible for making decisions about what to do with the money from that sale. The Tribunal observed “an informed view about [the appellant’s] capability to manage her financial affairs necessarily involves consideration of what her financial affairs involve.”

56. At [45]-[48], the Tribunal considered the support systems likely to be available to the appellant if she were to resume responsibility for managing her financial affairs. The Tribunal noted that the appellant said, if necessary, she would seek help from the Public Guardian and a social worker at Centrelink. The Tribunal accepted there would be some support available from these sources should the appellant seek them, but said it was likely there would “be limitations on the extent of those agencies involvement in this way”.

57. At [48], commenting on the appellant’s claim that if the financial management order were revoked she would be able to seek assistance from family members and friends, the Tribunal said there was no objective evidence to support that claim, in particular, evidence about “their willingness and the extent to which they are able to support her and their qualifications, work or general life experience to provide such advice”.

58. At [49]-[53], the Tribunal considered the extent to which the appellant “can be relied upon to make sound judgements about her welfare and interests”. The Tribunal considered significant the acrimonious nature of the family law proceedings between the appellant and her former husband together with the fact that she was now being asked to consider an offer made by her former husband to purchase her share of the former matrimonial home. The Tribunal said this “gives rise to concern that [the appellant] may not be able to consistently exercise sound judgment about protecting her own interests” and that this conclusion is supported by the decision made by the Federal Circuit and Family Court to appoint a litigation guardian, “as it was considered she was not able to adequately conduct or give adequate instructions about the conduct of those proceedings”.

59. The Tribunal said the appellant’s long history of mental health issues and conduct which led to the suspension of her registration as a medical practitioner “highlights [the appellant’s] vulnerability”.

60. The above summary of the Reasons reveals that in considering the question of whether the appellant had regained capacity to manage her affairs, the Tribunal evaluated the quality and cogency of the whole of the evidence and gave cogent reasons for finding it was not satisfied the appellant had regained capacity to manage her affairs.

61. It misstates the Reasons to contend that the Tribunal said the medical practitioners whose opinions were before it had expressed the opinion that the appellant lacked capacity to manage her affairs. Rather, the Tribunal said none had expressed the opinion that she is capable of managing her financial affairs.

62. The contention that there was no rationally probative material to support the conclusion reached by the Tribunal that it was not satisfied that the appellant had regained capacity to manage her affairs, finds no support in the Reasons and is rejected.

Impugned finding 2: the appellant claimed that criminal charges laid against her had been thrown out because she consented to an apprehended violence order

60. At [53] the Tribunal said:

“53 Other documents [the appellant] submitted to the Tribunal in support of her application to revoke the order, included partial copies of documents including NSW Police Fact Sheets in relation to various criminal charges against her from over 10 years ago in relation to a former colleague, with handwritten annotations and extracts of other correspondence relating to these charges. [T****he appellant] says these charges were "thrown out" by the Magistrate after she consented to an apprehended violence order being made against her. Documents related to [the appellant] 's request to a District Court Judge in 2019 requesting the Judge state a case to Court of Criminal Appeal were also provided by her. [The appellant] said this material shows she is able to protect herself from exploitation and can now manage her own affairs.”

(emphasis added)

61. It is not possible to decide whether, as the appellant claims in this appeal, in the proceedings before the Tribunal, she did not claim that the Local Court threw out criminal charges laid against her after she consented to an apprehended violence order being made against her because:

62. none of the documents the appellant filed in the appeal shed any light on that claim, and

63. we have not been provided with a transcript or the sound recording of the hearing before the Tribunal. On 16 April 2026, the Appeal Panel directed that if in the appeal the appellant intended to rely on what happened at the hearing before the tribunal she must file and serve a transcript of the relevant parts of the hearing.

Impugned finding 3: the appellant did not know the “price of what is not in my name” and was seeking advice about how to budget from “benign, helpful, supportive … religious minded church goers”

62. The appellant is mistaken in her claim that the Tribunal made the above purported findings. She appears to have attributed to the Tribunal statements made by the original Tribunal in its reasons for the decision to make the initial financial management order (Reasons for Decision, 22 September 2025, 2025/00217276 (unrep)(the 2025 Reasons). In those reasons at [14], the original Tribunal recorded:

“[The appellant] told us that she would not like to have someone manage her

finances. [The appellant] told us that:

…

1. That her primary asset was her house, but she was not aware of what it was worth.

…

1. When she receives the funds from her property settlement, being around one million dollars, she would consult with her bank and people at her temple about what she should do with the money.”

2. At [17], the original Tribunal said it was satisfied the appellant did not have capacity to manage her affairs, reasoning:

“[The appellant] appears to be totally dependent on her former husband to make financial decisions for her. She was unable to tell us how much her house at [omitted] was worth. This was of significant concern. [The appellant] told us that upon receiving the settlement money of around one million dollars she would get advice from different parties on how to manage her money, including seeking advice from “people” at her temple. [The appellant] is clearly a vulnerable person, she has a mental illness, she does not know the value of her house and will be seeking financial advice from people who may not be qualified to give this advice. [The appellant] is at high risk of financial exploitation in the community and has no experience in managing significant sums of money.”

64. The Tribunal did not refer to the claim, said to have been made by the appellant and recorded in the 2025 Reasons, that she did not know the value of the matrimonial home. Nor did the Tribunal say that the appellant had claimed that she intended to seek advice about how to budget from “benign, helpful, supportive … religious minded church goers”. The only reference made by the Tribunal to members of the appellant’s church was after referring to material provided by the appellant said to demonstrate that she has “people in her life including from the Church she attends”. At [48] the Tribunal said:

“There was, however, no objective evidence that would support [the appellant’s] contention that she is able to rely upon these individuals. In particular their willingness and the extent to which they are able to support her and their qualifications, work or general life experience to provide such advice in the event the financial management order is revoked.”

Impugned finding 4: limitations on the extent to which Centrelink would provide support to the appellant to manage her financial affairs

65. Recorded at [46], this finding was made in the context of the Tribunal considering the support likely to be available to the appellant to manage her financial affairs if the FMO were to be revoked:

“[The appellant’s] application says she will seek help from the Public Guardian and from a social worker at Centrelink if necessary. I accept that there would be some support available to her from these sources should she seek their advice or assistance, however, there would likely be limitations on the extent of those agencies’ involvement in this way.”

(emphasis added)

66. The appellant has not pointed to any evidence which was before the Tribunal to support her claim that there would no limitation on the advice or assistance Centrelink would be prepared to provide her if the FMO were to be revoked. If it is suggested by the appellant that it is a matter of common knowledge, “not reasonably open to question” (s 144(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)), that Centrelink provides unlimited financial advice and assistance to people who have been the subject of a financial management order, we are unable to agree.

67. In the absence of any evidence to support the appellant’s claim, it was open to the Tribunal to find it is likely there would be limitations on the extent to which Centrelink would provide support to the appellant if the financial management order were to be revoked.

Consideration

68. Findings 1, 2, and 4 were reasonably open to the Tribunal on the available evidence. The Tribunal did not make Finding 3. The premise on which the appellant’s complaint of apprehended bias rests — that the impugned findings were “false” — is not established.

69. But even if we are wrong and one or more of the impugned findings is “false”, the appellant has failed to allude to, less still identify, the factor(s) which might have led the Tribunal to make those findings, other than on their factual merits.

70. The claim that each of the impugned findings was dishonest because the Tribunal made them knowing them to be false is, in fact, a claim of actual bias and is addressed below.

Actual basis

71. The appellant contends the Tribunal demonstrated actual bias by:

72. making the impugned findings knowing them to be false, and

73. declining to revoke the FMO because to do would prejudice the interests of the NSW Trustee.

Actual bias: the principles

72. An allegation of actual bias must be distinctly made and clearly proven. Cogent evidence is required to support a finding of actual bias, and such finding should not be made lightly: Reid v Commercial Club (Albury) Ltd [2014] NSWCA 98 at [68]-[74]; South Western Sydney Area Health Service v Edmonds [2007] NSWCA 16 at [97].

Claim 1: The Tribunal made the impugned findings knowing them to be false

73. As we explained below the premise on which this claim is based, that the impugned findings are “false”, is not established. In any event, the appellant has failed to point to any evidence to support her claim that those findings are dishonest because the Tribunal made them, knowing them to be “false”.

Claim 2: The Tribunal declined to revoke the FMO because to do so would prejudice the interests of the NSW Trustee

74. We understand the benefit said by the appellant to accrue to the NSW Trustee if the FMO were to continue is that the NSW Trustee would continue to receive fees to manage the appellant’s estate. Where the estate of a protected person is committed to the management of the NSW Trustee under a financial management order, in addition to an establishment fee, the NSW Trustee is entitled to charge a management fee of 1.4% of the value of the protected person’s total assets, to a maximum fee of $20,816 per year: NSW Trustee and Guardian Regulation 2017, reg 26(2)(b); https://www.nsw.gov.au/departments-and-agencies/trustee-guardian/about-us/our-fees.

75. For current purposes we will assume, but not decide, as the appellant appears to contend, that the management fees the NSW Trustee receives to manage the appellant’s estate exceed the costs incurred by the NSW Trustee for doing so.

76. The appellant has not provided a shred of evidence to support her claim that one of the reasons the Tribunal declined to revoke the FMO was because it considered that decision would be to the benefit of the NSW Trustee. Having concluded that the discretion to revoke the FMO could not be exercised, in the absence of a suitable person to appoint as manager of the appellant’s estate, the Tribunal had no option but to commit its management to the NSW Trustee. See Guardianship Act, s 25M.

77. The claim of actual bias is unsupported by any evidence and is not established.

Conclusion

78. The complaints of apprehended and actual bias are not established.

Orders

1. The Appeal is dismissed.

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I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar