YQJ v Public Guardian

1. In 2023, several reports were made to the NSW Ageing and Disability Commissioner (the ADC), alleging that 74-year-old Maureen was subject to neglect. At that time Maureen was living in her own home with her adult grandson, Peter, who had lived with her since he was six years of age. In November 2023, the ADC arranged for Maureen to be taken by ambulance to hospital. In February 2024, Maureen was discharged from hospital to a residential aged care facility, where she lives to this day.
2. Maureen has been diagnosed with dementia and end-stage Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease.
3. Peter appeals from the decision made in April 2025 by the Guardianship Division of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT), to renew the initial guardianship order made in January 2024 in respect of Maureen and to reappoint the NSW Public Guardian as her guardian (the renewed order). Peter contends that the Tribunal denied him and his sister procedural fairness, misapplied the provisions of the Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) which govern the appointment of guardians, and made several errors of fact. He urged us to vary the renewed order by appointing him as Maureen's guardian.
4. We found, as contended by Peter, that in reappointing the Public Guardian the Tribunal misapplied the relevant statutory provisions. Nonetheless, as we explain below, that error was not material to the decision to reappoint the Public Guardian as Maureen's guardian and we affirm that decision.
5. Peter was the only party to participate in the appeal.
6. Peter and Maureen are fictious names. We decided not to use their real names in these reasons because of the sensitive nature of the matters discussed. At Annexure A to these reasons, we set out the pseudonyms assigned to the parties by NCAT's registry and the corresponding fictious names used in these reasons.

1. As a party to the proceedings to renew the initial guardianship order, Peter has a right to appeal the decision to make the renewed order, an "internally appealable decision", on any question of law or, with the leave of the Appeal Panel, on any other ground: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act), s 80(2)(b).
2. In the notice of appeal, Peter listed the following grounds of appeal:

"1. My history is an irrelevant factor for not being eligible as a guardian given the Public Guardian was willing to consider an accommodation proposal from me as a full-time carer.

2. The determination that I could not afford services is irrelevant because there was no evidence that substantiates the limitation of funds.

3. Throughout the course of time after the 18th of January 2024 hearing the member has stated that there is no evidence that I have not done what's in [Maureen's] best interests.

4. The determination that I failed to provide medical evidence to the Public Guardian is irrelevant, and the statement from the Member contradicts transcript evidence of My Aged Care and Care Side both informing that an ACAT assessment is the determining factor and the method of obtaining medical evidence.

5. My sister [name omitted] was not given an opportunity to be heard fairly at the hearing and was verbally abused by the member.

6. The Public Guardian failed to provide sufficient evidence that the Geriatrician stated that Level 4 services would not be sufficient.

7. The hearing in general was not conducted fairly because there was no opportunity given for parties to be heard, and having substantial evidence contradicted by the member has created an error of law."

1. Most of the grounds above are in the nature of submissions or factual assertions. None states a question of law. However, adopting the "more generous or benevolent approach" endorsed by the Court of Appeal (Griffiths AJA, Meagher and Kirk JJA agreeing) in Kudrynski v Orange City Council [2024] NSWCA 33 at [50], [51], and having regard to the oral submissions made by Peter in support of the appeal, the following purported questions of law can be discerned:

(1) Whether the Tribunal misapplied s 17(1)(c) of the Guardianship Act by failing to address whether Peter is able to exercise the functions conferred under the renewed order (Ground 1).

(2) Whether the Tribunal failed to afford Peter and his sister (the Sister) procedural fairness by failing to give them a reasonable opportunity to speak at the hearing (Ground 7).

(3) Whether the Tribunal failed to afford the Sister procedural fairness by being biased or appearing to be biased against her (Ground 5).

1. We will treat the remaining grounds on which Peter relies as arguments in support of his request for leave to appeal the decision to make the renewed order, specifically to appoint the Public Guardian as Maureen's guardian.

Did the Tribunal misapply s 17(1)(c) of the Guardianship Act by failing to address whether Peter is currently able to exercise the functions conferred under the renewed order (Ground 1)

1. Peter contends that the Tribunal misapplied s 17(1)(c) of the Guardianship Act by asking whether he was rather than is able to exercise the functions conferred under the renewed order. He contends that the Tribunal merely adopted the finding made by the previous Tribunal and failed to consider, or to properly consider, the evidence which post-dates the decision to make the initial guardianship order. That evidence includes his admission that he had "dropped the ball" as Maureen's carer when she was removed from the family home in 2023, and the subsequent remedial steps he has taken to ensure that Maureen's care needs would be met if she were to return to live with him, including purchasing necessary medical equipment, identifying a support worker to help with Maureen's care and arranging for his sister to move into the family home to provide full-time care to Maureen.
2. Before considering this submission, we set out the relevant statutory provisions and the reasons given by the Tribunal for the decision under appeal (Reasons for Decision, 22 May 2025 (the Reasons)).

1. The Tribunal must review a guardianship order at the expiration of its term: Guardianship Act, s 25(2)(b). On review, the powers available to the Tribunal are to renew, renew and vary the order, or to determine that the order is to lapse (and revoke the order in respect of any unexpired period for which the order is specified to have effect): Guardianship Act, s 25C(2).
2. Where the Tribunal decides to make, to renew, or to renew and vary a guardianship order, it must appoint a person(s) who is aged 18 years or more as the guardian of the person under guardianship: Guardianship Act, s 16(1)(a).
3. Before appointing a person to act as the guardian of the person under guardianship, the Tribunal must satisfy itself that the proposed guardian satisfies each of the three matters listed in s 17(1) of the Guardianship Act:

17 Guardians

(1) A person shall not be appointed as the guardian of a person under guardianship unless the Tribunal is satisfied that:

(a) the personality of the proposed guardian is generally compatible with that of the person under guardianship,

(b) there is no undue conflict between the interests (particularly, the financial interests) of the proposed guardian and those of the person under guardianship, and

(c) the proposed guardian is both willing and able to exercise the functions conferred or imposed by the proposed guardianship order.

1. Where, as in this case, the Tribunal decides to make a continuing, as opposed to a temporary, guardianship order the Tribunal must not appoint the Public Guardian where another person can be appointed as the guardian of the person: Guardianship Act, s 15(3).
2. Section 4 of the Guardianship Act imposes a duty on anyone exercising functions under that Act, including the Tribunal and any appointed guardian, to observe the principles in s 4:

4 General principles

It is the duty of everyone exercising functions under this Act with respect to persons who have disabilities to observe the following principles:

(a) the welfare and interests of such persons should be given paramount consideration,

(b) the freedom of decision and freedom of action of such persons should be restricted as little as possible,

(c) such persons should be encouraged, as far as possible, to live a normal life in the community,

(d) the views of such persons in relation to the exercise of those functions should be taken into consideration,

(e) the importance of preserving the family relationships and the cultural and linguistic environments of such persons should be recognised,

(f) such persons should be encouraged, as far as possible, to be self-reliant in matters relating to their personal, domestic and financial affairs,

(g) such persons should be protected from neglect, abuse and exploitation,

(h) the community should be encouraged to apply and promote these principles.

Reasons given for declining to appoint Peter as Maureen's guardian

1. After outlining the relevant statutory provisions and the principles which govern their operation, under the heading, "Should the Tribunal make a further guardianship order and if so, what order should be made?", the Tribunal discussed the views of Maureen, Peter and the Public Guardian about whether the power to renew the initial guardianship order should be exercised, and, if so, what functions (authority to make decision about specified matters) should be given to the guardian.
2. At [28], the Tribunal noted that following a request by Peter that it reconsider its decision that Maureen live in aged care, the Public Guardian had requested geriatrician, Dr P, to assess Maureen and provide an opinion about whether the proposal advanced by Peter that Maureen "live in her own home with drop-in supported services provided by My Aged Care/ACAT" would be in her "best interests given her disabilities and chronic health challenges". Dr P assessed Maureen in July 2024 and concluded that because of her "high care needs and behaviours of concern, a level four home care package [the highest level of care available under an Aged Care Assessment Team (ACAT) package] was not enough support for [Maureen] to return to the community". The Tribunal recorded that the Public Guardian said that it anticipates that further accommodation decisions will need to be made given Peter's "preference that [Maureen] return home".
3. At [28]-[30], the Tribunal recorded Peter's submission that it was in Maureen's interests that she return home to live with him. At [30], the Tribunal referred to the evidence he tendered in support of that submission, including photographs of equipment he had obtained to facilitate her return home, including a hospital bed, a wheelchair and an oxygen machine, Maureen's home in a clean and tidy state together with the steps he had taken to arrange for care to be provided to Maureen at home.
4. At [31], the Tribunal recorded Peter's claim that:

(1) after Maureen was removed from her home at the direction of the ADC, "he had rectified the living conditions in the home, and has focused on many months of saving funds from his Jobseeker payments, for medical equipment";

(2) he visits Maureen every day from between four to 11 hours a day because she "desperately wants to return home and needs to have [Peter] around her";

(3) Maureen finds being in the nursing home "deeply distressing";

(4) if Maureen were to return home he would:

(a) identify a new GP for Maureen;

(b) arrange weekly visits by a support person;

(c) arrange for his sister, to move in and provide fulltime care to Maureen; and,

(d) obtain government-funded and privately funded services, together with volunteer assistance from his church.

1. At [34], the Tribunal concluded that because there is a difference of views between the Public Guardian and the family as to where Maureen should reside, a guardian with an accommodation function should be appointed for Maureen.
2. In addition, the Tribunal concluded that it was necessary that the appointed guardian be given authority to make decisions on Maureen's behalf about the services she receives: at [38].
3. Noting that Maureen was prescribed antipsychotic medication to manage her behavioural and psychological symptoms of dementia and that this constitutes a "restrictive practice" regulated by the now repealed Aged Care Act 2014 (Cth), the Tribunal decided to give the appointed guardian authority to consent to, or to withhold consent to, the use of restrictive practices in relation to Maureen.
4. At [34]-[36], the Tribunal considered whether it was necessary to give the appointed guardian authority to consent to medical and dental treatment on behalf of Maureen. The Tribunal decided that it was not, reasoning that by the operation of Pt 5 of the Guardianship Act, as Mauren's grandson, Peter was deemed to be her "person responsible" and authorised to make decisions on her behalf about treatment. The Tribunal noted that since Maureen moved to residential aged care in February 2024, Peter had been consenting to treatment on her behalf and there was no evidence that he "had not made good decisions regarding his grandmother's health".
5. At [44]-[61], under the heading, "Who should be appointed as the guardian?", the Tribunal considered whether to appoint Peter as Maureen's guardian. Peter was the only person to nominate to take on that role.
6. After setting out the terms of ss 17(1) and 15(3) of the Guardianship Act and relevant authorities, the Tribunal considered the question of whether Peter was able to discharge the functions conferred under the renewed order. At [51], the Tribunal referred to the report made by the ADC that on 16 November 2023, Maureen was observed to be "living in a squalid and unhygienic environment and that she was reliant on [Peter] to maintain her living conditions due to cognitive and functional capacity issues". The Tribunal noted that at the hearing to renew the initial guardianship order, Peter repeated what he had said to the previous Tribunal (in January 2024): "I dropped the ball".
7. At [52],[53], the Tribunal noted that in its reasons for making the initial guardianship order the previous Tribunal:

(1) concluded that Peter could not be appointed as guardian because of the evidence of his "past inability to give paramount consideration to the welfare and best interests of his grandmother";

(2) recorded that Peter did not pay any money to Maureen to live in her house, although apparently he had contributed to bills;

(3) noted that Peter had been unable to afford recommended services for Maureen following previous hospital discharges; and

(4) recorded that Peter acknowledged that before she was admitted to hospital in late 2023, he had been irresponsible in managing Maureen's finances.

1. At [54]-[58], the Tribunal went on to consider whether there was an undue conflict between the interests (particularly, the financial interests) of Peter and Maureen: Guardianship Act, s 17(1)(b).
2. At [55], [56], the Tribunal noted it is likely that the NSW Trustee and Guardian, who had been appointed to manage Maureen's estate in January 2024, will need to sell Maureen's home to fund the payment of the Refundable Accommodation Deposit (RAD) to the aged care facility where she is now residing. The RAD was estimated to be between $450,000 and $650,000.
3. At [54], the Tribunal noted that Peter said that if Maureen's home was sold to pay the RAD "it would be a horrible situation for him and he would not be able to survive renting a home on the Jobseeker allowance". Peter had been living in Maureen's home since he was a child and had not lived anywhere else.
4. At [59], the Tribunal said it was not satisfied that Peter was a suitable person to be appointed as Maureen's guardian:

"[D]ue to his inability to promote [Maureen's] welfare in the past, and his current financial conflict of interest with that of [Maureen] with respect to him maintaining his housing and [Maureen's] need for a very high level of care and supervision."

1. Noting that there was "no suitable private person available to be appointed as guardian", the Tribunal reappointed the Public Guardian.

1. To exercise the power to appoint Peter as guardian, the Tribunal was required to attain a state of satisfaction about each of the matters in paras (a), (b) and (c) in s 17(1) of the Guardianship Act.
2. Section 17(1)(c) of the Guardianship Act, "the proposed guardian is ... able to exercise the functions conferred ... by the proposed guardianship order", required the Tribunal to make an evaluative judgement about whether Peter is "able" to exercise each of the functions conferred under the renewed order, accommodation, services and restrictive practices: ZKF v ZKG [2019] NSWCATAP 64 at [31]. In undertaking that task, the Tribunal was required to consider not only whether Peter possesses the necessary skill and experience to be able to exercise those functions but also has the necessary personal attributes, including judgement and integrity. In addition, in undertaking that evaluation, the Tribunal was required to consider whether Peter is able to make those decisions in a manner consistent with the statutory duty imposed by s 4 of the Act: W v G [2003] NSWSC 1170; (2003) 59 NSWLR 220 at [25], [2003] NSWSC 1170 (per Windeyer J); IR v AR [2015] NSWSC 1187 at [36] (per Lindsay J).
3. In YLU v Public Guardian [2025] NSWCATAP 81 at [49], the Appeal Panel explained that the use of the present tense in both the chapeau to s 17(1), "the Tribunal is satisfied", and paragraph (c), "the proposed guardian is ...able..." (emphasis added) indicates that the point-in-time the Tribunal is required to evaluate whether the proposed guardian is able to exercise the functions conferred under the guardianship order, is when that order is made. There are no contextual indicators which favour an alternative construction. Further, the Appeal Panel noted that that construction is consistent with the evident purpose of s 17(1) to ensure that, at the time of their appointment, a person entrusted with the authority and responsibilities of the role of guardian meets the criteria for appointment.
4. While not necessary to decide for this appeal, as noted by the Appeal Panel in YLU v Public Guardian at [49], the word 'is' in s 17(1)(c), appears to be used not only in the present tense but in the continuous present tense. That is, the phrase the "proposed guardian is ... able" refers not only to the point-in-time the Tribunal undertakes the evaluative task required by s 17(1)(c), but also the term of the guardianship order.
5. The issue raised by this ground is whether in undertaking that evaluation, the Tribunal considered whether Peter is currently able to exercise the functions conferred under the renewed order. As Peter points out, the Tribunal focussed on his past conduct in neglecting his grandmother's care, which resulted in the ADC intervening and removing her from his care. That is apparent from the Tribunal's reasoning at [59]: "the Tribunal was not satisfied that [Peter] was a suitable person to be appointed as [Maureen's] guardian due to his inability to promote [Maureen's] welfare in the past" (emphasis added).
6. Nowhere in the Reasons did the Tribunal engage with Peter's claim that he now accepted responsibility for the circumstances which led to Maureen being removed from her home in 2023. Nor did the Tribunal engage with his claim that since the initial guardianship order was made, he had taken steps to enable Maureen to be cared for at home, including purchasing equipment and exploring in-home care options, and so demonstrated that he now had a better understanding of her care needs. Nor did the Tribunal address Peter's submission that he was now able to make decisions on behalf of Maureen in a manner which gave paramount consideration to her welfare and interests.
7. The Tribunal was not obliged to accept Peter's claim that he had reformed and could now be entrusted to make decisions in relation to the functions conferred by the renewed order in a manner which conformed with the principles in s 4 of the Guardianship Act. Nonetheless, the Tribunal was required to engage with those claims and evaluate whether Peter was able to discharge the functions conferred by the renewed order at the time it made that order. By failing to do so and focussing solely on Peter's past conduct, the Tribunal misapplied s 17(1)(c).
8. This ground of appeal is established.

Did the Tribunal fail to give Peter and his sister a reasonable opportunity to speak at the hearing? (Ground 7)

1. Peter contends that the Tribunal failed to give himself and his sister a reasonable opportunity to speak at the hearing and, as a consequence, they were denied procedural fairness.
2. In written material in support of the appeal, Peter claimed that "the hearing ... was not conducted fairly because there was no opportunity given for parties to be heard". In oral submissions he claimed that the Member spoke for about 80 per cent of the hearing time leaving him with little opportunity to participate and to address the concerns raised by the Tribunal and the Public Guardian about his suitability to act as guardian. He said he may have been more accepting of the decision to appoint the Public Guardian had he been given a reasonable opportunity to address those concerns.

1. The Tribunal was obliged to afford Peter procedural fairness: NCAT Act, s 38(2). Among other things that obligation required the Tribunal to take such measures as are reasonably practicable to ensure that the parties to the review proceedings had a reasonable opportunity to be heard or otherwise have their submissions considered in those proceedings: NCAT Act, s 38(5)(c).
2. For current purposes, we will assume, but not decide, that the Sister was a person whose interests may be affected by the proceedings and therefore the Tribunal was required to afford her procedural fairness.
3. On 9 July 2025, a differently constituted Appeal Panel directed Peter to provide a transcript and a sound recording of the hearing at first instance if, in the appeal, he intended to rely on something that happened at that hearing. He failed to do so. The only information we have been provided about what happened at that hearing are the Reasons and the claims made by Peter in this appeal.
4. The Reasons contain several references to evidence given and submissions made by Peter in the course of the hearing: see, for example, [30],[31],[32], [33],[51],[53],[54]. The Reasons also refer to submissions made by the Sister in support of Peter being appointed as guardian: at [60]. While not determinative, these references do not support Peter's claim that he and his sister were denied a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
5. But more to the point, without the benefit of a transcript or the sound recording of the hearing, it is simply not possible to determine the factual premise on which this ground rests. As the appellant, it falls to Peter to establish the grounds he advanced in the appeal. His subjective recollection of what occurred at the hearing is insufficient to support his claim that he was denied a reasonable opportunity to make submissions and give evidence.
6. Ground 7 must be rejected.

Did the Tribunal fail to afford the Sister procedural fairness by being or appearing to be biased against her? (Ground 5)

1. Peter contends that the Tribunal was biased or appeared to be biased against his sister. He claims that the Tribunal "verbally abused" his sister during the hearing.
2. This ground raises the same problem identified in ground 7 as discussed above. Without the transcript or sound recording of the hearing it is not possible to determine the factual contention on which this ground is based.
3. Therefore, this ground must be rejected.

1. Peter contends that the Tribunal made several factual errors. In addition, he disagrees with several conclusions reached by the Tribunal. He submits that this warrants the exercise of the discretion to grant leave to appeal.

1. In Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17, an Appeal Panel of NCAT noted at [84] that there must be a "sound basis" to grant leave to appeal under s 80(2)(b) of the NCAT Act. The Appeal Panel stated that ordinarily it is appropriate to grant leave to appeal only in matters that involve:

"(a) issues of principle;

(b) questions of public importance or matters of administration or policy which might have general application; or

(c) an injustice which is reasonably clear, in the sense of going beyond merely what is arguable, or an error that is plain and readily apparent which is central to the Tribunal's decision and not merely peripheral, so that it would be unjust to allow the finding to stand;

(d) a factual error that was unreasonably arrived at and clearly mistaken; or

(e) the Tribunal having gone about the fact-finding process in such an unorthodox manner or in such a way that it was likely to produce an unfair result so that it would be in the interests of justice for it to be reviewed".

(Citations omitted)

1. Where, as here, the decision under appeal was made by the Guardianship Division of NCAT, in exercising the discretion to grant leave the protective character of the jurisdiction exercised by that Division must be considered: SAB v SEM & Ors [2013] NSWSC 253 at [10]; C v W [2015] NSWSC 1774 at [44] - [46]; ZXO v Public Guardian [2022] NSWCATAP 260 at [105].

The purported inability to afford services finding (Ground 2)

1. Ground 2 is not easy to understand but appears to be a complaint about the Tribunal purportedly taking into account Peter's inability to pay for services to be provided to Maureen after she was discharged from hospital in the two or so years before the initial guardianship order was made. Peter contends that his ability to pay for services throughout that period, was irrelevant to his suitability to act as Maureen's guardian.
2. In the passage in which the purported finding is contained, the Tribunal records the reasons given by the previous Tribunal for making the initial guardianship order:

"53 The reasons for decision of the previous Tribunal recorded that [Peter] did not pay any money directly for living at [Maureen's] house, although he was said to have been contributing to bills. [Peter] was receiving the carer allowance when [Maureen] was living in her home. [Peter] was unable to afford services recommended by the hospital for the benefit of [Maureen] following previous discharges. [Peter] admitted that he had been irresponsible with managing [Maureen's] finances at that time."

(Emphasis added)

1. Peter does not dispute, as found by the previous Tribunal, that on those occasions she was discharged from hospital in the two or so years before the initial guardianship order was made, he was unable to afford services recommended by the hospital for Maureen's care at home. Rather, he complains that his capacity to pay for those services was irrelevant to his suitability to act as guardian.
2. Even if, as Peter contends, the Tribunal adopted the finding made by the previous Tribunal about his capacity to pay for services, we reject the contention that finding was irrelevant to the question of whether he was able to exercise the functions conferred by the guardianship order (s 17(1)(c)). That finding must be put in the context. Before the initial guardianship order was made, Maureen's cognition was impaired, and Peter was making decisions on her behalf. A key decision he made was that after she was discharged from hospital, Maureen should return to live at home with him, notwithstanding that he was aware that she would not receive hospital recommended services because he lacked the capacity to pay for them. That decision was relevant to an assessment of Peter's judgment and his insight into the likely impact on Maureen of living at home without those services. Notably, returning to live at home was not the only option available to Peter. An alternative option, as eventually occurred, was for Maureen to live in residential aged care.

1. Peter contends that the finding made by the Tribunal that he was unsuitable to act as Maureen's guardian was inconsistent with its finding at [37] that "there is no evidence that I have not done what's in [Maureen's] best interests".
2. Peter is mistaken. The finding at [37], to which he refers, relates solely to the decisions he made about Maureen's health care after she moved to residential aged care in January 2024. That is apparent from the passage in which the impugned finding appears:

The Public Guardian proposed that [Peter] could be recognised as [Maureen's] person responsible, and make decisions regarding her medical and dental consents, rather than a guardian being reappointed to do so. There was no evidence before the Tribunal that [Peter] has not made good decisions regarding his grandmother's health since she has lived in the ACF. [Peter] was willing to make those decisions, and the Tribunal was satisfied that a guardian was not required to be appointed at this time with health care and medical and dental consent functions.

(emphasis added)

1. The Tribunal did not find, as Peter contends, that he made "good decisions" about all matters relating to Maureen.

The purported decision made by the Public Guardian not to revisit the accommodation decision (Ground 4)

1. Ground 4 appears to be a complaint about the Public Guardian's apparent refusal to reconsider its decision that Maureen remain in residential aged care, unless and until Peter provided medical evidence to support his claim that it is her best interests to return to live at home with him. At [28], the Tribunal said that the Public Guardian anticipates that because of Peter's view that Maureen should return to live with him, it is likely that in the future a further decision about Mareen's accommodation will need to be made. The Tribunal reasoned that it was therefore necessary that the appointed guardian be given an accommodation function.
2. The Tribunal neither recorded nor endorsed the purported decision made by the Public Guardian that it would not revisit its decision that Maureen remain in residential aged care. There is nothing in the Reasons which might tend to indicate that the Tribunal was aware of that decision or considered it relevant to whether the power to appoint Peter as guardian could be exercised.

The qualifications of the geriatrician assertion (Ground 6)

1. Ground 6 appears to be a factual assertion that the geriatrician who assessed Maureen at the request of the Public Guardian, Dr P was not qualified to provide an opinion about whether a Level 4 care package would be sufficient to meet Maureen's care needs if she were to return at home to live.
2. Leaving to one side the lack of evidence to support that assertion, the decision that Maureen remain in aged care was a decision made by the Public Guardian not the Tribunal and had no apparent relevance to the Tribunal's decision to appoint the Public Guardian.

1. The errors of fact said by Peter to have been made by the Tribunal are not established. The conclusions reached by the Tribunal about which Peter complains could not be said to be unreasonably arrived at or to be clearly wrong. Peter has failed to identify a sound basis to warrant the exercise of the discretion to grant leave to appeal. The proposed appeal does not raise any issue of general importance or a matter of principle. Nor does it involve a clear injustice such that it would be in the interests of justice to revisit the decision. Further, and significantly the proposed appeal has no reasonable prospects of success.
2. For these reasons, we decline to exercise the discretion to give leave to appeal.

1. The error made by the Tribunal in applying s 17(1)(c) of the Guardianship Act, was not material to the decision under appeal. This is because the Tribunal was not satisfied that "there is no undue conflict between the interests (particularly, the financial interests)" of Peter and Maureen (s 17(1)(b)). Therefore, irrespective of the conclusion reached by the Tribunal about whether Peter "is ... able to exercise the functions conferred" by the renewed order (s 17(1)(c)), it would not have been open to the Tribunal to exercise the power to appoint Peter as guardian.
2. For that reason, while allowed in part we have decided to affirm the decision under appeal.

(3) The decision made by the Tribunal on 17 April 2025 to renew and vary the initial guardianship order and to appoint the NSW Public Guardian as guardian for Maureen, is affirmed.

The Second Respondent and the person the subject of the appeal. YQJ's grandmother.

The appellant and YQK's adult grandson. The person who "has the care of" YQK within the meaning of s 3D(2) of the Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW).

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.