(3) A continuing guardianship order appointing the Public Guardian as the guardian of a person under guardianship shall not be made in circumstances in which such an order can be made appointing some other person as the guardian of the person.
20 The Tribunal referred to this in its second decision. It is because the appeal raises questions of parties and the proper application of s15(3) that I would grant leave to appeal if that were necessary. These are matters of general importance as opposed to the simple questions of fact, where it is undesirable that the court reconsider decisions of fact reasonably open to the Tribunal: K v K [2000] NSWSC 1052; C v C [2001] QSC 126. In any event I consider the s15(3) issue raises questions of law on its proper interpretation in light of s4 of the Act.
21 The Attorney-General sought and obtained leave to appear as amicus in the proceedings. I acknowledge the assistance given to the court by counsel thus appearing. I should also say that although the s15(3) question was never raised directly in the grounds of appeal it was clearly raised before me and if necessary I would give leave to further amend the grounds to reflect the argument.
Position of Ms M
22 I think that there is confusion in the reasons as to the position of Ms M. She was not a party. She was treated as a party in conflict or contest with Mrs W and referred to as such. For instance, Mr Cook presented her views. He was "speaking on behalf of Ms M" opposing Mrs W as a financial manager and proposing the appointment of Ms M or, in default, then the Protective Commissioner. He had no right of appearance at all under s58 of the Act. To that extent the hearing miscarried. I do not think there would have been any basis upon which the appointment of Ms M as financial manager could have been justified in face of the application by Mrs W.
Section 4 and section 14
23 Section 14 gives power to make a guardianship order. It sets out the matters to be considered in determining whether or not an order is necessary, recognizing of course that many people with a disability making them incapable of managing their person, can be properly looked after without the need for an order. The need for a guardian arose, the Tribunal decided, because there was an irreconcilable dispute about the future accommodation of Mrs G. To that extent s14 may have a bearing upon the s15(3) issue.
24 Section 4 sets out the general principles under which persons, including the Tribunal, must follow in exercising their functions under the Act. Principles (a) and (e) are the only ones relevant here and they are as follows:
4 General Principles
…
(a) the welfare and interests of such persons should be given paramount consideration,
…
(e) the importance of preserving the family relationships and the cultural and linguistic environments of such persons should be recognised,
…
The s15(3) question
25 There is no doubt that an order can be made appointing Mrs W as guardian. In fact, leaving aside the accommodation question, there is no doubt and it is not disputed she would be a proper person to be so appointed. There would be a considerable number of cases where no person would be available to be appointed. An example might be a disabled, destitute person with no friend or relative. Such a case might lead inevitably to the appointment of the Public Guardian. Nevertheless appointment of the Public Guardian should not, I think, be restricted to such cases. I consider that the proper meaning to be given to the section is to read it as saying that the Public Guardian should not be appointed in circumstances in which an order can properly be made in favour of another person. That requires not only that the person be willing, reliable and responsible, but that the appointment will result in the policy considerations and principles set forth in the Act being given effect. In this case, Ms M is not a party. She is not put forward as a guardian. Mrs C cannot be a guardian. The fact that Mrs W would obviously keep the accommodation of Mrs G as it is does not necessarily mean either, that it would not be an appropriate decision, or that Mrs W cannot be guardian.
26 While s15(3) must be interpreted within the context of the Act and in accordance with its principles, it must be given effect within those bounds. In Lunacy and Mental Health proceedings it has always been the policy to appoint a member of the family as committee or guardian of the person if that were possible. The policy is continued under the Act which created the office of Public Guardian. Just because a decision is required about accommodation and there is some dispute about this does not mean that a close family member holding one view ought not to be appointed. On the other hand if the Tribunal considered the evidence established that such a decision was likely not to be in the interests of the person under guardianship then the person who would make such a decision would not be a person who could properly be appointed under s15(3). In other words what is described as a "contest" is not sufficient reason not to appoint a person otherwise appropriate as guardian. This may mean that the Tribunal has to consider the evidence in some little detail. In the present case for instance, accepting that Mrs W, if appointed guardian, would retain the existing arrangements for the accommodation for Mrs G at Bundanoon, the Tribunal would need to decide whether that fact meant that Mrs W could not properly be appointed so that the appointment of the Public Guardian was authorized pursuant to s15(3).
27 This is not a case of two persons entitled to be parties contending for different appointments. It is a case of Mrs W, as a family member and as a party because she commenced the proceedings, being brought into or considered as in contest with Ms M, who is not a party and is not applying for guardianship, but who has strong views in opposition to the appointment of Ms W. While I would not wish to be thought to be saying that the Tribunal proceedings should be made unnecessarily formal, I do think it is necessary that the standing of people whose opinions seem to be given considerable weight, is clearly set out. If that is not done, then it seems to me the Tribunal may be seen to be giving undue weight to the views of what in law might be termed "interfering bystanders", although I am not saying that to be the position here. If Mrs C had sought to be made a defendant in these proceedings before me I think it is likely I would have made such an order. Ms M was given the opportunity to seek that she be made a party to these appeal proceedings but stated that she did not wish to become a party. In any event, it is unlikely that I would have joined her because I would not have considered it would have been appropriate for her to be a party before the Tribunal. I should say, however, that I have no reason to think that Ms M, in taking the steps she had taken up to date, has not been acting in what she considers to be the best interests of Mrs G, although in truth she is probably putting more emphasis on the interests of Mrs C. I should add here that there are no other contestants for appointment. Mr B does not seek appointment; Mrs C does not seek appointment and in any event it would not be appropriate to appoint her; Ms M does not seek appointment and in any event would not be appointed in light of the claim by Mrs W.
28 In all the circumstances I have come to the conclusion that insofar as leave is required then leave should be given as undue weight appears to have been given to the views of Ms M, who was treated as a party, and the facts necessary to justify the appointment of the Public Guardian in light of s15(3) have not been found. For the same reasons the appeal should be allowed. In those circumstances, either the matter will have to be reconsidered by the Guardianship Tribunal or the court should come to its own decision. I consider it should be remitted for decision by the Tribunal in accordance with these reasons. The Tribunal may hear further evidence including evidence of facts and matters relevant to a decision arising since the review. That is because if the evidence is convincing that it would not be inappropriate in the interests of Mrs G to remain at Bundanoon that would indicate that an appointment can be made of Mrs W as guardian.
Financial Management Order
29 I have come to the clear view that this order made should be set aside and that Mrs W should be appointed as manager. The Tribunal in coming to its decision treated Ms M as a party and gave undue weight to her views. The fact Mrs W may become a substitute executor of the will of Mrs G does not put her in a position of conflict. It is not suggested that she would not act in the best interests of Mrs G. She can take appropriate advice, and management of the fund will be relatively simple. She is at hand, at least at present, and can see for herself the needs of Mrs G that should be provided for. The opposition of Ms M does not justify the appointment of the Protective Commissioner in this case. It involves additional expense which need not be incurred.
30 Orders