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[2017] VSC 29
Supreme Court of Victoria
2017-02-08
VICKERY J
Original judgment source is linked above.
CONTRACT - Principles for inferring a contract from conduct - Conduct relied upon not capable of giving rise to a contract - No intention to enter into any agreement enforceable at law as a binding contract.
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST - Muschinski v Dodds [1985] HCA 78; (1985) 160 CLR 583 constructive trust considered - Common intention constructive trust considered - Onus of proof - Onus not discharged by party asserting constructive trust.
CORPORATIONS - Duties of directors to company - Content of conflict of interest rule and the profit rule - Application to a corporate trustee holding trust property - Evidentiary value of company financial statements - Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 295, 296, 297, 1308 and 1309 - ASIC v Hellicar 247 CLR 345, 381 discussed and applied.
EQUITY - Fiduciaries - Director of corporate trustee arranged for sale of assets of the trust - Motivated in significant part by personal advantage to himself - No loss or damage sustained to trust - Whether breach of fiduciary duties - Content of fiduciary duties of conflict of interest and acting for personal interest considered - Liability of recipient company for knowing receipt of property in breach of trust - First limb of Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244, 251-252 considered and applied - Persons considered to be the 'mind' of the recipient company.
EVIDENCE - Evidentiary Value of the Financial Statements - Assessed in context of Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) - Requirements on companies and their directors in relation to the accuracy of financial reports and statements - ASIC v Hellicar 247 CLR 345, 381 applied.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Very large number of issues to be determined - Trial of first tranche questions determined in a sequential trial - Ying Mui & Ors v Frank Kiang Ngan Hoh & Ors (Ruling No 1) ('Ruling No 1') [2016] VSC 519 applied.
RESULTING TRUST - Whether resulting trust arose in favour of family company - Principles applicable to formation of a resulting trust when real estate purchased - Purchase money in part supplied, not as capital for the purchases, but as loan funds - No resulting trust found.
1 This proceeding arises from the management of investments in Australia undertaken by the Hoh family, or parts of the Hoh family. The investments were property investments made in Victoria, Australia, over a period of some nine years, between 2001 and 2010.
2 Questions as to the beneficial ownership of the property investments is a principal subject matter of the litigation.
3 The proceeding, for the most part, concerns the creation and management of, and control over, two Australian family discretionary trusts established by elements of the Hoh family - the Ying Mui Trust and the Amore Trust. Sharikat Ying Mui Sendirian Berhad ('SYM'), the Fifth Defendant to a counterclaim in the proceeding, is a central participant. SYM is a private limited company incorporated in Malaysia in which various members of the Hoh family are shareholders. It has been the primary vehicle through which the broader Hoh family business has operated.
4 The trial has been conducted pursuant to a 'sequential trial' model described and ordered in Ying Mui & Ors v Frank Kiang Ngan Hoh & Ors (Ruling No 1) ('Ruling No 1').[1]
(a) The Plaintiffs' second further amended statement of claim dated 23 March 2016 (statement of claim);
(b) The First to Fifth Defendants' defence and counterclaim dated 1 April 2016 (defence and counterclaim); and
(c) The Plaintiffs' reply and defence to counterclaim dated 25 January 2016 (reply and defence to counterclaim).
6 Further, the Plaintiffs provided two sets of further and better particulars on 7 August 2015 and on 26 August 2015.
7 The statement of claim contains 464 paragraphs, 56 prayers for relief, together with 8 schedules of particulars. It consolidates the allegations in a first proceeding with those in a second proceeding.
8 As noted by the Court in relation to case management in Ruling No 1:[2]
This [consolidated] proceeding has extraordinary breadth and has generated a very large number of issues to be determined. Factually, the issues span more than fifteen years of complex commercial activity, and involve numerous actors and commercial entities. Many documents have been generated by these activities for the Court to consider, contained in the Court Books and Supplementary Court Books. Further, a considerable number of causes of action have been pleaded which call for close analysis and determination. ...
...
Whilst it is appreciated that the approach reflected in these management orders is somewhat novel, and involves a novel use of Order 47.04, nevertheless the extraordinary breadth and number of issues generated by this case, which span more than fifteen years of complex commercial activity, and involve numerous actors and commercial entities and many documents to consider, all call for special management of the trial in order for the overarching purpose of the CPA [Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic)] to be achieved as best as it is possible to achieve it.
9 The Court, having identified the fundamental issues in the proceeding, made orders during the trial in respect of the following questions (referred to forthwith as the 'First Tranche Questions'):
(1) In or about April 2001, or at any other and what time, was the alleged Joint Investment Agreement (the 'JI Agreement') formed between George, Frank and Robert Hoh to undertake property investment in Victoria through the vehicle of Ying Mui Pty Ltd, and if so:
(a) what were the terms of the JI Agreement?
(b) was property investment in Victoria subsequently undertaken by George, Frank and Robert Hoh pursuant to the JI Agreement?
(2) If not, in and after April 2001, was any or all property investment in Victoria undertaken by the Hoh family:
(a) for and on behalf of the family company, SYM; and/or
(b) pursuant the alleged benevolent purpose; and/or
(c) paid for by capital advanced by SYM, and not by loan funds;
(d) and if so, should any and what assets be held wholly or partly on a resulting and/or a constructive trust for SYM?
(3) Did Lumarkye, in receiving the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 from Ying Mui, knowingly receive trust property? If so, is Lumarkye a constructive trustee with respect to the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 or is required to pay compensation to Ying Mui?
10 These are the reasons for the determination of the first tranche of questions in the trial.
11 The First Tranche Questions were ordered to ensure the efficient and timely resolution of issues in the proceeding consistent with the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic). The Court accepted that answers to those questions would not resolve the entire proceeding but were 'pivotal to its ultimate disposition and the determination of the real issues in dispute in the proceeding overall'.[3]
12 The orders also provided that issues of quantum be determined separately from liability. That meant that a significant body of valuation and quantum evidence was not tendered during the trial.
13 Having regard to the lengthy period which has elapsed since the occurrence of so many of the events in question, the only safe course is to place primary emphasis on the objective factual surrounding material and the inherent commercial probabilities, together with the documentation tendered in evidence. In this context, the subjective interpretation the parties placed on the meaning, significance and effect of the objective evidence, must be approached with caution.
14 The conclusion described in these reasons for judgment in respect of this phase of the trial has been considered accepting counsel's final addresses as identifying the issues and the central relevant materials. In arriving at these reasons and the solutions to the questions which have arisen, I have read and considered, subsequent to their making, all that counsel have said in final addresses, both oral and written, and in their opening addresses, as well as the evidence of the witnesses. However, in order to make these reasons a workable document, not every element in the considerable array of material considered will be included or expressly referred to.
15 The case has invited a consideration of a body of circumstantial evidence in addition to direct evidence of events and transactions. In this regard, reference is made to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Nolan v Nolan where Chernov and Eames JJA said as to the accepted approach:[4]
The approach that is to be adopted in determining whether the ultimate fact, of which there is no direct evidence, can be inferred from other established facts, has been examined in a number of recent cases which re-state principles as to which there was little controversy before us. The principal debate before us centred on whether her Honour's analysis of the evidence was in accordance with the accepted approach. Thus, for example, in Chamberlain v. The Queen (No.2) Gibbs CJ and Mason J said:
"In a case depending on circumstantial evidence, the jury should not reject one circumstance because, considered alone, no inference of guilt can be drawn from it" and "that the jury should decide whether they accept the evidence of a particular fact, not by considering the evidence directly relating to that fact in isolation, but in light of the whole evidence, and that they can draw an inference of guilt from a combination of facts, none of which viewed alone would support that inference."
And in Shepherd v The Queen Dawson J, who delivered the principal judgment, after referring to Chamberlain (No. 2) said:
"Circumstantial evidence is evidence of a basic fact or facts from which the jury is asked to infer a further fact or facts. It is traditionally contrasted with direct or testimonial evidence, which is the evidence of a person who witnessed the event sought to be proved. The inference which the jury may actually be asked to make in a case turning upon circumstantial evidence may simply be that of the guilt of the accused. However, in most, if not all, cases, that ultimate inference must be drawn from some intermediate factual conclusion, whether identified expressly or not. Proof of an intermediate fact will depend upon the evidence, usually a body of individual items of evidence, and it may itself be a matter of inference. More than one intermediate fact may be identifiable; indeed the number will depend to some extent upon how minutely the elements of the crime in question are dissected, bearing in mind that the ultimate burden which lies upon the prosecution is the proof of those elements. For example, with most crimes it is a necessary fact that the accused was present when the crime was committed. But it may be possible for a jury to conclude that the accused was guilty as a matter of inference beyond reasonable doubt from evidence of opportunity, capacity and motive without expressly identifying the intermediate fact that the accused was present when the crime was committed."
A little later, his Honour said that "evidence may have a cumulative effect" and that it is incumbent upon the arbiter of fact "to consider all the facts together at the conclusion of the case".
Although the observations made by the High Court in Chamberlain (No. 2) and Shepherd were expressed in the context of criminal proceedings, the principles also have application in civil cases. Indeed, Tadgell JA explained in Longmuir that, both in the civil and criminal law context, the evidence in question must be evaluated as a whole and that the object of the exercise in a case such as the present, where direct proof of the disposition contended for is not available, is to ascertain "whether the evidence paints a picture to be derived from an accumulation of detail. The overall effect of the detailed picture can sometimes be best appreciated by standing back and viewing it from a distance, making an informed, considered, qualitative appreciation of the whole. The overall effect of the detail is not necessarily the same as the sum total of the individual details." Thus, it seems plain enough that, when a court is asked to infer a fact from various items of indirect evidence, it must consider the combined or cumulative effect of the evidence. This Court in Longmuir concluded that the trial judge had erred because he considered each item of circumstantial evidence in isolation from the other material and sought to determine whether the ultimate fact could be inferred from each such item of evidence. In that case, the respondent's house was damaged in a fire that was deliberately lit and there was a large body of circumstantial evidence which pointed to the respondent having set the property alight. The trial judge found for the respondent notwithstanding the evidence that implicated him in the lighting of the fire, his Honour reasoning that there was a possibility that someone else had set fire to the respondent's residence. In upholding the appeal on the basis that the judge had erred in the manner in which he assessed the evidence, the President observed:
"[H]is Honour deprived himself of the opportunity of assessing the full impact of [the] evidentiary facts by engaging in a false process of reasoning. Rather than considering what inferences flowed from the combination of evidentiary facts which were not in contest, the learned judge appears to have treated each of the individual evidentiary facts as if it were the ultimate factum probandum; in the sense that unless, when analysed, it was capable by itself of supporting the inference that the respondent was responsible for lighting the fire, it should be discarded without regard to the support which such fact might have received from the other facts."
Reference should also be made to the observation of Buchanan JA (with whom Phillips CJ and Charles JA agreed) in R v Huisman & Shiells that "the distinction between the evidence founding a chain of sequential reasoning and an accumulation of circumstances from which a fact may be inferred was explained metaphorically in Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 9 para. 2487, as the distinction between links in a chain and strands in a cable. See Shepherd v R" and in R v Ng the Court of Appeal held: "It is the very essence of a circumstantial case that the items of evidence should not be examined in isolation, but must be considered in their totality."
16 Consistently with the above statements of principle, I have approached the task of assessing the items of evidence and arriving at the conclusions expressed in these reasons by considering the evidence in its totality.
17 The structure of the Hoh family is outlined here.[5]
18 The Hoh Family was headed by Hoh Ying Chye ('Hoh Senior') who was married to Madam Yow Mui ('Madam Yow'). They are both now deceased. They had seven children.
19 The seven children of Hoh Senior and Madam Yow were:
(1) Robert Hoh Kiang Chan ('Robert'), who passed away on 24 December 2007;
(2) Linda Hoh Yuet Ngo ('Linda'), who passed away in 1959;
(3) Maureen Yuet Ming Oborn (nee Hoh) ('Maureen', also nicknamed 'Binky');
(5) George Hoh Kiang Po ('George') (the 'Third Plaintiff');
(6) Frank Hoh Kiang Ngan ('Frank') (the 'First Defendant'); and
20 Frank married Pooi Yoke Lim Hoh ('Pooi', also nicknamed 'Kit'), the Second Defendant. They had two children, Lynn Yook Lien Hon ('Lynn') and Ian Han Lok Hoh ('Ian'), whom are the Third and Fourth Defendants respectively. In late 1987, Frank, his wife and their children migrated to Australia.
21 Disputes have divided the Hoh family into three factions.
22 In the period spanning from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, Derek and Richard split from the Hoh family following a series of commercial disputes which developed. These matters are dealt with in more detail below.
23 The Hoh family has since divided into two further factions.
24 On the one side is the faction led by George (the 'George Faction'), supported by Maureen and his nephew Han Kayet Hoh ('Han') (the Fourth Plaintiff), who is the son of Robert. Han stepped into the shoes of Robert upon his death.
25 On the other side is the faction led by Frank (the 'Frank Faction'), supported by his wife Pooi and their children, Lynn and Ian, as well as Dominic Weng Khong Low ('Dominic'), who is Lynn's husband.
26 Thus we have in essence two opposing factions represented as follows:
27 Hoh Senior was a successful businessman in Malaysia. He made various investments in Malaysia, primarily through SYM, a company which he founded. The business interests of SYM included acting as a financier to four pawnbroking businesses, investments in shares in those pawnbroking businesses, and property investments in commercial, industrial and retail properties throughout Malaysia, combined with trading in gold and jewellery, and general trading.
28 SYM is a private limited company incorporated in Malaysia on 26 September 1968. The original subscribers of SYM's shares were Hoh Senior and Madam Yow, each holding one share.
29 SYM owned shares in the following pawnbroking companies incorporated and operating in Malaysia (collectively the 'Pawnshops'):
(1) Choong Teck Pawnshop Sdn Bhd (incorporated on 8 May 1998);
(2) Cheong Fatt Pawnshop Sdn Bhd (incorporated on 9 May 1998);
(3) Choong Thye Pawnshop Sdn Bhd (incorporated on 28 January 2004); and
(4) Choong Yee Pawnshop Sdn Bhd (incorporated on 11 June 1997).
30 The commercial activities of SYM generated wealth and prosperity for the Hoh family.
31 Hoh Senior gave each of his children shares in SYM.
32 In 1986, George took over the management of SYM, as Hoh Senior was 84 years old and had suffered a series of strokes. Hoh Senior passed away two years later.
33 The First to Fifth Defendants sought to establish the existence of a benevolent purpose put in place by Hoh Senior for the benefit of present and future generations of the broader Hoh family (the 'Benevolent Purpose').
34 The First to Fifth Defendants contended that the objective evidence establishes that the all property investment in Australia in and after April 2001 was undertaken by the Hoh family pursuant to this Benevolent Purpose. They pointed to a large body of uncontroverted evidence concerning Hoh Senior's legacy and the role of SYM.
35 There was no dispute that Hoh Senior worked hard, accumulated wealth during his lifetime and had a clearly expressed wish in relation to SYM and its role in helping current and future descendants within the Hoh family.
36 Frank's evidence on this issue, which was unchallenged, was as follows:
My late father, Hoh Ying Chye ("my father"), and my late mother, Yow Mui ("my mother"), had seven children ... [including] Robert, born in 1930, who passed away on 24 December 2007, ... whose only son is Hoh Han Keyet ... Maureen, born in 1933, Derek Hoh Kiang Howe ("Derek"), born in 1935 ... George, born in 1943 ... Frank ... born in 1944; and Richard Hoh Kiang Seong ("Richard"), born in 1946 ...
My father was a very determined and very strict man. He was very strong willed. ...
My father had an English education and spoke English. When I was young my father was a maths teacher. He was a teacher for about 35 years before his retirement from teaching when I was in my teens. Even while he was a teacher my father had other interests, which he always took very seriously. When he did something, he (to my observation) did it well. One of those interests was to collect stamps which he thought were of value. He did it as an investment as well as a hobby and established the Malaysian Stamp Company. As children we would help by cutting out the stamps from envelopes and washing them. From time to time, stamp collectors (including some from the UK) came to visit him in Malaysia. Stamp trading was a good source of income for my father, which income he used to educate his children in the UK and, to a lesser extent, in Australia. My father often said he had a strong belief in education. Robert, Maureen and Derek were educated in the UK, while Richard and I were educated in Australia. George initially went to the UK to study but did not graduate and later studied computer science in the ANU. I assisted him to settle in Australia.
For as long as I can remember my father was in the pawnshop business. He was involved, together with his cousins, in establishing the family run pawnshops in 1947.
My mother, a Malaysian-Chinese, was a devoted housewife. She came from a large family of 11 siblings. Family and family values were to my observation very important to my mother and my father. This was instilled in me from a very young age. My father was the son of a Chinese immigrant. Living in a foreign country, where all we had in terms of a support was family, my parents were very supportive of their wider family. For example, my father's brother was shot and killed during the Japanese occupation of what was then Malaya. His brother had three boys and two girls. My father took in and raised three of my cousins, Fook Yoong, Foong Yoong, and for a short period, Kiang Ming.
The broader Hoh family business was and is primarily run through the company called SYM. SYM is a Malaysian company founded and incorporated by my father on 26 September 1968. My father gave his children shares in SYM. SYM's ownership structure was and is as follows:
(a) In or around 1979 my mother and the children (excluding Linda, who had already passed away) each held 250,000 shares in SYM. Han, being the first and eldest grandson, held 100,000 shares, and the rest of my father's grandchildren each held 50,000 shares. To the best of my knowledge, my father retained no shares in SYM in his own name.
(b) In 1980 Maureen was required by my father to give up 150,000 of her 250,000 SYM shares following a dispute with my father. Those shares were transferred to my mother, Richard and me, who each received 50,000 shares.
I subsequently transferred 50,000 shares to my son, Ian, while my mother and Richard each transferred 50,000 shares to his two children, Leonard and Samantha.
(c) Thereafter, broadly speaking, the shares in SYM have been roughly equally divided five ways between the respective families of my father's five, with Maureen holding a smaller number of shares.
My father's requirement was that only the men in the family could be directors of SYM, and that they would control the company. When I finished my studies in Australia and returned to Malaysia I spoke with my father about the SYM ownership structure. My father told me that he intended that the future generations of the family would be provided for, regardless of their gender, but that his sons should have control of SYM. I considered that the same intention could be achieved under a fairer and more tax efficient structure. After discussing this with my father he changed SYM's share structure, to make two classes of shares, being ordinary shares and "non-director" shares.[6] The male family member had ordinary shares that made them eligible to be directors but, other than my mother, the female family members' shares did not entire the shareholder to be a director of SYM. The Hoh family companies also became entitled to hold "non-director" shares. All shares carried the same voting rights.
...
Shortly after the end of World War II, my father started the pawnbroking business in a family style "partnership" with two of his cousins, Ho Patt (born in 1909) and Hoh Chiap (born in 1911) (collectively, the "Pawnshop Owners"). There was no formal documentation to reflect the arrangements between them.
In around 1947, the Pawnshop Owners established the Choong Teck Pawnshop and Choong Fatt Pawnshop. ...
My father often referred to the Pawnshops as a "poor person's bank" because they operated in effect as an informal bank, offering loans to the public on the security of chattels where the banks were not interested in lending.
In addition to the profits generated by the Pawnshops' business, which the Pawnshop Owners (i.e. our partners) divided among themselves, the Pawnshop Owners also profited from interest income from funds "deposited" with the Pawnshops in the following manner:
(a) From time to time, when the Pawnshops required working capital, the Pawnshop Owners who had sufficient funds at the time would advance loans (which were often referred to as "deposits", likened to deposits with a bank), to the Pawnshops.
(b) the Pawnshop Owners did not necessarily advance loans to the Pawnshops in equal shares, but rather, whoever had sufficient "spare" funds at the time would advance the loans required.
(c) At various times, the Pawnshops also took deposits from third parties (i.e. people other than the Pawnshop Owners). These people were primarily relatives and friends of the Pawnshop Owners). However, these third parties received a lower interest rate on their loans than the Pawnshop Owners and their immediate families did on their loans.
The Pawnshop Owners were assisted in the day-to-day operations of the Pawnshops by a distant relative, Ho Tee Chai who was an employee and earned a wage. He was not entitled to preferential interest rates on funds deposited with the Pawnshops.
In 1968 my father incorporated SYM and transferred his interest in the Pawnshops into SYM.
Between 1969 and the early 1970s the other Pawnshop Owners cease to be involved in the Pawnshop business and received full repayment of their loans (with interest) to the Pawnshops. Thereafter, my father become the sole owner of the Pawnshops.
At around that time Ho Tee Chai reached an agreement with my father and became a part-owner of the Choong Teck and Choong Fatt Pawnshops. Pursuant to the agreement Ho Tee Chai became entitled to 3% of the Pawnshops' profits.
Over the years Ho Tee Chai and his family have gradually increased their shareholdings in the Pawnshops.
Management of SYM prior to my father's death in 1988
Since the 1970s, at my father's direction, all six of his surviving children were appointed as directors of SYM. Maureen later resigned as a director in 1980 following a dispute with my father. Although my father was not a formal director of SYM, he remained the directing mind of SYM and solely in charge of running its business, with the assistance of SYM's staff.
My understanding is that my father set up SYM as his "living will". He often said to me that SYM was intended to be his legacy for future generations of the broader Hoh family (the "Benevolent Purpose"). I discuss the Benevolent Purpose further below, but in short, the income generated from SYM's business and investments was to be used to provide financial assistance and support to members of the broader Hoh family.
My father did not make any particular effort to groom any of his children to take over SYM's business. My father saw to it that we received a university education overseas. After that, he said he expected that we pursue own careers, which we did. None of us were therefore heavily involved in SYM's business when my father was alive and well, even though his sons were directors in name. We would, however, occasionally provide some assistance to SYM's business on a temporary basis upon my father's request.
In 1986, when my father was 84 years old and had suffered a series of strokes, George began to increase his involvement in SYM. At or around this time I was preparing to migrate with my family to Australia and did so in December 1987. At the time only three of the sons (being Robert, Derek and George) were living in Malaysia and, of the three, George was the only one who did not have children).
...
My parents always placed great importance on family gatherings. While my parents were alive and I was living in Malaysia with my family, we would have regular family dinners on Fridays. My family would also come together for important occasions like birthdays and festivals ... My father and mother, and my siblings and I, expected that all family members would attend these events.
As a young man, I wanted to get into business like my father. My father and I would talk about business generally and also about the family business, in particular. Similarly, family lunches and dinners invariably involved talking about the family business. I really enjoyed it and found business fascinating. Through these discussions, and family life generally, I came to understand the family business and my father's desires for it.
Before my father's death, whenever my siblings or I needed money, we asked father for a loan. ...
As mentioned above, my understanding is that my father set up SYM as his "living will" and that SYM was intended to be his legacy for future generations of the broader Hoh family. When he died, he had very little to give in his will. Instead, he had placed the substantial majority of his assets and wealth into SYM and prepared a document entitled "Final instructions and Supplement to My Will". I understand that, in this way, my father's will was effectively dealt with through SYM and the shares issued to his children, informed by his written wishes. ...
After my father's passing Robert and my mother said on many occasions (often at family meetings) that if a family member was in need financially, whether it be the result of a health problem, disability or some other cause, the family business would be there to support them.
37 George conceded much of this evidence in his cross-examination.
38 Lynn and Kit provided similar evidence of Hoh Senior's legacy. Lynn recalls the following in relation to SYM and her grandfather:
At the family dinners the members of the extended Hoh family would regularly talk about the family business, which was operated through [SYM]. With the exception of my grandmother, the business was the responsibility of the men in the family. While Frank would regularly talk at home to my mother and, later as I got older, to me about the family business, as a woman, I understood that I would never be in a position to "run the company". I later learned that as a female shareholder, I was not eligible to be a director of SYM ...
As a child I was told by my grandfather and father that the extended Hoh family would be there for me if I ever needed support, financial or otherwise. My father always told me that, in times of need, I could count on my family.
...
Through my conversations with my grandfather Ying Chye and my father Frank and interactions with Hoh family members when I was young I was told by them that the extended Hoh family would support its members. The concept of filial duty is deeply rooted in our family culture. As I got older and began to learn about the extended Hoh family business, I always knew that I could approach the board of SYM (made up of Frank and my uncles) and ask for money, if I needed it. While I never had a reason to ask for money, I always knew that it was there as a safety net available to the whole family.
39 Hoh Senior's wishes were reflected in the provisions of SYM's Memorandum and Articles of Association. For example, the membership provisions of SYM's Articles of Associate state:
40 Further, the final instructions and supplement to Hoh Senior's will dated 1 September 1981 are of note. Relevantly, they provide:
FINAL INSTRUCTIONS AND SUPPLEMENT TO MY WILL
These are my last instructions to my children, grand-children and their descendants and it is my sincere wish that they will be faithfully carried out.
...
According to the Articles of Association of our family Company, under Clause No. 3 (amended on 1-1-1981) the membership shall be restricted to the natural male descendants, but any unmarried daughter of a member may be accepted and may hold shares as long as she lives. However if she married, she can still hold her shares and collect any dividends due to her. At her death, her shares must be transferred within six months as a present or gift to any one or more of the members of the Company as she wishes, or sell at a price not less than the par value of the shares.
...
The Assets of the Company consist of Immovable Properties including the three built-up blocks of Buildings - two at Pudu and one at Jalan Ipoh known as Bangunan Ying Mui ... Two blocks of three-storeyed buildings, each containing twelve flats will soon be erected on this land. All my grand-children and daughters-in-law will each be given a life-time lease on one flat the nominal rent of one ringgit a year and pay the annual Government charges of Assessment and Quit rent. These five lots are not to be sold under any circumstance. Beside these lots, there other immovable properties shares and cash deposits in Pawnshops.
The Penthouse in Jalan Badak at Pudu is to be offered for occupation free of rent, assessment, water and electricity supply to my eldest son. If he does not accept, then it is to be offered to the other sons in order of seniority and thereafter to my grandsons with the following conditions:-
...
(d) On Chinese New Year Eve he will prepare at the Company's expense a Reunion Dinner to all members of the family who are all expected to attend. Twice a year on Chinese New Year and "Ching Ming" all members must meet in the Penthouse at an appointed time in the morning and gather at the Ancestral Memorial to pay respect to our Ancestors and ask for their blessings and guidance.
...
After deducting all expenses, income tax etc. the net income of each year will be distributed as follows: A dividend of 10% is to be paid to all the shareholders according to the number of shares held by each person. If your mother survives me, each shareholder will contribute to her 5% or one-half of the dividend for her own use. A sum equivalent to about 1% of the total gross dividend will be paid to each of the 5 Directors as Directors' fees (Each son will appoint a Director). The final balance will be retained by the Company as Reserve Fund for future developments and purchase of shares of other companies. If the Company is not in debt a suitable sum may be kept aside to be used as charitable donations as the Company will think fit. ...
A sum of money for each of my grand-children has been paid into the pawnshops as fixed deposits bearing interest at 1.2% per month compounded monthly. These deposits are to be provide her or University Education to the grand-children who may withdraw the money when he or she is admitted into a University and needs the money. If the child is unable to obtain admission into a University or does not require the money, he or she may withdraw the cash when he or she attains the age of not less than twenty-five (25) years. If the pawnshops are not operating the cash will be withdrawn and deposited in the Banks in the name of the Company who will hold the cash and accounts in trust for the children.
It is my deepest and dearest wish that my children and descendants will continue to love and help each other when I am gone. Take heed of the old saying "Harmony within the Family promotes prosperity". The way to achieve such harmony as taught by ancient sages is to cultivate the virtues of filial piety and brotherly love.
It has been our good fortune to be born and bred in this Country which has a great future. This is our home and country and we must be loyal and patriotic and defend it as best we can when necessity requires us to do so. ...
The ethical teachings of Ancient China are well worth mentioning here and should be passed on to future generations. Our ancient sage said that one must first of all cultivate himself by character building and then regulate his family. ...
41 George was familiar with those instructions and it was his, Frank's and Robert's intention to carry out Hoh Senior's instructions, at least until the departure of Derek and Richard from the family enterprise in relation to the Australian investments. George gave evidence that he understood that his father wished to leave SYM for future generations and that it was his intention to give effect to those wishes (a view he shared with Frank and Robert). However, the situation changed following the change of position adopted by Derek and Richard. The following exchange between counsel and George is referred to:
You're [sic] understanding of your father's wishes is what I'm asking you about. You understood he wished to leave SYM for future generations didn't you? --- Yes
You and your brothers, Frank and Robert, all agreed that that should be the case didn't you? --- Yes. It was Derek and Richard who appeared not to be keen on that idea? --- Yes.
42 For the subsequent ten years following Hoh Senior's passing in March 1988, the directors of SYM remained unchanged, with all six branches of the Hoh family holding shares, and each receiving dividends in accordance with their shareholding.
43 I accept that Hoh Senior intended to set up SYM as his 'living will' and legacy. In short, Hoh Senior intended that the income generated from SYM's business and investments was to be used to provide financial assistance and support to members of the broader Hoh family.
44 However, since Hoh Senior passed away, and following the split of Derek and Richard from the Hoh family after a series of commercial disputes which occurred during the period between late 1990s and early 2000s, I am not satisfied that the Benevolent Purpose of Hoh Senior was able to be put into effect as he had intended, or at all.
45 To the extent that witnesses called on behalf of the Frank Faction made reference to the Benevolent Purpose continuing as a purpose governing the investments made in Australia, I find this evidence to be a self-serving personal interpretation of the facts. Although strongly conveyed in the witness box, the beliefs of these witnesses are not founded on any legal or factual basis which can safely be relied upon as an expression of an ongoing common intention of the Frank Faction on the one hand and the George Faction on the other, which served to regulate the property investments made in Australia.
46 In 1986, Hoh Senior and his wife Madam Yow purchased a property in Longueville, Sydney. This property was known as the 'Red House'.
47 The Red House was purchased by a company, Vielass Pty Ltd, which later changed its name to Ying Mui Pty Ltd ('Ying Mui'), the First Plaintiff.
48 The initial directors of Ying Mui were Madam Yow and Richard, together with Richard's wife, Chor Jee Tan.
49 Richard and his wife had, by this time, moved to Australia.
50 Tables A-N annexed to these reasons set out the structure, including shareholdings and directorships, of each of the relevant corporate actors in this proceeding.
51 Tables O-S additionally set out the structure of each of the relevant trusts, including the trustees and beneficiaries, of each of the relevant trusts in this proceeding.
52 Below is a brief description of the principal entities in the proceeding, in addition to SYM.
53 The shareholders of Ying Mui are presently George and Han. George is also a director of Ying Mui.
54 Ying Mui was originally incorporated to purchase and hold a property in the Sydney suburb of Longueville called the 'Red House'. The Red House was sold in the period from 1997 to 1998.
55 From about 6 July 2001 until 18 November 2011 Ying Mui carried on the business of trustee, initially as trustee for the Hoh Family Trust, which after 16 February 2002, became the Ying Mui Trust.
56 Amore Corporation Pty Ltd ('Amore') is the Second Plaintiff.
57 Lokit Investments Pty Ltd ('Lokit') is the Fifth Defendant. Frank along with Frank's wife Pooi and his son Ian are directors of Lokit and the 12 shares are held equally by Frank and Pooi.
58 Lumarkye Pty Ltd ('Lumarkye') is the Sixth Defendant. The directors of Lumarkye are Dominic and You Keun Hoo (known as 'Vgene' or 'Aunty You').
59 Frosthollow Pty Ltd ('Frosthollow') is the Seventh Defendant. The sole director and shareholder of Frosthollow is Lynn.
60 Frosthollow is presently the trustee of two family discretionary trusts, the Ying Mui Trust and the Amore Trust, which are also central actors in the case. The First Plaintiff is the former trustee of Ying Mui Trust and the Second Plaintiff is the former trustee of the Amore Trust.
61 Olrey Pty Ltd ('Olrey') is the Eighth Defendant. It was incorporated on 11 November 2009.
62 Frank Hoh was appointed a director, along with his wife Pooi, and both served its directors between 3 December 2009 until 1 March 2013.
63 Lynn Hoh was appointed a director of Olrey on 18 July 2011, and is currently the sole director.
64 FRG Investments Ltd ('FRG'), is a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands in December 2004.
65 From the outset, and currently, its directors and shareholders have remained as George, Frank and Robert Hoh (replaced by his son Han after Robert's death on 24 December 2007).
66 The central trust entities in the proceeding are:
67 The Ying Mui Trust was established on 6 July 2001. It was and remains a discretionary trust.
68 The former trustee was Ying Mui (from 6 July 2001 to 18 November 2011), when it was replaced by the current trustee, Frosthollow (appointed 18 November 2011).
69 The appointer at all material times is and has been Frank.
70 The specified beneficiaries defined in the trust deed of the Ying Mui Trust are and at all material times have been: Frank and Lokit Investments Pty Ltd; George and Beaustate Sdn Bhd; Robert and Rohandaren Holdings Sdn Bhd and Maureen.
71 The schedule to the trust deed provides that the general beneficiaries include the specified beneficiaries and the:
Spouse, Grandparents, Parents, Brothers, Sisters, Aunts, Uncles, Nieces, Nephews, Cousins, Children, Grandchildren of the said Specified Beneficiaries whether natural relatives or adopted relatives and all subsequent issue of any of the above mentioned persons.
72 The Amore Trust was established the following year on 20 June 2002. It was and remains a discretionary trust.
73 Amore was appointed the trustee from 20 June 2002. The trustee remained as Amore until 8 December 2011 when it was replaced by Frosthollow, again at the behest of Frank.
74 The appointer is and has at all material times been Frank.
75 The specified beneficiaries defined in the trust deed of the Amore Trust are and at all material times have been: Frank, Pooi, Lynn, Ian, and Lokit Investments Pty Ltd; George and Beaustate Sdn Bhd; Robert and Rohandaren Holdings Sdn Bhd and Maureen Oborn.
76 The schedule to the trust deed provides that the general beneficiaries include the specified beneficiaries and the:
Spouse, Grandparents, Parents, Brothers, Sisters, Aunts, Uncles, Nieces, Nephews, Cousins, Children, Grandchildren of the said Specified Beneficiaries whether natural relatives or adopted relatives and all subsequent issue of any of the above mentioned persons.
77 The FRG Investments Trust, a discretionary trust of which Olrey is the trustee.
78 'FRG' is an acronym for 'Frank, Robert & George'.
80 The nominated beneficiaries are: Frank, Lynn, Ian, Lokit Investments Pty Ltd and Linjoshan Pty Ltd; George, Braden Hoh and Beaustate Sdn Bhd; Han and Rohandaren Holdings Sdn Bhd; Maureen Oborn; and Ying Mui Pty Ltd.
81 The General beneficiaries of the FRG Investments Trust were as defined in clauses 2.1 and 2.2 of the FRG Investments Trust deed to mean, inter alia, the Nominated Beneficiaries and:
the parents brothers sisters spouses ... of the Nominated Beneficiary or Nominated Beneficiaries and the spouses widows widowers children and grandchildren of such brothers sisters spouses children and ... any charity ... etc.
(b) Opesco Investments Pty Ltd ('Opesco'), which was incorporated in Hong Kong in 1988;
(c) Artimax Investment Ltd ('Artimax'), was incorporated in Hong Kong as a limited company on 22 October 1999. At the time of incorporation, the registered shareholders and directors were Robert, George and Frank. Upon Robert's death on 24 December 2007, George and Frank became the only directors. A conflict has arisen as to the present shareholding of Artimax as described below;[7]
(f) The Woolshed Unit Trust, of which Lumarkye is the trustee;
(g) The River Venture Unit Trust, of which River Ventures is the trustee; and
83 In the late 1990s to early 2000s, disputes developed between Frank, Robert and George, on the one side, and Richard and Derek, on the other side. Issues which were the subject of these disputes included the following:
84 These disputes have generated considerable animosity between Richard and Derek on the one hand, and Frank, Robert and George on the other.
85 As a result of these disputes, Frank, Robert and George sought to exclude Richard and Derek from any further involvement in the commercial activities of the family as far as it was possible to do so. They sought to have legal title to all of the shares in Ying Mui transferred to them and for Derek and Richard to cease as shareholders of Ying Mui.
86 Discussions between Frank, Robert and George were undertaken with a view to restructuring Ying Mui. Any further investments in Australia were put on hold until after Richard and Derek had been removed as shareholders.
87 In due course, Richard settled the issue with the execution of a deed of release, which resulted in a payout to him of $52,853. This represented Richard's proportionate share of the profits held in Ying Mui resulting from the sale of the Red House. In return Richard agreed to transfer his shareholding in Ying Mui and this was effected in August 2000.
88 Derek surrendered his shares in Ying Mui in April 2001, at which time he was also paid out his share of the proceeds of the Red House.
89 As a result, by April 2001, the shareholding of Ying Mui was confined to Frank, Robert, George and Maureen, who each took 83 shares.
90 Further, Frank, Maureen and Lynn (all being residents in Australia) were appointed as the directors of Ying Mui.
91 Robert was married to Daisy Sui Keng Hoh ('Daisy'). Their son Han is the Fourth Plaintiff.
92 As earlier noted, Robert passed away on 24 December 2007.
93 By his will dated November 1964, Daisy was appointed to be the sole executrix of Robert's estate (the 'Estate'), and was bequeathed and devised all of Robert's property absolutely. On 12 October 2012, probate in respect of the estate was granted to Daisy in Hong Kong. The estate included Robert's one share in Artimax.
94 By an instrument of transfer dated 17 December 2012, Daisy elected to register Han as the holder of Robert's share and transferred it to him as a gift. By a letter dated 17 December 2012, Daisy requested that Artimax's board of directors effect the transfer.
95 A legal dispute subsequently emerged over the beneficial ownership of Robert's single share, specifically whether it was the subject of a trust in favour of SYM.[8] On 30 June 2016, the Hong Kong Court of First Instance held, inter alia, that Han was the legal and beneficial owner of the share.[9] The judgment is presently the subject of an appeal.
96 Briefly stated, the Plaintiffs' case against the First to Fifth Defendants is that they are each liable for certain misconduct in connection with the property investments undertaken in Australia through three corporate trustees - Ying Mui, Amore and Olrey.
97 Ying Mui and Amore bring claims as the former trustees of the Ying Mui Trust and the Amore Trust, respectively.
98 The Plaintiffs allege, in essence, that the purpose of the property investments in Australia was to benefit Frank, Robert and George (and their immediate families), but not Richard or Derek (or their immediate families).
99 The investments undertaken in Australia followed disputes between Frank, Robert and George on the one hand, and Richard and Derek on the other hand, as earlier referred to.
100 Over the ensuing years, numerous investments in real estate were made principally using the Ying Mui Trust, the Amore Trust and the FRG Investments Trust (of which the Eighth Defendant, Olrey, was the trustee). These investments were said to be undertaken pursuant to a purported joint investment agreement reached between Frank, Robert and George (the 'JI Agreement') in about April 2001. Pursuant to this JI Agreement, Frank, Robert (succeeded by Han) and George invested funds derived from Malaysia which they 'arranged' to be transferred to Australia.
101 The Plaintiffs claim that the 'seed money' for the property investments in Australia comprised the funds remaining from the sale of the 'Red House', which Frank, Robert, George and Maureen decided to reinvest rather than cash out, following resolution of their dispute with Richard and Derek.
102 In addition, the investments were funded, in part, by loan funds derived from Malaysia loaned by Frank, Robert and George to Ying Mui and Amore, with the balance of the funding provided by external lenders, primarily the Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd ('ANZ').
103 The Plaintiffs contend that although the funds remitted from overseas were sourced from a number of different accounts, as between Ying Mui and Amore and the provider(s) of those funds, those funds were remitted to Ying Mui and Amore as loans from Frank, Robert or George.
104 The loans were claimed to have been recorded in numerous contemporaneous documents, including the accounts of Ying Mui, deeds of postponement between Ying Mui, ANZ and George, Frank and Robert, minutes of family meetings and contemporaneous payment vouchers.
105 The Plaintiffs say that this arrangement worked until mid-2010, at which time the relationship between Frank and George collapsed.
106 It is then alleged that Frank, with varying levels of assistance from his wife Pooi, and children, Lynn and Ian, exercised his powers as a director of Ying Mui and Amore to procure the sale of numbers of the Australian property investments (the 'asset sale and distribution decision').
107 Frank, with assistance from the other defendants, as part of the asset sale and distribution decision, is alleged to have effectively appropriated the assets of the Ying Mui Trust, the Amore Trust and the FRG Investments Trust for the benefit of both himself and members of the Hoh family aligned with him, to the exclusion of George, Han and Maureen.
108 In other words, reduced to its most simple analysis, Frank and his family are alleged to have sold relevant trust assets comprised by the property investments in Australia and in effect have made distributions to themselves. This conduct is alleged to have been undertaken by Frank and his co-director and son, Ian, and allied family members, in breach of the duties he owed as a director, appointor and fiduciary, and Ian owed as a director and fiduciary.
109 The principal claim against Lumarkye is that by purchasing the two Australian investment properties namely those situated at:
(a) 530 Melton Highway, Sydenham, Victoria (the 'Sydenham Property'); and
(b) Lot 202, 440A Hampton Street, Hampton, Victoria ('Lot 202')
it was a 'knowing recipient' of trust property wrongfully transferred from the First Plaintiff in breach of fiduciary duty owed to it by Frank and Ian.
110 Alternatively, it is said by the Plaintiffs against Lumarkye that it:
(a) wilfully shut its eyes to the obvious fact that each property was sold by Ying Mui in circumstances where the defendants Frank and Ian had caused the sale to occur in breach of their fiduciary duties, or
(b) wilfully and recklessly failed to make such enquiries as an honest and reasonable person would make as to the circumstances of the sales, or
(c) had knowledge of the circumstances which would have indicated to an honest and reasonable person that Frank and Ian had caused the properties to be sold to Lumarkye by breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Ying Mui.
111 It is also alleged that, in acquiring the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 in late 2011, Lumarkye and its director Dominic received financial assistance from Lokit and Frank, again in breach of fiduciary duty.
Summary of First to Fifth Defendants' case in the proceeding
112 The First to Fifth Defendants position in relation to the First Tranche Questions is set out below.
113 Firstly, they contend that there was no JI Agreement at any time in relation to the Australian investments. They assert that the arguments advanced by the Plaintiffs in support of such an agreement do not withstand scrutiny and are inconsistent with the contemporaneous documents. Rather the evidence shows that the investments were always intended to benefit the broader Hoh family (including George and Han) pursuant to the Benevolent Purpose and as an extension of SYM in Malaysia.
114 The Australian investments were funded partly by bank borrowings, secured by mortgages provided by the relevant trustee companies and personal guarantees provided by Frank and Pooi and cross-collateralised against Frank's personal investments, and partly by funds remitted from Malaysia belonging to SYM, not the three brothers.
115 The funds advanced from Malaysia for investment in the Australian properties were from SYM and were by way of capital, not loans.
116 By reason of SYM's funding and backing of the Australian investments, the remaining Australian assets should be held on a resulting or constructive trust for SYM.
117 The sales of Lot 202 and the Sydenham Property by Ying Mui did not involve any breach of duty by Frank or Ian because they acted bona fide and did not act in conflict of interest or for an ulterior purpose. The substantial purpose of the sales was to pay down debt of Ying Mui. There is therefore no need to consider whether Lumarkye knowingly received trust property in acquiring those properties because there was no breach of any fiduciary duty.
Summary of Sixth Defendant's case in the proceeding
118 In order to make out their claim against it, Lumarkye contends that the Plaintiffs need to first establish that the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 were transferred to Lumarkye in breach of fiduciary duty.
119 The purpose and effect of the sale of these two properties to Lumarkye in late 2011 was to reduce debt which Ying Mui had previously incurred in financing property purchases in its capacity as trustee of the Ying Mui Trust.
120 Specifically, the purchase monies received from Lumarkye were paid directly to the trust's bankers, ANZ, and used by them to repay a commercial bill facility for a total sum of $2,700,000, which was due to be rolled over in December 2011.
121 This conduct, it was said, cannot be in breach of trust, where the properties were sold at full market value, and there was no other conduct which was wrongful or fraudulent which could amount to any breach of trust.
122 Further, on the facts, it was put that Lumarkye did not have the requisite degree of knowledge required for liability under either limb of Barnes v Addy.[10]
123 It was also put that the knowledge of Lynn (the wife of Dominic, one of the directors of Lumarkye) cannot be imputed to Lumarkye.
124 Further, although it was alleged by the Plaintiffs that Lumarkye should also be fixed with the knowledge and activities of Ian, no evidence was led to the effect that he was, or could have been, Lumarkye's controlling or guiding mind, nor its agent for any purpose.
125 Lumarkye further contends that, in any event, no loss or damage has been proven to have been sustained by the conduct alleged against it, and, in these circumstances, no relief can be granted, even if a breach of duty is able to be established.
126 Lumarkye maintains that the First Plaintiff has neither made out any:
(a) case for obtaining equitable compensation from Lumarkye (because it has suffered no loss by reason of Lumarkye having purchased the properties at their then full market value); or
(b) basis for return of the properties (again since they were purchased at full market value, and Lumarkye cannot be fixed with knowledge of, nor participation in, any relevant breach of duty).
Summary of Seventh Defendant's case in the proceeding
127 There are two claims made by the Plaintiffs against the Seventh Defendant, Frosthollow. The claims may be distilled as follows:
(a) a claim that Frosthollow indemnify the First Plaintiff (Ying Mui) for the alleged loans made by the Third Plaintiff (George), Robert and the Fifth Defendant (Lokit) (the 'indemnity claim'); and
(b) a claim that distributions made by Frosthollow to beneficiaries in 2012, 2013 and 2014 were made in breach of trust (the 'distribution claim').
128 Frosthollow contends that the allegation made by the Plaintiffs, that the funds from Malaysia were remitted to Ying Mui and Amore as loans from Frank, Robert or George, is wrongfully made.
129 It does so, not for the purpose of contesting the existence of the JI Agreement (about which it makes no submissions), but for the purpose of contesting the indemnity claim made against it.
130 Frosthollow adopts the position of the First to Fifth Defendants that the money the subject of the indemnity claims comprised capital advances by SYM. Frosthollow says that the Plaintiffs have not satisfied the Court that George or Robert (or Lokit) lent the money. It says that the money did not originate from them, nor is there is any evidence that the money was ever lent to them, or otherwise became theirs to pay to Ying Mui or Amore on the condition that at some future time the loan monies would be repaid.
131 Frosthollow also submitted in relation to the distribution claim that, insofar as these distributions may be regarded as relevant background facts in respect of the First Tranche Questions (specifically question 3), they ought not be considered in some way as part of any alleged asset sale and distribution decision or motivated by any such decision. It says that it has not been established, and indeed there is no evidence to support the proposition that the distributions by Frosthollow to beneficiaries in 2012, 2013 and 2014 were made to give effect to any asset sale and distribution decision and ought not be considered or treated as such.
Summary of Eighth Defendant's case in the proceeding
132 The Eighth Defendant (Olrey) is the trustee of a family discretionary trust, being the FRG Investments Trust, and is sued in its capacity as trustee. The sole director of Olrey is the Third Defendant (Lynn). The nominated beneficiaries of the FRG Investments Trust include George, Han, Frank, Ian and Lokit.
133 The FRG Investments Trust was established by a deed of settlement dated 23 December 2009 and Olrey has been the trustee since that time.
134 Subsequent to the establishment of the FRG Investments Trust, on 8 March 2011, Olrey, as trustee of the FRG Investments Trust, entered into an agreement with Frank and Lokit in relation to the management of the business of the trust (the 'Olrey Management Agreement').
135 The Plaintiffs seek the removal of Olrey as trustee of the FRG Investments Trust and allege that Olrey acted in breach of trust by entering into the Olrey Management Agreement.
136 By way of counterclaim, Frank, Lynn, Pooi and Ian claim that the assets comprised in the FRG Investments Trust are held on a constructive or alternatively, a resulting trust, for SYM.
137 Olrey has elected to play no active role in the proceeding and will abide the Court's judgment in respect of the claims made against it. However, in the event that it is to be removed as trustee of the FRG Investments Trust or the assets of the FRG Investments Trust are to be transferred to SYM, Olrey will address the Court seeking orders that the vesting or transfer of the assets of the FRG Investments Trust be contingent upon the liabilities Olrey has incurred in its capacity as trustee of the FRG Investments Trust first being discharged.
138 Olrey made no submissions to the Court on the First Tranche Questions.
In or about April 2001, or at any other and what time, was the alleged Joint Investment Agreement (the "JI Agreement") formed between George, Frank and Robert Hoh to undertake property investment in Victoria through the vehicle of Ying Mui Pty Ltd, and if so:
(a) what were the terms of the JI Agreement?
(b) was property investment in Victoria subsequently undertaken by George, Frank and Robert Hoh pursuant to the JI Agreement?
140 In essence, the Plaintiffs plead that in about April 2001, there was an agreement (the 'JI Agreement') between Frank, Robert (succeeded by Han) and George to invest Malaysian funds they 'arranged' to be transferred to Australia.
141 In relation to the JI Agreement, the Plaintiffs plead:
In or about April 2001, Robert, Frank and George (the Joint Investors, subject to the Variation pleaded in part P below) agreed to pursue joint investments in Australia [...] for the benefit of the Joint Investors.
Particulars
Particulars of the [JI] Agreement are contained in Schedule 3.
142 The Plaintiffs allege that terms of the JI Agreement were partly in writing, partly oral and partly to be implied. Reliance is placed on written communications dated November 1999 and subsequent conduct, including allegations regarding the ownership of funds transferred to undertake the joint investments. The oral component of the alleged agreement is as follows:
Insofar as the Joint Investment Agreement was oral, it arises from the discussions that took place during a meeting held in Malaysia on or about 11 April 2001 attended by Robert, George and Frank (among others). During that meeting, there were conversations (among others) to the following effect:
(a) Frank proposed that Ying Mui be used as the vehicle for investments in Australia and George and Robert said that they agreed with Frank
(b) Frank proposed that he identify and propose joint investments in Australia and George and Robert said that they agreed with Frank;
(c) Frank proposed that he would make the investments in Australia and then manage them through Ying Mui and George and Robert said that they agreed with Frank;
(d) George proposed that decisions to be made as to the joint investments should be made by consensus as he and Robert were too far away and they could not allow Frank to buy or sell without consultation and Frank and Robert agreed with George; and
(e) Robert proposed that Frank be required to provide a schedule of the application of funds and borrowings or cash flow statements on request and Frank and George said that they agreed with Robert.
143 However, no breach of the JI Agreement is pleaded by the Plaintiffs, and no relief arising directly from any breach of the JI Agreement is sought. Rather, the Plaintiffs advanced their case on the JI Agreement being, principally, it appears, relevant as background to their pleaded causes of action in the Second Further Amended Statement of Claim.
144 They assert that the existence and terms of the JI Agreement provide some context to the their allegations that the First to Fourth Defendants acted in breach of the fiduciary and statutory duties they owed to Ying Mui and Amore, and the allegations of breach of trust on the part of the relevant trustee, and the conduct of the First to Fourth Defendants in procuring those breaches.
First to Fifth Defendants' submissions on the significance of the purported JI Agreement
145 The First to Fifth Defendants contend that the existence of the JI Agreement is fundamental to the way in which the Plaintiffs advance their claims.
146 Accordingly, the First to Fifth Defendants contend that there was no JI Agreement at any time in relation to the Australian investments. They submit that the evidence demonstrates that the investments were always intended to benefit the broader Hoh family (including George and Han) pursuant to the Benevolent Purpose and as an extension of SYM in Malaysia.
147 As to the significance of the JI Agreement to the manner in which the Plaintiffs' case is put against them, the First to Fifth Defendants say:
(a) The JI Agreement is alleged to constitute the basis upon which the joint investments were pursued in Australia. For example:
(i) the alleged Management Power of Frank derives from a term of the alleged JI Agreement;
(ii) the establishment of each of the relevant trusts is said to arise from Frank's purported exercise of the Management Power;
(iii) the No Conflict Rule, which provides the basis for later allegations of breach of duty by Frank including the creation of the relevant trusts and the appointment power, is claimed to be sourced directly from the Management Power and the JI Agreement;
(iv) the establishment of each of the relevant trusts is said to arise from Frank's purported exercise of the Management Power;
(v) the source of the funds used for investments are alleged to be in furtherance of the alleged JI Agreement and each of the investments are alleged to be joint investments and an implementation of the JI Agreement;
(vi) the JI Agreement is alleged to have been varied following Robert's death;
(vii) the alleged asset sale and distribution decision, and subsequent property sales are said only to assume relevance if there is in fact a JI Agreement; and
(b) The JI Agreement is alleged to constitute the basis upon which relief is sought. For example:
(i) part of the basis for impugning particular payments and agreements is that they were made for the purpose of implementing the alleged asset sale and distribution decision or made without informed consent of the joint investors;
(ii) part of the basis for seeking to invalidate Frank's appointment of Frosthollow is that he did not act exclusively for, and in the best interest of, the joint investors as a whole which necessarily requires a finding that there was a JI Agreement and there were joint investors;
(iii) part of the basis for seeking to remove Frosthollow is the JI Agreement and its alleged effect;
(iv) an alternative basis for claiming that the 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 distribution payments were made in breach of trust was that they were made to give effect to the alleged asset sale and distribution decision;
(v) Ying Mui's claim based on the right of indemnity proceeds on the basis that the three shareholders advanced loans to Ying Mui which implicitly proceeds on the basis that the three joint investors advanced funds of their own for the purposes of the joint investments; and
(vi) each of the alleged breaches of statutory and fiduciary duty by Frank, Ian, Pooi and Lynn are alleged to arise in the above context in which there is a JI Agreement and an alleged asset sale and distribution decision which disadvantages the other joint investors.
The Importance of the JI Agreement to determination of the proceeding
148 The existence, or otherwise, of the JI Agreement and, if it did exist, its terms, is of sufficient importance to consider and determine at the outset.
149 The outcome of the determination will provide the necessary framework against which the various claims of the Plaintiffs are to be considered.
Whether the JI Agreement existed and, if so, its terms
(a) Frank, Robert and George agreed pursuant to the JI Agreement to pursue investments in Australia for the benefit of themselves (and their immediate families), not the extended Hoh family;
(c) The property investments of Ying Mui, Amore and Olrey were made pursuant to the terms of the JI Agreement.
Legal Principles _ - Contract inferred from conduct_
[W]here there is a dispute as to the existence of a contract, or the contract is oral or there is a question as to how the contract is to be characterised or there is a question of whether a term was incorporated into a contract, or where there is a question of an implied term, the parties' subsequent conduct may be relied upon to establish the existence of that contract, and what the terms of the contract were.
I would see it as the inferring of a real intention expressed through, or to be found in, a body of conduct, including, sometimes, communications, even if it be the case that the parties did not consciously advert to, or discuss, some aspect of the relationship and say: "and we hereby agree to be bound in this or that respect. The essential question in such cases is whether the parties' conduct, including what was said and not said and including the evident commercial aims and expectations of the parties, reveals an understanding or agreement or, as sometimes expressed, a manifestation of mutual assent, which bespeaks an intention to be legally bound to the essential elements of a contract.
154 Thus, it is accepted that it is open to a court to infer the existence of a contract from the parties' conduct on the basis of the objectively ascertained manifestation of mutual assent.[18]
155 However, such cases are rare and it will only be 'in a very clear case that a promise will be implied from facts which do not involve written or oral communication from which a promise appears'.[19]
... in the "unrefined" commercial context the benchmarks of the classical theory of offer, acceptance, consideration and intention to create legal relations may not readily apply, and instead courts may infer a contract from conduct, [McHugh J] still insisted that it is necessary to draw from those circumstances "a tacit understanding or agreement" and that the parties' conduct "must be capable of proving all the essential elements of an express contract". Moreover, it is "not enough that the conduct is consistent with what are alleged to be the terms of a binding agreement. The evidence must positively indicate that both parties considered themselves bound by that agreement".
157 Thus, in assessing the evidence relied upon to establish a manifestation of mutual assent, which in turn points to an intention to be legally bound to the essential elements of a contract, the conduct must be capable of satisfying the Court on the balance of probabilities that a contract is to be inferred. The evidence must positively indicate that both parties considered themselves bound by that agreement. Equivocal conduct, or conduct which, when looked at as a whole, falls short of providing the requisite degree of satisfaction, will not result in a contract being proven.
158 Following Richard and Derek's departure from Ying Mui, Frank, Robert and George regarded themselves in a position to pursue investments in Australia. As Frank said in his oral evidence at trial:
[W]e are free to invest ... They [Richard and Derek] are no more there and we are free to do as we wish.
159 Written correspondence exchanged between Frank, Robert and George in November 1999 supports this intention:
(a) By memorandum dated 16 November 1999, Frank wrote to George, expressed the view that 'there is no better secure investment than property' and stated that 'I am not prepared to let my portion of funds in SYM(A) sit in a bank and earn under 4% ... I don't want my funds sitting in a bank';
(b) By letter dated 18 November 1999, George forwarded Frank's memorandum to Robert, and wrote further 'I am in agreement with him', and expressed the view that if they wanted 'to build a capital base outside Malaysia' Robert and George should 'trust and support [Frank] in his choice of investment'. Otherwise, George confirmed that they could 'distribute the profits for each of us to individually decide on its application'; and
(c) By letter dated 22 November 1999, Robert wrote that 'Some reasonable justification for any investment must be given' and that Robert would 'go along with the investment in Jells Road if it can be shown that the rental return will provide a return of 7% or 8% after all expenses'.
160 The oral evidence given by George at trial as to the existence of the JI Agreement indicates that the discussion was confined to the three brothers (himself, Frank and Robert). George's evidence to this effect was that:
Frank came to me one day when he was in Malaysia. He said, you know, "We have now sold the Red House. We have dividends from the sale, proceeds of the sale."... And he suggested that we invest in property in Australia ...
I said, "Fine. You know, I don't want to bring my money back into Malaysia. So if I have money here. I'm fine with investing so long as, you know, you invest and we have certain terms that we invest on I am fine" ...
And so I said, "Let's talk to Robert about it" ...
All three of us. We sat down. I can't remember whether Maureen was there, you know, but we sat down. I talked to Robert, "Look, Frank wants to invest with our money" and we agreed on certain terms" ...
Your Honour, the terms in essence was that Frank would manage the company here. He would be paid a salary, which he's supposed to propose. Right? Whatever he buys or sells must be by consensus. We must agree. He must discuss with us if he wants to buy anything, he wants to sell anything, any property. Funds will be from the initial dividends that we had from the sale of the Red House with my mother's loan. Yes to update us regularly on at least a minimum of one year, you know. The property we have, the funds utilised, how the funds were utilised to buy property ...
The acquisitions were from our funds.
161 No date was in evidence as to when these discussions took place in Malaysia, or precisely where they took place (the 'Malaysian Investment Conversations'). However, it is likely that they took place in the period after the sale of the Red House sometime in the period between 1997 and 1998 and the departure of Richard and Derek from Ying Mui which occurred by April 2001.
162 Frank further agreed that 'we did discuss' using 'Ying Mui to acquire property in Australia'.
163 Similarly, the evidence was that Robert told Han that 'he was going into investments with George and Frank and that was just through the three branches of the Hoh family investing in Australia'.
164 As outlined above, upon the death of Robert in December 2007, his estate passed to his wife Daisy, who in turn gifted what was formerly Robert's shareholding in Ying Mui to Han.
165 Thereafter, both George and Frank treated Han as if he effectively stood in the shoes of Robert in their property dealings.
Investment in Australia (October 2001 - February 2002)
166 In October 2001, Ying Mui as trustee of Ying Mui Trust acquired 33-37 Railway Parade, Glen Waverley (the 'Glen Waverley Property'). Before Ying Mui acquired that property, Frank faxed George concerning 'our cash outlay' and 'our return on investment' and asked George 'What price should we go up to?'.
167 Frank's evidence was that he 'discussed the Glen Waverley property with George' before he purchased it and 'sought George's input on the price we should pay for the property'. George further explained that he discussed with Frank 'where it was', what 'price to go up to', and to '[g]o up to [$]1.7[m] because that's a good return'.
168 In December 2001, Ying Mui, as trustee of the Ying Mui Trust, acquired the Sydenham Property. Before Ying Mui acquired the Sydenham Property, Frank faxed George some information concerning that property and projected rental returns. The evidence of George was that Frank 'proposed to buy this' property and Frank and George discussed it 'over the phone' and George approved the purchase. After Ying Mui acquired the property, Frank then sent George another fax concerning the property and wrote '[t]his is what we got'.
169 In February 2002, Ying Mui as trustee of Ying Mui Trust acquired a property in Hampton Street, Hampton (the 'Hampton Property'). Frank subsequently managed the development of this property which resulted in the construction of eleven residential units and two retail tenancies. Before Ying Mui acquired the Hampton Property, Frank sent numerous faxes and emails to George in relation to the property, in which he requested that George telephone 'to discuss', provided information and options for 'further discussion', and relayed advice received from a real estate agent. Frank accepted that he discussed 'the wisdom or otherwise of buying' the property with George and George further explained that he discussed with Frank that the plan was to 'sell the residential and retain the two commercial' for long term revenue. George also explained that he 'took it to Robert and Robert says, fine, you know. Yes'.
170 In April 2002, it was agreed that it was necessary to make some changes to the share structure of Ying Mui, pursuant to which Maureen ceased to be a shareholder in the company.
171 Frank, George and Robert agreed that Maureen would benefit from Ying Mui notwithstanding the relinquishment of her shareholding. A letter of comfort dated 31 May 2002 was drafted in her favour to give effect to this intention. No other member of the Hoh family received a letter in similar terms.
172 By these means, Maureen gave up her shareholding in Ying Mui for no payment but on the assurance that she would continue to be provided for.
173 It will be recalled that it had earlier been arranged for Richard and Derek to be paid out for relinquishing their shares in Ying Mui, thereby relieving Ying Mui of any obligation to continue to provide for them.
174 In this way, by on or about 31 May 2002 and thereafter, the shares in Ying Mui came to be held by Robert, George and Frank exclusively.
175 It was recorded at that time that Ying Mui 'is an investment company and is now in operation'.
Further investment in Australia (August 2002 - early 2010)
176 In August 2002, Ying Mui as trustee of the Ying Mui Trust settled its acquisition of 805/5 Caravel Lane, Docklands (the 'Docklands Property'). Frank's evidence was that he discussed the Docklands Property with George 'before purchasing'. Further, Frank subsequently faxed George, upon receiving an inquiry from a real estate agent, and asked him '[d]o we want to sell [that property]?'. Frank also provided George with documents concerning a lease.
177 In October 2003, Amore (as trustee of the Amore Trust) acquired 1 Lynne Avenue and 456-458 Burwood Highway, Wantirna South (the 'Knox Properties') and in October 2007, Ying Mui acquired the adjacent property situated at 3 Lynne Avenue, Wantirna South (the 'Wantirna South Property'). Frank asked George for money to fund the acquisition of these properties. Frank subsequently emailed George regarding the projected costs and profitability of developing those properties.
178 In early 2010, Ying Mui borrowed $1,400,000, from ANZ. Ying Mui on-loaned those funds to Olrey, which purchased a property located at 800-802 Camberwell Road, Camberwell, as trustee of the FRG Investments Trust (the 'Camberwell Property').
179 Frank sent a number of emails to George in relation to the acquisition of the Camberwell Property. Frank also confirmed that he 'did discuss [the Camberwell Property] with him'. George further explained that he 'asked him you know give me - to find me more information' about the Camberwell Property and that he required Frank to '[g]ive [him] a figure that you know we have to pay' before completing the acquisition.
180 The Plaintiffs submitted that the evidence made it plain that Frank consulted with George in some detail in relation to the properties to be acquired in Australia.
181 They also pointed to evidence where Lynn said that 'my father made and received multiple calls from my Uncle [George] on a daily basis', and where George gave evidence that he 'always' then discussed the proposed properties with Robert, and later with Han.
182 The Plaintiffs also referred to evidence where George described his practice in the following terms:
Frank comes with this proposal to buy property. I discuss it with Robert and - ah, Robert will give his opinion, yes or no, and I agree with him. You know, we discuss it. We disagree so I try to convince him if I think it's good and finally if he agrees, [he] agrees, and we buy the property.
183 It was submitted that, in accordance with this practice, Frank understood that when he discussed with George investment opportunities in Australia, George would then 'discuss those in turn with Robert'.
184 They also submitted that the written correspondence exchanged between Frank, Robert and George evidenced that Frank sought the approval of George and Robert before making investment decisions in Australia. For example, in relation to various investments, Frank wrote: 'What price should we go up to??', 'Do we want to sell?', 'Let me know if you have any points to raise', 'Agent is after me for decision on Hallam', and 'Have a look at these properties'.
185 Further, the Plaintiffs referred to a concession made by Frank in cross-examination that he knew that he 'had to ask George whether he agreed with the proposal the idea of selling the [Hallam] property'. Similarly, in relation to another property, Frank gave evidence that 'George said that it was better that Ying Mui not proceed with the purchase of the Rowville property, so I decided to buy it myself'.
Conclusion as to the existence of the JI Agreement
186 Although I am satisfied that Frank, and George and Robert (and later Han), as a matter of practice, adopted a procedure of consultation in relation to the acquisition of investment properties in Australia between October 2001 and early 2010, I am not satisfied that the arrangement and the conduct evidenced a binding agreement in the nature of an enforceable contract between the three brothers, Frank, Robert and George (and later Han).
187 Although there was some conduct consistent with what are alleged to be the terms of the JI Agreement, there is insufficient evidence to satisfy me that the initial participating parties, namely Frank, Robert and George, considered themselves bound by its terms.
188 Rather, the arrangement as to purchase, ownership and division of the proceeds of sale of the various properties was governed by the trust deeds of the three trusts[22] and the control of the trusts was governed by the trustees of the trusts, namely the Ying Mui, Amore and Olrey companies, managed in accordance with the applicable company constitutions and the corporations law.
189 The three brothers were content to have these structures govern their relationship in law and in equity in relation to investments in property in Australia.
190 Frank, as the local representative in Australia for himself and his two brothers, Robert and George, assumed the primary role of sourcing properties for potential investment. The arrangement as to the buying and management of the various properties adopted a practice of consultation between the three brothers from time to time.
191 Beyond this structure, the following factors point to there being no intention to enter into any agreement that would be enforceable at law between them of the character of a binding contract:
(a) At least one of the components of the arrangement evidenced by the Malaysian Investment Conversations was never acted upon or enforced, namely that Frank would be paid a management salary, which was open to be proposed by him, but which in fact was never proposed. This remained the position until well after 2001, when Frank fell into dispute with George and unilaterally, and without any proposal and without any prior consultation, claimed a lump sum of monies for 'salary' he said was due to him and proceeded to pay himself the sum he claimed from trust funds;
(b) The arrangement was made between three brothers, who made investments of property in Australia for a considerable period, between October 2001 and early 2010, without any apparent intention to document their arrangements any further than the trust and corporate structures they had put in place; and
(c) The arrangement as to the buying and management of the various properties adopted a practice of consultation between the three brothers from time to time, where the practice was founded on a common understanding, but was not intended to be legally enforceable between them.
192 In answer to the question: In or about April 2001, or at any other and what time, was the alleged Joint Investment Agreement (the 'JI Agreement') formed between George, Frank and Robert Hoh to undertake property investment in Victoria through the vehicle of Ying Mui Pty Ltd?
The answer is: No legally binding agreement came into existence. However, an arrangement or understanding for a joint endeavour arose and operated between Frank, Robert (later Han) and George between October 2001 and early 2010 for investment in property in Australia.
193 In answer to the question: What were the terms [of the arrangement or understanding]?
The answer is: The arrangement or understanding was governed by the trust deeds of the three trusts and the control of the trusts was governed by the trustees of the trusts, namely by the Ying Mui, Amore and Olrey companies, managed in accordance with the applicable company constitutions and the corporations law.
194 In answer to the question: Was property investment in Victoria subsequently undertaken by George, Frank and Robert Hoh pursuant to the JI Agreement?
The answer is: No. The property investment was undertaken pursuant to a joint endeavour under the arrangement or understanding described.
If not [i.e. if property investment in Victoria was not subsequently undertaken by George, Frank and Robert Hoh pursuant to the JI Agreement] in and after April 2001, was any or all property investment in Victoria undertaken by the Hoh family:
(a) for and on behalf of the family company, SYM; and/or
(b) pursuant the alleged benevolent purpose; and/or
(c) paid for by capital advanced by SYM, and not by loan funds;
(d) and if so, should any and what assets be held wholly or partly on a resulting and/or a constructive trust for SYM?
Whether Australian investments undertaken for the benefit of the Hoh family company, SYM?
196 The evidence favours a finding that the purpose of acquiring the investments in Australia - whether made through Ying Mui, Amore or Olrey - was to benefit Frank, Robert and George (and their immediate families), rather than the extended Hoh family encompassing Richard and Derek or SYM (of which Richard and Derek remained shareholders). The evidence which points in this direction, and which I accept, is summarised below.
197 First, Frank, Robert and George intended to and did exclude Derek and Richard from Ying Mui. Frank, Robert and George elected to wait until a settlement had been achieved with Richard and Derek to secure their exclusion from any claim to monies comprising the surplus from the sale of the Red House held by Ying Mui. This was to provide the seed money for the Australian property investments. Once this had been achieved by April 2001, Frank, Robert and George were free to and did proceed with investments in property in Australia, as earlier described. In October 2001, Ying Mui as trustee of Ying Mui Trust acquired the first of the investment properties in Australia following the sale of the Red House, namely the Glen Waverley Property.
198 Oral evidence given by both Frank and George supports this finding. Frank gave oral evidence that:
(i) 'Ying Mui specifically excluded as shareholders Derek and Richard';
(ii) Derek had 'nothing to do with this company';
(iii) Richard and Derek surrendered their shares in Ying Mui in return for cash payments;
(iv) and that 'we have to exclude those two members [referring to Richard and Derek]'.
199 George gave oral evidence to similar effect, remarking that 'Australia here is Robert, Frank and George. We invested, we loaned money here, shares are held by us'.
200 As earlier found, I am satisfied that Frank, George and Robert (and later Han) as a matter of practice adopted a procedure of consultation in relation to the acquisition of investment properties in Australia between October 2001 and early 2010. They did not consult with Richard or Derek or their families in relation to these acquisitions.
201 Second, the corporate structure of Ying Mui, Amore and Olrey, and the specified beneficiaries of the Ying Mui Trust, the Amore Trust and the FRG Investments Trust, strongly point to an intention being held by Frank, Robert and George that investments made in Australia were to be made for the benefit of themselves and their immediate families, as well as Maureen, but not Richard or Derek. By way of summary:
(a) In April 2001, the shareholding of Ying Mui was restricted to Frank, Robert, George and Maureen, who held 83 shares each. From April 2002, Maureen ceased to be a shareholder, with the consequence that the shares in Ying Mui were held equally by Frank, Robert and George;
(b) The specified beneficiaries of the Ying Mui Trust, when established in July 2001, was also consistent with the intention to benefit the shareholders of Ying Mui (at the time George, Frank, Robert and Maureen) and not Richard and Derek. The specified beneficiaries were Frank and his company Lokit, George and his company Beaustate, Robert and his company Rohandaren, together with Maureen;
(c) The sole shareholder of Amore, when incorporated in August 2001, was Ying Mui. Amore was therefore at that time a wholly owned subsidiary of Ying Mui, which was then owned by Frank, Robert and George, together with Maureen. Importantly, neither Derek or Richard nor their respective families had any interest in Amore;
(d) The specified beneficiaries of the Amore Trust, when established in June 2002, again did not include Derek and Richard or their families but expressly included Frank, George, Robert and entities associated with them, together with Maureen. The specified beneficiaries of the Amore Trust were identical to the Ying Mui Trust, save that Frank also included his wife Pooi and his children Lynn and Ian in the Amore Trust as specified beneficiaries.
(e) The shareholders of Olrey, when incorporated in November 2009 (after the death of Robert), were Frank, the company Linjoshan, whose directors and shareholders comprise Frank, Ian and Lynn, and George's company Beaustate.
(f) Shortly after the incorporation of Olrey, in December 2009, Frank procured Olrey to execute a trust deed, which named Olrey the trustee of the FRG Investments Trust. The name 'FRG' selected for the trust was an acronym for the names of 'Frank', 'Robert' and 'George'. The specified beneficiaries of the FRG Investments Trust were the same as the Amore Trust, save that Han replaced Robert, and George's son, Braden, was included, and Linjoshan replaced Pooi. The FRG Investments Trust structure and its name, strongly suggested the intention to exclude Richard and Derek from its benefits.
202 Although each of the Ying Mui Trust, the Amore Trust and the FRG Investments Trust were in fact discretionary trusts, and each included a facility for distributions of benefits to the wider Hoh family as falling within the class of general beneficiaries, significance is to be attached to the families of Derek and Richard not being nominated as specified beneficiaries in any of these trust deeds.
203 I do not accept the evidence of Frank to the effect that he chose the specified beneficiaries by reference to 'whatever came to [his] head at the time' and that he chose the name 'FRG' because '[i]t just came to [his] head'.
204 A more likely scenario is that the specified beneficiaries were selected to reflect the intention of Frank, Robert and George in establishing the three trusts to benefit themselves and their families to the exclusion of Derek and Richard and their families. No evidence was called from any independent person, such as the solicitor who drew up the trust deeds, as to instructions received to reflect any alternative intention.
205 By way of summary, the shareholders of Ying Mui, Amore and Olrey and specified beneficiaries of the Ying Mui Trust, the Amore Trust and the FRG Investments Trust, comprised Frank, Robert and George and companies controlled by them, and members of their families, but tellingly, did not include any members of the families of Richard or Derek or any companies controlled by them.
206 Third, there was a body of consistent evidence, principally in the form of business records, which recorded both the intention to pay, and the fact of payment, of dividends to the shareholders of Ying Mui, namely Frank, Robert and George. By way of example, the following documentary evidence is referred to:
(a) minutes of a meeting in December 2001 record that:
'GH suggested and it was agreed that YMA should consider paying dividends on its investments whenever possible. While it is prudent to accumulate its earnings for future uses it is also necessary to pay reasonable dividends for the benefit of the shareholders';
(b) minutes of a meeting in April 2004 record that the investment policy of Ying Mui was that 'the investments should produce an income stream, if possible, so as to declare dividends unless otherwise required for new investments';
(c) the accounts of Ying Mui for the year ended 30 June 2006, which Frank signed in his capacity as a director as presenting 'fairly the company's financial position', recorded as a current liability of Ying Mui a provision for a dividend in 2005 and 2006 of $212,199 at a time when the only shareholders of Ying Mui were Frank, Robert and George;
(d) by letter dated 31 May 2002, Frank sent a letter of comfort to Maureen, upon her relinquishing her shareholding in Ying Mui. The letter was written 'on behalf of all other Shareholders' (who were Frank, Robert and George). The letter stated further that despite Maureen relinquishing her shareholding, she would 'continue to benefit from the Company's ability to provide for those members of the Hoh family still having an interest in Ying Mui Pty Ltd'.
207 In the light of these and other consistent documentary evidence, I reject the evidence of Frank to the contrary where he asserted that he never contemplated the payment of dividends. I also do not accept Frank's evidence when he said that he 'didn't agree with' that policy.
208 Fourth, there was a body of evidence which demonstrated that Frank, Robert and George consistently excluded Derek and Richard from the flow of information between them as to all investment structures and investment decisions made in Australia after 2001.
209 Frank himself gave oral evidence that '[t]here is no way that we would allow Derek or Richard to know what is done' in Australia.
210 Frank's wife Pooi confirmed that, in her capacity as a director of Ying Mui, she never provided Derek or Richard with any information 'in relation to the affairs of Ying Mui'.
211 Indeed, the Australian property investments were concealed from Derek and Richard. There was an example in evidence of a minute of a meeting being prepared in relation to SYM which was specifically designed to exclude Derek and Richard from receiving relevant information about the Australian investments. The recorded minutes of the meeting attended by Robert, Frank, George and Maureen held on 9 January 2000 to discuss, inter alia, the business of SYM, was marked 'RESTRICTED' and was intended not to be passed on to either Derek or Richard. George said in cross-examination that '[t]he restricted minutes were for distribution to myself, Frank and Maureen ... Of course Robert' but not for Derek or Richard.
212 The minutes of 9 January 2000 draw a distinction between SYM and SYM Australia. Following the sale of the Red House, the first property purchased for investment in Australia was the Glen Waverley Property in October 2001. This was purchased by Ying Mui Pty Ltd as trustee for the Ying Mui Trust, which had been established on 6 July 2001. Accordingly, at the time of the meeting held on 9 January 2000, the structure for the purchase of investment properties in Australia had not been established. Insofar as the persons present at the 9 January 2000 meeting were concerned, I am satisfied that when reference is made in the minutes of the meeting to 'SYM Australia' they had in mind and intended to refer to an entity or entities, yet to be established in Australia which excluded Richard and Derek. These entities ultimately became the Ying Mui Trust, with Ying Mui Pty Ltd as the trustee and the Amore Trust with Amore Corporation Pty Ltd as the trustee. It is apparent that, at this meeting, there was no agreement on the question of whether the directors and shareholders of 'SYM Australia' should make themselves available to be bound to personal guarantees should that be required to support loans to fund investments in Australia, although some of the participants at the meeting apparently ventured the view that SYM would 'ultimately be responsible and liable on the guarantee'.
213 The following evidence further supports a finding that the Australian investments were undertaken for the benefit of Frank, Robert and George, rather than for SYM.
(a) As discussed below, Frank, Robert and George were responsible for providing the funds for investment in Australia. Richard and Derek had no involvement in this process;
(b) Numerous emails and faxes sent by Frank to George in relation to the Australian investments, point to him considering the investments made by Ying Mui as ones which were made on behalf of Frank, Robert and George;
(c) When Frank and George fell into dispute in July 2010, Frank's daughter Lynn wrote to George offering a resolution. By letter dated 23 July 2010, Lynn proposed an 'asset swap', pursuant to which Frank and his family would gift to George and Han various assets, in return for George and Han relinquishing their claims to the Australian assets. In the proposal it was not contemplated that Derek or Richard (or their families) had any interest in the investments made in Australia or the Ying Mui Trust, the Amore Trust or the FRG Investments Trust. Furthermore, the proposal was inconsistent with any members of the extended Hoh family or SYM having any interest in the assets of the trusts.
To the extent that Lynn asserted in cross-examination that her proposal merely sought to 'separate the management' of the assets held by SYM and Ying Mui, I reject this evidence;
(d) It is of note that Richard and Derek did not participate in any of the discussions following July 2010 conducted between Frank and George or on their behalf, with a view to resolving the differences between them concerning the investments in Australia. Indeed, they were excluded from the discussions. As Frank observed, '[t]hey were not invited so they can't attend'; and
(e) On 12 October 2011, Frank, Lynn and Ian wrote to George, Han and Maureen advising of a decision they had made to 'cause YM, in its capacity as trustee, to sell the Trust's assets, for distribution among the beneficiaries'. The letter concluded by stating that '[t]he purpose of this letter is to inform you, as a matter of courtesy, of the course YM now intends to take'. The letter on its face does not contemplate that Derek or Richard or their families having any interest in the investments in Australia made through the Ying Mui Trust. Indeed the letter was exclusively addressed to George, Han and Maureen 'in your capacity as the heads of your respective families, the members of whom, together with ours, comprise the beneficiaries of the Trust'.
214 Finally, the oral evidence given by Ian at trial in relation to the letter of 12 October 2011 as to the status of the Australian investments, is compelling. It was wholly inconsistent with the case of the First to Fourth Defendants that investments were made in Australia for the benefit of the broader Hoh family. The transcript reads:
Do you accept that the letter [of 12 October 2011] is only addressed to George, Han and Maureen, and no other members of the Hoh family?---Yes.
And that's because, isn't it, you understood them to be the members of the Hoh family that had - that were the beneficiaries of the trust?---Yes.
Together with Frank and his immediately family?---Yes.
The letter isn't addressed, is it, to Derek or Richard Hoh?---No.
Or their family members?---No.
And that's because you didn't understand them to have any interest in the Ying Mui Trust, did you?---No.
And you didn't believe them to have any interest in the Ying Mui Trust based on conversations you've had with Frank over the years?---Yes ...
Is it correct though that you had discussions with your mother over the years regarding the Ying Mui trust?---Yes.
And based on those discussions you believed that the Ying Mui Trust was for the benefit of your father Frank and his immediately family?---Yes.
George and his immediate family?---Yes.
Han and his immediate family?---Yes.
And Maureen?---Yes.
But not other members of the extended Hoh family?---No.
And did you also discuss the Ying Mui trust with Lynn?---Yes.
And is the understanding you've just articulated also an understanding based on conversations you had with Lynn?---Yes ...
215 This evidence given by Ian assumes greater weight where it was given against Ian's own interest and that of his immediate family members in pursuing the Counterclaim.
Sources and character of monies for investment in Australia
216 I am satisfied that it was Frank, Robert and George who arranged the funds to enable the Ying Mui Trust, the Amore Trust and the FRG Investments Trust and their corporate trustees to make investments in Australia.
217 These funds originated from a variety of sources.
218 However, neither Richard nor Derek (nor their families) ever had any role in, and indeed were unaware of, the fund raising or investment activity.
219 Frank gave evidence that, following the departure of Richard and Derek from Ying Mui, the remaining 'funds from the Red House formed, in large part, the seed money to kick-start the Hoh family investments in Australia'. As to this observation, while I accept that funds derived from the sale of the Red House were used to provide the initial funding for investment in property in Australia, I do not accept that for this purpose the 'Hoh family' extended beyond Frank, Richard and George, and their immediate families.
220 As to these funds, only Frank, Robert, George and Maureen had an interest in them, as the remaining shareholders of Ying Mui. Prior to commencing further investment in Australia, both Richard and Derek had been paid their proportionate share of the proceeds of the sale of the Red House in return for cash payments they received for their shares in Ying Mui.
221 I conclude from the evidence that the seed money for the investments made by Ying Mui in Australia was derived from the remaining proceeds from the sale of the Red House. These comprised, monies which belonged to Ying Mui, and in respect of which the sole shareholders were Frank, Robert, George and Maureen, after the shares of Richard and Derek had been bought out.
222 The bulk of the funds used by Ying Mui, Amore and Olrey to acquire various properties in Australia were by way of bank finance.
223 The evidence was that the bank finance was advanced by ANZ, and on one occasion the Commonwealth Bank,[23] in various facilities granted from time to time, including commercial bills and loans.
(a) The purchase price of the Glen Waverley Property plus charges was $1,830,153, of which $1,550,000 was funded by a commercial bill from ANZ;
(b) The purchase price of the Docklands Property plus charges was $433,698, of which $350,000 was funded by borrowings from the Commonwealth Bank;
(c) The purchase price of the Sydenham Property plus charges was $711,204, of which $368,837 was funded by a commercial bill from ANZ;
(d) The purchase price of the Hampton Property plus charges was $2,210,000, of which $1,494,479 was funded by a commercial bill from ANZ; and
(e) The purchase price of the Camberwell Property was $3,160,000, of which approximately $1,400,000 was funded by Ying Mui with the balance funded by a loan from ANZ.
225 These bank borrowings from the ANZ and the Commonwealth Bank were undertaken by Ying Mui, Amore or Olrey which each assumed liability to service the loans and to repay the sums borrowed from time to time.
226 Frank, as the local representative in Australia for himself and his two brothers Richard and George, provided personal guarantees for these loans. Neither Richard nor Derek or any members of respective their families were made guarantors of any of the loans or assumed any liability in respect of the bank borrowings.
Funds remitted from overseas _ - whether loans or capital_
227 Ying Mui, Amore and Olrey also received monies remitted from overseas to fund the Australian investments.
228 The Plaintiffs contended that these overseas funds were remitted principally from Malaysia and were advanced as loans to the Australian trustee companies, Ying Mui, Amore and Olrey to make property investments on behalf of the Ying Mui Trust, the Amore Trust and the FRG Investments Trust respectively.
229 Reliance was placed upon contemporaneous documents, including business records, to establish these facts.
230 If this is found to be so, then the funds advanced to the trust companies as loans became the property of the trustee companies, subject to an obligation to repay the funds to the lender.
231 On the other hand, the First to Fourth Defendants contended that these overseas funds were advances by way of capital and were sourced from SYM.
232 If this was the case, a critical element in the establishment of resulting trusts in favour of SYM in respect of the various Australian investment properties was said by the First to Fourth Defendants to be made out.
233 The financial statements of the Ying Mui Trust and the Amore Trust recorded for a considerable period of the relevant time that the funds received from overseas were loan funds provided by Frank, Robert and George.
234 The financial statements of the Ying Mui Trust for the years 2004-2009 record in each of the years 2004 and 2005 the sum of $3,243,290 as a 'Shareholder Unsecured Loan', followed by the sum of $3,243,748 for the year 2006 and the sums of $3,230,249 for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009, which are recorded on the same basis.
235 Further, the financial statements of the Ying Mui Trust for 2010 recorded individual loans of $1,076,749 had been owed to each of George, Han (having succeeded Robert) and Frank's company, Lokit.
236 I accept that these records accurately reflect the transactions that were actually undertaken at the time. In all likelihood, the funds in each case were in fact loan funds advanced as loans to the Ying Mui Trust by the relevant shareholders, Frank, Robert and George.
237 It is to be inferred that a similar pattern of investment was followed in relation to property purchases undertaken by the Amore Trust and the FRG Investments Trust, to the extent that funds for property investment in Australia may have been originally sourced in part from SYM.
238 In respect of all of these financial statements, Frank confirmed in cross-examination that he:
(a) signed declarations, as a director of Ying Mui, that the financial statements and notes presented fairly the financial position of the Ying Mui Trust;
(b) understood that it was important when a director gives a declaration as to the accuracy of the financial statements, that the declaration be true; and
(c) believed the financial statements accurately recorded the financial position of the Ying Mui Trust.
239 The financial statements for the Amore Trust for 2005 and 2006 recorded a loan of $638,368 owed to Frank.
240 The financial statements for the Amore Trust for 2007 recorded a loan of $744,665 owed to Frank and George.
241 The financial statements for the Amore Trust for 2008 recorded a loan of $759,644 owed to Frank and George.[24]
242 The financial statements for the Amore Trust for 2012 recorded a loan of $1,380,178 owed to FRG.
Evidentiary value of the financial statements
243 The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) imposes a number of requirements on companies and their directors in relation to the accuracy of financial reports and statements. Critically, financial reports 'must comply with the accounting standards',[25] financial statements and notes 'must give a true and fair view of the financial position and performance of the company',[26] and include a 'directors' declaration' about them,[27] including that they comply with ss 296 and 297.[28] If a director makes a false or misleading statement without taking reasonable steps to ensure that the statement is not false or misleading, they will commit an offence.[29] Further, s 1309 creates the offence of making available 'false information'.
244 In ASIC v Hellicar ('Hellicar'),[30] the joint judgment of the High Court observed that,[31] in assessing an allegation as to the inaccuracy of board minutes (admissible at the trial as 'business records'), the allegation as to the falsity of the minutes had to be assessed in the context of those statutory provisions observed. The plurality reasoned:[32]
The respondents' allegations of falsity must be assessed in the light of not only the statutory provisions (s 251A) requiring the keeping of minute books but also those statutory provisions (s 1308(2), (4)) of the Corporations Law and the Corporations Act making it an offence for a person to make or authorise the making of a statement, in a document required by or for the purposes of the Act, that, to the person's knowledge, is false or misleading in a material particular, and an offence to make or authorise the making of such a statement without having taken reasonable steps to ensure that it was not false or misleading.
245 In the present context, the financial statements referred to which record loans to the relevant shareholders, Frank, Robert and George, assume weight in the light of both the observations of the High Court in Hellicar, and the statements made by Frank in cross-examination that he understood the importance and effect of signing accurate financial statements in his capacity as a director of Ying Mui.
246 No accountant from Ying Mui or Amore was called to qualify or explain why the financial statements of these companies should not be accepted in their entirety at face value.
247 In order for Ying Mui to obtain bank finance to fund the various property investments in Australia, Frank, Robert and George were required by ANZ to execute deeds of postponement ('Deeds of Postponement').
248 The deed executed by Frank was dated 21 February 2002, and those executed by Robert and George were both dated 12 March 2002.
249 In each instrument the deed described the individual signatory (who were Frank, Robert and George respectively) as the 'Postponer'.
250 Ying Mui was a party to each deed in its capacity as a trustee, and was described as the 'Company'.
251 The Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited was also a party to each deed and was described as 'ANZ'.
252 Each instrument recorded that 'the Company is indebted to the Postponer', and that Ying Mui, Frank, Robert and George would not 'permit the sum from time to time due to the Postponer by the Company to reduce below $260,000'.
253 The Deeds of Postponement in recitals common to each evidenced that, in consideration of each of Frank, Robert and George entering into the deed, the ANZ agreed to provide ongoing loan facilities to Ying Mui in its capacity as trustee. In this respect, each recital provided:
... at the request of the Postponer, made or agreed to make or may later agree to make advances to the Company and/or to extend cash credit accommodation and other banking facilities and/or leasing facilities to the Company in consideration (among other things) of the Postponer entering into this Deed ...
254 The deeds also, and critically, evidenced that the company, Ying Mui, in its capacity as trustee, was indebted to each of Frank, Robert and George at the time of execution of the deeds and that further loan facilities to be provided by the ANZ to the company in the future would be covered by the obligations as to postponement expressed in the deeds. The deeds provided in provisions common to each as follows:
1.1 Subject to Clauses 1.3 and 2, ANZ's claim against the Company at any time for any moneys owing to ANZ on any account whatsoever has priority over any claim which the Postponer may have against the Company whether by way of set off or for moneys advanced to the Company or in any other way owing to the Postponer by the Company for any other reason;
1.2 The Postponer will not, without previous consent in writing of ANZ, demand or accept any payment at all from the Company or an Official Manager or an Administrator or a Receiver or Liquidator of the Company in respect of the Company's indebtedness to the Postponer or any part of it at any time;
1.3 If the Company goes into liquidation the Postponer will:
1.4 The Postponer must, unless ANZ agrees otherwise in writing, receive any dividend paid in respect of that claim on trust for ANZ and upon receipt must pay it to ANZ immediately;
1.5 Except as expressly provided in this Deed, the Postponer will not:
255 Frank, Robert and George as natural persons each executed Deeds of Postponement in this form in favour of ANZ.
256 When cross-examined about the deed he executed, Frank confirmed that Ying Mui was indebted to him as at 21 February 2002, the date when he executed the deed applicable to him.
257 Frank also confirmed that he understood the deed to be an important document and that he understood that it was important to provide the ANZ with accurate information.
258 A minute of the meeting held on 9 April 2003 further evidenced that funds remitted from overseas were intended to be loans, not capital.
259 The minutes of a meeting dated 9 April 2003, attended by Frank, Robert, George, Maureen and Han, recorded that:[33]
[T]he financial structure of the investments of YMA is that YMA will have a small equity capital. The bulk of the financing for the investments will be by way of loans to the HOH TRUST in Australia.
260 In this record I infer that 'YMA' is intended to refer to Ying Mui and the 'HOH TRUST' is intended to refer to the Ying Mui Trust.
261 The minutes further recorded that, to the extent that funds had already been remitted, they were also loans:[34]
Details will be provided by GH and FH as to how the source of the loans (Artimax?) were channelled to Australia (the Trust/YMA)? The total funds remitted up to date is +/- 6.2 million.
262 In her letter to George and Han dated 23 July 2010, Lynn wrote:
I believe the development of the YMA group to the stage it is at today has been the result of my dad's sole efforts, with minimal input from the other shareholders except for funds remitted from Malaysia, of which one-third was contributed by my dad.
263 This position is consistent with personal loans having been advanced by Frank (and the other shareholders, Robert and George) to Ying Mui from Malaysia with a one-third contribution having been made by Frank.
264 I accept from the contents of Lynn's letter of 23 July 2010 that Frank was appraised of its general terms prior to it being sent. Lynn agreed that she 'discussed what I was trying to do' with Frank and he 'agreed to the broad terms'.
265 This was a letter sent by Lynn on her father's behalf to George and Han proposing a financial settlement of the serious dispute which had erupted. The proposal included an offer that Frank gift his 'one-third share' in approximately RM19 million and a loan owed to him to George and Han.
266 However, I am not satisfied on the evidence that Frank was appraised of the precise terms of the letter or approved of its contents prior to it being sent.
267 Consequently, I do not accept it as an admission against Frank that one third of the funds remitted from Malaysia to Ying Mui and Amore were 'contributed by' him.
Conduct in arranging for monies from Malaysia
268 The only persons involved in the physical remittal funds to Australia were Frank, Robert and George. There is extensive documentary and oral evidence which records the requests made by Frank for funds and the conduct of George and Robert in arranging the remission of such funds.
269 In each case, it was Frank who would identify to George or Robert the amount of funds required and the account into which the funds were to be paid. No other members of the extended Hoh were ever asked by Frank to remit funds to Australia or were involved in doing so.
270 I accept that the funds transferred from Malaysia originated from a number of different accounts. However, only some, and not all of these funds, could be considered as having been originally sourced from SYM.
271 The First to Fourth Defendants relied upon the expert report of Mr Michael Hill dated 28 July 2016, who they called as a witness. In all, Mr Hill identified 21 funds transfers, of which 'transfer 20' involved 8 transfers of AUD $15,000 each.
272 For the purpose of Mr Hill's analysis, as derived from Appendix G and Appendix I of his report, the transfers may be grouped as follows:
273 Mr Hill concluded as follows in relation to these funds:
Based on the information made available to me as well as the statement from Mr Teck and my analysis of the pawnshop ledgers, I have reached the following conclusions in relation to the 21 Fund transfers:
274 In relation to the 2 transfers [1 and 9 - the Robert/Beaufix transfers], I conclude that:
(a) Transfer 1 was a remittance of AUD$103,569.65 from George's Malaysian company Beaufix to Frank's Australian company Sole Mio Pty Ltd. The source of funds was therefore George's company, paid at Frank's direction to Frank's Australian company. There is no evidence that these funds were ever associated with SYM or the extended Hoh family; and
(b) Transfer 9 was a remittance of AUD$152,434.05 from Robert's personal bank account with Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation Limited directly to Ying Mui. Again, there is no evidence that these funds had ever been associated with SYM or the extended Hoh family. Further, it is written on the remittance document that it is a 'Remittance by Robert_'_. In cross-examination Mr Hill answered 'no' when asked whether these funds should be regarded as SYM funds.
275 In relation to the Artimax/Opesco D transfers (transfers 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 16, 17 and 18) are concerned, it is not in dispute that the funds in the Artimax D and Opesco D accounts at the pawnshops were sourced, at one point in time, from SYM. So much is accepted by the Plaintiffs.
276 However, the Plaintiffs submitted that these funds were loaned by SYM to Opesco and Artimax, which in turn loaned the funds to the pawnshops. The Plaintiffs rely on business records contained in the minutes of a meeting held on 30 December 2001, where the following is recorded:
The original purpose of Artimax was for it to replace OPESCO. That is, to take the place of Opesco in accounting for the interest payable to SYM on the deposits with the pawnshops ... The interest on this is also accounted in Opesco. GH suggested and it was agreed that SYM will demand repayment of the loan of RM2.8 million from Opesco. The mechanics for this repayment will be for SYM to open a HK bank account.
(a) The pawnshop will repay Opesco the loan of RM2.8 million into Opesco's HK bank account.
(b) Opesco will repay SYM's HK bank account the same RM2.8 million.
(c) SYM will re-lend this RM2.8million to HGL at interest rate. Agreed that the rate will be HK Bank base rate +1%.
(d) HGL will lend this RM2.8million to the pawnshop at 1.2% a month.
(e) HGL will repay the loan of RM2.8 million to SYM from the interest earned by HGL from the pawnshops. This repayment will be made monthly.
277 I accept the analysis of the Plaintiffs as the most likely position on the available evidence.
278 The most likely analysis of the Artimax/Opesco D transfers (transfers 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 16, 17 and 18) is that when funds were withdrawn from the Artimax D and Opesco D accounts at the pawnshops for remittance to Australia, they constituted a withdrawal of the funds of Artimax and Opesco. Accordingly, the funds withdrawn from the Artimax D and Opesco D accounts at the pawnshops were no longer SYM's funds, but had been loaned by SYM to Artimax and Opesco when they were deposited at the pawnshops, subject to the contractual obligation of the pawnshop to pay those funds to the account holder on demand. When demand was made and the funds withdrawn, ownership of the funds reverted to the account holder, namely Artimax and Opesco.
279 The payment vouchers recording the withdrawals of funds the subject of the Artimax/Opesco D transfers all record withdrawals 'from Artimax D' or 'from Opesco D'.
280 These payment vouchers may be contrasted with other payment vouchers, which were not associated with the fund transfers to Australia. These record payments to SYM from Artimax D as 'Being loan repayment - Debit Artimax "D"'.
281 Further, when funds were withdrawn from the Artimax D and Opesco D accounts at the pawnshops for remission to Australia, those funds were loaned to Ying Mui or Amore having first been loaned by Artimax or Opesco to Frank, Robert and George. The oral evidence of George on this issue in relation to a transaction was as follows:
[W]hen I wrote this withdrawal from Opesco D what I meant was it's a
loan---
From who to who?---from Opesco D.
To whom?---To the three of us.
All right?---Frank, Robert and me.
Thank you. So Opesco D had money at the pawn shop?---Opesco D had money in Choong Fatt pawn shop.
282 This analysis is further supported by the following documents:
(a) one of the payment vouchers concerning the Artimax/Opesco D transfers included the text 'Withdrawal from Artimax D (Loan to George Hoh)';
(b) financial statements for Ying Mui recorded that the funds were remitted as loans on behalf of Frank, Robert and George; and
(c) the Deeds of Postponement executed by Frank, Robert and George recorded that Ying Mui was indebted to Frank, Robert and George, who agreed not to call on their loans.
283 In relation to the Hever loan transfers (transfers 6 and 7), the contemporaneous documents confirm that the funds remitted to Australia were sourced from funds standing to the credit of Hever and not SYM or the extended Hoh family. The following is of not of insignificance:
(a) On 3 and 8 January 2002, SYM transferred funds to Lynn and Ian. The remittance documents were executed by Frank and George on behalf of SYM. The funds, although physically remitted by SYM to Australia, were loaned by SYM to Hever. SYM issued payment vouchers in respect of each of these fund transfers, which recorded that SYM had granted a '[l]oan to Hever Group Ltd'. As Mr Hill observed, the payment vouchers record that 'the funds were loaned by SYM to Hever'; and
(b) Hever was a company owned by Robert and he had agreed with Frank and George that they could use his company 'to remit funds' to Australia 'for the three of us'.
284 In relation to the Hever withdrawal transfers (transfers 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15), the contemporaneous documents again record that the funds remitted to Australia were sourced from funds standing to the credit of Hever. By way of summary:
(a) On 15 August 2002, the Choong Fatt pawnshop issued a payment voucher, recording a payment of USD$100,000 to Ian, which constituted a 'withdrawal from Hever Group Ltd'. On the same day, Choong Fatt executed an overseas remittance form in respect of the transfer of those funds;
(b) Between 14 November 2002 and 2 December 2002, Beaufix transferred approximately USD$200,000 to Amore, by executing a series of remittance applications. In respect of each of those transfers, the source of funds was Hever's account in the Choong Fatt pawnshop and the pawnshop issued a payment voucher recording a 'withdrawal from Hever Group' account, which was paid to Beaufix; and
(c) In accordance with the payment vouchers, the monthly statements issued by Choong Fatt to Hever recorded that funds had been withdrawn from the account held by Hever at the pawnshop and sent to 'Aust'. Mr Keun, the manager and a former director of Choong Fatt, confirmed that these monthly statements were 'like a bank statement' and recorded how much money was 'standing to the credit' of the account holder. Mr Hill agreed that the monthly statements were consistent with the payment vouchers in recording withdrawals from the account of Hever (i.e., not SYM) at the Choong Fatt pawnshop.
285 In relation to the FRG transfers (transfers 19, 20 and 21), the contemporaneous documents confirm that the funds remitted to Australia were remitted from an account in FRG's name, and not SYM or the extended Hoh family. By way of summary:
(a) On 27 April 2005, the Choong Fatt pawnshop executed an overseas remittance form, pursuant to which AUD$316,000 (RM935,385) was transferred to Amore. On the same day, Choong Fatt issued a payment voucher, which recorded that it had paid RM935,385 to Amore from the account of FRG Investments;
(b) Between 22 March 2007 and 17 August 2007, George transferred a total of AUD$120,000 to Frank and Pooi, by executing a series of remittance applications. In respect of each of those transfers, the source of funds was FRG's account in the Choong Fatt pawnshop and the pawnshop issued a number of payment vouchers recording a 'withdrawal from FRG Investment' account, which was paid to George;
(c) FRG was a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, which had deposited a common pool of funds on behalf of Frank, Robert and George in the pawnshops. The shareholders of FRG were Frank, Robert and George.
286 Frank asserted, in emails he wrote prior to the commencement of this proceeding, that the funds deposited by FRG in the pawnshops were owned exclusively by the families of Frank, Robert and George. In particular, Frank wrote that the 'FRG deposits' belonged to 'our three families', that he had a 'one third portion of the FRG deposits', and that he was entitled to have 'my 1/3 share of funds transferred from FRG'.
287 To similar effect, the settlement proposal made by Lynn to George and Han in July 2010, referred to '[m]y dad's one-third share ... of all cash in the FRG pawnshop account (approximately RM19 million)'.
Tracing of Malaysian funds into the Australian investment companies
288 Mr Hill also embarked on a tracing exercise in order to determine whether the funds derived from Malaysia were in fact used to acquire of the Australian investment properties in issue. His conclusions are as follows:
Based upon the information available to me, the following table sets out the conclusions I have been able to reach in relation to whether any of the Funds Transfers were the source (either directly or indirectly) in relation to any of the Properties acquired.
Table 1. Source of funds use for the acquisition of the properties
Were the Funds Transfers a source of funds for the acquisition
Partly funded from transfer 9, which originated from a bank account in Singapore held by the late Mr Robert Hoh.
Partly funded from the sale proceeds arising from the sale of Unit 6, 440 Hampton Street, Hampton (a newly built property from redevelopment of the Hampton property purchased in February 2002 referred to above).
1 Lynne Avenue, and 456-458 Burwood Highway, Wantirna South (Wantirna South Properties)
Partly funded from transfer 16, which originated from a bank account in Malaysia held by Choong Fatt. Choong Fatt's payment voucher and ledger record this transaction as a withdrawal from Artimax D. Mr Teck has identified in his statement that he believes funds standing to the credit of the Artimax D account belong to SYM.
Partly funded from the sale proceeds arising from the sale of the Wantirna South Properties (see above).
It can be seen from the above table, that for the majority of the Properties, I do not have sufficient information to reach a conclusion on whether the Funds Transfers were a source of the funding for the acquisition of the properties, either directly or indirectly as I am missing various bank statements and settlement documents and details of some settlement payments. To the extent that further information is made available to me, I may be able to draw further conclusions.
289 The evidence of Mr Hill was that he was unable to conclusively determine whether the funds remitted from overseas were used to finance the acquisition of any of the properties, with the exception of the Docklands Property, the Wantirna South Properties and the Pakenham property (which was said to be 'partly funded from the sale proceeds arising from the sale of the Wantirna South Properties').
290 Further, insofar as the Docklands Property is concerned, Mr Hill identified that the funds remitted from overseas which were used to fund the acquisition of that property were the funds remitted by Robert which Mr Hill identified as 'transfer 9' and concluded were not sourced from SYM.
291 Based upon this analysis, although I accept that some of the funds used to invest in properties in Australia may have been derived from funds originally sourced from SYM, only part of the funds to purchase some of the properties were originally sourced from SYM. On the available evidence, I am unable in each case to identify the precise proportion of funds invested in each property which were originally sourced from SYM or the quantum of such funds.
292 Further, although SYM may have been the original source of a portion of these investment funds, I am not satisfied on the evidence that when the relevant 21 fund transfers were remitted to Australia, SYM had any legal title to those funds.
293 Rather, the evidence establishes, on the balance of probabilities, that when the 21 fund transfers were remitted to Australia and at the time when they were paid to the Ying Mui Trust, the Amore Trust and the FRG Investments Trust, the funds were:
(b) the subject of loans advanced to Frank, Robert and George by various entities; and
(c) in turn were on-leant by Frank, Robert and George as loans from themselves to the Ying Mui Trust, the Amore Trust and the FRG Investments Trust.
Evidence of Mr Hill as to source of funds derived from Malaysia
294 The First to Fourth Defendants also relied upon the expert report of Mr Hill, which was concerned with the source of funds for each of the 21 transfers he described.
295 However, as Mr Hill agreed in cross-examination, the opinions he expressed concerned whether the funds were originally 'sourced from SYM', in accordance with his instructions that he identify 'the original source of the funds that were the subject of the transfers'. Mr Hill expressed the opinion that the original source of ten of the transfers were to be '[r]egarded as SYM funds', that the original source of nine of the transfers was '[l]ikely to be at least partly SYM', that the source of one transfer was not SYM, and that the source of one transfer was unknown.
296 However, I am satisfied that the character of the funds that originated with SYM critically changed to loan advances by the time they were remitted to Australia, even though those funds could be said to have been originally sourced from SYM.
297 In this context, the fact that at a particular point in time funds which eventually found their way to Australia for investment stood to the credit of SYM is irrelevant to the issues for determination in this case.
Evidence of Mr Tam as to source of funds derived from Malaysia
298 The First to Fourth Defendants also relied upon expert reports given by Mr Tam.
299 These reports sought to identify 'the original source of the funds in the accounts of FRG Investments Ltd' at the Choong Fatt, Choong Teck and Choong Thye pawnshops.
300 Mr Tam confirmed in cross-examination that the exercise he undertook was 'to seek to trace the starting point of the funds' which ended up in the FRG accounts in the pawnshops.
301 It will be recalled that FRG was a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands which was created and existed for the benefit of Frank, Robert and George.
302 Again, the fact that funds standing to the credit of FRG in the pawnshops were, at a particular point in time, funds standing to the credit of SYM, is irrelevant to determination of the issues in this case.
303 For example, in relation to the Choong Fatt pawnshop, the evidence of Mr Tam was that the 'original sources' of the funds standing to the credit of FRG as at 31 December 2005 were the OP D and OP D2 accounts at the pawnshop, and that the 'original sources' of the funds in those accounts 'can be traced to SYM'.
304 In this respect, the oral evidence of Mr Tam was:
If we start at 1999 the funds go from SYM (B) and OP A to OP D. Then in 2002 they go from OP D and OP D2 to Hever Group and then in 2005 they go from Hever Group to FRG?---That's correct.
305 Insofar as the OP A account was concerned, Mr Tam confirmed that he had traced the funds in this account to SYM, through a loan which SYM had granted to Kapoh Agency Ltd. Mr Tam said in cross-examination on this issue:
So because SYM, there is evidence of a resolution whereby SYM by its directors resolved to lend money to [K]apo[h] Agency in the amount of 750 RM, you have drawn the conclusion that the monies that were in OP A were leant to it by SYM?---Yes.
[T]his is a little bit of a simplification, but in essence, SYM lends money to an entity called [K]apo[h] Agency Limited, that's so, isn't it, sir?---Yeah.
Yes. And that money ends up in an account at the pawn shop in the name of Opesco A, or OP A?---Yes.
306 That particular loan is recorded in a resolution of the directors SYM, dated 1 January 1986, pursuant to which SYM was 'hereby authorised to give an interest-free loan of $750,000/- to Kapoh Agency Ltd'.
307 Thus, I conclude that the funds 'sourced' from SYM, were in fact loaned by SYM to Kapoh Agency Ltd, at which time Kapoh Agency Ltd, became the legal and beneficial owner of the funds subject to a contractual obligation to repay the funds to SYM. The funds were then deposited in the pawnshop, at which time the pawnshop became the legal and beneficial owner of the funds, with a corresponding liability to pay monies standing to the credit of its customer, namely 'Opesco A' to that customer.
308 Accordingly, although SYM might be described as the 'original source of the funds' paid into the OP A account, which were then paid into the OP D account, and then the Hever account, and then the FRG account, SYM lost its status as the beneficial or legal owner of those funds. Except that, from the moment SYM loaned those funds to Kapoh Agency Ltd for deposit into the OP A account, SYM became a creditor of Kapoh Agency Ltd and correspondingly the funds belonged to Kapoh Agency Ltd prior to being deposited in the pawnshop upon which the funds belonged to the pawnshop, as a debtor of Opesco A.
309 The evidence of Mr Tam was that the original source of funds standing to the credit of FRG at the Choong Teck pawnshop as at 31 December 2005 was OP A, SYM and Yow Mui. To the extent that Mr Tam concluded that funds came from SYM, he drew this conclusion on the basis of a contemporaneous resolution which recorded that the monies that were in the name of Kapoh Agency were lent to it by SYM.
310 Mr Tam gave written evidence that funds moved from the SYM ledger of the Choong Thye pawnshop to the FRG ledger. However, in cross-examination Mr Tam agreed, funds 'started with Hever Group at the start of 2005, went to FRG, during the course of 2005 went to SYM but ended back with FRG'.
311 Thus, although SYM might have been the 'original source of' a portion of the funds in the FRG account in the Choong Teck pawnshop, by virtue of a subsequent chain of transactions, SYM no longer retained its status as the beneficial or legal owner of those funds. Rather, the relevant funds fell to be 'owned' by the pawnshop, subject to its obligation to repay moneys standing to the credit of FRG.
Evidence of Mr Keun as to source of funds derived from Malaysia
312 The First to Fourth Defendants also relied upon the evidence presented by Mr Keun by witness outline. In the outline, Mr Keun expressed the opinion that Opesco, Artimax and FRG, being 'companies associated with SYM', the funds in Opesco D, Artimax D, Opesco D2 and Artimax D3 accounts at the Choong Fatt pawnshop therefore 'belonged' to SYM.
314 Mr Keun did not express the opinion that the Hever and FRG accounts at the Choong Fatt pawnshop 'belonged' to SYM.
315 Further, in cross-examination Mr Keun accepted that he did not have any personal knowledge of the circumstances concerning the deposits into and withdrawals from the Hever and FRG accounts at the Choong Fatt pawnshop.
316 Finally, it is apparent that Mr Keun's opinion as to ownership of the funds in the Opesco D, Artimax D, Opesco D2 and Artimax D3 accounts at the Choong Fatt pawnshop was founded on an unsubstantiated or unreliable factual basis. It was primarily based on unidentified 'discussions with George'. He confirmed that he was not involved in the management of SYM's financial affairs and he did not have any legal or accounting expertise which would enable him to express any opinion as to the ownership of the funds in the Opesco D, Artimax D, Opesco D2 and Artimax D3 accounts.
Conclusion as to whether Australian investments paid for by capital advanced by SYM or by loan funds
317 In answer to the question as to whether the Australian investments paid for by capital advanced by SYM or by loan funds, the answer is: although funds in part were originally sourced from SYM, the Australian investments were not paid for by any capital advanced by SYM. Loan funds were used to supplement bank borrowings for this purpose.
Conclusion as to investment for and on behalf of SYM
318 In answer to the question: in or after April 2001, was any or all property investment in Victoria undertaken by the Hoh family for and on behalf of the family company, SYM, the answer is No. The investments in Australia were undertaken for the benefit of Frank, Robert and George.
Whether the Australian investments undertaken pursuant to the Benevolent Purpose
319 I have already dealt with the purported Benevolent Purpose alleged by the First to Fourth Defendants, and I have rejected the existence of such a purpose.
320 I here deal with a consequence of the purported Benevolent Purpose if, in the alternative, it did exist. The First to Fourth Defendants submitted that Ying Mui was considered to be SYM Australia or an extension of SYM and the controlling trustees considered themselves custodians of SYM and Hoh Senior's legacy. The discretionary trust structure followed in Australia was merely the vehicle by which SYM continued in Australia.
321 This evidence was also said to support the presumption of a resulting trust in favour of SYM.
322 The First to Fourth Defendants also invited the Court to consider whether a constructive trust arose in favour of SYM.
323 It was contended that the evidence establishes that, following the winding-up proceedings in 2000 by Derek and Richard, the three other brothers, Frank, Robert and George, embarked on a joint endeavour to continue SYM in Australia, albeit through surreptitious means, supported by funding provided from SYM for the purposes of that joint endeavour and for the benefit of the broader Hoh family.
324 The joint endeavour relied on mutual filial trust and obligation to further and protect Hoh Senior's legacy and on the basis that George managed SYM in Malaysia and Frank managed Ying Mui or 'SYM(A)' in Australia without interference.
325 It was further asserted that the joint endeavour was expected to continue to be managed by them until such time as generational change was required and thereafter the joint endeavour would be continued by other members of the broader Hoh family. It was submitted that the objective evidence, which included the correspondence in mid to late 2010, establishes this proposition.
327 To my mind, they comprise a construction overlayed on the facts which, although in some respects are consistent with the facts, do not withstand close scrutiny and are not proven on the balance of probabilities.
328 Indeed, the propositions in significant respects are in conflict with established facts.
329 First, establishing Ying Mui or 'SYM(A)' as the structure for property investment in Australia was never documented as a continuance or extension of SYM in Australia or as a joint endeavour and for the benefit of the broader Hoh family.
330 Second, there is no contemporaneous document which states that any of the investments made in Australia, after the 'cash out' of Richard and Derek, were intended to benefit SYM or promote the Benevolent Purpose which is now alleged.
331 Third, as earlier found, Ying Mui or 'SYM(A)' was never supported by funding directly provided from SYM for the purposes of property investment in Australia, nor were any bank borrowings for this purpose supported by guarantees provided by SYM.
332 Fourth, and significantly, two members of the Hoh family, being Richard and Derek, and, in turn, their respective families, were consciously excluded from any knowledge of the Australian investments, even though these two brothers remained shareholders of SYM. The oral evidence of Frank was that:
(a) he wanted to ensure that Richard and Derek had 'nothing to do with' Ying Mui;
(c) he wanted to 'get rid of Derek and then start [investing]';
(d) 'there was fighting among the brothers', and that they 'were at loggerheads'; and
(e) '[t]here [was] no way that we would allow Derek or Richard to know what is done'.
333 This position is starkly at odds with Frank's contention that he made the investments in Australia for the benefit of SYM, a company which he recognised as representing the six branches of the Hoh family (namely, Frank, Robert, George, Maureen, Richard and Derek).
334 Fifth, the contemplated payment of dividends by Ying Mui to its shareholders (namely Frank, Robert and George to the exclusion of other members of the Hoh family), as recorded in minutes of meetings attended by Frank and in the financial statements of Ying Mui signed off by Frank, is inconsistent with the assertion that the investments made in Australia were intended to benefit SYM or promote the Benevolent Purpose.
335 Finally, the conduct of Frank in relation to the sale of a number of properties indicates a pragmatic approach to family property dealings over which he had control, rather than an adherence to the Benevolent Purpose of his late father. In Hoh Senior's final instructions for his will and supplement, he identified five properties which 'are not [to] be sold under any circumstances'. Despite this, Frank admitted in cross-examination that he voted in favour of the sale of those five properties by SYM, even though he knew this was 'contrary to [his] father's wishes'.
Should any and what assets be held wholly or partly on a resulting trust for SYM?
336 I am satisfied that a resulting trust cannot arise in respect of any of the assets of the Ying Mui Trust, the Amore Trust or FRG Investments Trust, in favour of SYM.
337 It is accepted that in certain circumstances (most often but not exclusively confined to the acquisition of property arising in the course of a personal relationship[35]), equity presumes, absent a presumption of advancement, that the registered proprietor intends that the person who provides the purchase money for the acquisition of the property will own the property beneficially to the extent of the beneficial interest corresponding to the proportion of purchase money supplied.[36]
338 It is also well established that '[f]or a resulting trust to arise the purchase money must have been provided by the purchaser with the character of purchase money (i.e. not as a loan)'.[37]
339 In Ong v Lottwo Pty Ltd (in liq),[38] Nicholson J (with Kourakis CJ and Stanley J agreeing) held that:
There is no doubt that for a resulting trust to arise the moneys contributed must bear the character of purchase moneys. A resulting trust will not arise where money is provided by way of gift or by way of loan or on some other commercial basis such as, for example, pursuant to a contractual obligation which is independent of the use to which the money might be put by the recipient. Ultimately, the court must be satisfied that the money has been provided with the requisite character.
The weight to be given to a presumption of a resulting trust in the resolution of what is essentially an issue of fact may vary in accordance with changing community attitudes and with the contemporary strength or weakness of the rationale of the rule embodying the presumption ... Indeed, in a case where a presumption of resulting trust or a "presumption" of advancement applies in circumstances where the relationship between the parties does not, as a matter of modern experience, provide any firm rational basis for presuming either intention to retain the beneficial interest or an intention to confer it on the other party, the presumption may be found to be of practical importance only in those cases where the evidence, including evidence of the actual relationship between the parties, does not enable the court to make a positive finding of intention.
341 I have found that, although SYM may have been the original source of a portion of these investment funds, which it is to be noted, is not defined in terms of quantum, I am not satisfied on the evidence that when the relevant 21 fund transfers were remitted to Australia, SYM had any legal title to those funds.
342 Rather, I have found that the evidence establishes, on the balance of probabilities, that when the 21 fund transfers were remitted to Australia and at the time when they were paid to the Ying Mui Trust and the Amore Trust and the FRG Investments Trust, to the extent that these funds may have originally been sourced from SYM, the funds were transferred to Australia as loans not capital. As such, SYM had no legal title to the funds.
343 Critically, '[t]he onus of establishing the payment(s) giving rise to a presumption of resulting trust lies on the person who is asserting the existence of a resulting trust'.[41]
344 The First to Fourth Defendants and SYM have failed to discharge that onus.
345 In any event, the First to Fourth Defendants do not have any standing to pursue the claim which gives rise to this question.[42] In Daunt v Daunt,[43] Redlich, Santamaria and Kyrou JJA recently reiterated that '[i]t is a fundamental principle that, in the absence of specific exception, a wrong done by B to A cannot be vindicated by C'.[44]
346 Consequently, no resulting trust arose as claimed by the First to Fourth Defendants and by SYM in its counterclaim.
Should any and what assets be held wholly or partly on a constructive trust for SYM?
Legal principles _ - constructive trust_
347 The basic principles concerning the circumstances in which a constructive trust may arise are not in dispute.
348 Relevantly, for present purposes, where there is a contribution to property, a constructive trust may arise in two circumstances.
349 First, a Muschinski v Dodds constructive trust may arise:[45]
where the substratum of a joint relationship or endeavour is removed without attributable blame and where the benefit of money or other property contributed by one party and for the purposes of the relationship or endeavour would otherwise be enjoyed by the other party in circumstances in which it was not specifically or intended or specifically provided that that other party should so enjoy it. The content of the principle is that, in such a case, equity will not permit that other party to assert or retain the benefit of the relevant property to the extent that it would be unconscionable to do so ...
350 Second, a common intention constructive trust:[46]
will arise where there is an actual or inferred common intention of the parties as to their entitlements to the beneficial interest in the property, and there has been detrimental reliance on that common intention by the claimant such that it would be an equitable fraud on the claimant to deny his or her interest in the property.[47] The onus of proving the parties had a common intention lies on the party asserting the property is held on trust for his or her benefit.[48]
Factual findings _ - constructive trust_
352 In the present case, I find that no constructive trust arose on either basis.
353 What was contemplated was a joint relationship or endeavour on the part of the three brothers, Frank, Robert and George. SYM was not included in this arrangement. The investment properties in Australia were held in accordance with the terms of a written trust deeds relating to the Ying Mui Trust, the Amore Trust and the FRG Investments Trust. The trust deeds did not contemplate or include SYM as a beneficiary of the trusts. As such, SYM was not and never had been a party to any such joint relationship or endeavour.
354 Insofar as a common intention constructive trust is concerned, the First to Fourth Defendants and SYM have not even identified who they allege to have held the 'common intention'. Nor have they identified how that common intention arose or who placed any detrimental reliance upon that common intention. Indeed, the terms of the relevant trust deeds constitute evidence of an intention to the contrary.
355 In particular, there was no common intention on the facts of this case established to have existed between Ying Mui on the one hand and SYM on the other that the assets of the Ying Mui Trust, the Amore Trust and the FRG Investments Trust were held, not upon the terms of the various trust deeds, but for and on behalf of and for the benefit of SYM. The evidence is to the contrary.
356 The joint relationship or endeavour, such that it was, existed between Frank, Robert and George, to the exclusion of SYM.
357 I am not satisfied that these brothers shared any common intention that any so-called benevolent purpose of their late father would be advanced by them through their undertaking property investment in Australia.
358 Rather, and more than likely, these investments were intended by the Frank, Robert and George to be for their benefit and that of their respective immediate families, and were not intended to be undertaken for the benefit of the broader Hoh family which included Richard and Derek or for the benefit of SYM.
359 The First to Fourth Defendants and SYM have failed to discharge the onus.
360 In answer to the First Tranche Questions 2 in and after April 2001, was any or all property investment in Victoria undertaken by the Hoh family:
(a) for and on behalf of the family company, SYM; and/or
(b) pursuant the alleged benevolent purpose; and/or
(c) paid for by capital advanced by SYM, and not by loan funds;
(d) and if so, should any and what assets be held wholly or partly on a resulting and/or a constructive trust for SYM?
361 The answer to each of the above questions (a) to (d) inclusive is: No in each case.
362 The third question to be determined by the Court in this part of the proceeding is:
Did Lumarkye, in receiving the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 from Ying Mui, knowingly receive trust property? If so, is Lumarkye a constructive trustee with respect to the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 or is it required to pay compensation to Ying Mui?
363 The principal allegations of the Plaintiffs, which give rise to these issues, centre upon a case that Frank, together with his son Ian and the assistance of his daughter Lynn, exercised their powers as directors of Ying Mui and Amore to procure the sale of numbers of the Australian property investments (the 'asset sales process'). Frank's objective in implementing the asset sales process was said to be threefold, namely that he wanted to:
364 As part of the asset sale process, the Plaintiffs say that Ying Mui sold two of its investment properties to Lumarkye, being the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 (in this part together called the 'two properties').
365 The asset sale process was claimed to have been intentionally concealed from George, Han and Maureen. The Plaintiffs point to the evidence of Frank when he said:
I could not tell them because I was fighting with them. They would stop me. If I told them they would stop me straight away.
366 It is then alleged by the Plaintiffs that when George and Han (who owned two-thirds of the shares in Ying Mui and Amore), objected to Frank's conduct in undertaking the asset sales process and sought to exercise their rights as shareholders to replace Frank, Pooi, Ian and Lynn as directors of Ying Mui and Amore, Frank outmanoeuvred them by exercising his powers as appointor under the trusts to remove Ying Mui and Amore as trustees, and to appoint a new trustee, Frosthollow. It will be recalled that the sole director of Frosthollow is Frank's daughter, Lynn.
367 Subsequently, Frosthollow made further substantial distributions from the Ying Mui Trust and the Amore Trust, exclusively to companies controlled by Frank and members of the Hoh family aligned with Frank in his ongoing dispute with George.
368 By these means, Frank, with varying levels of assistance from those allied to him and their friends, is alleged to have effectively appropriated the assets of the Ying Mui Trust and the Amore Trust for his own benefit, and for the benefit those associated with him, to the exclusion of George, Han and Maureen.
369 In other words, Frank and his family, despite objection from George and his family, sold relevant trust assets comprised in the investments in Australia and in effect have made distributions to themselves. This conduct is alleged to have been undertaken by Frank and Ian in breach of the duties which they owed to Ying Mui as directors.
370 The principal claim against Lumarkye is that, by purchasing the two properties through the work of Lynn, through her knowledge, it became a 'knowing recipient' of trust property misappropriated from Ying Mui in breach of fiduciary duty owed to the company by Frank and Ian in their capacity as its directors.
371 By way of summary, Lumarkye contended that, for the reasons which follow, the case put against it should be dismissed.
372 In order to make out their claim against Lumarkye, the Plaintiffs need to first establish that the two properties were transferred to Lumarkye in breach of fiduciary duty.
373 Lumarkye contended that the purpose and effect of the sale of the two properties in late 2011 was to reduce debt which Ying Mui had earlier incurred in financing property purchases in its capacity as trustee of the Ying Mui Trust.
374 In support of this contention, it was submitted that the evidence disclosed that the purchase monies received from Lumarkye were paid directly to the trust's bankers, ANZ, and were in turn used to repay a commercial bill facility for a total sum of $2,700,000, which was due to be rolled over in December 2011.
375 This conduct, it was said, could not be in breach of trust where the properties were sold at full market value, and there was no other conduct which was wrongful or fraudulent which could amount to any breach of trust.
376 Further, on the facts, it was put that Lumarkye did not have the requisite degree of knowledge required for liability under either limb of Barnes v Addy.[52]
377 It was also submitted that the knowledge of Lynn should not be imputed to Lumarkye.
378 Further, although it was alleged by the Plaintiffs in their pleadings that Lumarkye should also be fixed with the knowledge and activities of Ian, no evidence was led to the effect that he was, or could have been, Lumarkye's controlling or guiding mind, nor its agent for any purpose.
379 Lumarkye also contended that no loss or damage has been proven to have been sustained by the conduct alleged against it, and in these circumstances, no relief can be granted, even if a breach of duty is able to be established.
380 In these circumstances, Lumarkye contended that the First Plaintiff has not made out:
(a) any case for obtaining equitable compensation from Lumarkye (because it has suffered no loss by reason of Lumarkye having purchased the properties at their then full market value), or
(b) any basis for return of the properties (because they were purchased at full market value, and Lumarkye cannot be fixed with knowledge of, nor participation in, any relevant breach of duty).
(a) the three parts of the First Tranche Question 3 concerning Lumarkye should be answered 'no'; and
(b) the plaintiffs' claims against Lumarkye in this proceeding should be dismissed with costs.
Trust property held or controlled subject to a fiduciary obligation
382 The transfer of property, arising as a result of a breach by a company director of duties owed by the director to the company (whether statutory or fiduciary in nature), constitutes 'trust property' for the purpose of recipient liability. In Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) it was held that:[53]
Distinctly while the proprietary liability referred to depends upon the existence of trust property in the strict sense, "trust property" for Barnes v Addy purposes extends beyond it to property held or controlled subject to a fiduciary obligation. Most importantly for present purposes, it extends to corporate property, ie property subject to the control and the fiduciary responsibilities of a company's directors.
383 As the relevant directors of the company Ying Mui,[54] Frank (director from 17 July 1998 to present) and his son Ian (director from 27 April 2009 to 21 December 2011) owed Ying Mui fiduciary duties (and analogous statutory) duties, which included, amongst others, duties to:
(b) not improperly use their position to obtain a benefit or profit for themselves or somebody else.[55]
It is a fundamental principle governing corporate governance that the relationship between a director and the company is a fiduciary one. The law imposes strict fiduciary and statutory obligations on a director so as to ensure high standards of loyalty in the performance of the duties of office. The scope and reach of a director's fiduciary duties includes the prohibition against conflict of interest. In Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44 Lord Herschell warned ... that a person in a fiduciary position "is not allowed to put himself in a position where interest and duty conflict". In Boardman v Phipps [1966] UKHL 2; [1967] 2 AC 46 Lord Upjohn, at 123, noted "the fundamental rule of equity that a person in a fiduciary capacity must not make a profit out of his trust which is part of a wider rule that a trustee must not place himself in a position where duty and interest conflict".
385 In a more recent authority on point, Australasian Annuities Pty Ltd (in liq) v Rowley Super Fund Pty Ltd ('Australian Annuities'),[57] the Court of Appeal was asked to consider an action for knowing receipt and restitution brought by the appellant (the plaintiff at trial), Australasian Annuities Pty Ltd (in liq) (receivers and managers appointed) ('AA'), against the respondent (the defendant at trial), Rowley Super Fund Pty Ltd ('RSF'), in circumstances where funds were diverted from AA to a superannuation fund of which RSF was trustee. AA sought to recover these payments, which it alleged were diverted in breach of fiduciary duties owed by AA's sole director, Mr Rowley.
386 The observations of Warren CJ in Australasian Annuities explain the rationale for the fiduciary duties owed by director to a company:[58]
It is clear, as the trial judge noted, that a director owes fiduciary duties to a company as a separate legal entity, and not to that company's shareholders or creditors. Mason J set out the nature of a fiduciary relationship in Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp:
The critical feature of these relationships is that the fiduciary undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf of or in the interests of another person in the exercise of a power or discretion which will affect the interests of that other person in a legal or practical sense. The relationship between the parties is therefore one which gives the fiduciary a special opportunity to exercise the power or discretion to the detriment of that other person who is accordingly vulnerable to abuse by the fiduciary of his position.
...
It is partly because the fiduciary's exercise of the power or discretion can adversely affect the interests of the person to whom the duty is owed and because the latter is at the mercy of the former that the fiduciary comes under a duty to exercise his power or discretion in the interests of the person to whom it is owed.
387 As to whom the duties are owed in respect of property held on trust, the observations of Edelman J in Agricultural Land Management Ltd v Jackson & Ors (No 2) are pertinent:[59]
I explain below why it is nonsense to speak of fiduciary duties owed to a company in a particular capacity as trustee or as beneficial owner. Fiduciary duties are owed to the company.
...
Duties are generally owed to legal persons. A "trust" is not a legal person which has rights and is owed duties. The rights are held by the trustee. The duties are owed to the trustee.
Viewed from the perspective of the trustee, the rights are held, and any loss is suffered, by the trustee. So, when a defendant damages a tangible thing the defendant will be liable to the owner for damages for conversion or trespass to the chattel. It does not matter if the ownership of the chattel is held on trust. The owner still holds the rights (subject to the trust). The claim for damages against the third party defendant (ie external to the trust relationship) is almost always brought by the trustee as part of the trustee's duty to protect the trust estate even though the ultimate loss might be borne by the beneficiaries.
388 These duties are 'owed to the company as a separate legal entity and not to that company's shareholders or creditors'.[60]
389 Thus in this case, the relevant duties said by the Plaintiffs to have been breached by Frank and Ian are those duties which they owed in their capacity as directors to the trustee company, Ying Mui. As the corporate entity to which the relevant duties were owed, it is Ying Mui that has standing to bring claims for breach of these duties.
390 In this vein, in Young & Ors v Murphy & Anor, J.D. Phillips JA held (with Brooking and Batt JJA agreeing) that:[61]
It follows that if there be a breach by the directors of the duties which they did owe to the company, being the former trustee BPTC, and if the company was thereby damnified, BPTC might have a right of action against the directors for breach of their duties. In so far as those duties were founded in the common law, there might be a right of damages and, if they be fiduciary duties, there might be a right to equitable compensation. Either way, it is the company in which the right of action is vested ... [T]he existence of both the trusts and the trust property was but the context in which the duties fell to be discharged by those who owed duties to the company generally as its officers ...
On that basis, it follows that any right of action against the former directors for breaches of duties said to have been owed to BTPC remains with that company.
391 Accordingly, I do not accept the submissions of the First to Fourth Defendants that Frank and Ian owed duties as directors of trustee companies of discretionary trusts, which 'were effectively owed to the beneficiaries of a family trust who were all members of the broader Hoh family or entities associated with the Hoh family'.
392 That is not to say the additional considerations do not come into play where the company concerned is a corporate trustee. However, such considerations, when they do arise, are usually relevant to the scope and content of the duty and whether there has been a breach of duty. As Warren CJ put it in Australasian Annuities:[62]
The fiduciary duty owed by a director to a company is somewhat expanded when the company is a trustee company. This was explained by Robson J in Re S & D International Pty Ltd (No 4), where his Honour stated:
The basic common law duty of a director is that he or she must act bona fide in what he or she believes is in the best interests of the company as a whole. This duty is encompassed in s 181 [of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)]. In this instance, S & D acted as a trustee of the unit trust and the best interests of the company were clearly to act properly in accordance with the trust deed and in the interests of the unit trust. In other words to ensure that the trustee exercised its powers honestly and in the best interests of the beneficiaries of the trust.
393 I also adopt the observations of Garde AJA in Australasian Annuities when his Honour said to like effect:[63]
The pivotal attribute of fiduciary relationships was described by Mason J in Hospital Products as being the undertaking or agreement by the fiduciary to act for or on behalf of or in the interests of another person in the exercise of power or discretion which will affect in a legal or practical sense the interests of that other person. The duty of a company director to act in good faith in the best interests of the company stems from the fiduciary character of the relationship between the director and the company. The duty is now statutory as well as fiduciary. It underpins the duty of directors to consult the interests of the company and its interests alone in deciding whether payments should be made to other companies. The directors must give real and actual consideration to the interests of the company. This consideration must be more than a mere token, and must actually occur.
The scope of the duties of directors where a company acts as a corporate trustee has considerable importance, as companies in Australia frequently assume that capacity, and the resulting responsibilities.
...
I agree with the statement by Robson J [see above] of the duties of a director of a company that acts as a corporate trustee. In circumstances where a company is a corporate trustee, a director acting in the best interests of the company as a whole must act in good faith to ensure that the company administers the trust in accordance with the trust deed having regard to the rights and interests of the beneficiaries of the trust. The best interests of the company as a corporate trustee are to act properly in accordance with the trust deed in managing the business of the trust and in dealing with the assets and liabilities of the trust. A director of a corporate trustee must act in good faith to ensure that the company complies with its obligations as a trustee, and properly discharges the duties imposed on it by the trust deed and by trust law generally. It is not in the best interests of the company for it to act in breach of its duties of a trustee, for the company has assumed the responsibilities of that office and must see to it that they are fulfilled.
The obligation of a director of a corporate trustee is the same whether the trust is a unit trust or a discretionary trust viz. to act in good faith to ensure that the company acts properly in accordance with the trust deed in administering the business, assets and liabilities of the trust. Although in the case of a discretionary trust, a member does not have any present entitlement to the trust assets, the member does have standing to compel the proper administration by the corporate trustee of the trust. This is not disputed. The director should act in good faith to ensure that there is no cause for legitimate complaint by a beneficiary about the administration of a trust for which the company is responsible.
394 In Australasian Annuities, the Chief Justice summarised the fiduciary duties of a director of a company, noting that:[64]
[a]s a result of that fiduciary relationship a director owes a number of separate, though intertwined duties, including a duty to act in good faith and in the interests of the company, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest, and a duty not to exercise powers for an improper purpose.
395 The fiduciary duty of a director not to improperly use his or her position to personal advantage to obtain a benefit or profit is closely aligned with the no conflict duty. Indeed, there has been some conjecture as to whether 'the conflict of interest rule and the profit rule may be two themes within a single fundamental principle, rather than two separate doctrines'.[65]
396 Whether or not this is the case, it is clear that the objective of these rules is to preclude a fiduciary from being swayed by considerations of personal interest and from actually misusing his or her position for personal advantage.[66] The critical point is that '[i]t is the promotion of the personal interest that equity finds abhorrent'.[67]
397 A thorough review of the relevant authorities was undertaken by Owen J in The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) ('Bell Group'). He drew the principles together in the following passages:[68]
In the work by Austin, Ford and Ramsay, Company Directors, Principles of Law and Corporate Governance, LexisNexis, Sydney, 2005, the authors identify five closely related rules administered by equity and which have an application to conflicts of interest on the part of company directors and senior officers. They can overlap extensively with one another. The five rules are:
(a) the conflict of interest rule: the director or officer must not, in any matter falling within the scope of his or her office, have an interest that conflicts or may possibly conflict with his or her duty to the company, except with the company's fully informed consent;
(b) the conflict of duties rule: the director or officer must not, in any matter falling within the scope of his or her office, have an inconsistent engagement with a third party except with the company's fully informed consent;
(c) the misappropriation rule: the director or officer must not misappropriate the company's property for their own, or for a third party's benefit;
(d) the profit rule: the director or officer must not misuse his or her position for personal or a third party's possible advantage, except with the company's fully informed consent and, therefore, he or she must account to the company for any gain which they make in connection with the fiduciary office;
(e) the business opportunity rule: the director or officer (at least if engaged full time in the service of the company) must not divert any profit making opportunity in the same line of business as the company's present or prospective business, to himself or herself or to some other person, except with the company's fully informed consent.
...
A convenient starting point for any discussion about conflicts of interest is the time-honoured dictum of Lord Herschell in Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44, 51-2 (Bray):
It is an inflexible rule of a Court of Equity that a person in a fiduciary position is not; unless otherwise expressly provided, entitled to make a profit; he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict. It does not appear to me that this rule is, as has been said, founded on principles of morality. I regard it rather as based on the consideration that human nature being what it is, there is danger, in such circumstances, of the person holding the fiduciary position being swayed by interest rather than duty, and thus prejudicing those he is bound to protect. It has, therefore, been deemed expedient to lay down this positive rule.
This passage was quoted with approval by Gaudron and McHugh JJ in Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 108; 138 ALR 259, 285; 43 ALD 481, 504; [1996] HCA 57 (Breen). Their Honours went on to say that the law of fiduciary duty rests "not so much on morality or conscience as on the acceptance of the implications of the biblical injunction that 'no man can serve two masters' [Matthew 6:24]".
There is authority for the proposition that the conflict of interest rule and the profit rule may be two themes within a single fundamental principle, rather than two separate doctrines. The objective of the principle is to preclude the fiduciary from being swayed by considerations of personal interest (the first theme) and from actually misusing his or her position for personal advantage (the second theme): Chan v Zacharia [1984] HCA 36; (1984) 154 CLR 178, 198-9; [1984] HCA 36; 53 ALR 417, 432-4 (Chan) (Deane J). The tendency to regard the profit rule as little more than a corollary of the conflict rule was criticised in Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp [1984] HCA 64; (1984) 156 CLR 41, 103; [1984] HCA 64; 55 ALR 417, 459; [1984] HCA 64; 4 IPR 291, 334 (Hospital Products) where Mason J said:
And a recognition of its shortcomings induced Sir Frederick Jordan in his Chapters on Equity, 6th ed. (1947), p 115, to describe the conflict rule as a 'counsel of prudence' rather than a rule of equity. Accordingly, the fiduciary's duty may be more accurately expressed by saying that he is under an obligation not to promote his personal interest by making or pursuing a gain in circumstances in which there is a conflict or a real or substantial possibility of a conflict between his personal interest and those of the person whom he is bound to protect: Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Brothers [(1854) 1 Macq 461, 471].
In Chan at CLR 198- 9; ALR 432 Deane J also cited Sir Frederick Jordan's observations. This necessitates some comment. What Sir Frederick said is this:
It has often been said that the person who occupies a fiduciary position ought to avoid placing himself in a position in which his duty and his interest, or two different fiduciary duties, conflict. This is rather a counsel of prudence than a rule of equity; the rule being that a fiduciary must not take advantage of such a conflict if it arises.
The statements in Bray (accepted in Breen) and in Lewin on Trusts that a fiduciary must not "put himself" or "place himself" in a position of conflict has to be seen in the light of Mason J's formulation in Hospital Products. It is the promotion of the personal interest that equity finds abhorrent.
The basis for liability
Generally speaking, liability arises not from the mere existence of a conflict of interest but from the pursuit of personal interest by, for example, actually entering into a transaction in which the relevant conflict exists, or the actual receipt of personal benefit in circumstances of such conflict: Gemstone Corporation of Australia Ltd v Grasso [1993] SASC 4211; (1994) 62 SASR 239, 255 (Gemstone Corporation); R v Fitzsimmons (1997) 23 ACSR 355, 357-9. The mischief is not so much being in a position of conflict but rather in pursuing that conflict.
No loss or damage necessary for breach of fiduciary duty
399 A starting point for the conflict of interest rule and the profit rule with regard to directors where no loss has been sustained to the company by the conduct of the directors is Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver.[71] There, four directors of a company which owned a cinema were held to have breached their fiduciary duty to the company in circumstances where they had made use of their position for personal gain. The directors were accordingly held liable to account for the gain. It was held that the directors had not acted dishonestly. It was also held that it was no answer that the company had not been damaged by the conduct of the directors or would not in all likelihood have benefitted had the breach of fiduciary duty not occurred. Lord Russell of Killowen said:[72]
The rule of equity which insists on those who by use of a fiduciary position make a profit, being liable to account for that profit, in no way depends on fraud, or absence of bona fides; or upon such questions or considerations as whether the profit would or should otherwise have gone to the Plaintiff, or whether the profiteer was under a duty to obtain the source of the profit for the Plaintiff, or whether he took a risk, or acted as he did for the benefit of the Plaintiff, or whether the Plaintiff has in fact been damaged or benefited by his action. The liability arises from the mere fact of a profit having, in the stated circumstances, been made. The profiteer, however honest and well-intentioned, cannot escape the risk of being called upon to account.
There is a wide variety of formulations, of the general principle of equity requiring a person in a fiduciary relationship to account for personal benefit or gain. The doctrine is often expressed in the form that a person "is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict" (Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44, 51) or "may conflict" (Boardman v Phipps [1966] UKHL 2; [1967] 2 AC 46, 123) or that a person is "not to allow a conflict to arise between duty and interest": New Zealand Netherlands Society "Oranje" Inc v Kuys [1973] 1 WLR 1126, 1129; [1973] 2 All ER 1222, 1225. As Sir Frederick Jordan pointed out, however (see Chapters on Equity, 6th ed. (Stephen) (1947), p. 115, reproduced in Jordan, Select Legal Papers (1983), p. 115), this, read literally, represents "rather a counsel of prudence than a rule of equity": indeed, even as an unqualified counsel of prudence, it may, in some circumstances, be inappropriate: see, eg Hordern v Hordern [1910] AC 465, 475; Smith v Cock [1911] UKPCHCA 2; (1911) 12 CLR 30, 36-37; [1911] AC 317, 325-326. The equitable principle governing the liability to account is concerned not so much with the mere existence of a conflict between personal interest and fiduciary duty as with the pursuit of personal interest by, for example, actually entering into a transaction or engagement "in which he has, or can have, a personal interest conflicting ... with the interests of those whom he is bound to protect" (per Lord Cranworth LC, Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Bro (1854) 1 Macq 461, 471) or the actual receipt of personal benefit or gain in circumstances where such conflict exists or has existed.
401 Justice Olsson continued in Gemstone:[75]
It is to be noted that Deane J spoke of liability arising, not from the mere existence of a conflict of interest, but, rather, from the pursuit of personal interest by, for example, actually entering into a transaction in which the relevant conflict exists, or the actual receipt of personal benefit in circumstances of such conflict.
When the facts of the present case are stripped to the essentials, that is precisely what happened. The pursuit of personal actually manifested itself by the executed transaction ...
By way of summary then it must, in my opinion, be said that the learned trial judge fell into error in adopting as a fundamental principle, the proposition that... "in order to found an action ... in equity for compensation ... the fiduciary must either receive a profit or cause a loss".
Quite apart from the authorities to which I have referred, the very authorities relied upon by [senior counsel for the respondent] demonstrate the fallacy of such a suggestion; and re-affirm that the right of action arises at the moment at which a fiduciary enters into a relevant transaction in breach of his duty.
...
In the case at bar, the facts established by the evidence patently revealed an actionable breach of fiduciary duty arising from Grasso's conduct in substituting an ephemeral nominee for himself, without making proper disclosures to the Board. In my opinion the plaintiff plainly established an entitlement to the relief claimed. Gemstone is entitled to be placed in the situation which would have obtained had Grasso been required to either stand behind Star or take up the entitlement personally.
403 Justice Parker in Fitzsimmons v R put the matter succinctly when his Honour held:[77]
It is not, then, the existence of the conflict that constitutes the mischief with which the law is concerned. It is the pursuit of that interest which renders the conduct objectionable and improper.
404 Indeed, the liability of a director for breach of these fiduciary duties 'is not reduced or eliminated by demonstrating that the transaction was fair to the principal'.[78] In this respect, the duties impose 'an inflexible rule, and must be applied inexorably' and the Court 'is not entitled ... to receive evidence, or suggestion, or argument as to whether the principal did or did not suffer any injury'.[79] The rationale for this approach is founded on the principle that '[a] director who is personally interested in a proposed transaction cannot make an impartial decision as to whether it is a fair transaction from the company's point of view'.[80]
Approach to determination of conflict of interest
405 As to the approach taken by the courts in determining whether a relevant conflict has arisen, a common sense approach requiring a real likelihood of conflict is necessary before an adverse finding is made and a material conflict of interest is found to exist. So much was made clear by Owen J in Bell Group:[81]
The courts have developed a pragmatic, common sense approach to the scope of the conflict of interest rule by requiring a real sensible possibility of conflict before finding that a conflict of interest exists. In Boardman v Phipps [1966] UKHL 2; [1967] 2 AC 46, 124; [1966] UKHL 2; [1966] 3 All ER 721, 756 Lord Upjohn said:
In my view it means that the reasonable man looking at the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case would think that there was a real sensible possibility of conflict; not that you can imagine some situation arising which might, in some conceivable possibility in events not contemplated as real sensible possibilities by any reasonable person, result in a conflict.
This passage was cited with approval by the Privy Council in Queensland Mines Ltd v Hudson [1911] ArgusLawRp 95; (1978) 18 ALR 1, 3; 3 ACLR 176, 177. The force of Lord Upjohn's remarks (with subtle variations of terminology) has been recognised in a succession of Australian authorities, for example:
(a) Chan v Zacharia ("a conflict ... or significant possibility of such conflict" per Deane J at CLR 198; ALR 432);
(b) Hospital Products ("a conflict or real or substantial possibility of conflict" per Mason J at 103);
(c) Green and Clara Pty Ltd v Bestobell Industries Pty Ltd [1982] WAR 1 ("in which, in a real and sensible way, his duty may possibly conflict with his interest" per Burt CJ at 5);
(d) Clay v Clay (1999) 20 WAR 427; [1999] WASCA 8; Clay v Clay (2001) 202 CLR 410; 178 ALR 193; [2001] HCA 9, [56] ("sensible, real or substantial possibility of conflict"); and
(e) Southern Real Estate Pty Ltd v Dellow (2003) 87 SASR 1; [2003] SASC 318 ("a conflict or a real or substantial possibility of a conflict" per Debelle J at [24]).
The test for ascertaining a possible conflict is objective. It is not necessary to establish fraud, dishonesty or bad faith: Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134, 137; [1942] UKHL 1; [1942] 1 All ER 378, 381. In order to assess whether or not there is a real or substantial possibility of conflict the court must adopt the position of the reasonable person looking at the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case. Nonetheless, in the case of a company, a director may act with a personal interest even though the director has not freed his or her mind of that personal interest when so acting, provided that his personal interest was not the actuating motive. Rather, the actuating motive must be some bona fide concern for the benefit of the company as a whole or for fairness as between members: ASIC v Adler [735] per Santow J.
406 In an obvious case where the exercise by a director of the position is 'intended to and [does] result in significant financial benefits' to that director or to his or her immediate family, a breach of this duty will arise.[82]
407 Conduct which promotes the 'personal interests' of a director 'by advancing his [or her] personal circumstances or those of his [or her] family at the expense of' the company will also constitute a breach of this duty.[83]
408 Thus the concept of a 'personal interest' is not confined to achieving a pecuniary gain. It extends to a broad range of interests or personal advantages. The decision of Owen J in Bell Group is further referred to where his Honour observed:[84]
The last point I want to raise in this review of general legal principles concerning conflicts of interest relates to the phrase "personal interests". I think it is common ground that the phrase is not confined to pecuniary interests. It extends to non-pecuniary and indirect interests. In Baker v Palm Bay Island Resort Pty Ltd (No 2) [1970] Qd R 210, 221-2, WB Campbell J said that the interest must be direct and certain and not contingent or remote. As a matter of principle I cannot see why it needs to be director of a contractual nature. It would be appropriate to adapt the test for a possible conflict ("real and substantial") and apply it to the identification of the interest. Mason J in Hospital Products excluded the ground of relief "when the interest of the fiduciary is remote or insubstantial". Some care needs to be taken to ensure the word "substantial" is not seen purely in quantitative terms relative to, for example, the subject matter of the transaction to which the impugned conduct relates.
This approach accords with the statement by Judge Learned Hand in Phelan v Middle States Oil Corporation [1954] USCA2 295; (1955) 220 F 2d 593, 602, indicating that the doctrine is applied with regard to the particular circumstances. His Honour went on to say that the rule does not apply when the putative interest, though in itself strong enough to be an inducement, is too remote, or when, though not too remote, it was too feeble an inducement to be a determining motive. These comments were cited with approval by the Mason J in Hospital Products at CLR 104; ALR 459- 60; IPR 334-5 and by McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ in Pilmer at [79].
...
One way of ascertaining whether the interest of the fiduciary is remote or insubstantial is to ask whether the interest is such that a reasonable person would think there was a real or substantial possibility of the fiduciary being swayed by it. In this way, tests for the identification of the "interest" and for the "possibility of a conflict" would be applied bearing in mind a similar rationale.
409 As to steps to be taken by a director to avoid conflict where such a situation arises, where a director is in 'a position of power and influence' over the board, mere disclosure of a conflict may not be enough.[85] The director may come under a positive duty to take steps to protect the company's interests 'such as by using such power and influence as he had to prevent the transaction going ahead'.[86]
411 The rule was expressed in Barnes v Addy by Lord Selbourne LC as follows:[89]
Those who create a trust clothe the trustee with a legal power and control over the trust property, imposing on him a corresponding responsibility. That responsibility may no doubt be extended in equity to others who are not properly trustees, if they are found either making themselves trustees de son tort, or actually participating in any fraudulent conduct of the trustee to the injury of the cestui que trust. But, on the other hand, strangers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act as the agents of the trustees in transactions within their legal powers, transactions which perhaps of which a Court of Equity may disapprove, unless those agents receive and become chargeable with some part of the trust property, or unless they assist with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustee.
412 The first limb of Barnes v Addy liability has become known as 'knowing receipt', and the second limb as 'knowing assistance'.[90]
413 The Plaintiffs' allegations against Lumarkye are based on the first limb, that is to say it received trust property (namely the two properties) with knowledge of Frank and Ian's alleged breaches of fiduciary duty which they owed to Ying Mui as its directors. In other words, the Plaintiffs claim that Lumarkye received the two properties with notice of the trusts.
414 It should be noted that in Farah Constructions, the decision the subject of the appeal had sought to address the breach of fiduciary duty issue by characterising liability for knowing receipt of trust property in terms of unjust enrichment.[91] However attractive this solution might be, it was emphatically rejected by the High Court and is not the law in Australia. The High Court instead followed its obiter dicta in Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd ('Consul Developments')[92] as to the operation of the first limb of Barnes v Addy.
415 In so doing, the High Court in Farah Constructions dismissed the case maintained under the first limb of Barnes v Addy in first finding that there had been no breach of any fiduciary duty. Then followed three tiers of obiter dicta reasoning which concluded with the following further findings:
(a) If there had been a breach of fiduciary duty, there was no receipt of assets transferred consequent upon the breach;
(b) If there had been any such receipt, there was no relevant notice on the part of the recipient; and
(c) There was in any event, no liability because the recipients had obtained indefeasibility of title under the Torrens system upon registration of their interests.
416 The three tiers of obiter dicta reasoning described above carry the weight of a High Court majority judgment. [93]
417 The elements of the first or 'knowing receipt' limb of Barnes v Addy as structured by the High Court in Farah Constructions and as applied to the facts of this case, are considered below.
418 In order to be liable under the first limb of Barnes v Addy the recipient must have 'received trust property with knowledge that it was trust property being misapplied or transferred pursuant to a breach of fiduciary duty or trust'.[94]
419 This may be contrasted with the liability of a knowing assistant under the second limb of Barnes v Addy where the assistant has knowingly aided a breach of trust and is liable to beneficiaries caused by the breach. In such a case, liability is triggered by the assistant's intentional participation in the wrongdoing with knowledge of the dishonest or fraudulent design on the part of the fiduciary.
420 In Mathieson Nominees v Aero Developments ('Mathieson Nominees')[95] this Court adopted the following elements of the cause of action of knowing receipt in Australia as identified by Owen J in Bell Group[96] where his Honour applied what was said by Stephen J in Consul Developments about constructive knowledge:[97]
The resulting law, as I apprehend it, is that for a third party to be held liable for knowing receipt:
(a) there must be a "trust";
(b) the trustee must have misapplied "trust property";
(c) the third party must have received trust property;
(d) at the time of receiving the trust property, the third party must have known of the trust and of the misapplication of the trust property; and
(e) the third party will be taken to have 'known' in the relevant sense if the third party:
(i) has actual knowledge of the trust and the misapplication of trust property; or
(ii) has deliberately shut his or her eyes to those things; or
(iii) has abstained in a calculated way from making such enquiries as an honest and reasonable person would make, about the trust and the application of the trust property; or
(iv) knows of facts which to an honest and reasonable person would indicate the existence of the trusts and the fact of misapplication.
421 When the recipient is a corporation, its knowledge resides in the natural person or persons who is or are the directing mind and will of the corporation. In this way, the doctrine attributes to the corporation the knowledge of those who manage and control its relevant actions.
422 As held in Australasian Annuities, the knowledge of a person might be attributed to a company, 'whether or not he [or she] was the directing mind and will in managing all other aspects' of the operations of that company.[98] This will be so where that person 'was instrumental in all of the [relevant] transactions ... and was the directing mind and will behind all of the [relevant] transactions and all of the payments' and 'passed money through various accounts to' the company.[99]
423 As to the approach for determining the relevant knowledge of a corporation, Warren CJ in Australasian Annuities observed:[100]
In determining whether the mind and will of the director of a company or of some other person should be regarded as the mind and will of the company:
management or control is not something to be considered generally ... It is necessary to identify the natural person or persons having management or control in relation to the act or omission in point.[101]
In considering whether a director has management and control in relation to a particular act, it is appropriate for the Court to take a pragmatic view.
425 The required knowledge for the purposes of the first limb was held by Warren CJ in Australasian Annuities[104] to be such as to fall within one of the first four levels of knowledge described in Baden v Société Générale Favouriser le Développement du Commerce et de l'Industrie en France SA ('Baden').[105] In other words, the third party recipient will be taken to have 'known' that trust property was misapplied or transferred pursuant to a breach of fiduciary duty or trust if they acted:
ii. by wilfully shutting his or her eyes to the obvious;
426 This is consistent with the decision in Farah Constructions where, in following its earlier decision of Consul,[106] the High Court determined that the circumstances falling within any of the first four categories of Baden are sufficient to answer the requirement of knowledge in the second limb of Barnes v Addy.[107] This approach was followed by this Court in Mathieson Nominees.[108]
427 However, the approach in Farah Constructions 'does not travel fully into the field of constructive notice by accepting the fifth category' described in Baden, namely, knowledge of circumstances which would put an honest and reasonable person on inquiry.[109]
428 As to the content of the knowledge for liability to be established under the first limb of Barnes v Addy, a question arises as to whether the recipient must, for the purposes of establishing actual knowledge, be shown to know and understand the legal consequences of the facts within his or her knowledge, or merely the facts themselves.[110]
429 This may be addressed by considering the competing interests at play for the purposes of Barnes v Addy recipient liability in establishing the appropriate degree of knowledge or notice required before the recipient of misdirected assets will be rendered personally liable. The law of knowing receipt must maintain a balance between the interests of both those who have entrusted their assets to fiduciaries and those who deal with fiduciaries in good faith. As has been recognised by Professor Robert Chambers:[111]
In an age when the vast majority of wealth is managed by fiduciaries, the risk of personal liability being imposed on those who deal with fiduciaries must be set at an appropriate level. If the risk is too high, transaction costs are increased and transactions delayed by precautions taken to manage the risk. If the risk is too low, misdirected wealth can quickly become irrecoverable, leaving the beneficiaries with significant losses and others unjustly enriched at their expense.
430 The problem must in turn have regard for the contemporary commercial context where: [112]
[w]ealth flows swiftly and easily around the world by electronic means, and where there is a host of sophisticated new ways to commit fraud and launder money. People will find ways to exploit their environment and the law must be equipped to deal with the emerging forms of misappropriation.
431 One such approach to be taken in determining the content of knowledge under the first limb of Barnes v Addy would appear to have been advanced by the learned authors of On Equity (although the learned authors may have offered merely a general description of the approach of the courts, rather than suggesting a test to be applied) where they write:[113]
[A]ll that is necessary is that the known facts would have communicated to a reasonable person a general understanding that fraud, breach of trust or fiduciary duty had occurred.
432 A test formulated in this way, while providing a level of guidance as to the required content of the relevant knowledge for the purposes of establishing liability under the first limb of Barnes v Addy, in my respectful opinion, is probably the best that can be achieved, although a test in these terms does not establish with great precision the level of knowledge required.
433 'Actual knowledge' on the part of a third party recipient that trust property has been misapplied or transferred pursuant to a breach of fiduciary duty or trust may be considered to be a relatively rare occurrence if it incorporates an element of knowledge of the legal consequences of the known facts. On balance, however, I determine that it does. In this circumstance, liability is only likely to arise where a court can be satisfied that the recipient not only had knowledge of the essential facts, but also had at least an appreciation of the legal consequences of those facts which point to a breach of fiduciary duty or trust. In practice, this is likely to occur only where the recipient has a working knowledge of the law relating to breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, and fraud, or obtains appropriate legal advice as to the application of this sometimes complex area of the law to the known essential facts.
434 For this reason, the second to fourth means of establishing the requisite knowledge defined in Baden in most cases, are more likely to be engaged and operate to give the doctrine meaningful work to do. Application of these categories serves to introduce an appropriate degree of impropriety, want of probity or dishonesty into the recipient's impugned conduct when applied to the facts. By this means, the approach does not permit 'the morally obtuse ... to escape by failure to recognise an impropriety that would have been apparent to an ordinary person applying the standards of such persons'.[114]
Background conduct to sales of Sydenham Property and Lot 202
435 It is alleged that Frank (and Ian) acted in breach of fiduciary duty by facilitating the sale of the two properties to Lumarkye.
436 The background conduct giving rise to this allegation, which I find is made out, is set out below.
437 Ying Mui had owned the Sydenham Property since 2001. It was rented by a commercially sound long term tenant, Australia Post.
438 The Hampton Property (which included Lots 201 and 202 and Unit 10) was acquired by Ying Mui in the period 2004-2005. Ying Mui owned Lot 202 following development of the Hampton Property. Lot 202 was similarly occupied by a secure long term tenant, the National Australia Bank.
439 As at 2010, Ying Mui still held the Sydenham Property and Lot 202.
440 However, in mid-2010, Frank raised certain complaints regarding George's management of SYM. A bitter dispute quickly developed. This culminated in an email from Frank to George dated 14 July 2010:[115]
There is nothing more to say except that you cannot accept the facts as I see them...As for YM Australia all assets will be sold and funds distributed and I will expect that you do likewise with the FRG investments in the pawnshop asap.
441 Shortly thereafter, Lynn wrote to George her letter of 23 July 2010, which she also sent to Han, advising that she had spoken to Frank, who did 'not wish to continue the joint business arrangements of the YMA group in Australia' and considered it 'the right course of action for our immediate family to divest of our interests in SYM and unwind the existing collaborative arrangements in YMA'. Lynn wrote further in her letter that Frank 'is getting old and he no longer wishes to be in a position where he may have to deal with disagreements with you or other Hoh family members regarding family business matters'.
442 Lynn outlined her proposal for an asset swap and warned that, if George and Han did not accept the proposal, she would 'return this matter to my dad for him to proceed with his initial intended course of action as set out in his last email to you'. I infer 'his last email' to refer to the email addressed from Frank to George dated 14 July 2010.
443 Some further emails were then exchanged between George, Frank, Han and Lynn, which culminated in Han proposing a meeting between Frank, George and Han to attempt to resolve the dispute.
444 Lynn responded by letter dated 31 July 2010. Lynn wrote:
Firstly, perhaps it wasn't clear in my letters to you and Uncle George - MY DAD HAS MADE HIS DECISION - in his words, he wants 'out' of all business associations with the extended Hoh family ...
I think my dad has gotten to the point of agreeing to disagree with Uncle George and is therefore proceeding to the next course of action which he believe he should take for himself and his immediate family. Personally I can't be bothered with the reasons why we are at this juncture. All I care about is putting it to rest and achieving my dad's wishes as cleanly as possible.
When I saw my dad in Melbourne last week, he was pretty adamant in his decision to part ways with the extended family from a business perspective ...
I felt that I could come up with a proposal that would achieve my dad's desire whilst providing an equitable outcome for you and Uncle George ... I felt this was a "cleaner" solution to my dad's initial intentions to effectively wind up all these businesses with a view to distributing the proceeds to relevant parties.
As I indicated in my letters to you and Uncle George, if you reject my proposal I will be handing this matter back to my dad because frankly I do not have the time nor energy to get into what I personally feel is a more messy way for my dad to divest his interests in SYM and YMA. What I can tell you is this - I am pretty sure he will take action that will likely significantly affect the future of SYM and YMA ...
I believe that from his perspective there is no need for a meeting because he has already made his decision to separate. The only decision that needs to be made here is by you and Uncle George - whether you want to accept my proposal as set out in my letter, or take your chances with what my dad will do if you reject my proposal. I am telling you this based on my assessment of my father's current state of unwavering resolve and diminishing patience with business-related matters with the extended Hoh family.
(a) considered in light of the surrounding context, the proposal contained in the letter dated 31 July 2010 was made by Lynn on behalf of her father as his agent; and
(b) George and Han did not accept the proposal made by Lynn on behalf of Frank. George and Han were then shareholders of Ying Mui. As such, the informed consent of the company Ying Mui was not forthcoming in respect of the proposal.
446 Following the sending of the letter dated 31 July 2010, Frank determined to sell off as much as possible of the assets held by the Ying Mui Trust.
447 Lynn confirmed in her evidence that she knew that Frank, following his dispute with George, wanted to 'put all the properties on the market'.
449 First, Frank and Pooi wanted to reduce their exposure under personal guarantees they had given to the bank. The evidence of Frank was that:
[M]y family home is at stake, my wife guarantees at stake [sic], my guarantee at stake. I want to make sure that can't do anything hopefully.
450 Indeed, Frank gave evidence that his 'first priority' was to 'get rid of my personal, my family's commitment to the bank'.
451 Similarly, Pooi gave evidence that she 'wanted to sell of as much as possible to discharge the guarantees that Frank and [herself] had personally given'.
452 Lynn stated that she wanted to sell the assets of the Ying Mui Trust because she was 'concerned about the level of debt that my parents were exposed to'. She was worried about the level of borrowing which she understood her parents were 'on the hook for'. She said in cross-examination:
Because you and your father and mother had a personal concern about their exposure to the guarantees, is that the evidence you want to give to His Honour?---Yes I was concerned about the level of debt that my parents were exposed to Your Honour.
453 Lynn additionally mentioned that the concern she had about the level of debt was the subject of 'significant discussions' between herself and her parents.
454 However, nowhere in any correspondence does there appear any suggestion that among any other member of the Hoh family, or any banker on behalf of the bank which provided the loan funds, there was concern as to the level of debt or the capacity to service the debt. The investment properties had been held by Ying Mui and Amore for a considerable period of time. I conclude that there was a strong cash flow available to comfortably service the debt, including that derived from rental income provided by the commercial properties held in the Ying Mui investment portfolio.
455 Rather, I consider that the pressure which Frank perceived, and which made him feel financially vulnerable, emanated from his disputation with George. Frank's immediate concern was in relation to legal action that George might take in the course of the dispute.
456 Second, and for this reason, Frank wanted to 'create a fighting fund' to be used in defence of anticipated litigation. Frank expressed this in his evidence:
I wanted to get my management fee and my fighting fund. So I said don't sit on it, move on it, because they are coming.
457 Frank's wife Pooi agreed in her evidence that 'one purpose in selling those properties was to create a fighting fund' which was to be 'a pool of money used to fund ... defence of anticipated litigation'.
458 Frank's son Ian also confirmed in evidence that it was his understanding that Frank 'wanted to sell these properties because he wanted to create a fighting fund' and that part of the proceeds of the sale of the properties have been used to pay legal fees in this proceeding. Likewise, Frank's daughter Lynn gave evidence that 'the distributable income was largely attributable to capital gains realised from the sale of properties'. She also agreed that the distributable income paid to Frank's company Lokit, formed part of the fighting fund:
What about the $1.673m distribution to Lokit financial year end 30 June 2011, was that to deal with medical bills?---That's to, ah, as we've mentioned, I think my father has mentioned, that we felt that a, um, I think we're calling it a legal fighting fund was required to protect the family's assets, um, for the benefit of the family.
459 Third, Frank was anxious to ensure that he could obtain money from Ying Mui, described as a 'management fee', before George and Han were able to take control. In cross-examination, Frank said:
When I saw that they were coming, or thought they were coming to take over control of Ying Mui in Australia, I just took the funds that were available in Ying Mui's bank account, as quick as I could because they were coming to control the company and I wouldn't have the opportunity to take my management fee.
460 It will be recalled that in the Malaysian Investment Conversations, which took place sometime in the period after the sale of the Red House in the period between 1997 and 1998 and the departure of Richard and Derek from Ying Mui which occurred by April 2001, included recognition 'that Frank would manage the company [in Australia]' and that '[h]e would be paid a salary, which he's supposed to propose'.
461 However, I find that there was no proposal for a salary ever suggested by Frank, and no agreement was ever discussed or achieved in relation to payment of a salary to Frank. He acted unilaterally in claiming monies said to be for management fees.
462 Prior to 29 June 2011, $550,000 had been paid out to Frank's company, Lokit, from funds derived from sales of the property investments in Australia. According to the evidence of Lynn, Frank paid this money to Lokit on account of his management fees. However, this was undertaken without any supporting invoices or other accounting records.
463 Frank confirmed that the funds he took from Ying Mui's bank account had been generated by the sale of properties and that he wanted to sell those properties to ensure he obtained management fees and monies for a fighting fund.
464 Frank admitted that he acted in a self-interested manner, at the expense of Ying Mui, when he said the following during cross-examination:
You chose didn't you to advantage your company, Lokit and yourself personally at the expense of Ying Mui, didn't you?---As you have said in the last sentences, yes.
465 Further, Frank's wife Pooi confirmed that she knew that property sales 'would be needed in order for Frank to pay himself monies out of the Ying Mui Trust'.
466 By mid-2010 when the dispute with George flared, I infer that Frank calculated that it would not have been possible for him to obtain the consent of George to payment of a management fee. Frank did not propose any management fee but rather acted unilaterally to claim what he considered he should be paid.
467 On 15 August 2011, Ying Mui paid a further $715,932.27 to Lokit and Amore paid $13,365.35 to Lokit. These were payments of invoices issued pursuant to what were described as 'Management Fee Agreements'. These agreements were dated 15 February 2010 and were signed by Frank, as a party in his own right, Lynn, in her capacity as a director of Ying Mui and Lokit, and Pooi, in her capacity as a director of Amore and Lokit. However, as revealed by Lynn in her cross examination, these agreements were in fact executed in mid-2011, but back-dated by Lynn to read 15 February 2010. I conclude that Lynn backdated the agreements in an endeavour to provide some basis for the making first three Lokit Payments earlier described. Lynn said in her evidence:
I might have had in my mind that the payments made by my father could have been management - was in relation to the management fee. So in my mind this agreement had to be executed prior to those dates and I chose that date because that was a date when all parties who signed the agreement were together.
468 I reject the explanation given by Lynn in cross-examination which suggested that there was prior agreement as to management fees payable to Frank made in 2010, and I do not believe her evidence when she suggested this was the case.
469 Invoices which were raised on 1 August 2011 demonstrate that management fees purportedly payable to Frank were retrospectively calculated for the period 2002 to 2010 at 8 per cent of all rental and sale proceeds on residential properties. This calculation was made in spite of Frank having retained real estate agents to lease the properties and having paid leasing and management fees for them to do so.
470 Also on 1 August 2011, Frank, Lynn and Ian, in their capacity as directors of Ying Mui, and Frank, Pooi and Lynn, in their capacity as directors of Amore, voted in favour of resolutions that Ying Mui and Amore be authorised to pay the management fee invoices. Frank also backdated a resolution of the board of Amore. I find he did this in an attempt to justify, after the fact, the earlier payment of management fees. His explanation given in cross-examination for taking this action was merely 'whatever is done is done'.
471 Frank and Lokit also purported to enter into a similar Management Fee Agreement with Olrey, apparently dated 8 March 2011, which required Olrey to pay 8 per cent management fees to Lokit in respect of the Camberwell Property.
472 Against this background, on 12 October 2011, Frank, Lynn and Ian sent a letter to George, Han and Maureen, stating that it was their 'present intention to cause YM, in its capacity as trustee, to sell the Trust's assets, for distribution among the beneficiaries'.
473 The letter concluded by stating that its purpose was to inform George, Han and Maureen, 'as a matter of courtesy, of the course YM now intends to take'.
474 However, without the prior knowledge of George, Han and Maureen, the following events had already taken place before they received the letter of 12 October 2011:
(a) On 30 August 2010, Ying Mui paid $300,000 into a home loan account in the name of Lynn. Frank admitted that he caused Ying Mui to make this payment. In relation to this payment, I have difficulty accepting the evidence of Lynn to the effect that she was not aware that she had received a payment of $300,000 until 'years later'. This explanation is improbable.
(b) On 1 October 2010, Frank, Pooi and Ian voted in favour of a resolution that Ying Mui sell the Docklands Property to a third party for $563,280. Frank executed the contract of sale on 21 October 2010 and Frank and Pooi executed the transfer of property.
(c) On 1 November 2010, Ying Mui paid a second sum of $100,000 to Lokit. It will be recalled that Lokit was a company owned jointly by Frank and Pooi and whose only directors are Frank, Lynn, Pooi and Ian. Frank admitted in his evidence that he caused Ying Mui to make this payment.
(d) On 10 February 2011, Frank, Lynn and Ian voted in favour of a resolution that Ying Mui be authorised to sell Unit 10 of the Hampton Property to a third party for $645,000. This transaction was effected even though the tenant of Unit 10 had previously signed a long-term lease. Lynn executed the contract of sale on 10 February 2011 and Frank and Lynn executed the transfer of property.
(e) On 27 May 2011, Frank, Lynn and Ian voted in favour of a resolution that Ying Mui be authorised to sell Lot 201 of the Hampton Property to a third party for $1,800,000. Lynn executed the contract of sale on 27 May 2011 and Lynn and Ian executed the transfer of property. They did so even though the tenant, Australia Post, had only recently signed a lengthy extension of its lease.
(f) On 28 June 2011, Ying Mui paid a further payment of $150,000 to Lokit. Frank has admitted in his evidence that he caused Ying Mui to make this payment and that Ying Mui could not have done so if it had not sold the Docklands Property and Unit 10 of the Hampton Property.
(g) On 29 June 2011, Frank, Lynn and Ian voted in favour of a resolution that 100 per cent of the net income for the Ying Mui Trust be distributed to Lokit. Frank confirmed that the motivation for this resolution was to retrospectively authorise the three payments that had previously been paid to Lokit, payments which had been previously made without any supporting documentation such as an agreement or invoice.
(h) An additional $883,753 was subsequently paid out of the Ying Mui Trust to Lokit in accordance with this purported resolution of 29 June 2011.
(i) As to these payments Lynn stated in her witness statement that she 'formed the view that they should be treated as interim distributions', but then sought to distance herself from this position by a contradiction in cross-examination when she said '[i]t actually just didn't enter our minds at that time'.
(j) On 30 September 2011, Frank and Ian voted in favour of a resolution that Ying Mui be authorised to sell the Sydenham Property to a 'proposed purchaser' for $990,000. The purchaser was Lumarkye, a company whose directors were Dominic, and a Hoh family friend, Vgene. Frank executed the contract of sale on 30 September 2011. Subsequently, Frank and Ian executed the transfer of property. This is one of the property sales the subject of the third of the first tranche questions.
(k) On 28 October 2011, Frank and Ian voted in favour of a resolution that Ying Mui be authorised to sell Lot 202 to a 'proposed purchaser' for $1,680,000. Once again, the purchaser was Lumarkye. Frank executed the contract of sale on 28 October 2011 and Frank and Ian executed the transfer of the property.
475 All of the asset sales, distributions and payments described above were concealed from George, Han and Maureen at the time of the transactions being undertaken. Further, the fact of them having taken place was disguised in the letter dated 12 October 2011 sent to George, Han and Maureen, by clothing the letter with the phrase which advised, 'as a matter of courtesy, of the course YM now intends to take'.[116]
476 In this respect, Frank conceded in cross-examination:
I could not tell them because I was fighting with them. They would stop me. If I told them they would stop me straight away.
477 Similarly, Lynn confirmed in cross-examination that she was not 'volunteering any information' to George and Han and that she 'chose not to tell them that information'.
478 The 12 October 2011 letter made no mention of any of the asset sales, distributions and payments which had already taken place, and was thus patently false and misleading, and, I find, deliberately so.
479 Upon receipt of the 12 October 2011 letter, George, Han and Maureen took steps to try and prevent the sale of the assets of the Ying Mui Trust in the following manner:
(a) On 21 October 2011, Minter Ellison, solicitors on behalf of George, requested the directors of Ying Mui to call a general meeting to consider resolutions that Lynn, Pooi and Ian be removed, and George, Han and Maureen be appointed, as directors of Ying Mui. By separate letter, Minter Ellison also stated that George objected to the 'proposal to cause Ying Mui Pty Ltd, in its capacity as trustee of the Trust, to sell the Trust's assets'.
(b) On 11 November 2011, Lynn sent a letter on behalf of Ying Mui providing notice of a general meeting to be held on 21 December 2011, to consider the resolutions proposed by George.
(c) Lynn responded by letter dated 17 November 2011 on behalf of Ying Mui, which stated that it:
will take no immediate steps to sell the Trust's assets except where, in the opinion of the trustee, such a sale is reasonable in all the circumstances and in the best interests of the beneficiaries.
480 On 18 November 2011 (the Ying Mui special general meeting having been called by Lynn on 11 November 2011 for 21 December 2011), Frank exercised his powers as appointor of the Ying Mui Trust to remove Ying Mui, and appoint Frosthollow, as trustee of the Ying Mui Trust with immediate effect. The deeds were witnessed by Pooi and signed by Lynn in her capacity as the sole director of Frosthollow. Frank confirmed that he took this step because he knew that George and Han had the majority, that they could take control of Ying Mui, and that if they did so, the asset sale process would cease.
481 On 5 December 2011, Frank, Lynn and Ian voted in favour of a resolution that, having ceased to act as trustee, Ying Mui transfer the Glen Waverley and Wantirna South Properties to Frosthollow. The Glen Waverley and Wantirna South Properties to this point had not been sold by Ying Mui and remained in its ownership.
482 Also on 5 December 2011, Frank and Ian executed transfers of land, pursuant to which Ying Mui transferred the Glen Waverley and Wantirna South Properties to Frosthollow. Lynn executed those transfers on behalf of Frosthollow.
483 On 21 December 2011, the special general meeting of Ying Mui took place. Pooi and Lynn were removed as directors and George, Han and Maureen joined Frank as a director. Frank and Lynn did not disclose to George and Han at the meeting that the asset sales had taken place, nor that Ying Mui was no longer the trustee of the Ying Mui Trust.
484 On 23 December 2011, having sold or transferred all of its real estate properties and paid off its bank debts, Ying Mui transferred $1,050,836.60 to Frosthollow.
485 A similar pattern of transactions occurred with Amore. On 8 December 2011:
(a) Frank exercised his powers as appointor of the Amore Trust to remove Amore, and appoint Frosthollow, as trustee of that trust. The deeds were witnessed by Pooi and signed by Lynn in her capacity as a director of Frosthollow;
(b) Frank, Lynn and Pooi voted in favour of a resolution that, having ceased to act as trustee, Amore transfer the Knox Properties to Frosthollow; and
(c) Frank and Pooi executed transfers of land, pursuant to which Amore transferred the Knox Properties to Frosthollow. Lynn executed those transfers on behalf of Frosthollow.
486 On 19 December 2011, Lynn, the company Linjoshan, together with Frosthollow, executed two 'Management Fee Agreements', pursuant to which Frosthollow agreed to pay 6 per cent of all rental proceeds to Linjoshan in consideration for Lynn's services. Lynn executed the agreement on behalf of herself and Frosthollow and Frank executed the agreement on behalf of Linjoshan.
487 Four days later, Frosthollow then executed exclusive leasing and managing authorities with Appleby Real Estate, pursuant to which Frosthollow was obliged to pay a 5.5 per cent managing fee to Appleby Real Estate in respect of the very properties said to be 'managed' by Lynn.
488 Subsequently, Frosthollow, in its capacity as the trustee of the Ying Mui Trust and the Amore Trust, sold the Knox Properties for a total of $2,400,000 and the Wantirna South Property for $1,100,000.
489 Then followed substantial distributions from the Ying Mui Trust and the Amore Trust to members of the Hoh family aligned with Frank, as well as companies under the control of Frank, Lynn, Pooi and Ian, as described below.
490 In 2012, Frosthollow made distributions from the Ying Mui Trust of $1,012,904 to Lokit and $20,000 to each of Jonathon Hoh, Alicia Briggs and Samantha Hoh. The effect of these distributions was that:
(a) $60,000 was distributed to the children of Derek and Richard, with whom Frank, Lynn and Ian had contracted in relation to the sale of SYM shares and who are now aligned with Frank in his dispute with George, even though Derek and Richard had previously been bought out of Ying Mui; and
(b) Throughout 2011 and 2012, a total of $3,175,954.62 was paid out of the Ying Mui Trust and the Amore Trust to Lokit.
491 In 2013, Frosthollow made distributions from the Ying Mui Trust of $280,604 to Lokit, $50,000 to Derek, $30,000 to each of Jonathon and Cordelia, $20,000 to Alicia and $10,000 to Leonard Hoh. The effect of these distributions was that $140,000 was distributed to Derek and the children of Derek and Richard and that a total of $3,456,558.62 was paid out of the Ying Mui Trust and the Amore Trust to Lokit between 2011 and 2013.
492 In 2014, Frosthollow made a distribution from the Ying Mui Trust of $631,471 to SYM and a distribution from the Amore Trust to SYM of $596,394. This was the first time that any distribution had ever been made to SYM from the Ying Mui Trust or the Amore Trust. This occurred after a board meeting of SYM was held at which Frank, Jonathon and Leonard passed a series of resolutions removing George and Han from positions within SYM and appointing and appointing Lynn, Cordelia, Richard and Gloria in their place.
493 All of the 2012, 2013 and 2014 distribution payments described above were funded by the capital gains realised from the asset sales authorised by Frank, Pooi, Lynn and Ian.
494 The total cash paid out to Lokit pursuant to the 2011 ($1,433,753), 2012 ($1,012,904) and 2013 ($280,604) distribution payments was $2,727,261, which supplemented the cash paid out by way of management fees of $729,297.62.
Whether Sydenham Property and Lot 202 transferred to Lumarkye in breach of fiduciary duty?
495 As previously explained, the allegations against Lumarkye are based on the first, or 'knowing receipt' limb of Barnes v Addy, as applied in Farah Constructions.[117] That is to say the Plaintiffs claim that Lumarkye received trust property (namely the two real properties being the Sydenham Property and Lot 202) with knowledge of Frank and Ian Hoh's alleged breaches of fiduciary duty owed to the legal owner, the company Ying Mui, of which they were directors.
496 The Sixth Defendant, Lumarkye contended that, whatever the motivation for the other transactions complained of by the Plaintiffs, the purpose and effect of the sale of the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 to Lumarkye in late 2011 was to reduce debt which Ying Mui had previously incurred in financing property purchases in its capacity as trustee of the Ying Mui Trust.
497 Specifically, Lumarkye said that purchase monies received from Lumarkye were paid directly to the Ying Mui Trust's bankers ANZ, and used by them to repay a commercial bill facility for a total sum of $2,700,000, which was due to be rolled over in December 2011.
498 Absent the sales to Lumarkye, Ying Mui was commercially compelled to repay the amounts owing from other sources, or borrowing again from ANZ by rolling over the commercial bill facility for another term.
499 It was submitted that avoiding the need to raise funds from other sources, or borrow further funds, to roll over those bill facilities was a sound commercial reason for Ying Mui in its capacity as trustee to sell the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 in late 2011.
500 The Sydenham Property and Lot 202 were sold to Lumarkye for their full market value in late 2011. Further, the properties were only sold to Lumarkye because attempts to sell them to others had failed.
501 It was contended that it cannot be a breach of trust for a trustee to sell trust assets at full market value to repay debts properly incurred by it in its capacity as trustee. The beneficiaries of the trust were deprived of the trust assets, but at the same time they received more than full market value for them, and obtained the benefit of reducing debt in amounts that the trustee would otherwise have had to re-borrow, and on which it would otherwise have had to continue to pay interest, and for which the trustee would have had a full right of indemnity out of trust assets.
502 The purchase prices paid by Lumarkye for Lot 202 and the Sydenham Property were used to repay the trust debt of $2,700,000. The entire proceeds of sale of the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 to Lumarkye were used for the proper purposes of reducing the trust's debts.
503 In these circumstances, it was contended that there no breach of trust or fiduciary duty, and no wrongful alienation of a trust asset. Lumarkye therefore did not wrongfully receive any trust property.
504 It was submitted further that, by purchasing the two properties at full market value, and using its own funds to do so, Lumarkye did not do anything which caused compensable loss to Ying Mui or to anyone else. In those circumstances, Lumarkye cannot be said wrongfully or fraudulently to have received any trust property or diminished the value of the Ying Mui trust assets in any way.
505 It was submitted that, although Ying Mui lost the benefit of the two properties, it received full market value in respect of them, and reduced its debt and avoided further interest payments. Accordingly, Ying Mui and the beneficiaries of the Ying Mui Trust of which it was then trustee, were not any worse off by reason of the property sales. Indeed, it was put that Ying Mui in its capacity as trustee was benefitted by the sale of the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 through being relieved of debts it would otherwise have had either to repay from other resources, or borrow money to repay.
506 The First to Fourth Defendants submitted that the acquisition of the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 by Lumarkye did not involve receipt of trust property because the sales of those properties to Lumarkye did not involve any breach of statutory or fiduciary duty by Frank or Ian. The pleaded breach is that Frank and Ian acted out of personal interest and in conflict of interest. It was submitted that this has not been established by the evidence for the principal reasons which follow.
507 The properties in dispute were not sold at undervalue. Indeed, the sale prices achieved were above market valuations obtained by Ying Mui.
508 The directors had the power to sell the properties and took all reasonable steps to ensure the properties realised above market value through various selling methods.
509 Frank gave evidence that he was acting in Ying Mui's interests in selling assets which he thought should be sold, and not premium assets, because there were issues with them. He was not doing Lumarkye any favours in selling the two properties to it.
510 It was submitted that there was no relevant conflict of interest in selling the properties to Lumarkye. Neither Frank nor Ian were said to have any relevant interest in the purchaser. Further, Lynn was acting in the best interests of Ying Mui in finding a purchaser who was prepared to pay above market value. Her role in assisting the purchaser to obtain finance and setting up the appropriate corporate structure was not improper and was undertaken as agent of Lumarkye. She abstained from the resolution to sell the properties to Lumarkye. Even if there was any conflict of interest, there was fully informed consent to Frank and Lynn acting to procure the sales to Lumarkye.
511 Finally, the directors did not act for any ulterior purpose or personal interest in deciding to sell the properties. Reducing debt and personal exposure is not inconsistent with the best interests of the company or a bona fide purpose, particularly where the sales achieved above market prices.
Conclusions as to breach of fiduciary duty on the part of Frank
512 I conclude on the evidence that the conduct of Frank, in authorising and effecting the sale of the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 to Lumarkye, was in breach of the fiduciary duty which he owed to Ying Mui, the company of which he was a director.
513 The sale of the two properties to Lumarkye was part of the broader property asset sales programme initiated by Frank for his personal purposes.
514 I am satisfied that Frank exercised his powers as a director for the improper purpose of obtaining substantial and direct personal benefits. I am further satisfied that he did not give any consideration to what was in the interests of Ying Mui or the beneficiaries of the trust of which it was the trustee.
515 The driving motivation for the sales was Frank's personal interest, which in turn placed him in a conflict of interest which he failed to acknowledge and from which he did not withdraw.
516 Further, I am satisfied that Frank, by participating in and giving effect to the two sale transactions being the sales of the two properties to Lumarkye, actually and personally benefitted not only himself, but also his wife Pooi and his son-in-law Dominic.
517 As earlier observed, the evidence of Frank was that he sold the properties held by the Ying Mui Trust, including the Sydenham Property and Lot 202, for reasons which served both his personal interests and the interests of his immediate family. I am satisfied that Frank is liable in respect of breach of fiduciary duty arising from the sales of the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 to Lumarkye.
Conclusions as to breach of fiduciary duty on the part of Ian
518 I also conclude on the evidence that the conduct of Ian, in authorising and effecting the sale of the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 to Lumarkye, was in breach of fiduciary duty which he owed to Ying Mui, the company of which he was a director.
519 I am satisfied that Ian knew that the sale of the two properties to Lumarkye was part of the broader property asset sales programme initiated by Frank for his personal purposes.
520 The evidence of Ian in respect of the sale of the Sydenham Property and Lot 202, was that:
(a) He did not give any independent consideration to whether it would be in the best interests of Ying Mui to sell either of those properties;
(b) As a director of Ying Mui, he always deferred to Frank. He did not require Frank to provide him with any information when Frank proposed to sell the properties, and he simply agreed to the sales and signed all necessary transfer documents because Frank asked him to do so; and
(c) He knew that Frank wanted to sell the properties because of his dispute with George in order to create a 'fighting fund', and he knew that cash received from the sale of the properties was to be used in defence of litigation which Frank anticipated.
521 I am satisfied that Ian exercised his powers as a director for the improper purpose of conferring substantial and direct personal benefits upon his parents. I am further satisfied that Ian did not give any consideration as to what was in the interests of Ying Mui or the beneficiaries of the trust of which it was the trustee.
522 Ian found himself in a clear conflict of interest, from which he did not withdraw.
523 Further, I am satisfied that Ian, by participating in and giving effect to the two sale transactions arising from the sales of the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 to Lumarkye, actually benefitted his parents.
524 For these reasons, Ian is liable in respect of breach of fiduciary duty arising from the sales of the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 to Lumarkye.
525 Added to this is the conduct of both Frank and Ian arising from payments to Lokit (the 'Lokit Payments').
526 As to the Lokit Payments, it will be re-called that Lokit is the Fifth Defendant. Frank along with Frank's wife Pooi and his son Ian are directors of Lokit and the 12 shares are held equally by Frank and Pooi.
527 I find that both Ian and Frank acted with a conflict of interest, as directors and/or shareholders of Lokit in managing the Lokit Payments. These payments comprised the 'management fees' and a 'fighting fund' to be paid out from the proceeds of sale of the Sydenham Property and Lot 202. The recipient of these payments was Lokit.
528 The funds paid out to Lokit, consequent upon the sale of the Sydenham Property and Lot 202, I find, were used by Frank and Ian to pay legal fees in this proceeding. The following cross-examination of Ian reveals as much:
You'll see a transfer of land bearing your name and signature on the bottom right-hand corner?---Yes.
This transfer concerned Lot 201?---Yes.
The Australia Post property?---Yes.
Now as with the resolutions you signed these documents because Frank asked you to do so?---Yes.
And you did what he asked?---Yes.
You didn't give any independent consideration in signing any of these documents as to whether it was in the best interests of Ying Mui to sell these properties?---No.
Now you knew when signing these documents that Frank was in dispute with George and Han?---Yes.
And that he wanted to sell these properties because of that dispute?---Yes.
He wanted to sell these properties because he wanted to create a fighting fund?---Yes.
That fighting fund would be moneys received from the sale of the properties to be used in defence of anticipated litigation?---Yes.
In fact your understanding is that the proceeds or at least part of the proceeds of the sale of these properties once distributed or paid to Lokit have been used to pay legal fees in this proceeding?---Yes.
529 Indeed, the evidence of Frank is that approximately $2,000,000, which was generated by the sale of properties held by the Ying Mui Trust, has been spent in this proceeding defending the conduct of Frank, Pooi, Lynn and Ian whilst they were directors of Ying Mui and Amore. The following re-examination of Frank is referred to:
In response to his questions, you said that distribution was made because you needed a fighting fund. Would you please tell His Honour why you thought you needed a fighting fund during the financial year ended 30 June 2011?---Your Honour, because I knew that if they took control of the company, they would take legal action against me.
What action did you anticipate would be taken against you, or might be taken against you?---They would take control of the trust and all the properties, that's - I thought they would do that.
And what did you anticipate the fighting fund might be used for?---Pay legal fees.
Yes. You gave evidence in answer to a question from our learned friend this morning that $2m had been spent thus far and it didn't allow for the three weeks of this court hearing. Do you recall giving that evidence?---Yes. It's very expensive.
What exactly has that $2m been spent on?---What was spent, is it?
Sorry?---What - - -
What exactly has that $2m been spent on? Is it just this case?---Yes, yes.
530 In effect, by authorising the sale of the Sydenham Property and Lot 202, Frank and Ian converted assets of the Ying Mui Trust into cash, which was deposited with Lokit and which they in turn used to defend allegations in the present proceeding that they acted in breach of fiduciary duty whilst directors of the trustee of the Ying Mui Trust.
531 In so doing, both Frank and Ian acted with a clear conflict of interest in relation to Ying Mui and out of self-interest in authorising and undertaking the sales of the two properties to generate the necessary cash for purposes which, I find, they had in contemplation at the time the sales were effected.
532 Looking at the relevant facts and circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable person, I am satisfied that the personal interests of Frank and Ian were such that a reasonable person would think there was a real or substantial possibility of the fiduciary being swayed by their desire to make the Lokit Payments. They took no step to avoid the conflicts but in fact pursued their personal interests.
533 The breach of fiduciary duty on the part of both Frank and Ian in relation to the Lokit Payments is also established.
534 Twenty seven matters are pleaded by the Plaintiffs from which it is claimed to be inferred that Lumarkye is under the effective management and control of Frank and/or Lynn, such that their knowledge of the breaches of fiduciary duty can and should be imputed to Lumarkye.[118]
535 However, in submissions, the Plaintiffs focussed on the role of Lynn as the directing mind or will of Lumarkye in relation to the sale of the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 to Lumarkye.
536 The Plaintiffs submitted that, for the purposes of the sale transactions of the two relevant properties, it was Lynn who was the 'directing mind or will' of Lumarkye,[119] even if she did not formally have 'sufficient authority to bind' the company.[120] Her knowledge was therefore the knowledge of Lumarkye.
537 To this end, it was submitted that, on the evidence, Lynn had knowledge of the facts giving rise to the breaches of fiduciary duty on the part of Frank and Ian which have been found.
538 As such, Lumarkye had the requisite degree of knowledge required for a 'knowing receipt' liability to be established under Barnes v Addy.
539 Lumarkye submitted that, on the facts, it did not have the requisite degree of knowledge required for liability under either limb of Barnes v Addy.
540 As to the submission of the Plaintiffs that Lynn's knowledge of the sale transactions should be imputed to Lumarkye, it was submitted that this is not open on the facts.
541 It was submitted that the fact that Lynn was involved in facilitating the purchase and investment by Lumarkye in the Sydenham and Lot 202 properties does not mean that she was the alter ego of Lumarkye, or that she was in effect a principal or investor in it in her own right. It was submitted that the actual investors, principals, guiding minds and decision makers were at all times her husband, Dominic, and Vgene and her Malaysian relatives.
542 The directors of Lumarkye at all material times were Dominic and Vgene.
543 The only formal connection that Lynn had with Lumarkye was that, up to 9 September 2011, Linjoshan held 50 per cent of the shares in Lumarkye, and Lynn held one of the three shares in Linjoshan, along with Ian and Frank.
544 It was put that Lynn's role in Lumarkye was 'administrative' in nature, well short of assuming the position of the 'mind' of the company.
Whether Lynn the 'controlling mind' of Lumarkye in relation to the sale of the two properties
545 I am satisfied that, in making the decision to purchase the two properties from Ying Mui, the ultimate decision was made by the directors of Lumarkye, Dominic and Vgene.
546 Nevertheless, I am also satisfied that Lynn was the driving force behind the purchases and was involved in the purchases to such an extent that she, in effect, had the management and control of the two sale transactions in point. She had detailed knowledge of the two sale transactions and the motivation of her father Frank in seeking to have Ying Mui effect the sales.
547 In this way, Lynn had actual knowledge of facts which would lead a reasonable person in her position to conclude that the two properties were trust property being misapplied or transferred pursuant to a breach of fiduciary duty or trust.
548 In assessing whether the person in question has management or control in relation to a particular act, it is appropriate for a court to take a pragmatic view.[121]
549 For the purposes of the two sale transactions, Lynn was 'so closely and relevantly connected' with Lumarkye that her state of mind in relation to the transactions should 'be treated as being identified with the company' such that it 'can be treated as being the state of mind of the company'.[122]
550 I find that Lynn was the key instrument in effecting the sale transactions and was the directing mind and will behind the transactions on behalf of the company.[123]
551 However, beyond her role in effecting the two sale transactions, I am satisfied that after they were completed, Lynn withdrew to an administrative role within Lumarkye in the management of the properties, and conducted this administration in a manner short of that which could be said to manifest the state of mind of the company. This change in roles within Lumarkye, however, did not detract from Lynn's knowledge of the sale transactions and the motivation of Frank in pressing for them, which ought to be attributed to a company. It is clear that the knowledge of a person might be attributed to a company for the limited purpose of effecting particular transactions, whether or not he or she is the directing mind and will in managing all other aspects of the operations of the company.[124]
552 Lynn had considerable and impressive business skills and experience which enabled her to readily and competently undertake property transactions of the type involved with the purchase of the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 by Lumarkye.
553 In her witness statement, Lynn described her qualifications and experience in the following terms:
After school I studied at Monash University, completing a Bachelor of Accounting. The Bachelor of Accounting was a specialist, accelerated Bachelor of Commerce degree offered by Monash University which included three industry-based learning components.
In 1997, after graduating from university, I started working at Arthur Andersen in Sydney.
I worked in the Enterprise group at Arthur Andersen for two years, after which I transferred to the Tax group. I was admitted as a member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in January 2000. I worked in the tax group until 2002 when the firm collapsed. At that time, Arthur Andersen's Australian practice was integrated into Ernst & Young's Australian practice, so I moved across to Ernst & Young. I worked in the Tax group, focussing on international tax, including in the context of mergers and acquisitions and corporate restructures, for approximately five years.
Towards the end of 2003, my husband, Dominic, for a job with Goldman Sachs in Tokyo, Japan. My supervising partners at Ernst & Young in Sydney encouraged me to approach the Tokyo office for opportunities to join the firm there. I did so and the Tokyo partners created a position for me. I established the "Australian Tax Desk", offering Australian tax advice to Japanese companies wanting to do business in Australia, as well as being a liaison for Japanese tax advice to Australian companies wanting to do business in Japan.
554 Lynn's qualifications and experience were such as to command respect and indeed deference from the directors of Lumarkye in her undertaking of the property sale transactions in favour of Lumarkye.
Lynn's actual knowledge of, and participation in, the sale transactions
555 It is clear that Lynn had actual knowledge of, and direct participation in, the transactions involving the sale of the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 to Lumarkye. This is evidenced by the following:
(a) In mid-June 2011, Lynn was in Kuala Lumpur and, during a meal with other extended Hoh family members, including those who operated the pawnshops, she mentioned that Ying Mui was selling a number of properties in Melbourne and Dominic was considering investing in one of those properties but did not have sufficient capital to make the investment on his own;
(b) On 23 June 2011, Lynn sent an email to Vgene to see if she, and some or all of her siblings, would be interested in investing with Dominic in the Sydenham property and Lot 202;
(c) On 6 July 2011, Lynn received two indicative valuations of the Sydenham property;
(i) Lot 202 went to auction with a reserve of $1,800,000;
(iv) after the auction finished the highest bidder increased their offer by $10,000;
(e) Vgene and some of her siblings informed Lynn that they had decided to invest in Australia with Lynn's husband Dominic;
(f) In September 2011, the company Lumarkye was set up for that purpose. Lynn knew that the current shareholders were and are River Ventures Pty Ltd (50 per cent), which represented her extended family's interests, and her husband Dominic (50 per cent);
(g) Lynn instructed solicitors to draw up a unit trust deed, pursuant to which Lumarkye was appointed trustee of the Woolshed Unit Trust on 16 September 2011. The current unitholders of the trust are River Ventures Pty Ltd (50 per cent) and Lynn's husband Dominic (50 per cent);
(h) On 20 September 2011, Lynn received another valuation of the Sydenham Property;
(i) On the basis of that valuation Lynn told her husband Dominic and Vgene that Ying Mui was prepared to sell the Sydenham Property for at least $980,000. Shortly after that, Lumarkye made an offer to buy the Sydenham Property for $990,000;
(j) On 30 September 2011 Lynn attended a board meeting of Ying Mui. Frank and Ian also attended. Because Lynn was married to Dominic, she abstained from voting on the proposed sale of the Sydenham Property. Frank and Ian resolved to sell the Sydenham property to Dominic (and/or his nominee) for $990,000;
(k) On 30 September 2011 Lynn was aware that Frank executed a contract of sale in respect of the Sydenham Property on behalf of Ying Mui;
(l) On 20 November 2011 Lynn was aware that Frank signed a transfer of land in respect of the Sydenham Property on behalf of Ying Mui;
(m) On 30 November 2011 Lynn was also aware that settlement of the Sydenham Property took place;
(n) On 3 October 2011 Lynn sent an email to the various investors in the Woolshed Unit Trust updating them on the purchase of the Sydenham Property. The email read:
CONGRATULATIONS - Sydenham
From: Lynn Hoh
Sent: Monday, 3 October 2011 6:18:22 PM
To: Choong Xin Pawnshop; You Keun Hoo; Chok Keun Hoo; Teck Keun Hoo; Cheng Keun Ho; Pei Leng Siew
Cc: Frank Hih; Dominic Low 2 attachments Sydenham Contract of Sale 30 Sep 2011.pdf (4.5 MB), Sydenham Valuation Report 20 Sep 2011.pdf (1333.4 KB)
Hi all
Re: Purchase of 530 Melton Highway, Sydenham
Please find attached for your reference the executed Contract of Sale for the abovenamed property. Dom has signed the contract as nominee for the Woolshed Unit Trust (River Ventures Pty Ltd holds 50% of the units of this Trust).
Also attached is a recent valuation report which values the property at $980,000. After negotiation with the vendor, we agreed on a sale price of $990,000. At the current net rent of approx. $85,400, this purchase price reflects an 8.6% return on our investment. The tenant has agreed to a 4% rental increase effective from mid-December 2011, so out return will increase to approx. 9%.
Funding
At the time of executing the Contract for Sale, a 10% deposit was made - $49,500 from River Ventures Pty Ltd and $49,500 from Dominic Low.
Settlement is scheduled to take place on 29 November 2011. Please ensure that sufficient funds are available in River Ventures' bank account by 15 November for your 50% share of the settlement amount ($445,500), stamp duty (approx. $23,000), legal costs (approx. $2,000). As you should be aware, the Australian Dollar is currently relatively weak and therefore it may be a good time for you to transfer funds to Australia. Note also that the Australian Reserve Bank is due to meet tomorrow and there is an expectation that interest rates will be reduced which should also likely further weaken the strength of the Australian Dollar.
If you have any questions about this, please let me know.
Best regards
Lynn.
(o) On 18 October 2011, Lynn received a valuation of Lot 202;
(p) On the basis of that valuation Frank and Lynn agreed that Ying Mui should revise the reserve for Lot 202. It was clear that prospective purchasers, as confirmed by an independent valuer, did not believe, as they initially did, that the market values for Lot 201 and Lot 202 were identical. It appeared that potential purchasers felt that the investment risk associated with Lot 202 was slightly higher, and therefore placed a lesser value on Lot 202 than on Lot 201;
(q) Lynn advised Dominic and Vgene that Ying Mui was prepared to sell Lot 202 for not less than $1,670,000. Shortly after that, Lumarkye made an offer to buy Lot 202 for $1,680,000;
(r) On 28 October 2011 Lynn attended a board meeting of Ying Mui. Frank and Ian also attended. Because Dominic is Lynn's husband, she abstained from voting on the proposed sale of Lot 202. Frank and Ian resolved to sell Lot 202 to Dominic (and/or his nominee) for $1,680,000;
(s) Lynn was aware that on 28 October 2011 Frank executed a contract of sale in respect of Lot 202 on behalf of Ying Mui;
(t) Lynn also was aware that on 13 December 2011 Frank and Ian signed a transfer of land in respect of Lot 202 on behalf of Ying Mui, and on 13 December 2011 settlement took place.
556 I am satisfied that Dominic, who was Lynn's husband, and one of the two directors of Lumarkye, respected, trusted and indeed deferred to Lynn's business acumen and experience which made her well-equipped to manage property transactions of the type involved with the sales of the two properties. In effect, Dominic delegated the property sale transactions of the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 and the detailed implementation of the transactions to Lynn. He took this approach in relation to all key aspects of the transactions, including delegating to Lynn the planning, organisation and implementation of:
(b) the legal structure to provide the vehicle for the purchases, including establishing Lumarkye specifically for this purpose, and the Woolshed Unit Trust, of which Lumarkye was the trustee;
(d) structuring and arranging finance for the purchase;
(e) instructing accountants and solicitors for these purposes;
(f) co-ordinating all sales of property in Australia by Ying Mui and Amore; and
557 The following passages from the cross-examination of Dominic evidence these findings:
Participants
It was your wife Lynn who identified the Malaysian extended family members as being persons who might potentially be interested in the acquisition of the two properties?---Yes. She did, Your Honour.
So the sequence of events is that Lynn has made you aware of the fact that lot 202 and Sydenham were available for sale. That's so, is it not?---Yes. She did, Your Honour.
Lynn then identified that some extended family members, based in Malaysia, may be willing to join in the acquisition of the two properties with you and Lynn. That's fair', isn't it?---Yes. That's fair, Your Honour.
...
And she also sought to interest some other friends of yours in joining you in acquiring the investment didn't she? You recall that?---Ah, yes, she tried to, um, I mean as I explained before, we couldn't afford the property by yourselves, so we had to go through a process of finding other investors, Your Honour.
...
And similarly she was also communicating with the Malaysian distant relatives, that was s' wasn't it?---Excuse me. Ah, yes, she was communicating with the Malaysian investors Your Honour.
...
Yes, because Lynn was co-ordinating the acquisition investment group wasn't she?---Um, yes she was co-ordinating with um Vgene and her siblings, yes Your Honour.
...
Yes. All right, and Lynn was attaching some proposed structures for the two property investments that our families will be making together, do you see that?---Ah yes I do see that Your Honour.
...
Is that again because it was your wife that was hands on in relation to putting this buying group together?---Ah yes she was definitely hands on Your Honour.
Legal structure
Not only was it your wife Lynn who identified the extended family members who may be willing to participate in the acquisition of the two properties; it was also Lynn who put together the trust structure by which the properties were to be acquired wasn't it?---Yes. She did put together the structure, Your Honour.
...
It was Lynn that did indeed coordinate the execution of the documents didn't she? Not you?---Yes, Lynn coordinated documents, not me.
...
Now similarly in relation to the establishment of the Woolshed Unit Trust, Lynn was involved wasn't she, in instructing solicitors to prepare the relevant trust documents? That was so wasn't it?---Yes, I believe so Your Honour.
You weren't involved were you?---No, it's not something that I get involved in Your Honour.
Negotiation of the sale contracts
It was Lynn that presumably engaged in that negotiation on behalf of the purchasing group with the vendor?---Yes, it appears so Your Honour.
...
In relation to the contracts they reflected arrangements that had been negotiated on Lumarkye's behalf by Lynn, that's so is it not?---Yes, of course. Lynn is in a better position with her occupation to do that, but I just add through discussion with me and instruction from me.
...
I suggest that Lynn had full authority on behalf of Lumarkye to arrange those sales contracts, that's so isn't it?---Yeah, per my instructions to do so.
Structuring and arranging finance
That's an email that Lynn sent to Kevin Sait from the ANZ Bank providing information to Mr Sait in connection with your loan application. Do you see that?---Yes, I do see that Your Honour.
Lynn also copied your father-in-law Frank in on this email? ---Yes, I can see Frank's name on the email, yeah.
Lynn offered to Kevin Sait that Frank and Kit, which is your mother-in-law, also known as Pooi, would guarantee the loan to you and provided apartment 7 as collateral for the loan?---Yes, I see that Your Honour.
That was a matter that Lynn arranged was it not?---Appears so, Your Honour, yes.
...
I suggest to you that the finance arrangements were all negotiated by the bank by Lynn?---I - I wouldn't - I wouldn't say that there was a furious amount of negotiation for the loan. Lynn kept me updated on the status of the financing and the settlement.
Instructing accountants and solicitors
The board minutes that you were asked to sign from time to time they were all produced by Lynn as well weren't they?---Yes, the board minutes were produced by Lynn and in consultation with our accountants. The details are pretty rudimentary.
Lynn would just get you to sign documents wouldn't'' she?---She'd ask me to review and sign the documents Your Honour.
Co-ordination of Australian property sales
You knew, didn't you, that your wife Lynn was co-ordinating the sales of those properties. Did you know that?---Yes. I did, and I knew that she was co-ordinating the sale of probably all the properties.
...
General management of the two sales
Because she was really running the whole acquisition process on behalf of you and her wasn't she?---Um, I would say she was facilitating our investment objectives.
She was much more hands on than you wasn't she?---Ah, yes, she was much more hands on as that's what she does for a living, Your Honour.
...
558 Although the decision to invest, in addition to some other key decisions, ultimately lay with Dominic, both in his capacity as an investor and a director of the investment vehicle Lumarkye, I am satisfied that he was guided and influenced by Lynn's proposals and competent administration to such a degree, that for the purposes of the transactions, Lynn should be treated as the controlling mind of Lumarkye.
559 There was another factor which to my mind embedded Lynn's influence with Lumarkye for the purposes of the two sale transactions, such that she became its controlling mind for these purposes. It was known to both directors that Lynn had a strong indirect interest in Lumarkye. As already noted, her husband Dominic held a 50 per cent shareholding in Lumarkye, and was a 50 per cent specified unit holder in the Woolshed Unit Trust, of which it was a trustee. By these means Dominic gained a 50 per cent interest in the two properties to be held as assets of the Woolshed trust. Lynn's position would itself have been a reason for the directors of Lumarkye to defer to her investment plans.
560 Vgene, the other of the two directors of Lumarkye, I am satisfied, took a similar approach to that of Dominic in relation to participation in the sale of the two properties to Lumarkye and, in effect, the delegation of all key aspects of the transactions to Lynn, including the planning and organisation of the transactions and the detailed implementation of them.
561 Although the decision to invest, in addition to some other key decisions, ultimately lay with Vgene, both in her capacity as an investor and a director of the investment vehicle Lumarkye, I am satisfied that she was guided and influenced by Lynn's proposals and competent administration to such a high degree, that for the purposes of the transactions, Lynn should be treated as the controlling mind of Lumarkye for these purposes.
562 Vgene said in her evidence, which I accept, that:
(a) [She] knew that Lynn was a qualified chartered accountant and had worked in senior accounting roles overseas. She trusted Lynn's advice in financial matters.
(b) Lynn's general approach in dealing with [her] and the other investors of the two Australian properties was to provide [them] with regular and detailed information and to answer any questions which [she] may have had in relation to this information.
(c) Lynn would provide guidance and advice in relation to properties and matters relating to them. , however, she at no stage sought to make any decisions for [her] or to impose her will on [her].
(d) [She] knew Dominic as the husband of Lynn Hoh. Dominic and [her] had no direct discussion during the period of purchase.
Conclusion as to whether Lynn the 'controlling mind' of Lumarkye in the two sale transactions
563 It will be recalled that the transactions took place on 30 September 2011 (Sydenham Property) and 28 October 2011 (Lot 202) respectively.
564 Although Lumarkye was incorporated on 12 June 2008, the current directors (Dominic and Vgene) and shareholders River Ventures Pty Ltd (in which Vgene and Dominic held shares as of 50 per cent each), were appointed and took up their shareholdings on 9 September 2011.
565 Thus when the relevant transactions occurred, the structure of the transactions had already been well advanced by Lynn. It was on 17 June 2011, that the other investors and Vgene had earlier agreed to invest in the two properties.
566 After reviewing the evidence, I am satisfied and infer that, although Dominic and Vgene had been appointed as directors of Lumarkye and, by reason of holding office as directors, had formal control of the company, they in fact had a very limited role in the two sale transactions. At least until completion of those transactions, Lynn was the controlling mind of Lumarkye when the company received benefits of the transfers of the two properties to it.
567 In the present case it is clear that Lynn had actual knowledge of three critical matters (the 'critical facts'):
(a) Her parents had a personal interest in selling the two properties to reduce their liabilities under their personal guarantees in relation to the Australian property holdings;
(b) Her father's personal interest in establishing a fighting fund to be used by him to protect his family assets. Lynn also knew details of the transactions involving the sale of the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 by Ying Mui to Lumarkye, including the fact that monies realised from the sales had been paid to Frank's company Lockit and formed part of the fighting fund established by her father; and
(c) The first three Lockit payments, which were sourced from the property sales, were received by her father as remuneration for management fees he claimed.
568 It was not put to Lynn in cross-examination that she had actual knowledge that any of the conduct found against Frank or Ian as directors of Ying Mui constituted any breach of fiduciary duty on their part, or that she had actual knowledge of this being the case.
569 Nevertheless, given her actual knowledge of the critical facts as I have found them, I am satisfied that Lynn had actual knowledge of sufficient of the circumstances which would indicate to an honest and reasonable person that the conduct of Frank in selling the two properties because he wanted to reduce the liabilities under his personal guarantees, establish a fighting fund for his personal use and use part of the monies to pay management fees to him for his personal use, placed him in a clear conflict of interest which, in turn, constituted breach of fiduciary duty owed to Ying Mui.
570 This disposes of the Plaintiffs' knowing receipt claim in their favour.
571 Although it has been alleged by the Plaintiffs in their pleadings that Lumarkye should also be fixed with the knowledge of Ian, no evidence has been led to the effect that he was, or could have been, Lumarkye's controlling or guiding mind, nor its agent for any purpose. Nor have the plaintiffs put any submission to this effect.
572 Accordingly, it is not open to find that Lumarkye can be fixed with any of the knowledge of Ian.
573 The third question to be determined by the Court in this part of the proceeding is:
Did Lumarkye, in receiving the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 from Ying Mui, knowingly receive trust property?
If so, is Lumarkye a constructive trustee with respect to the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 or is it required to pay compensation to Ying Mui?
574 In answer to the First Tranche Question 3: Did Lumarkye, in receiving the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 from Ying Mui, knowingly receive trust property? The answer is: Yes.[125]
575 In answer to the First Tranche Question 3: Is Lumarkye a constructive trustee with respect to the Sydenham Property and Lot 202 or is it required to pay compensation to Ying Mui? The answer is that the Court is presently unable to answer this question in the light of the submissions that have been made.
576 It is a matter of note that, although the two properties comprised real estate which was, in all likelihood, subject to the Torrens system of land registration in Victoria, no defence of indefeasibility of title was either pleaded by Lumarkye or contended for in submissions. In Farah Constructions, the High Court held that the recipient of the real estate there in question had obtained indefeasible title to the properties transferred upon registration under the Torrens system. For this reason, it was held that the recipients could not be liable for knowing receipt, even if they had received the properties with notice of the breach of fiduciary duty. With some exceptions, indefeasibility of title protects registered proprietors from adverse claims to land in the absence of actual fraud on their part or on the part of their agents. The breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the fiduciary in Farah Constructions even if it had occurred, was held not to be of such an order that it could be described as 'actual fraud'. For this reason, the recipients, who became the registered proprietors of the properties in question, could not be guilty of fraud, even if they had received the properties with actual knowledge of the fiduciary's breach.
577 However, no such case was pleaded or at this point pressed in submissions.
578 The Court will need to hear further from the parties as to whether any and what amendment to the pleadings and further submissions should be entertained before determining this part of the First Tranche Question 3.
579 I will hear the parties on these matters, and what further questions need to be addressed, if any, in the next tranche of questions to be dealt with in this sequential trial.
09/09/1985 (initially called Vielass Pty Ltd, named changed on 28/02/1986)
Pooi Lim - alternate director (from 04/04/2001 until 21/12/2011)
George Hoh - 83 shares (from 30/06/1998, with varying quantities since 31/03/1988)
Han Hoh - 83 shares (from 27/04/2009, which were transferred from Robert Hoh)
Lokit Investments Pty Ltd - 83 shares (from 01/01/2002, which were transferred from Frank Hoh)
Richard Hoh - varying quantities (from 24/09/1985 until 03/08/2000), including at times shares held on trust for other siblings
Derek Hoh - 83 shares (from 17/07/1998 until 04/04/2001)
Maureen Oborn - 83 shares (from 17/07/1998 until 30/12/2002)
Robert Hoh - 83 shares (from 17/07/1998 until 27/04/2009)
Frank Hoh - 83 shares (from 17/07/1998 until 01/01/2002)
Yow Mui Yow - varying quantities (from 24/09/1985 until 04/04/2001)
Ying Chye Hoh - 24 shares (from 24/09/1985 until 31/03/1988)
Prior to 11/09/2007, the sole shareholder of Amore Corporation Pty Ltd was Ying Mui Pty Ltd.
River Ventures Pty Ltd - 100 shares (since 09/09/2011)
Han Hoh (appointed 27/09/2004) [NB: subsequently removed and then reinstated]
Gloria Hoh, as an alternative director to Leonard Hoh (appointed 03/09/2012)
Cordelia Hoh, as an alternative director to Jonathan Hoh (appointed 03/09/2012)
Richard Hoh, as an alternative director to Frank Hoh (appointed 03/09/2012)
There have been numerous changes to the directors of SYM over time.
There have been numerous changes to the shareholders of SYM over time. By agreement dated 11 July 2011, Linlok Enterprises Sdn Bhd, Lynn Hoh and Ian Hoh purported to sell a total of 344,000 shares to Cordelia Hoh.
You Keun Hoo (Vgene) - 150 shares (from 29/06/2011)
Han Hoh (from 29/09/97 until 02/03/2000, and then re-appointed on 08/07/2008)
Robert Hoh (from 29/09/1997 until his death on 24/12/2007)
Robert Hoh - 1 share (from 01/06/2005 until his death on 24/12/2007)
Robert Hoh (appointed 21/01/2000 until his death on 24/12/2007)
This is a company controlled by George Hoh: T532.25
This is a company that was controlled by Robert Hoh: T532.27
Ying Mui Pty Ltd (from 06/07/2001 until 18/11/2011)
As defined in clause 1.2 of the trust deed to mean, inter alia, the Specified Beneficiaries and:
"the parents, brothers, sisters, spouses, widows, widowers ... children and next of kin of the Specified Beneficiary or Specified Beneficiaries and the spouses, widows, widowers, children and grandchildren of such brothers, sisters, spouses children ...
Any charity, or charitable, educational, benevolent, sporting or religious institution person or persons, corporations or associations howsoever constituted whom the Trustee in the Trustee's absolute discretion considers worthy of receipt of funds either for charitable, educational, benevolent, sporting or religious purposes or for the relief of poverty or for scientific or public educational purposes ..." (clause 1.2)
The Schedule specifically provides General Beneficiaries:
"As specified in Clause 1.2, including the Spouse, Grandparents, Parents, Brothers, Sisters, Aunts, Uncles, Nieces, Nephews, Cousins, Children, Grandchildren of the said Specified Beneficiaries whether natural relatives or adopted relatives and all subsequent issue of any of the above mentioned persons".
Amore Corporation Pty Ltd (from 20/06/2002 until 08/12/2011)
Frank Hoh, Pooi Lim, Lynn Hoh, Ian Hoh and Lokit Investments Pty Ltd
As defined in clause 1.2 of the trust deed to mean, inter alia, the Specified Beneficiaries and:
"the parents, brothers, sisters, spouses, widows, widowers ... children and next of kin of the Specified Beneficiary or Specified Beneficiaries and the spouses, widows, widowers, children and grandchildren of such brothers, sisters, spouses children ...
Any charity, or charitable, educational, benevolent, sporting or religious institution person or persons, corporations or associations howsoever constituted whom the Trustee in the Trustee's absolute discretion considers worthy of receipt of funds either for charitable, educational, benevolent, sporting or religious purposes or for the relief of poverty or for scientific or public educational purposes ..." (clause 1.2)
The Schedule specifically provides General Beneficiaries:
"As specified in Clause 1.2, including the Spouse, Grandparents, Parents, Brothers, Sisters, Aunts, Uncles, Nieces, Nephews, Cousins, Children, Grandchildren of the Said Specified Beneficiaries whether natural relatives or adopted relatives and all subsequent issue of any of the above mentioned persons."
Frank Hoh, Lynn Hoh, Ian Hoh, Lokit Investments Pty Ltd and Linjoshan Pty Ltd
As defined in clauses 2.1 and 2.2 of the trust deed to mean, inter alia, the Nominated Beneficiaries and:
"the parents brothers sisters spouses ... of the Nominated Beneficiary or Nominated Beneficiaries and the spouses widows widowers children and grandchildren of such brothers sisters spouses children and ...
Any charity or charitable, educational, benevolent, sporting, religious institution person or persons, corporation, corporations, association or associations, howsoever constituted whom the Trustee in the Trustee's absolute discretion considers worthy of receipt of funds either for charitable, educational, benevolent, sporting or religious purpose or for the relief of poverty or for scientific or public educational purposes ..."
This trust the "family trust" of Frank, Pooi, Lynn and Ian
[1] Ying Mui & Ors v Frank Kiang Ngan Hoh & Ors (Ruling No 1) [2016] VSC 519.
[2] Ruling No 1 [2016] VSC 519 [42], [57].
[4] [2004] VSCA 109 [119]-[121] (citations omitted).
[5] See also Ruling No 1 [2016] VSC 519 [2]-[6].
[6] This occurred in 1986 through alterations to SYM's Articles of Association.
[8] Hoh Han Keyet v Artimax Investment Ltd and Others [2016] HKCFI 1105.
[10] (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244, 251-252.
[11] Hendriks v McGeoch [2008] NSWCA 53 [10] (Giles JA), cited with approval in County Securities Pty Ltd v Challenger Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 193 [152] (McColl JA).
[12] Hendriks v McGeoch [2008] NSWCA 53 [39] (Basten JA), cited with approval in County Securities Pty Ltd v Challenger Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 193 [152] (McColl JA).
[13] 'The question... is whether the conduct of the parties, viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances shows a tacit understanding or agreement': Integrated Computer Services Pty Ltd v Digital Equipment Corp (Aust) Pty Ltd (1988) 5 BPR 11,110 at 11,117-11,118 (McHugh JA, Hope JA and Mahoney JA concurring), cited with approval in Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council [2001] NSWCA 61; (2001) 53 NSWLR 153, 178 [77] (Heydon JA) and County Securities Pty Ltd v Challenger Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 193 [153] (McColl JA).
[14] Apple & Pear Australia Ltd v Pink Lady America LLC [2015] VSC 617 [94] (Croft J).
[15] J D Heydon, Cross on Evidence (LexisNexis Butterworths, 10th ed, 2015) [39290] (citations omitted), cited with approval in Apple and Pear Australia Ltd v Pink Lady America LLC [2015] VSC 617 [94] (Croft J).
[16] See, eg, County Securities Pty Ltd v Challenger Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 193 [154]-[155] (McColl JA); Norman v FEA Plantation Ltd [2011] FCAFC 99; (2011) 195 FCR 97, 108 [89]; Apple & Pear Australia Ltd v Pink Lady America LLC [2015] VSC 617 [95] (Croft J); Commissioner of Taxation v Normandy Finance and investments Asia Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 180 [172] (Jagot and Davies JJ).
[17] [2001] FCA 1833; (2001) 117 FCR 424, 525 [369].
[18] ICS (1988) 5 BPR 11,110, 11,117 (McHugh J); Vroon BV v Foster's Brewing Group Ltd [1994] VicRp 53; [1994] 2 VR 32, 81 (Ormiston J); PRA Electrical Pty Ltd v Perseverance Exploration Pty Ltd [2007] VSCA 310; (2007) 20 VR 487, 489 [3], [6] (Nettle JA); P'Auer AG v Polybuild Technologies International Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 42 [10]-[11] (Whelan JA); cited in Apple and Pear Australia Ltd v Pink Lady America LLC [2016] VSCA 280 [221] (Tate JA).
[19] Pacific Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty Ltd (2005) Aust Contract R 90-213 [45] (Finkelstein J); cited in Apple and Pear Australia Ltd v Pink Lady America LLC [2016] VSCA 280 [221] (Tate JA).
[20] [2016] VSCA 280 [221] (citations omitted).
[22] Ying Mui Trust, Amore Trust and FRG Investments Trust.
[23] In respect of the purchase of the Docklands Property.
[24] The statements from 2009-2011 are not in evidence.
[25] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 296.
[28] Ibid s 295(4)(d).
[29] Ibid s 1308(4).
[31] French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ.
[32] Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345, 381 [71].
[35] See eg, Muschinski v Dodds [1985] HCA 78; (1985) 160 CLR 583; Calverley v Green [1984] HCA 81; (1984) 155 CLR 242.
[36] Calverley v Green [1984] HCA 81; (1984) 155 CLR 242, 246.
[37] Lam v Lam & Ors [2016] VSC 298 [20] (Almond J).
[38] (2013) 116 SASR 280, 289 [28]. See also Potter v Potter [2003] 3 NZLR 143 [13] (Fisher J).
[39] Lam v Lam & Ors [2016] VSC 298 [22] (Almond J).
[40] Calverley v Green [1984] HCA 81; (1984) 155 CLR 242, 270 (citations omitted). See also Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538, 602 (McHugh J); Dullow v Dullow (1985) 3 NSWLR 531, 535-536 (Hope JA).
[41] Sivritas v Sivritas [2008] VSC 580; (2008) 23 VR 349, 371 [118] (Kyrou J).
[42] Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83, 93-94, applied in Hurley & Anore v BGH Nominees Pty Ltd & Ors (1982) 31 SASR 250, 252.
[43] [2015] VSCA 58 [51].
[44] See also H A J Ford, R P Austin and I M Ramsay, Ford's Principles of Corporations Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 15th ed, 2013) [8.250].
[45] Muschinski v Dodds [1985] HCA 78; (1985) 160 CLR 583, 620 (Deane J); applied in Baumgartner v Baumgartner [1987] HCA 59; (1987) 164 CLR 137, 147-148 (Mason CJ, Wilson and Deane JJ), 152 (Toohey J); recently cited in Sivritas v Sivritas [2008] VSC 580; (2008) 23 VR 349, 373 [129] (Kyrou J).
[46] Sivritas v Sivritas [2008] VSC 349, 375 [134] (Kyrou J).
[47] Allen v Snyder [1977] 2 NSWLR 685; Hohol v Hohol [1981] VicRp 24; [1981] VR 221, 225; Rasmussen v Rasmussen [1995] VicRp 38; [1995] 1 VR 613, 615-616.
[48] Hohol v Hohol [1981] VicRp 24; [1981] VR 221, 226.
[49] [2008] VSC 580; (2008) 23 VR 349, 371-375.
[50] [2015] VSC 72 [39]-[41] (Rush J).
[51] [2016] VSC 298 [17]-[25] (Almond J).
[52] (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244, 251-252.
[53] [2012] FCAFC 6; (2012) 200 FCR 296, 359 [254]. See also Australasian Annuities Pty Ltd (in liq) v Rowley Super Fund Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 9; (2015) 318 ALR 302, 334 [136]-[140] (Neave JA) and 363-364 [279]-[281] (Garde AJA) and Gino Dal Pont, Equity and Trusts in Australia, (Thomson Reuters, 6th ed) [38.100].
[54] Lynn was also a director of Ying Mui from 27 April 2009 to 21 December 2011. However no breach of fiduciary duty was alleged in respect of her conduct.
[55] Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp [1984] HCA 64; (1984) 156 CLR 41, 96-97, 103 (Mason J); The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) [2008] WASC 239; (2008) 70 ACSR 1, 258-261 [4496]-[4512]; H A J Ford, R P Austin and I M Ramsay, Ford's Principles of Corporations Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 15th ed, 2013) [8.5].
[58] Ibid 316-317, [57] (citations omitted).
[59] [2014] WASC 102; 98 ACSR 615, 660 [277], 665 [302]-[303].
[60] Australasian Annuities [2015] VSCA 9; (2015) 318 ALR 302, 316 [57].
[61] [1996] 1 VR 279, 302-303.
[62] Australasian Annuities [2015] VSCA 9; (2015) 318 ALR 302, 317 [59] (citations omitted).
[63] Ibid 349-350, [225]-[229] (citations omitted).
[64] Australasian Annuities [2015] VSCA 9; (2015) 318 ALR 302, 317 [58] (citations omitted).
[65] The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) [2008] WASC 239; (2008) 70 ACSR 1, 259 [4501].
[66] Chan v Zacharia [1984] HCA 36; (1984) 154 CLR 178, 198-199.
[67] The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) [2008] WASC 239; (2008) 70 ACSR 1, 260 [4503].
[68] [2008] WASC 239; 70 ACSR 1, 258-260 [4496]-[4504].
[69] Gemstone Corporation of Australia Ltd v Grasso [1993] SASC 4211; (1994) 62 SASR 239, 245; approved in Bell Group [2008] WASC 239; (2008) 70 ACSR 1, 260 [4505].
[70] Boardman v Phipps [1966] UKHL 2; [1967] 2 AC 46, 103-104, 108-109, 112; Birtchnell v Equity Trustees, Executors & Agency Co Ltd [1929] HCA 24; (1929) 42 CLR 384, 408-409.
[73] [1993] SASC 4211; (1994) 62 SASR 239, 253-254.
[74] [1984] HCA 36; (1984) 154 CLR 178, 198 (emphasis added).
[77] (1997) 23 ACSR 355, 357.
[78] R P Austin and I M Ramsay, Ford's Principles of Corporations Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 15th ed, 2013) [9.220]. See also Gemstone [1993] SASC 4211; (1994) 13 ACSR 695, 702, 709.
[79] Parker v McKenna (1874) LR 10 Ch App 96, 124-125. See also Gemstone [1993] SASC 4211; (1994) 13 ACSR 695, 702-703, 709.
[80] R P Austin and I M Ramsay, Ford's Principles of Corporations Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 15th ed, 2013) [9.260.3].
[81] [2008] WASC 239; (2008) 70 ACSR 1, 260-261 [4506]-[4508].
[82] Australasian Annuities [2015] VSCA 9; (2015) 318 ALR 302, 318 [64] (Warren CJ).
[84] [2008] WASC 239; (2008) 70 ACSR 1, 261 [4509]-[4510], [4512].
[85] Permanent Building Society (in liq) v McGee (1993) 11 ACSR 260, 289 (Anderson J).
[86] ASIC v Adler (2002) 41 ACSR 72, 232 [735(4)].
[89] (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244, 251-252 (emphasis added).
[90] Farah Constructions v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89, 140 [112].
[91] Say-Dee Pty Ltd v Farah Constructions Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 309.
[93] Further, it is clear from the text of the judgment that lower courts are obliged to follow it: Farah Constructions (2007) 230 CLR 89, 151-152 [135].
[94] Australasian Annuities [2015] VSCA 9; (2015) 318 ALR 302, 310 [32] (Warren CJ).
[95] [2016] VSC 131 [161].
[96] [2008] WASC 239; (2008) 70 ACSR 1 , 313 [4748].
[97] [1975] HCA 8; (1975) 132 CLR 373, 408.
[98] Australasian Annuities [2015] VSCA 9; (2015) 318 ALR 302, 335 [143] (Neave JA).
[99] Ibid 360, [269(a)], [270(a)] (Garde AJA).
[101] El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc [1993] EWCA Civ 4; [1994] 2 All ER 685, 695 (Nourse LJ) (emphasis added).
[102] Australasian Annuities [2015] VSCA 9; (2015) 318 ALR 302, 359 [266].
[103] Ibid 334, [139] (citations omitted).
[105] [1993] 1 WLR 509, 575-576.
[107] (2007) 230 CLR 89, 163-164.
[108] [2016] VSC 131 [160].
[109] (2007) 230 CLR 89, 163 [177].
[110] See R P Austin, 'Constructive Trusts' in P D Finn (ed), Essays in Equity (Lawbook, 1985) 196, 235.
[111] Rob Chambers, 'Knowing Receipt: Frozen in Australia' (2007) 2 Journal of Equity 40, 40-41.
[113] Hon Peter W Young, Clyde Croft and Megan Louise Smith, On Equity (Lawbook, 2009) [6.910].
[114] (2007) 230 CLR 89, 164 [177].
[118] Second Further Amended Statement of Claim particulars to paragraph 14.
[119] Australasian Annuities [2015] VSCA 9; (2015) 318 ALR 302, 327 [106] (Warren CJ).
[120] Westpac Banking Corporation v Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (No 3) [2012] WASCA 157, [2188].
[121] Australasian Annuities [2015] VSCA 9; (2015) 318 ALR 302, 334 [139] (Neave JA).
[122] See Brambles Holdings Ltd v Carey (1976) 15 SASR 270, 279 (Bright J); approved in Krakowski v Eurolynx Properties Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 563, 582-583; Australasian Annuities [2015] VSCA 9; (2015) 318 ALR 302, [263] (Garde AJA).
[123] See Australasian Annuities [2015] VSCA 9; (2015) 318 ALR 302, 360 [269(a)], [270(a)] (Garde AJA).
[125] See Ying Mui & Ors v Frank Kiang Ngan Hoh & Ors (Ruling No 5) (Slip Rule) [2017] VSC 211.
Ying Mui & Ors
Frank Kiang Ngan Hoh & Ors
(1985) 160 CLR 583
(1996) 186 CLR 71
(1984) 154 CLR 178
(1984) 156 CLR 41
(1994) 62 SASR 239
(1911) 12 CLR 30
(1978) 18 ALR 1
(1999) 20 WAR 427
(2001) 202 CLR 410
(2003) 87 SASR 1
(2001) 53 NSWLR 153
(2011) 195 FCR 97
(2001) 117 FCR 424
(2007) 20 VR 487
(2012) 247 CLR 345
(1984) 155 CLR 242
(2013) 116 SASR 280
(1995) 184 CLR 538
(1985) 3 NSWLR 531
(2008) 23 VR 349
(1982) 31 SASR 250
(1987) 164 CLR 137
(2012) 200 FCR 296
(2015) 318 ALR 302
(1929) 42 CLR 384
(2007) 230 CLR 89
(1975) 132 CLR 373
(1976) 15 SASR 270
(1995) 183 CLR 563