16 No objection was raised to his Honour's general appreciation of the relevant law. The appeal in this respect instead concentrates on the very same factual matters that were urged on his Honour at trial and in substance amounts to an attempt to have a fresh evaluation of his Honour's factual findings. With respect to Mrs Clay's presence at a few meetings at which the affairs of the estate were discussed, his Honour concluded that there was no evidence that she took part in the decision making or in any way purported to act as executor or trustee of the estate. The issue is whether Mrs Clay intermeddled with the assets of the estate in such a way as to denote an assumption of the authority, or an intention to exercise the functions, of the executor and trustee. Her mere presence at meetings, but not participating in the decision making of the meetings, can hardly be sufficient for this purpose, no matter what the subject matter being considered at the meetings. His Honour found that Mrs Clay did let Queenslea Drive and receive the rent, but he expressly found that she did so with the authority of Speed. That finding was clearly open on the evidence. As his Honour noted, acts done with the authority of the trustee do not constitute "intermeddling"; Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed, Vol 48, par 595. Insofar as the appellants seek to rely on Mrs Clay "taking and retaining" chattels of the estate, that too was the subject of adverse factual findings of the learned trial Judge and will be the subject of more detailed consideration later in these reasons. For present purposes it is sufficient to say that there is no reason to question the propriety of his Honour's rejection of the factual basis for these contentions. The learned trial Judge was not persuaded that any failure to disclose information to the appellants and in particular Paul James Clay, as to their interest in the estate as alleged in the ground, could amount to intermeddling so as to constitute Mrs Clay a trustee de son tort. At the most the evidence would indicate that, by her presence when this matter was discussed, Mrs Clay was aware that Speed had not to that time informed the appellants and Jeanette Simone Clay of their residuary interests under Mr Clay's will, and that Speed intended deferring doing so for a time. It was not the effect of the evidence that Speed did not intend to inform them. A number of considerations would provide reason why he as trustee may have thought it better to defer this for a time, including the considerable uncertainty which appears to have beset the affairs of the estate at that time, and their ages especially as their entitlement to share in the residuary estate arose on their attaining 25 years of age. Insofar as the appellants contend that Mrs Clay participated in this decision of Speed that is against a specific finding of the learned trial Judge that she did not participate in decision making. Nor can it be said that the evidence demonstrated any "wilful" non-disclosure whether on the part of Speed or Mrs Clay. Submissions sought to take the matter further than the ground of appeal by seeking also to rely on what was contended to be a breach of the first respondent's duty to inform her wards of their interests. Notwithstanding this objection, even if the duties of Mrs Clay as guardian extended to informing Paul James Clay on his attaining his majority, the evidence and the factual findings do not warrant the conclusion that any such failure was for the purpose of or constituted "wilful" non-disclosure to the appellants, or that it was directed to the defrauding of the appellants of their entitlements; Halsbury, 4th ed, op cit, vol 17, par 753. As it has not been shown Mrs Clay participated in "wilful non-disclosure" to the appellants of their entitlements under the will, cases such as Life Association of Scotland v Siddal [1861] EngR 300; (1861) 45 ER 800 relied on by the appellants are not in point.