1. The application, which seeks injunctive relief[5] in this Court in relation to the still to be completed decision-making process by the Minister in relation to the IMR Recommendation, is within this Court's jurisdiction for relief in relation to a migration decision.[6]

1. Uncontroversial background facts are as follows:

1. the applicant: 1. is a citizen of Iraq who left that country for Iran in December 2007;[7] 2. travelled to Indonesia in February 2008 where he was recognised as a refugee by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;[8] 3. arrived unauthorised on Christmas Island on 5 January 2010;[9] and 4. lodged a request for a Refugee Status Assessment[10] on 12 February 2010;[11] 2. on 16 March 2010 the RSA found that the applicant did not meet the definition of "refugee" under the Convention;[12]

1. the applicant applied for an independent merits review of the RSA and was interviewed for that purpose on 21 May 2010;

1. on 4 June 2010 an independent merits reviewer found that the applicant did not meet the definition of "refugee" under the Convention;[13] 2. following the judgment of the High Court of Australia in Plaintiff M61 the applicant was offered a fresh independent merits review of his claims for refugee status;[14] 3. the applicant was interviewed by the IMR on 12 April 2011. On 23 May 2011, the IMR found that the applicant did not meet the criterion for a protection visa set out in s.36(2) of the Migration Act, and recommended to the Minister that the applicant not be recognised as a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention;[15] and 4. the applicant was notified of the IMR Recommendation by letter dated 25 May 2011.[16]

1. The applicant claimed a well-founded fear of persecution on the Convention-based ground of religion, and specifically, on the basis of his conversion from Islam to Christianity. Although some of the detail and particulars surrounding the essential claim varied when different accounts were given, the applicant asserted in essence that he told his cousin[17] of his conversion which led to the issue of a fatwa - essentially an edict that an apostate is to be killed - which caused him to flee from Iraq. The applicant also claimed that he was able to enter Iran by paying a smuggler who contrived to have an entry permit stamped in the applicant's passport.
2. The IMR expressed a number of difficulties with the consistency and reliability of the applicant's accounts and narratives that sourced his claim for refugee status.[18] The IMR concluded that the applicant had fabricated significant aspects of his claims.[19] More specifically the IMR:

1. accepted that the applicant entered, remained and renewed his period of legal stay in Iran, but not that he did so through bribery on the day of entry;[20] 2. considered that the applicant's story of reliance on the bribery of a smuggler to be improvised and far-fetched and that there was therefore a serious flaw in the applicant's account of his decision to leave Iraq for Iran in the circumstances that had been claimed;[21]

1. rejected the applicant's claim that he left Iraq because of the issue of a so-called "tribal fatwa", and found that the tribal fatwa and the fatwa said to have been issued by the Imam were fake;[22]

1. did not accept that: 1. the applicant shared his religious views with the Cousin before leaving Iraq;[23] 2. the applicant's brother had any effect upon the applicant's religious views prior to his departure from Iraq;[24] 3. the applicant was grappling with issues of sin and retribution before leaving Iraq;[25] and 4. the applicant "was genuinely Christian";[26] 2. accepted that the applicant was not a devout Muslim in Iraq but did not accept that he was undergoing a religious experience, or awakening, or a conversion prior to leaving Iraq, and in turn did not accept that the applicant was known to Islamic zealots or other Muslims who would seek to harm in Iraq because of the Convention-based ground of religion;[27] 3. accepted that the applicant: 1. stopped going to the mosque; 2. is not a practising Muslim; 3. rejects many Islamic social teachings; 4. rejects the imposition of Islamic Law on modern life; 5. is not committed to Islam; and 6. engaged with Christians in Australia and had undertaken the learning of Christian teaching since arriving in Australia;[28] 4. was not satisfied that the applicant's conduct of: 1. engaging in the conduct of learning about Christianity; 2. taking Christian instruction; 3. professing himself as a Christian in Australia; 4. affiliating with Christians in Australia; and 5. other related activities,

was conduct otherwise than for a purpose of strengthening his claim to be a refugee within the meaning of the Convention, and hence, the IMR disregarded the applicant's religious conduct in Australia;[29]

1. concluded that the chance of the applicant being imputed to be an apostate in Iraq was remote;[30] and
2. was not ultimately satisfied that the applicant faced a real chance of persecution for a Convention-based ground were he to return to Iraq.[31]

1. Ground (a) is as follows:
   • Having found applicant was not a devout Muslim and he had rejected the imposition of Islamic Law, the ... [IMR] failed to properly consider whether making a finding of apostasy in this case in itself was sufficient to constitute a well founded fear of Convention-related persecution

1. the IMR made adverse findings in relation to the applicant's claims of converting to Christianity. The IMR did not accept that the applicant "was genuinely grappling with notions of sin and transgression".[32] The IMR concluded his findings about the applicant's Christianity by stating that the applicant's "narrative overall does not convince me he is genuinely Christian";[33] 2. the IMR arrived at that finding after: 1. asking the applicant to describe Jesus, in which he replied that Jesus was God's spirit who became human, and that "God loved people so much 'he gave his Holy Son'";[34] 2. confirming that the applicant had regularly attended Church since arriving in Australia;[35] 3. the applicant was able to describe the gospels of a certain number of apostles;[36] 4. the applicant said he "would die as a Christian and be proud to do so";[37] 5. the applicant was able to recite a number of the ten commandments[38] described by the IMR as "only half...but, on the other hand, he could quite quickly recall half of them"; and 6. the applicant was able to describe Jesus' sermon on the mount;[39]

1. notwithstanding any arguments that may be made in relation to arriving at a conclusion that is illogical on the evidence the IMR did make a finding relevant to his apostasy. The IMR found: 1. the applicant stopped going to the Mosque; 2. is not a practising Muslim; 3. rejects many Islamic social teachings; 4. rejects the imposition of Islamic Law on modern life; and 5. is not committed to Islam;[40]

1. it is acknowledged that procedural fairness does not necessarily require the IMR to carry out an inquiry in order to identify what an alternative case to be put to the applicant might be;[41] 2. having accepted that the applicant was seeking asylum on the basis of a Convention related reason, namely religion, the applicant had a legitimate expectation that having found the applicant was effectively an apostate, the IMR would have, and should have, then gone on to enquire as to the chance the applicant would suffer a fear of persecution upon being returned to Iraq as an apostate;[42] 3. in W161/01A v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs[43] the Federal Court set out the characteristics of apostasy as: * Apostasy involves abandonment of belief in Islam. Formal conversion to another religion is not a requirement. An apostate maybe an atheist who has rejected Islam. (See: Hussain Islamic Law and Society The Federal Press 1999 at p.138.)[44]

the Tribunal, of course, was aware that in Iran apostasy is a capital offence and, for an apostate, the risk of extreme punishment always exists.[45]

1. in this case, the applicant was not afforded procedural fairness in relation to the apostasy finding of the IMR on the following grounds:
   1. having made findings akin to apostasy as set out above, the IMR failed to explore whether such findings amount to a well founded fear of persecution, either in the interview or in his reasons;
   2. the applicant had a legitimate expectation the IMR would enquire as to the impact of a finding of apostasy should it be made out; and
   3. having made findings akin to apostasy as set out above, the IMR, in arriving at an ultimate finding that the chance of the applicant being imputed to be an apostate in Iraq was remote, arrived at a conclusion that no rational and logical decision maker could have arrived at on the same evidence;[46] and
2. the fact that the IMR did not undertake this process of decision making reveals a flaw in his decision making to the extent that the applicant has not been afforded procedural fairness; both in terms of the adequacy of his reasons for his decision or findings,[47] and also in terms of not being able to address the issue of whether the applicant would be found to be an apostate. The applicant was denied an opportunity to be heard on the issue.[48]

1. relevantly, the IMR accepted that the applicant was not a devout Muslim in Iraq and that the applicant "stopped going to the mosque, is not a practicing Muslim, rejects many Islamic social teachings, rejects the imposition of Islamic law on modern life, and is not committed to Islam";[49] 2. a finding that the applicant was not an apostate was not actually made. Nor, on a fair reading of the IMR's findings, can it be concluded that the applicant was found to be "effectively" an apostate.[50] Hence the factual premise on which this ground is based cannot be substantiated;

1. in any event, the IMR did consider whether there was a chance of the applicant being imputed to be an apostate in Iraq. The IMR concluded that that chance was remote. After accepting that the applicant was not a practicing Muslim, the IMR also did not accept that the applicant was known to Islamic zealots or other Muslims who would seek to harm him in Iraq because of his religion;[51]

1. thus, the IMR did consider and address the issue of apostasy and whether the applicant faced a real chance of persecution for that reason. To assert, as ground (a) does, that the IMR has failed to properly consider an issue, shades into merits review. The proper question for a Court to ask on judicial review is whether the basis of a claim for a protection visa has in fact been considered and addressed; 2. the ground incorporates reference to an asserted legitimate expectation on the applicant's part.[52] In light of Lam, any purported doctrine of legitimate expectation must be viewed with considerable circumspection;[53] and 3. Lam is prayed in aid by the applicant, as supporting the assertion that the applicant was denied an opportunity to be heard on the issue of whether he would be found to be an apostate. But as the cited passage in Lam emphasises, a critical touchstone for procedural fairness is the avoidance of practical injustice. Here, the applicant was exhaustively interviewed by the IMR against a background of his earlier accounts in support of his claim. That claim was evaluated and addressed with an appreciation by the IMR of the impact that ongoing detention may have on a claimant of refugee status.[54] No evidence has been advanced to support any claimed finding that there were matters the applicant may have wished to address, but was not given the opportunity to address. In all the circumstances it cannot fairly be said that the applicant suffered any practical injustice in the hearing and determination of his claim.

1. Apostasy is the "abandonment of religious faith, vows, principles",[55] and an apostate is one "guilty of apostasy".[56]
2. To be an apostate from the Islamic faith (or any other faith) does not require conversion to a different faith.[57] But it does require abandonment or rejection of the first faith.[58]
3. The IMR made no express finding that the applicant was an apostate, that is, that he had abandoned or rejected his Islamic faith. Nor did the IMR find that the applicant had converted to another faith, in this case, Christianity. In fact, the IMR was not convinced that the applicant was "genuinely Christian".[59]
4. The applicant does not, however, now argue this matter on the basis that he has converted to Christianity and is, therefore, an apostate, which appeared to be his argument up to and including the time of the hearing before the IMR. Rather, the argument is that the IMR "effectively" found that the applicant was an apostate because of findings "akin" to apostasy, namely that the applicant:

1. stopped going to the Mosque; 2. is not a practising Muslim;

1. rejects the imposition of Islamic Law on modern life; and 2. is not committed to Islam.[60]
2. The IMR did consider the above findings in the context of whether the applicant might be considered to be an apostate if returned to Iraq. And the IMR found that "[o]n the evidence before me" the "chance of ... [the applicant] being imputed to be an apostate in Iraq is remote".[61] That finding followed a detailed review of the evidence before the RSA and the IMR, leading to the findings that the applicant now asserts are findings that he is "effectively" an apostate. The IMR's findings do not, however, go that far, which is why the IMR goes on to find, on the evidence, that there was only a remote chance of apostasy being imputed to the applicant upon return to Iraq. A finding in those terms would be unnecessary if the IMR had "effectively" found the applicant to be an apostate. For this Court to now find that there was "effectively" such a finding would be for the Court to substitute a different factual finding for that actually made by the IMR. That would be to engage in merits review, not judicial review, contrary to accepted principle.[62] In any event, the Court is not satisfied that the findings of fact made by the IMR are sufficient to conclude that the applicant was an apostate, actually or "effectively", as there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the applicant actually abandoned or rejected Islam (as opposed to some aspects of it). Even though conversion is unnecessary, the Court's view is further reinforced by the finding that the applicant was not "genuinely Christian",[63] and by the doubts that the IMR had in relation to the applicant's "overall credibility".[64]
3. In the above circumstances:

1. no issue of procedural fairness in relation to the apostasy issue arises, especially as there was no finding of apostasy, and as the IMR heard and dealt with the evidence and submissions made on this issue comprehensively; 2. no question of legitimate expectation arises, as there was no finding of apostasy; and

1. the assertion that no rational or logical decision maker could have arrived at the conclusion arrived at by the IMR cannot be made out.
2. Ground (a) must therefore fail.

1. Ground (b) is as follows:
   • In the alternative to ... [ground ...(a)] the ... [IMR] failed to put his findings relevant to the Applicant's apostasy to him in the course of the Independent Merits Review

1. the IMR questioned the applicant in relation to his commitment to Islam.[65] The applicant stated: 1. "I wasn't committed to practice what they do or do what they do";[66] 2. "He [the Cousin] knew that I wasn't praying and he used to ask me, 'Why don't you pray? Why don't you come to the mosque?' I told him I wasn't convinced in that and I don't was (sic) to do it";[67] 3. the applicant told the Cousin that he had no religion;[68] 4. the applicant told his uncles in his family "I am deserting their religion and my uncle said, you know, 'are you doing that?' and I said 'I am not convinced in that religion' and the Cousin came and said 'That's a deed. They issued a deed against you'";[69] and 5. the applicant stated to the IMR that "If I go back to my country I will be killed...I will be taken as a murtad, a deserter of religion";[70] 2. the IMR put to the applicant in the course of the interview that he was not convinced of the genuineness of the fatwa documents in the applicant's possession;[71]

1. the IMR also put to the applicant his concerns about the veracity of the applicant's claims of conversion to Christianity;[72]

1. what the IMR failed to do was put to the applicant any concerns or issues the IMR may have had with the applicant's apostasy. Apostasy is not the same thing as conversion to Christianity; and 2. by failing to put any concerns or issues the IMR may have had with the applicant's claims to apostasy to the applicant, the IMR denied the applicant procedural fairness. Put another way, such a failure also amounted to the IMR failing to ask a relevant question.[73]

1. the context of the IMR's findings concerning apostasy, as outlined above, is again relevant here; 2. the content of the principles of procedural fairness as they impact upon an administrative decision-maker such as the IMR of a claim for a refugee status do not extend so far as to require the decision-maker to: 1. disclose what the IMR is minded to decide so that the parties may have a further opportunity of criticizing his mental processes before a final decision is reached;[74] or 2. give a running commentary about what the IMR thinks about the evidence given, as to do so would carry a serious risk of conveying an impression of prejudgment;[75] and

1. nor, contrary to the applicant's written submissions,[76] can the claimed shortcoming be characterised as a failure to ask a relevant question, and in that distinct way amount to jurisdictional error. This ground, both as cast and as developed, does not advance a recognised basis for judicial review.

1. The findings of the IMR challenged in ground (b) are, as in ground (a), those to do with apostasy. The applicant asserts that there was a failure by the IMR to put any concerns that the IMR had on the issue of apostasy to the applicant.
2. Two things may be said about the applicant's assertion:
   1. it is for the applicant to make his case, and there is no suggestion that the applicant did not have, or was denied, the opportunity to make any submissions or put any relevant material before the IMR;[77] and
   2. the IMR was not obliged to:
      1. give a running commentary on his views to the applicant; or
      2. preview his conclusions for review by the applicant.[78]
3. In Abebe v The Commonwealth of Australia[79] the position was summarised thus:
   • The want of procedural fairness was said to lie in the Tribunal not putting to the applicant any suggestion that her story of detention and rape was untrue. Framed in this way, the submission may, perhaps, assume that proceedings before the Tribunal are adversarial rather than inquisitorial or that in some way the Tribunal is in the position of a contradictor of a case being made by the applicant. Such assumptions, if made, would be wrong. The proceedings before the Tribunal are inquisitorial and the Tribunal is not in the position of a contradictor. It is for the applicant to advance whatever evidence or argument she wishes to advance in support of her contention that she has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The Tribunal must then decide whether that claim is made out.[80]
4. And that is what has happened in this case: the applicant advanced a case before the IMR, and the IMR made a recommendation on the basis of what was put by the applicant, the details of which are set out above.[81] There was neither a denial of procedural fairness, nor the failure to ask a relevant question.
5. Ground (b) must therefore fail.

1. Grounds (c), (d) and (e) are as follows:
   • c) The ... [IMR] made findings adverse to the applicant's credit which lacked a rational or logical connection to those findings;
   • d) The ... [IMR] made findings adverse to the applicant's credit which no logical or rational decision maker could arrive at on the basis of the evidence before the IMR;
   • e) On the basis of c) and d), the ... [IMR] was in error in finding that the Applicant fabricated his evidence in relation to i) the manner in which he gained entry into Iran when he fled Iraq; and ii) the Applicant's conversion to Christianity at a time prior to fleeing Iraq;

1. the approach taken by the IMR in his findings can be broadly described as follows: firstly, having set out the details of the review request and the relevant law in relation to the obligations of a country who is party to the Convention, the IMR then sets out the claims and evidence before him (UNHCR extended mandate report and letter, Entry Interview of the Applicant, RSA Application and interview, submissions and matters relevant to the IMR interview); 2. there can be no doubt that the various inconsistencies in the evidence of the applicant were regarded by the IMR as being destructive of the applicant's credibility. This in itself is not an appellable error. An assessment of an applicant's credibility was within the legitimate province of matters for assessment by the IMR;[82]

1. the inconsistencies relied upon by the IMR in forming an adverse opinion about the credibility of the applicant, whilst clearly within his discretion, do not then permit the IMR to justify conclusions of fabrication of evidence, as he concluded in relation to the authenticity of the two fatwas issued against the applicant;

1. other than the fact that there were no dates on the fatwas, the only other findings that justified the conclusion of the IMR that they were fraudulent were previous inconsistent statements about: 1. the timing of his departure from Iraq; 2. the nature of his transition through Iran; and 3. the substance of his discussions about Christianity with extended family members whilst still a resident in Iraq; 2. at no stage in his findings did the IMR entertain or deal with the possibility that the documents were genuine and were an important piece of objective evidence;[83] and 3. rather, the IMR simply arrived at a conclusion that breached the rules of procedural fairness by arriving at findings "which no rational or logical decision maker could arrive at the same evidence".[84]

1. the inconsistencies relied upon by the IMR in this case in relation to the manner of the timing upon which the applicant claimed to have communicated his apostasy and conversion to Christianity whilst in Iraq were not so significant to entitle the IMR to make adverse findings as to the applicant's credibility;[85] 2. the IMR erred in relying upon alleged inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence in relation to his transition through Iran when it was not open for him to do so because the IMR's findings were at odds with the evidence;[86]

1. it was not open on the evidence for the IMR to conclude the applicant was not "genuinely Christian" as he did;[87]

1. in forming such a view, the IMR breached the rules of procedural fairness on the basis that the applicant's knowledge of fundamental tenets of the Christian religion were filtered though its own views of what were appropriate understandings and beliefs for a follower of Christianity to have;[88] and 2. examples of this jurisdictional error are found in the IMR Transcript.[89] In particular, the exchange where the IMR explains "periods where Christians executed apostates, executed heretics, executed Muslims for not confessing to Christianity"[90] is an exchange where a discussion about the Crusaders is clear evidence of the IMR applying his own filter to evaluate the applicant's level of knowledge about Christian values.

1. these grounds can conveniently be addressed together. The relevant findings which appear to be the basis for a contention of illogical or irrational reasoning seem to be those identified in ground (e) that the applicant fabricated his evidence in relation to: 1. the manner in which he gained entry into Iran when he fled Iraq; and 2. the applicant's conversion to Christianity at a time prior to fleeing Iraq; 2. the extent to which, and the way in which, illogicality or irrationality sufficient to give rise to jurisdictional error may source a ground of review was considered in SZMDS.[91] Importantly: 1. if probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning, and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of conclusions to be drawn, there is no basis for review simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion; and 2. not every lapse in logic will give rise to jurisdictional error. A court should be slow, although not unwilling, to interfere in an appropriate case;

1. it was open to the IMR to find that the applicant fabricated his evidence in relation to the manner in which he gained entry into Iran and his conversion to Christianity at the time he left Iraq. The IMR's rejection of the applicant's account in this regard was based on independent country information (which had been put to the applicant) that he could not have obtained an entry visa for Iran on entry but would have needed a pre-issued valid entry visa before he could be given an Iranian entry stamp in his Iraqi visa at the time of entry. It was open to the IMR to find that the applicant had fabricated his evidence of reliance on the bribing of a smuggler to ensure that Iranian officials issued both a 30 day visa label and its commencement date endorsement stamp at the same time;[92]

1. it was also open to the IMR to reject the applicant's claim of conversion to Christianity prior to leaving Iraq for reasons which included: 1. inconsistency in the applicant's claims to the UNHCR and the IMR about his reasons for fleeing Iraq;[93] 2. inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence about when he divulged his leanings towards Christianity to the Cousin;[94] 3. the IMR's rejection of the applicant's account of his decision to leave Iraq for Iran within the space of a day, and his finding that the applicant took formal steps to apply for a visa for Iran before the day on which he supposedly first disclosed his religious views to the Cousin;[95] 4. the IMR's findings that the applicant's fatwa story was false and the documents purporting to evidence the fatwa were fraudulent;[96] 5. the inconsistency between the applicant's evidence about keeping his religious views a secret and disclosing them to, purportedly, the Cousin, which contributed to the IMR's findings that the applicant did not to any significant extent, share his religious views before leaving Iraq;[97] and 6. the applicant's evasive evidence when asked by the IMR how his brother first inspired him to be a Christian, which did not suggest to the IMR that the applicant had become attracted to Christianity or was undergoing a religious experience, or awakening, or conversion prior to leaving Iraq;[98] and 2. it cannot fairly be said that it was not open to the IMR to conclude that the applicant had fabricated his evidence on the critical matters which underpin these grounds. The fact that the IMR ultimately did not accept critical components of the applicant's evidence did not render the IMR an illogical or irrational decision-maker.

1. Credibility in administrative decision making is a matter par excellence for the decision maker.[99] In this case there were many not insignificant inconsistencies in the applicant's versions of events, including his evidence as to:

1. his entry into Iran, which was inconsistent with independent country information;[100] 2. his wanting to keep his religious views (as to Christianity) secret, yet saying that he disclosed them to the Cousin, who was not a Christian, and inconsistencies as to when he told the Cousin about his alleged conversion to Christianity;[101]

1. his attraction to Christianity as a consequence of discussions over the telephone with his brother in Australia, in relation to which he struck the IMR as "evasive";[102] and

1. claims to the UNHCR and to the IMR.[103]
2. On these critical matters the applicant gave an account the IMR did not believe either because of inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence, or inconsistency between the applicant's evidence and independent country information. Those are usual grounds for making adverse findings in relation to credibility in relation to refugee claims. This case is no different and the IMR was entitled to make the adverse findings he made in relation to the applicant's entry into Iran and his conversion to Christianity.[104] The findings made by the IMR in these respects were neither irrational nor illogical.
3. The IMR clearly considered the fatwa documents, and whether or not they were fraudulent. In this case, the IMR had manifest concerns about the applicant's "overall credibility"[105] and did not accept his account of his conversion to Christianity before leaving Iraq. In relation to the fatwa documents it is also clear that the IMR had regard to the fact that:
   1. one of the fatwas purported to pass judgment on the applicant, before acknowledging that his conversion from Islam was not yet proved, a fact which the IMR thought was indicative of its preparation by an "amateur"; and
   2. inconsistencies in relation to how the fatwa documents were created, and why they caused the applicant to flee suddenly,

before arriving at the view that the tribal fatwa was a fake, and that the other documents purporting to be fatwas and warnings on letters of intent to kill, were also fakes. Further, there were no dates on the fatwas, a fact which is not disputed by the applicant. In the circumstances, the overall credibility of the applicant was sufficiently found wanting, so that when considered together with the specific findings with respect to the applicant's credibility vis-à-vis the fatwas, and events surrounding the alleged creation of the fatwas, that the IMR was entitled to come to the view that the fatwas were documents which had been fabricated. This was no mere bare assertion by the IMR, but a case where, on proper grounds, the IMR had already determined that the substantive claims of the applicant were dishonestly made, and the fatwas, which purported to corroborate those claims, necessarily fell with the claims. The question of whether or not the fatwas were genuine was specifically addressed during the IMR interview with the applicant, and it is not disputed by the applicant that the IMR put his concerns about the genuineness of the fatwa documents to the applicant.[106] Also, the IMR raised in the IMR interview the fact that the fatwa did not have a date, and the IMR could not know when it was written.[107] Thus, the question of the genuineness of the fatwa was raised by the IMR at the IMR interview, and the applicant had the opportunity to address the genuineness of the fatwa, and associated documents.

1. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the applicant was denied any opportunity to deal with either the fatwas generally, or the issue of their authenticity.
2. The applicant also asserts that the IMR used his own views as to appropriate understandings of Christianity to assess the applicant's knowledge of the fundamental tenets of the Christian religion.
3. The IMR was however, aware of this issue, and reminded itself that a reviewer "should not place undue weight on the individual claimant's religious knowledge_._"[108] Further, this was not a case where the applicant's claim was dismissed solely on the basis of the issue of his Christian knowledge. For reasons set out above, the applicant's claims were not otherwise believed to be credible by the IMR. Also, the overall circumstances of the case, even without the issue of the genuineness of the applicant's Christian knowledge, did not allow the IMR to consider that there was any, or a genuine, conversion to Christianity by the applicant. In that context, the assessment of the applicant's Christian knowledge was but one factor, and a factor in relation to which the IMR was cognisant of the importance of not being over reliant.[109] There was nothing irrational or illogical about those findings either.
4. In all the circumstances, grounds (c), (d) and (e) are not made out, and must therefore fail.

1. Ground (f) is no longer pressed by the applicant.

1. Ground (g) is no longer pressed by the applicant.

1. Ground (h) is as follows:
   • h) By finding that the Applicant did not face "a real chance of Convention-related persecution" the ... [IMR] misdirected himself by applying the wrong test for whether the Applicant met the criterion for a protection visa sets out in s 36(2) of the Migration Act 1958.

1. The applicant submits that:
   1. as set out in Chan v Minister for Immigration,[110] a "real chance" of Convention-related persecution excludes a remote, insubstantial or far fetched possibility. However it also means that a person may have a well founded fear of persecution that is below 50 percent; and
   2. it is submitted that by leaving open the finding as to the applicant's apostasy, the IMR did not correctly apply the Chan test to the applicant's prospect of Convention-related persecution and accordingly fell into error.

1. The Minister submits that:
   1. the use of the expression "real chance" is unexceptional. It has been used in many determinations of refugee status following the decision of the High Court in Chan;[111] and
   2. the IMR properly applied the principles enunciated in Chan and there was no misdirection as to whether the criteria for a protection visa in ss.36 and 65 of the Migration Act were satisfied.

1. In determining whether or not there is a well founded fear of persecution the IMR was obliged to look to see whether or not there was a current or prospective threat to the applicant on a Convention-related ground.[112] The IMR focussed upon whether or not there was a current or prospective threat, and arrived at the conclusion that there was no real chance of Convention-related persecution in Iraq on the ground of religion, a finding which is unexceptional given that it found that the chance of the applicant being imputed to be an apostate in Iraq was remote.[113] The mere fact that the expression "real chance" was used is unexceptional: it is used by this Court, and litigants in this Court, in case after case, and its use by the IMR in these circumstances involved no error in relation to the relevant assessment of whether the IMR ought make a recommendation to the Minister on the basis that the criteria for a protection visa in ss.36 and 65 of the Migration Act were or were not satisfied.
2. It follows that ground (h) has not been made out, and must fail.

1. Each of the grounds relied upon have not been made out, and must fail. Accordingly, the application must be dismissed, and there will be an order accordingly.
2. The Court will hear the parties as to costs.

I certify that the preceding 45Error! Style not defined.!Syntax Error, !Error! Style not defined.Error! Style not defined.!Syntax Error, !forty-fiveforty-five (45) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Lucev FM

[1] "Migration Act".

[2] "IMR Recommendation" (at Court Book ("CB") 336-357) and "IMR" respectively.

[5] The applicant was granted leave at hearing to amend the amended application, filed on 7 September 2011, to include relief, by way of injunction, against the Minister, and his employees, agents and servants, from relying upon the IMR Recommendation: Transcript, p.3

[6] Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.476(1) ("Migration Act"); Plaintiff M61/2010E & Anor v Commonwealth of Australia & Ors [2010] HCA 41; (2010) 243 CLR 319 at 334, 344-345 and 358-360 per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ; [2010] HCA 41 at paras.8, 50-52 and 99-103 per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ ("Plaintiff M61"); Darabi v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship & Anor [2011] FMCA 371; (2011) 250 FLR 301 at 308 per Nicholls FM; [2011] FMCA 371 at para.31 per Nicholls FM.

[29] CB 355-356; Migration Act, s.91R(3).

[41] Citing SZMDB v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship & Anor [2008] FCA 1937; (2008) 105 ALD 499 at 506 per Graham J; [2008] FCA 1937 at para.37 per Graham J.

[42] Citing Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995] HCA 20; (1995) 183 CLR 273; Annetts & Anor v McCann & Ors [1990] HCA 57; (1990) 170 CLR 596 at 599 per Mason CJ, Deane and McHugh JJ.

[43] [2002] FCA 285 ("W161").

[46] Citing Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 at 647-648 per Crennan and Bell JJ; [2010] HCA 16 at paras.130-131 per Crennan and Bell JJ ("SZMDS").

[47] Citing AK v The State of Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438; [2008] HCA 8.

[48] Citing Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 at 12-14 per Gleeson CJ; [2003] HCA 6 at paras.34-38 per Gleeson CJ ("Lam").

[50] See Submissions of the Applicant at para.51, see also para.49.

[52] See particularly Submissions of the Applicant at paras.51 and 54(b).

[53] Lam CLR at 9-12 per Gleeson CJ, 20-21 and 27-28 per McHugh and Gummow JJ and 35-36 per Hayne J; HCA at paras.25-29 and 34 per Gleeson CJ, 61-67 and 81-83 per McHugh and Gummow, and 111 per Hayne J.

[55] The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 7th Edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p.40 ("Concise Oxford Dictionary").

[58] Concise Oxford Dictionary, p.40; W161 at para.32 per Lee J.

[62] Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 and 281-282 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ; Zentai v Honourable Brendan O'Connor & Ors (No. 3) [2010] FCA 691; (2010) 187 FCR 495 at 589 per McKerracher J; [2010] FCA 691 at para.367 per McKerracher J; see also Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZJSS & Ors [2010] HCA 48; (2010) 243 CLR 164 at 177 per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ; [2010] HCA 48 at para.36 per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ.

[71] IMR Transcript, page 42 at 15-20 and especially at IMR Transcript, page 59 at 35-45.

[73] Citing Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 30.

[74] Citing SZBEL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs[2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152 at 166 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ; [2006] HCA 63 at para.48 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ ("SZBEL").

[75] SZBEL CLR at 166 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ; HCA at para.48 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ.

[76] Submissions of the Applicant at para.60.

[77] SZBEL CLR at 164 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ; HCA at para.40 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ.

[78] SZBEL CLR at 166 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ; HCA at para.48 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ.

[79] (1999) 197 CLR 510; [1999] HCA 14 ("Abebe").

[80] Abebe CLR at 576 per Gummow and Hayne JJ; HCA at para 187 per Gummow and Hayne JJ.

[82] Citing Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at 423 per McHugh J; [2000] HCA 1 at para.67 per McHugh J ("Durairajasingham"); Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZOCT & Anor [2010] FCAFC 159; (2010) 189 FCR 577 at 594-595 per Buchanan J; [2010] FCAFC 159 at para.63 per Buchanan J ("SZOCT").

[83] Citing WAIJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 74 at paras.43-48 per Lee and Moore J.

[84] Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS & Anor [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 at 647-648 per Crennan and Bell JJ; [2010] HCA 16 at paras.130-131 per Crennan and Bell JJ ("SZMDS").

[85] Citing WZANW v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2009] FMCA 1075 at para.100 per Lucev FM ("WZANW").

[86] CB 354, IMR Transcript pages 47-52.

[88] Citing Wang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1599; (2000) 105 FCR 548 at 552 per Gray J; [2000] FCA 1599 at para.16 per Gray J; WALT v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2007] FCAFC 2 at paras.7-8, 17 and 29-30 per Mansfield, Jacobson and Siopis JJ.

[89] IMR Transcript, pages 61-70, and 79-81.

[91] CLR at 647-648 per Crennan and Bell JJ; HCA at paras.130-131 per Crennan and Bell JJ; see also CLR at 624-625 per Gummow ACJ and Kiefel J; HCA at paras.37-40 per Gummow ACJ and Kiefel J.

[99] Citing Durairajasingham ALR at 423 per McHugh J; HCA at para.67 per McHugh J; SZOCT FCR at 594-595 per Buchanan J; FCAFC at para.63 per Buchanan J.

[104] WZANW at para.100 per Lucev FM.

[106] IMR Transcript pages 42 at 18, and 59-60.

[110] [1989] HCA 62; (1989) 169 CLR 379 ("Chan").

[111] CLR at 389 per Mason CJ, 398 per Dawson J, 407 per Toohey J and 429 per McHugh J.

[112] VBAO v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor (2006) 233 CLR 1; [2006] HCA 60.