WSS v Medical Council of New South Wales [2026] NSWCATOD 9;

1. In the second application the Practitioner asserts that the jurisdiction for the Tribunal to entertain this application is "the National Law : s 216(1) and (2)o; s 176F(3)b; s 127(3)b; s 220A7; Smithson T".
2. In the second application, the Practitioner seeks the following "orders":

1. Disclose the role of MCNSW in transfer of emails to be produced to SCQ.

2. Disclose what emails were transmitted.

3. Disclose if they were filed with the registry of SCQ.

4. Disclose who were involved in the deal.

5. Disclose what the motive was.

6. Disclose how contents of the emails obviate administration of justice, in my case.

7. Disclose the role of MCNSW in maintenance of conditions of registration.

8. Disclose the reason for refusing my application before NCAT in April 20225 (sic)

9. Disclose the motive and role of MBQ in this process?

10. Transfer my file to the Medical Board of Victoria, once I have relocated to Victoria.

1. The Practitioner provides the following grounds for the second application:

1. Colluded with MCNSW and trial judge.

2. Interfered with case.

3. Sabotaged legal proceedings.

4. Offered financial inducements.

5. Refused reinstatement application.

6. Adduced unsecured emails as evidence of trial in another jurisdiction.

7. Breach of privacy.

8. Discrimination against practitioners, with illness.

9. Discrimination against race.

10. Denied natural justice.

11. Perverted the course of justice.

12. Fraudulent conduct.

13. Conspiring to unjustifiably dismiss the case.

14 Brought SCQ to abject disrepute & CJ to distrust.

1. The Practitioner asserts that this application is lodged within the time allowed under the relevant legislation; but then fills out the particulars as to why the application has been lodged outside time as follows:

Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002; Information Privacy Act 2002; Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 No 133[4A, 20, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33]; Health Profession Regulation National Law 2009 s 207(Qld) & s 150 (NSW); Case Law Precedents/Authorities: AIN v MCNSW [2017] NSWCATAP 22 [18, 64, 65, 67, 69, 70, 82, 88, 89, 91]; Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81-159 CLR 550; [1985] HCA 81; 60 ALJR 113; Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA; MCNSW v Smithson [2021] NSWCA 53 [9, 10, 15, 23-4, 29]; Fit-Prop Test does not apply to this hiatus (s 150 to reinstatement); no fuss, please !

REQUEST MADE BY THE PRACTITIONER IN HIS RESPONSE OF 30 OCTOBER 2025

1. As indicated above, the Practitioner on 30 October 2025 filed a set of submissions by way of response (ex 8). That document was not seen by the Medical Council of New South Wales until after 10am on 7 November 2025.
2. In that document at [13], the Practitioner writes:

I would like to reframe a question to be answered by NCAT.

Was the council's exercise of s 150 powers invalid because it depended on an ultra vires own motion notification from the MBQ?

That question goes to jurisdictional validity, which is a question of law squarely relevant to NCAT's power under s 159.

I am legitimately framing my new NCAT application as appeal from the suspension grounded in a jurisdictional challenge rather than factual dispute about risk.

The decision of the Medical Council of NSW to suspend my registration under s 150 was made without jurisdiction because it purported to act on an invalid own-motion notification from the MBQ, which lacks statutory power under the National Law to issue such notification. Accordingly, the Council's decision is void and ought to be set aside.

That keeps you within s 159(1)(a), while focusing the argument squarely on error of law.

1. The Practitioner said that his request for this reframing was a result of some free online legal advice that he had received.
2. What the Practitioner now wished to do was to convert the applications into an application under s 159 by way of an appeal against an outcome at a s 150 hearing on 7 November 2023 which was confirmed by at least one subsequent s 150A hearing.
3. This was not on the basis of any error of factual finding in relation to the risk that he posed based upon what he had written in his letter to AHPRA on 6 July 2023, but on an asserted error of law involving the Queensland jurisdiction.
4. I was unable to work out what connection there was between the Medical Council of New South Wales conveying a s 150 hearing based on a referral from AHPRA arising from a letter written by the Practitioner to AHPRA on 6 July 2023, and previous proceedings that had taken place in Queensland.
5. During oral submissions, the Practitioner talked about a recent trial in the Supreme Court of Queensland where an application made by him had been refused by the Queensland Supreme Court.
6. As I explained to the Practitioner, I was not prepared to give him leave to amend his application on two basis:

(1) Its lateness. In my view, the pivot by the Practitioner creates an entirely different application which has not been addressed squarely in the volume of material that has been filed.

(2) The inability on the material filed to confidently deal with any appeal from any of the decisions suspending or confirming suspension in the absence of a comprehensive understanding of all the completed and current proceedings involving the Practitioner.

1. As detailed above, there have been other applications that are extant of which I have no knowledge at all.
2. In the event that the first set of proceedings (ending 9048) were to be construed to involve a s 159 and/or a s 159B appeal under the National Law, those applications may have already been run by the Practitioner.
3. In exhibit 5, page 80, the Practitioner refers to a second s 150A hearing which was held on 22 July 2024 which was adjourned first to 5 August 2024 and postponed to 19 August 2024. The outcome of those proceedings are unclear to me.
4. In exhibit 5 at page 77, there is a copy of an administrative review application filed by the Practitioner (proceedings 2024/00318007) where the Practitioner does seek relief seemingly under s 159.
5. In the Practitioner's latest submissions, he asserts that, "the NCAT trial in April 2025 was a fiasco, not because of myself; so first attempt should be a dry run". Again, I have no detail as to what proceedings that might refer to.
6. If in fact an appeal has already been heard by the Tribunal under s 150 and/or s 159B, then to hear a further appeal, would likely be an abuse of process.
7. His application by way of appeal on a point of law seems to be based on a notion that the original proceedings in Queensland were tainted and therefore the referral by AHPRA to the Medical Council was tainted and therefore the original s 150 hearing was ultra vires.
8. That seems to ignore what I understand to be the agreed fact that it was the letter that the Practitioner himself wrote to AHPRA on 6 July 2023 that led to the delegates, both in the s 150 hearing on 7 November 2023 and upon the s 150A hearing on 14 February 2024, concluding that the Practitioner was a risk to the public based upon what he had written to AHPRA. This seems to have no relevant connection to previous conditions put upon his registration by the Queensland Medical Board. Counsel for the Medical Council made the point in final submissions that there was in fact no referral of anything from Queensland to New South Wales and that the two jurisdictions operate upon their own State versions of the National Law by way of State legislation.
9. Any suggestion that the delegates at the s 150 hearing or s 150A hearing cannot take action, whether or not a complaint has been made or referred to them, is misconceived. Section 150(4)(a) and (b) makes it clear that the Council may take action under s 150 whether or not a complaint has been made or referred to Council about the Practitioner and whether or not proceedings in respect of a complaint about the Practitioner are before the Committee or Tribunal.
10. It is for these reasons that I indicated to the Practitioner I was not prepared to entertain his request to reframe the basis upon which the applications were being brought.
11. The Practitioner did not resile from the basis set out in the original applications and accordingly, I will now deal with the applications as they have been pleaded.

THE SECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL LAW UPON WHICH THE PRACTITIONER PURPORTS TO RELY IN HIS APPLICATIONS

Persons may notify Council of professional performance matters [NSW]

(1) A person may notify the Council for a health profession of a matter the person thinks indicates the professional performance of a health practitioner registered in the profession is unsatisfactory.

(2) The Council must not have the professional performance of the practitioner assessed on the basis of a notification if it is made anonymously.

1. Section 216(1) and (2)(a) are in the following terms:

Duty of confidentiality

(1) A person who is, or has been, a person exercising functions under this Law must not disclose to another person protected information. Maximum penalty -

(a) in the case of an individual $5,000; or

(b) in the case of a body corporate - $10,000

(2) However, s (1) does not apply if -

(a) the information is disclosed in the exercise of a function under, or for the purposes of, this law.

Confidentiality of protected reports

(3) A protected report may not be admitted or used in civil proceedings before a court other than with the consent of -

...

(b) the person the subject of the report

1. Relevantly, s 138 defines protected reports narrowly.

Removal of condition or revocation of undertaking

(3) However, the condition or undertaking may not be removed or revoked -

...

(b) for a condition imposed by an adjudication body for a co-regulatory jurisdiction, unless the adjudication body decided, when imposing the condition, that this Subdivision applied to the condition.

Disclosure of information about registered health practitioners to protect health and safety of persons

(7) In this section - "health information" has the same meaning as in the Privacy Act 1988 of the Commonwealth.

1. Section 154B of the National Law is not a provision that gives the Tribunal jurisdiction to hear any matter. In any event, there is no evidence or suggestion in the application that the Practitioner's performance was ever assessed under Division 5 of Part VIII of the National Law (the Division in which s 154B sits), so it is not apparent that the provision has any relevance to the circumstances of the Practitioner. The Medical Council's "bundle to dismissal application" dated 14 October 2025 (Exhibit 5) includes reference to various assessments of the practitioner but that all of those assessments seemed to be associated with his mental health.

1. Subsections 216(1) and (2)(a) of the National Law relate to criminal offences for the disclosure of "protected information". The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to enforce those provisions.
2. Subsection 176F(3)(b) of the National Law relates to the use of "protected reports" in civil proceedings "before a court". The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to enforce that provision. Moreover, a protected report has the narrow meaning given to it in s 138 of the National Law, so it is not apparent from the application made by the Practitioner that the provision has any relevance to assertions made in the application. It is not clear as to what type of report or what report the practitioner is referring to.
3. Section 127(3)(b) of the National Law relates to the removal of conditions imposed by a "National Board" or an undertaken given to the "National Board" by a practitioner and provides that a condition may not be removed, or an undertaking may not be revoked, for a condition imposed by an adjudication body for a co-regulatory jurisdiction, unless the adjudication body decided, when imposing the condition, that the subdivision of which the section is a part applied to the condition. This provision does not confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal to do anything. Moreover, it is not at all apparent what relevance this provision has to the council or the practitioner's circumstances (given that he is currently suspended).
4. Section 220A(7) of the National Law is the definition for "health information" for the purpose of s 220A. This provision does not confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal.
5. The Tribunal has no identified and relevant power to grant declaratory relief, or to "nominate" staff, or to order unspecified persons "to disclose" matters, or to require files to be transferred to other jurisdictions.

1. The applications by the Practitioner should be dismissed for two different reasons.
2. Foremost is that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction or power under the sections nominated by the Practitioner to make any of the orders or declarations sought by the Practitioner.
3. Secondly, the applications filed by the Practitioner attract each of the categories referred to in s 55(1)(b) of the CAT Act.

1. The Medical Council seeks that the Practitioner pay its costs in respect of both proceedings including these interlocutory proceedings. Clause 13 of Schedule 5D of the National Law provides the Tribunal may award costs.
2. The Council wrote to the Practitioner to put him on notice that his two applications which have now been dismissed, were misconceived. The Practitioner did not withdraw the applications.
3. The Practitioner indicated that he was impecunious and on income tested benefits. I explained to the Practitioner that impecuniosity of itself was not a basis on which a costs application would be automatically rejected.
4. The Practitioner has been wholly unsuccessful in resisting the Medical Council's dismissal applications and accordingly wholly unsuccessful in the applications that were originally filed on 27 and 28 August 2025. The Council is entitled to an order for costs of each of the proceedings and including these interlocutory proceedings.

1. In exhibit 5, page 119, there is a copy of an order made by the Tribunal in case numbers 2024/00318007 and 2024/00419837, in which it is recorded that on 14 April 2025, the following orders/directions were made:

Pursuant to s 64(1) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, publication or disclosure of the name or evidence concerning the identity of the applicant, who has been allocated the pseudonym WSS, or of patients of the applicant, is prohibited except to any regulatory bodies, Tribunals or Courts who govern the registration or practice of the applicant.

1. I am informed from the bar table by Counsel for the Medical Council that the basis of that order was the findings by Dr Yadav of the impairment of the Practitioner.

1. The Application filed by WSS in proceedings 2025/00329048 on 27 August 2025 be dismissed.

2. The Application filed by WSS in proceedings 2025/00343960 on 28 August 2025 be dismissed.

3. WSS pay the Medical Council's costs in relation to both proceedings as agreed or assessed by a costs assessor under the Legal Costs Legislation (as defined in s 3A of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014).

4. Pursuant to s 64(1) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, publication or disclosure of the name or evidence concerning the identity of the applicant, who has been allocated the pseudonym WSS, is prohibited except to any regulatory bodies, Tribunals or Courts who govern the registration or practice of the applicant.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.