Williams v Victorian Legal Services Commissioner [2026] VSC 208

(a) The respondent, Victorian Legal Services Commissioner (Commissioner), applies by summons dated 2 February 2026 (Summons) for orders that the application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a decision of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal)[1] (Extension Application), filed by the applicant (Mr Williams) be summarily dismissed and for a declaration that the Extension Application is incompetent (Summary Dismissal Application); and

(b) Mr Williams applies pursuant to s 17B of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) (Supreme Court Act) by written submissions dated 7 April 2026 for orders that the Extension Application be referred to the Court of Appeal to be heard and determined at the same time as a pending application in a related matter before the Court of Appeal (Referral Application).

1. The Commissioner has filed and relies upon the following:

(a) Summons dated 2 February 2026;

(b) affidavit of Matthew Anstee affirmed 2 February 2026; and

(c) written submissions dated 2 February 2026.

1. Mr Williams has filed and relies upon the following:

(a) notice of appeal filed 20 October 2025;

(b) summons dated 28 October 2025;

(c) affidavit of Jeremy Williams sworn 28 October 2025;

(d) affidavit of Jeremy Williams sworn 23 March 2026;

(e) affidavit of Jeremy Williams sworn 7 April 2026; and

(f) written submissions dated 8 April 2026.

1. Mr Williams was an Australian legal practitioner practising in Victoria.
2. In 2021 and 2022, the Commissioner prosecuted Mr Williams in three separate applications brought in the Tribunal and heard at the same time (Disciplinary Proceedings).[2]
3. The Disciplinary Proceedings were conducted in two phases:

(a) conduct hearing on 1 to 4 and 9 March 2021 conducted before Senior Member Judge Jenkins (Conduct Hearing); and

(b) penalty hearing on 20 June 2022 conducted before the President, Quigley J (Penalty Hearing).

1. On 28 July 2021, after the Conduct Hearing, the Tribunal constituted by Judge Jenkins made a determination that Mr Williams was guilty of 21 charges of professional misconduct (Conduct Determination).
2. On 20 September 2021, Mr Williams first alleged that during the luncheon adjournment of the Conduct Hearing and prior to the Conduct Determination, the Senior Member had made adverse comments about him in a conversation with an unknown person (1 March Comments).
3. On 5 October 2021 the Commissioner wrote to the Tribunal to inform it of Mr Williams' allegation that the adverse comments had been made.
4. On 25 October 2021, the Tribunal was reconstituted with the President, Quigley J, sitting as the Tribunal for the purpose of hearing the ongoing conduct of the Disciplinary Proceeding.[3] Mr Williams applied to stay the Tribunal proceeding, pending determination of a complaint he had made to the Judicial Commission concerning the 1 March Comments. That application was refused.
5. There is a dispute before me as to when Mr Williams became aware of the Penalty Hearing. He claims that he was not aware of the Penalty Hearing (despite appearing at a directions hearing on 21 March 2022 at which that hearing was listed) and thought that the Disciplinary Proceeding was on hold pending resolution of his complaint to the Judicial Commission.
6. From 8 June 2022, the Commissioner was unable to contact Mr Williams. The last correspondence received by the Commissioner from him was an email on 19 May 2022.
7. On 20 June 2022, the Penalty Hearing took place. Mr Williams did not appear.
8. On 15 July 2022, the Tribunal handed down its decision and made orders including an order recommending to this Court that his name be removed from the roll maintained by the Court and prohibiting him from practice for 9 years (Penalty Determination).[4]
9. On 10 October 2025, Mr Williams filed an application in the Tribunal seeking to re-open its orders (Re-opening Application).[5]
10. On 20 October 2025, Mr Williams filed the Extension Application by which he seeks an extension of time to seek leave to appeal the Conduct Determination made by the Tribunal constituted by Judge Jenkins.[6]
11. On 29 December 2025, Mr Williams filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeal, seeking an extension of time to seek leave to appeal from orders made by the Tribunal constituted by Quigley J in relation to the Penalty Determination (Second Extension Application).[7]
12. On 16 January 2026, the Commissioner filed an originating motion with the Supreme Court seeking that Mr Williams' name be removed from the roll of practitioners (Name Removal Proceeding).[8]
13. On 2 February 2026, the Commissioner filed the Summons (seeking summary determination of the Extension Application and for declarations).
14. On 31 March 2026, Lorenz JR ordered that the Name Removal Proceeding be stayed until the conclusion of the Extension of Time Proceeding.
15. On 8 April 2026, I heard the Summary Dismissal Application and the Referral Application.

1. The Summary Dismissal Application and the Referral Application both relate to Mr William's Extension Application which is brought pursuant to s 148(5) of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) (VCAT Act).
2. Section 148(5) of the VCAT Act provides that the Trial Division of the Supreme Court may at any time extend or abridge any time limit fixed by or under s 148 of the VCAT Act which includes the 28 day time limit provided by s 148(2) of the VCAT Act for the making of an application for leave to appeal.
3. While Mr Williams' submissions refer in some instances to his rights by way of 'judicial review', the Extension Application is in aid of an appeal and not an application for prerogative relief.
4. While the Commissioner initially opposed Mr Williams' Referral Application, by the conclusion of the hearing both parties sought those orders by agreement.
5. For reasons that follow, I consider that it is in the interests of justice to direct that the Extension Application (including the Summary Judgment Application) be argued before the Court of Appeal pursuant to s 17B(2) of the Supreme Court Act. Whether or not the Court of Appeal grants leave for the proceeding to be argued before it, or whether the Court of Appeal refuses leave and remits the matter to the Trial Division for determination by it, will be a matter for it.[9]
6. The starting point is to note the obligation of the Court to seek to give effect to the overarching purpose in the exercise of any of its powers, namely to facilitate the just, efficient, timely and cost‑effective resolution of the real issues in dispute.[10]
7. A central issue for determination in relation to the Summons before me is the effect of the 1 March Comments on the Conduct Determination.
8. There is considerable merit to the Commissioner's contention that the Conduct Determination is not amenable to an appeal pursuant to s 148 of the VCAT Act, because that section facilitates appeals from orders and not determinations, and no relevant orders were made in relation to the Conduct Determination by Judge Jenkins. The contention is consistent with Ginnane J's decision in Chen v Victorian Legal Services Commissioner,[11] (Chen) to the effect that findings in relation to the first stage of a professional misconduct hearing, namely concerning the question of guilt, were not orders within the meaning of s 148(1) of the VCAT Act.
9. Against this, Mr Williams relies on the 'McDonald's cases'[12] and Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond,[13] in support of the proposition that s 148 of the VCAT Act extends to findings of the kind made in the Conduct Determination. The present case is not a completely straightforward application of Chen because determinations in the Disciplinary Proceedings were made by both a non-Presidential member and the President - in a context where the VCAT Act provides different appeal pathways depending on the constitution of the Tribunal.
10. The Commissioner's position is that the proposed appeal the subject of the Second Extension Application, would, subject to the grant of an extension of time and of leave to appeal, be the proper vehicle for resolution of any grounds of appeal arising from both the Conduct Determination and the Penalty Determination.
11. The Commissioner points out that the grounds of appeal in the Second Extension Application (pending before the Court of Appeal) cover the same matters that are raised by Mr Williams in the proposed appeal the subject of the Extension Application that is before me. Those grounds include matters relating to the Conduct Determination. Mr Williams also seeks to expand his grounds of appeal in both applications to include allegations concerning Quigley J's alleged role in the Judicial Commission investigation.
12. Further, the Extension Application raises a number of discretionary considerations that are likely to substantially overlap with discretionary considerations that arise in the Second Extension Application. For example, the Commissioner is likely to emphasise delay in opposing both extensions. The relevance of delay is complicated by Mr Williams' contention that the VCAT orders are affected by actual or apprehended bias and denial of procedural fairness,[14] with consequence, he contends, that the Tribunal decision is a nullity.[15]
13. Mr Williams' contention that the VCAT orders are a nullity also has potential relevance to the merit of the underlying appeal in relation to both the Extension Application and the Second Extension Application. In each case, the Commissioner will contend that Mr Williams waived his right to complain about the 1 March Comments because of his delay in raising the issue of bias.[16]
14. Evidently there is significant overlap in the legal and factual issues that arise in relation to both the Extension Application and the Second Extension Application. I am also concerned about the further fragmentation of the appeal proceedings and misalignment of current and future appeal processes regardless of the outcome of the Summary Dismissal Application. Finally, the question of whether in truth, the Extension Application is a matter for the Court of Appeal,[17] which lies at the heart of the Summary Dismissal Application, is another reason why it is appropriate to refer the matter to the Court of Appeal.

1. In the premises, I consider that it is in the interests of justice to direct that the Extension Application (including the Summary Judgment Application) be argued before the Court of Appeal pursuant to s 17B(2) of the Supreme Court Act. I shall make orders accordingly. My preliminary view is that costs ought to be reserved. If either party seeks a different costs disposition, I will list the matter for a short hearing.

[1] Proceeding numbers J24/2019, J61/2020, and J4/2021, reported as Victorian Legal Services Commissioner v Williams (Legal Practice) [2021] VCAT 806.

[3] Section 108 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) (VCAT Act).

[4] Pursuant to s 302 of Schedule 1 to the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (Vic) (LPUL).

[6] Made pursuant to s 148 of the VCAT Act.

[7] Made pursuant to s 148 of the VCAT Act.

[9] Section 17B(3) of the Supreme Court Act.

[10] Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) (CPA), ss 8 and 9.

[11] [2020] VSC 842, [57] Ginnane J.

[12] Victorian Legal Services Commission v McDonald (Legal Practice) [2013] VCAT 1943. See also [2014] VSC 34; [2015] VSC 237; [2016] VCAT 21; [2017] VSC 89; [2019] VSCA 18; [2019] HCASL 190.

[13] [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321.

[14] Compare Chen v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 41; (2022) 288 FCR 218, [34].

[15] Compare Cameron v Cole [1944] HCA 5; (1944) 68 CLR 571 at 590 (Rich J); State of Queensland v Mr Stradford (A Pseudonym) (2025) 421 ALR 376; Hycenko v Badge & Ors [2023] VSC 19, [15] (Niall J).

[16] See Vakauta v Kelly [1989] HCA 44; (1989) 167 CLR 568 at 557-579 (Dawson J) and at 572 (Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ); Smith v Roach (2006) 227 CLR 423, [43].