1. I am conscious of the objects of the Act as set out in s.3. I am conscious of the method of interpretation of the Act to be adopted as set out in s.3(2). I am aware of the various authorities, which could be summarised as standing for the proposition that it is proper to give the relevant provisions of the Act that construction which would further, rather than hinder, free access to information, and that the Act is to be interpreted generally in favour of access but not so as to override specific provisions. I am also aware of the proposition that VP bears the onus of proof in attempting to establish that the documents are exempt documents. I am conscious of various statements made from time to time by those on both sides of Parliament concerning the desirability of there being openness and accountability in Government and by agencies. I have borne the above matters in mind, and have applied them, in coming to a decision in the present case.
2. I am also conscious of the fact that some care has to be taken by me in formulating the wording of this judgment so that details of the information sought are not revealed. I am aware that, should the result be in favour of Williams, I should not render any appeal process effectively useless by "letting the cat out of the bag" in my reasons. Similarly, should the result fall the other way, I should not descend into such detail as to give Williams the information which she seeks, whilst at the same time finding against her.

1. The following findings of fact are made for the purposes of this application, and are in no way findings for the purposes of any dispute between the various parties and particularly as between Williams and the Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association ("the SDAEA"). Bearing that caveat in mind, I make the following findings of fact by way of explaining the background to this application.
2. Williams was employed as an organiser by the Victorian Branch of the SDAEA from 23rd February 1999 until 5th November 2004. She was aggrieved by the circumstances in which her employment was terminated. Without going into great detail, suffice to say that internal politics played at least a background role in the circumstances leading to the cessation of Williams' employment with the SDAEA and that allegations of bullying and harassing behaviour were made by Williams against the SDAEA and its Victorian Branch Secretary, Mr Michael Donovan, who is also an intervener in the present application. Litigation initiated by Williams against the SDAEA ensued. It should be added that, at about the relevant time, an election, possibly involving some heat, was being conducted in respect of the positions of certain office holders of the SDAEA, including that of Mr Donovan. In addition, it would seem that Williams was placed upon Workcover payments as a result of psychological or psychiatric injury sustained by her as a result of her employment. Her litigation against the SDAEA was ultimately settled in March, 2006.
3. On the evening of 5th October 2005, Williams was visited at her home by two detectives, one being Detective Senior Constable McQualter. Their visit was in relation to threatening messages that had been received by a number of people from the Victorian Branch of the SDAEA. The detectives indicated that one of these persons was Mr Donovan. Williams alleges that Mr McQualter informed her that she was being interviewed because she was one of three people who were "persons of interest" in relation to the threats. Williams found the whole affair very distressing and, because at that time her litigation was still on foot, felt that the police visit associated with the allegations made was a continuation of the bullying.
4. In essence, Williams now wishes to clear her name and satisfy herself as to what occurred in connection with the police visit in October, 2005. She denies that she is seeking access to documents in order to assist her with any litigation.

1. In February, 2006, Williams sought access to all documents relating to the relevant allegations and the investigations thereof in connection with the events in question. Ultimately the documents which remain in dispute are a witness statement and parts of a LEAP database report. It is apparent from the written statement provided by Mr Donovan, the sole intervener who took an active part in the hearing of this proceeding, that his concern relates to a witness statement which he provided to VP in relation to various threats received by him between November 2004 and September 2005. The other interveners for whom Mr Murray acts also object to the release of the documents. The LEAP report is a document prepared by VP which contains, in essence, a summary of information which has been collated from various sources and which records the progress of the case. Parts of this document which were non-contentious and which related directly to Williams have been released to her. No part of Mr Donovan's witness statement has been released. The exemptions relied upon have been referred to above.
2. Against that background I shall now briefly summarise the cases advanced on behalf of the parties and the interveners. Given the purpose and structure of the Act and the burden placed upon an entity relying upon an exemption, VP produced its evidence before that of the other parties and interveners, and the submissions on its behalf were made first. Accordingly, I shall summarise the evidence adduced on behalf of VP at the outset. I shall then summarise the evidence adduced on behalf of the interveners and Williams. I shall then turn to the submissions.

1. The evidence adduced by Dr McNicol on behalf of VP could be summarised as follows.
2. The police investigation into serious threats, including death threats, was, and is still being, undertaken. Effectively in charge of that investigation has been Detective Senior Constable McQualter. Particular reliance is placed on s.31(1)(a). Documents such as witness statements should not be released to the world at large whilst a police investigation is continuing and before charges are laid. To release such documents would create various problems for those investigating the possible offences. The evidence of Detective Senior Constable McQualter is that, whilst nothing has happened in the investigation since May, 2006, the investigation has not concluded and is still open pending the receipt of any further information. The only part of the investigation which is currently active relates to fingerprints, although evidence in that regard may never become available. Files in relation to a serious indictable offence such as this are never closed, and there is no statute of limitations applicable. An investigation is completed only when all offenders have been charged. The investigation is not active, but pending.
3. In the present case, the original complaint was verbal, but this was reduced to writing and Mr McQualter compiled the written statement. Mr McQualter assisted with the compilation of Mr Donovan's written statement. The names of three possible suspects in relation to the threats were supplied verbally. Notes of interviews and the like were then transferred to the LEAP incident report. The original notes were not released as part of the Freedom of Information request. The threats were made in the context of a union election. The only evidence uncovered in relation to possible offenders was circumstantial evidence and was insufficient to enable an offender to be charged.
4. In the present case, when Mr McQualter interviewed Williams, he did divulge some of the material that was contained in the complaint, but that is not a course which is always or invariably followed. This might not occur if there was a fear of someone being harmed or identified. The witness statement contains information relating to personal affairs of a person within the meaning of the Act because it contains details of threats made to the person and the threats are of a personal nature. In the present case, some of the threats made were more related to the individual's personal life than his or her business life. The witness statement referring to the threats was made in the context of a union election campaign, and such things are ongoing. If released, it could fall into the hands of persons who might be engaged in further campaigns and further threats could result. There could also be reprisals.
5. Williams is not an active suspect, although Mr McQualter had information to the effect that she may have been involved. That is why he visited her and asked her about any possible involvement. Her explanation was satisfactory, and she was not pursued any further. However, Mr McQualter would not agree that there was not even any circumstantial evidence which might implicate Williams.
6. Under the LEAP system, there are three categories of files. One is active, one is completed, and the other is pending, which is the status of the file in the present case. Normally a file is completed if an offender is charged, but if it is discovered that the complaint did not occur at all, special notation of completion is made in that instance.

1. The evidence adduced by Mr Murray on behalf of the interveners could be summarised as follows.
2. Mr Donovan has made no allegation of criminal conduct against Williams and is unaware of any such allegations having been made by the SDAEA or by persons associated with it. Various persons, including senior staff and members of the stated council and some delegates, were advised of the threats. Mr Donovan believes that he had not indicated to any of these people that Williams was a suspect, and had no recollection of them being told this by another person. There may have been discussion amongst senior officers as to who was behind the threats and Williams was mentioned. A number of staff of the SDAEA have left whilst Mr Donovan was Secretary in circumstances that were not happy. Mr Donovan would also have factional enemies within the Australian Labour Party. However, he does not believe that he has ever had any other threats. The last threat which Mr Donovan received was in February, 2006. When a threatening event did occur, material was forwarded to the police. A summary of the threatening events was sent on each occasion to the police.
3. The election campaign that was underway during these events was in fact the first contested election since 1995, and was the first contested election during Mr Donovan's term as Secretary. This was a hotly contested election. Williams was not contesting or involved in the election. There were groups within the membership that were hostile to Mr Donovan's regime. Mr Williams agreed that, during the years that Williams was employed by the union, she never raised her voice to Mr Donovan, abused him or threatened him. However, Williams went on to Workcover payments because of alleged bullying by Mr Donovan, and a similar allegation was made in relation to Ms Field (a former co-worker of Williams and a person who had no objection to personal information concerning her being released).

1. The evidence adduced by Mr Willoughby-Thomas on behalf of Williams could be summarised as follows. The reason why Williams is seeking to have access to the documents is that the accusations have put her life in turmoil and she needs to know what has been said. She could then move on. She also feels that her name has been slurred and wishes to clear her name. She was questioned about such things as sending SMS messages, something which she does not know how to do. However, she has no wish to pursue anyone in relation to what they may have said.
2. She believes that, as the result of the incapacity which she has because of these events, her working life may have effectively ended. However, the present application has nothing to do with her livelihood. The allegations were made at a time when Williams was engaged in negotiations, concerning legal matters, with the SDAEA. She believes that the allegations were made in an attempt to undermine her resolve in relation to her dispute with the union. The allegations may also have been made in an attempt to discredit someone seen as an opponent during elections. In fact she has no political affiliation. She also believes that the timing of the complaints to VP represented a continuation of the bullying process and an attempt at intimidation in the context of litigation. She now has no intention of litigating any further. She has no personal animosity towards Mr Donovan although he has made her life difficult, and there are not others within the SDAEA office that she dislikes.

THE SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES AND THE INTERVENORS

1. The submissions of Dr McNicol on behalf of VP could be summarised as follows.
2. There is no statutory limitation for indictable offences. The relevant police file is still open. The investigation has been described as pending. It can be reactivated if there are further developments. Further material may be added to the LEAP database or it may be of use in relation to similar matters.
3. It is understandable and prudent that VP would keep confidential documents relating to an offence when a person has yet to be charged. Granting disclosure of documents such as a witness statement or the LEAP database could provide assistance to a suspect who might tailor his or her behaviour and response accordingly. If there were another outburst of threats, it may be useful for VP to be able to make a comparison based upon the confidential information which it possesses. It must be borne in mind that release is release to the world at large.
4. Thus, there are three important facts upon which to focus:-

1. No charge has been laid against Williams and she still has the benefit of the presumption of innocence. It is not intended that the Act be used to "fill in gaps" and thus compromise the criminal investigation process. If a charge had been laid, the situation would be different. Various checks and balances are then in place. Even when a charge has been laid, the LEAP database does not form part of the hand-up brief.
2. As was said by Vincent JA in R v Tofalau (No. 2) [2006] VSCA 40:-

"Police officers are not normally required, for example, to disclose the state of their investigation or the extent of their knowledge of the circumstances to the confessionalist."

1. In addition, the documents sought by Williams will not assist her in relation to her uncertainty as to where she stands.
2. However, VP's primary submission is based upon s.31 of the Act. Clearly VP can point to a specific investigation of the breach of the law, and can establish that the documents in question were prepared in the course of, or for the purposes of, the investigation of that breach. Secondly, in relation to s.33 of the Act, the documents involved contain matters of private concern to individuals. Furthermore, it would be unreasonable to disclose these matters after the balancing exercise is undertaken, particularly bearing in mind that disclosure is to the world at large. The main factors to be taken into account in relation to the balancing exercise favour the non-disclosure of the material contained in the documents. There must also be taken into account the risk of people who supply witness statements being harassed, stressed or endangered by the release of the documents in question. In other words, the person who has been the subject of threats ought to be able to report them without being concerned about the risk of further threats.
3. In addition, a person who provides information to a police investigator is usually held to have provided such information in confidence for the purposes of s.35(1)(b). Reference is made to the decision of Deputy President Coghlan in Biviano v Victoria Police (General) [2006] VCAT 2542.
4. In relation to public interest grounds, investigations into serious and indictable criminal offences should remain confidential, particularly in circumstances where charges have not been laid. It is not in the public interest to release the names of suspects unless charges have been laid against such suspects. In addition, there is a public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of statements provided by persons voluntarily to a police investigator. The failure to ensure confidentiality could result in members of the public being less willing to assist police investigators in the future. This is an argument not particularly related to the present case. It relates to the protection of criminal investigation processes. The Act should not be used to supplement a form of criminal discovery. In addition, the release of confidential information relating to police investigations prior to charges being laid could compromise the physical safety of persons making reports to the police.
5. Both the documents under consideration fall within the first limb of the exemption contained in s.31(1)(a) of the Act in that they were created for the purpose of a specific investigation into breaches or possible breaches of the law.
6. Both are also exempt pursuant to s.33(1) in that they relate to the personal affairs of a person, an expression which has been interpreted widely. For the purposes of s.33, the concept of unreasonableness requires a balancing exercise between the public interest in protecting an individual's right to privacy and the public interest in the disclosure of information. When that exercise is carried out in the present case, the result is that disclosure would be unreasonable. It is again emphasised that disclosure is to the world at large. It is also pointed out that the type of information being sought in the present case is not information that would normally be available to the public. Another factor is that a person such as Mr Donovan should be able to complain about the receipt of threats or harassment without being concerned that disclosure of the complaint might result in further harassment.
7. In relation to s.35(1)(b), where a witness or complainant provides information to a police investigator, such information is usually held to have been provided in confidence. Reference is made to the decisions of Gunawan v Department of Education [1999] VCAT 665 and Akers v Victoria Police [2003] VCAT 397. The recent decision in Biviano further underlines this.
8. In relation to public interest, there is public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of pending criminal investigations, particularly where charges have not yet been laid. It would not be in the public interest to release the names of suspects unless charges are laid against those suspects. There is also public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of statements given by members of the public voluntarily to the police. If it were otherwise, members of the public would be less willing to assist police investigators in the future. Release of statements given in confidence prior to charges being laid could also compromise the physical safety of persons making such reports.

1. The submissions of Mr Murray on behalf of the interveners could be summarised as follows.
2. The interveners adopt and support the arguments advanced on behalf of VP. In relation to s.33(1), the information under consideration falls within it. Disclosure of it would be unreasonable. Reference is made to Williams v Victoria Police (General) [2005] VCAT 2516. In relation to these factors, it is not necessary to demonstrate, for example, that disclosure would be reasonably likely to endanger the life or physical safety of any person by reason of that danger coming from the applicant Williams. Indeed, the person at risk might be Williams. In relation to the reasonable likelihood, this is not a fanciful situation. Threats, including threats to kill, have already been made. The danger to physical safety is apparent.
3. Further, the information is by its nature confidential information. For example, it was not the intention of Mr Donovan that his witness statement should be released to the world at large, which includes the person responsible for the making of the threats. The interveners, including Mr Donovan, have objected to the release of the information. In relation to the motives of Williams, which is another factor to be taken into account in performing the balancing exercise, it may well be the intention of Williams to use the material, if it were released, in pursuit of litigation. This is so given the history of litigation against SDAEA in which she has engaged. Even if her motive is to solely to clear her name, as she has said, release of the material would not assist in this regard. Also, the information has current relevance in that it is part of an on-going investigation.

1. The submissions of Mr Willoughby-Thomas on behalf of Williams could be summarised as follows.
2. VP has not come close to discharging the burden which it bears pursuant to s.55 of the Act. The Act is to be interpreted generally in favour of access. Reference is also made to the approach which is to be adopted pursuant to s.16 of the Act. The Act is about giving access to information and not about claiming exemptions. For example, a strict rather than an expansive interpretation of the words "communicated in confidence" found in s.35 should be adopted. A similar approach should be adopted towards words in s.31 such as "would be reasonably likely to prejudice the investigation". The intention of the Act is that a document should be released unless an exemption is claimed and substantiated. In relation to s.31, the type of investigation to which the exemption should apply should be a current investigation of a breach, as opposed to something like a pending investigation. Because all files are, by their nature, pending unless completed, the interpretation argued for by VP would undermine s.31. "Reasonably likely" means something that is real and not fanciful or remote. The present investigation is for all intents and purposes completed. The part of the LEAP database that has been released includes wording to the effect that there are no further avenues of enquiry. Thus, for the purpose of s.31 there is no investigation in the particular instance. There is no longer an investigation underway in this particular matter.
3. If an investigation is complete and no further action is contemplated, the administration of justice cannot be prejudiced by the release of a report which was part of the investigative process. There is authority for a proposition such as this - see, for example, Buggy v Victoria Police (Unreported, 28th June 1996), and Coleman v Director General, Local Government Department, Pentland (1985) 1 VAR 9.
4. If the investigation were considered to be pending rather than complete, the words "reasonably likely" must receive attention. The release of the material with names deleted or release of the parts relating only to Williams would not be reasonably likely to prejudice any investigation. Furthermore, Williams has not been portrayed as someone who is likely to make threats or pose a danger to the safety of persons. Mr Donovan gave evidence that Williams had never raised her voice to him, abused him or threatened him.
5. In relation to s.33, corporations do not have personal affairs. As far as the individual interveners are concerned, it seems unlikely that the documents would contain information concerning their personal affairs other than their names or possibly addresses. It is clear from the statement which Mr Donovan has made to the Tribunal that these matters occurred in the context of business and union affairs, and are not private matters. These are public matters, and not matters of private concern to an individual.
6. If opinions are provided by persons in their professional capacity, those opinions might be part of their public rather than their private lives and accordingly may not relate to their personal affairs - see Conyers v Monash University [2005] VCAT 2509. As was determined in that case, the names of those involved can be personal information, but the opinions which they have expressed may not be. A similar situation exists in the present case. Individuals are either expressing their opinions or relating facts which come into existence in a business rather than a personal context.
7. In Baker v Department of Education and Training (General) [2005] VCAT 2263, an exemption pursuant to s.33 was not made out where the document in question involved a description by persons of a particular event and their reactions to that event. What is contained within the witness statement in the present case is a person's view of particular experiences and events and that person's reaction to them. That does not represent personal affairs within the meaning of s.33. This is consistent with the meaning of the words and the objects of the Act.
8. There is also the question as to whether or not the disclosure would be unreasonable, and it is in relation to this that the balancing exercise must be performed. In relation to the factors to be taken into account, this is almost akin to the public interest override contained in s.50(4). The Act requires disclosure unless the agency concerned is affirmatively satisfied that, for some tangible reason, disclosure would be unreasonable in the particular circumstances - see AB v Department of Human Services [2001] VCAT 2020. In the present case, the agency (VP) has put nothing forward which could lead to affirmative satisfaction that, for some tangible reason, disclosure would be unreasonable. Disclosure is being withheld from Williams despite the fact that there is no active investigation. Her reputation has been tarnished. As conceded by Mr Donovan, there has been discussion amongst a range of people concerning the threats. Williams' name had been mentioned. In fact it is unreasonable for the interveners to say that the document should not be released when the interveners have effectively told the world at large that Williams is a suspect in relation to the making of death threats. If any unreasonableness does exist in relation to disclosure, it can be overcome by the deletion of names pursuant to s.25 of the Act.
9. The desire of a person to clear his or her name when serious allegations have been made is a factor that can be taken into account - see Buggy.
10. In relation to s.35, nothing has been placed before the Tribunal in support of the elements necessary to establish the exemption. Nothing has been put forward to establish that the witness statement of Mr Donovan was given in confidence. Indeed, the statement which Mr Donovan has made for the purposes of this proceeding indicates that he made the witness statement in the understanding that it may not be confidential and may be used as part of the investigative process or in the courts. Thus there is no confidentiality in the sense contemplated by the Act. Similarly, Mr McQualter at no stage said that any undertakings were given in relation to confidentiality. Elements of the witness statement were in fact put to people such as Williams. The confidence was breached. Parts of statements are frequently put to third parties as part of the investigative process. In summary, the requirement of communication in confidence is not made out. There is no such thing as a conditional communication in confidence - there is either a confidential communication or there is not.
11. Similarly, nothing has been put which would substantiate the proposition that the documents are exempt for the purpose of s.35(1)(b). There is no evidence that disclosure would be reasonably likely to impair the ability of VP to obtain similar information in the future. There must be something more than a mere assertion based upon s.35(1)(b). There must be some evidence or material - see Porter v Victoria Police (General) [2005] VCAT 962. People who make complaints to VP would not expect confidentiality.
12. There may be individual cases where there is a risk of harm - see, for example, Marke v Victoria Police (General) [2006] VCAT 1364. However, in that case, there was a risk that disclosure would result in some policemen harassing a fellow officer. This is not such a case. Nor is there a risk that disclosure will impair the ability to obtain statements in the future or that people will be less inclined to complain about crimes. Reference is made to Sifredi v Medical Practitioners Board [1999] VCAT 87, in which case there is some discussion concerning what is required to establish this particular exemption.
13. In summary, none of the three exemptions claimed have been made out on the evidence or on the proper interpretation of the legislation. Furthermore, the original written decision not to release the documents and claiming exemptions contain no reference to s.35. Section 35 was not relied upon either initially or upon review.
14. Turning to the issue of the public interest override, one of the key factors emphasised is that an injustice has been done and there is public interest in that injustice being rectified. Reference is made to the decision in Ambikapathy v Victoria Legal Aid (Unreported, 27 August 1999). This issue is relevant both to the question of unreasonableness of disclosure and to the public interest override. Williams has been named as a suspect to various individuals and delegates. It is out there in the community that Williams is a suspect in relation to these criminal acts. She has a right to know what was said and to attempt to rectify the situation.
15. Given the evidence of Mr Donovan that there were groups in the union hostile to the regime and that Williams took no part in the election, it is a reasonable inference to say that the naming of Williams as a suspect was related to the litigation which she was bringing against the union.

1. The reply of Mr Murray on behalf of the interveners could be summarised as follows.
2. Mr Donovan did not say that Williams had been named as a suspect to the delegates. He did say that her name had been mentioned amongst senior officers. Furthermore, it was not put to Mr Donovan that the threats were linked to the litigation.

1. The reply of Dr McNicol on behalf of VP could be summarised as follows.
2. It is emphasised that VP does in fact rely upon all three exemptions. In relation to s.33, the number of interveners in this case should not be ignored, and release of the documents is release to the world at large.
3. There is authority for the proposition that, in s.31(1)(a) the words "in a particular instance" apply to both limbs of the preceding words. However, whatever interpretation is given, there is a reasonable prospect that this particular investigation would be prejudiced by disclosure. The LEAP database is a document that is supplemented and updated from time to time. If, on the evidence, the correct and preferable decision involves reliance upon exemptions not otherwise claimed in the documentation, such a decision should be made and there should not be disclosure. In this regard, reference is made to s.31(1)(c) and (d). In those sub-sections, the terminology used is "the law" without the additional words "in a particular instance".
4. In relation to s.35(1)(b), confidentiality does not have to be expressed. It is a question of fact in every case.
5. Any fundamental right to know on the part of Williams does not extend to a right to know about police investigations, follow-up procedures and the methods by which investigations are conducted.
6. In relation to any application of s.25 and editing of documents, the witness statement should be read in its entirety. There is a lot of personal information in the document. An edited version of the witness statements should not be released.

1. In this matter, I am of the view that the decision of VP in relation to the documents should be affirmed. In my opinion the exemption claimed pursuant to s.31(1)(a) has been made out. I accept the evidence of Detective Senior Constable McQualter. He struck me as an impressive and reliable witness. I accept his evidence that the file of VP in relation to these threats is still open. It is classified as "pending". Whilst no further avenues are being explored at this time, the file has not been closed or completed. Material in relation to fingerprints has been gathered, and further enquiries in that regard have not been exhausted.
2. It may be that no further investigations can be carried out unless there is some further event or development. However, such an eventuality may arise, in which case further investigations and interviews would be conducted.
3. I accept that the release of these documents has the capacity to prejudice the investigation of what, in this particular case, has the appearance of being the commission of a serious offence or offences. As a matter of common sense, I accept the proposition that has been advanced that to release documents of this nature to the world at large is to afford to a wrongdoer the opportunity to craft or tailor a response. I accept the evidence of Detective Senior Constable McQualter that the releasing of information of this nature in relation to a file such as this, which is still classified as pending, could lead to the possible destruction of evidence in addition to providing to a wrongdoer the opportunity to create a false alibi or otherwise give false evidence.
4. Both documents in the present case were prepared in the course of and for the purposes of the investigation of a serious breach of the law. In my opinion the release of the documents would prejudice that investigation. That is my view regardless of which interpretation of s.31(1)(a) is adopted, because, in my opinion, the release would prejudice the enforcement or proper administration of the law in this particular instance.
5. Dr McNicol also argued that VP placed reliance on s.31(1)(c) and (d) of the Act. Given that I have found that the exemption pursuant to s.31(1)(a) has been made out, there is basically no need for me to consider those additional sub-sections. Originally reliance was not placed upon them, and some argument may exist as to whether or not they can now be taken into account. Dr McNicol argued that, in arriving at the correct and preferable decision, those sub-sections should also be considered. Whether or not that is correct, I am of the view that, for the reasons set out above in relation to s.31(1)(a), exemption pursuant to those sub-sections has also been established. I might add that, if reliance upon s.31(1)(c) and (d) were permitted, the exemption would again be made out.
6. I am not of the opinion that the public interest override contained in s.50(4) operates so as to overcome the granting of the exemption. Without going into the numerous authorities which exist in relation to s.50(4), it does not seem to me that the public interest in disclosure is sufficiently strong so as to override the factors that warrant an exemption. Whilst there is obviously a public interest in ensuring that justice be done and that injustice be rectified, the situation in the present case is basically one of an individual, in a case of no notoriety, wishing to clear her name in relation to an offence with which she has not been charged and concerning which she is not an active suspect. As has been determined in Secretary to the Department of Premier and Cabinet v Hulls [1999] VSCA 117; [1999] 3 VR 331, public interest must demand or necessitate the release of the documents. The nature of the overriding provisions is such that the public interest in disclosure must be of sufficient strength to override, and not to simply outweigh, the factors that justify the exemption. In the present case, those factors do not exist. A satisfactory basis for an exemption has been established. VP has been investigating a serious offence. No person has been charged. Williams has been interviewed, but it has been openly stated that she is not an active suspect. There is no suggestion that the matter, insofar as it involves her, has received any media attention, if it has received any such attention at all. I fail to see how the interviewing of Williams by members of VP has been in any way vindictive or represents an injustice. I do not see how the public interest requires that documents relating to and preceding such interview should be released to the world at large.
7. Indeed, it seems to me that that the public interest is better served by the documents not being released. I agree with the submissions of Dr McNicol that the public interest is better served by the release of information relating to investigations such as this not being ordered. It is more in the public interest that investigations should be able to be carried out without witness statements and LEAP reports being released.
8. The exemption pursuant to s.31 having been established, it is probably unnecessary for me to move on to the other exemptions concerning which argument has been advanced. However, should it be necessary, in each instance I find in favour of VP (and thus the interveners). The documents in question do contain information relating to the personal affairs of various persons. Seven individuals notified in accordance with s.53A have indicated their objection to the documents being released. The name of each appears in one of the documents, although not all names can be found in each. That Mr Donovan made a witness statement became quite apparent, but that cannot be treated as some sort of waiver of his rights.
9. Having viewed the documents, I am of the view that they contain information relating to the personal affairs of various persons. I also accept the arguments of Dr McNicol that disclosure of the documents would involve a reasonable likelihood of the physical safety of persons being endangered. Detective Senior Constable McQualter gave some evidence in this regard, and I accept that, but it also seems to me to be a matter of common sense that such a reasonable likelihood would be created. The threats that have been made were serious, including a threat to kill, and, whether or not they were related to it, made against a background of conflict which could arise again. In any event, whether or not reliance is placed upon s.33(2A), disclosure of the documents would seem to me to involve the unreasonable disclosure of information relating to the personal affairs of various people. A statement has been made to VP. The LEAP report has been produced. Both documents contain information relating to the personal affairs of people. In the circumstances of this case, and I will not repeat them again, the disclosure of such information would not seem to me to be reasonable. To me, it seems to be clearly unreasonable. As s.50(4) does not apply to s.33, it need not be addressed.
10. In relation to s.35(1), firstly it is required that a matter be communicated in confidence by or on behalf of a person to an agency or minister. In my opinion, each document satisfies this requirement. Both the witness statement and the LEAP report are matters that have been communicated by individuals (the witness and the compilers of the LEAP report) to an agency. The disclosure of the information would be reasonably likely to impair the ability of the agency to obtain similar information in the future. Common sense dictates that persons would be less likely to make statements to the police if they were of the view that the making of such statements was not confidential. If it became known that the making of such a statement could be disclosed to the world at large, I have little doubt but that persons would be reluctant to make such statements. Apart from it being commonsense, I accept the evidence of Detective Senior Constable McQualter in this regard. Similarly, the LEAP report contains information, presumably compiled by an officer of VP, which in turn refers, at least in part, to material obtained from potential witnesses. Again, potential witnesses may be reluctant to convey information if it is known that a report containing it can be released.
11. In summary, it seems to me that the release of the information contained in either document would be reasonably likely to impair the ability of VP to obtain similar information in the future.
12. I might add that I accept the argument that a document does not have to be marked "confidential" in order to achieve the status of containing information communicated in confidence. Various persons have provided information to VP. They object to the release of that information. Persons making a complaint to VP have, as a matter of common sense, every right to believe that the information which they pass on is given in confidence.
13. I have already commented in relation to s.50(4). I have also expressed the view that, pursuant to s.35(1)(b), disclosure of the information contained in the documents would be contrary to the public interest. Accordingly, I am not of the view that the public interest override would operate such as to overcome the exemption that has otherwise been established.
14. I am reinforced in the conclusions to which I have arrived by the decision of Deputy President Coghlan in Biviano. Some of the relevant authorities are referred to in that decision.
15. I am not of the view that the documents in question should be released following the process of deletion set out in s.25 of the Act. In relation to the LEAP report, selected sections relating solely to Williams have already been released to her. To release the balance in an edited form would not be practicable. The removal, for example, of any names and the releasing of the balance would still mean that a considerable amount of information would be released which would be reasonably likely to prejudice the investigation. The same can be said of the witness statement. In addition, to the trained eye, the identity of those whose names had been removed could well be discerned. By the time all exempt material had been deleted from the documents, the balance would be meaningless.
16. In conclusion, VP succeeds in relation to each exemption claimed in relation to these two documents, although, as stated, it was probably not necessary for me to move beyond the first exemption successfully established. The decision of the Respondent, Victoria Police, of 23rd August 2006 is affirmed. The application of the Applicant, Kaye Williams, is dismissed.