30 In his written statement Senior Sergeant Weller said that he considered the information he gave his superior was highly confidential. In his viva voce evidence he told the Tribunal that the rationale for the documents was that Halloran would know that, were the applicant to return to his unit, there were concerns about her, and Weller asserted all of those concerns were legitimate management concerns. He said that the document was designed for Halloran's knowledge only and it certainly was not intended for the applicant's personnel file. I accept that the information was provided in confidence. But of course, that alone is not enough to avail the respondent of the exemption. For it to apply, it must be shown that disclosure would be reasonably likely to impair the agency's ability to obtain similar information in the future.
31 Sergeant Weller did not say in his evidence that were these documents to be released, he would not provide similar information in the future.
32 Superintendent Maclean in his written statement expressed the view that, in his opinion, disclosure would create a general reluctance in members, through fear of repercussions, fully and frankly to communicate their views and thereby impede an effective resolution of this type of disputation.
33 It was his view that Senior Sergeant Weller's views were expressed in a very candid and forthright manner and were not intended for wider dissemination. Whether or not that was his intention, they have had a quite an airing already. At the very least they have been seen by officers Halloran, Maclean and Buckle, by staff at the Ombudsman's office, by members of ESD, by Assistant Commissioner Shuey, by Mr Chettle of senior counsel and presumably by his instructing solicitors Kenna Croxford. In addition, part of the context of the documents was aired in cross-examination in the open court proceedings referred to earlier.
34 The force (along with all public sector agencies) has processes for dealing with unsatisfactory performance and these processes have, according to the evidence before me, operated satisfactorily for decades. There was no evidence to suggest that, for instance, in the formal performance review process, that is, a transparent review process, superior officers felt constrained in expressing views about the performance of their subordinates. And that absence of constraint is of course consistent with the oath taken by all police officers to serve "without favour or affection malice or ill-will".(See Police Regulation Act 1958)
35 The "full and frank" argument has been the subject of consideration for years and in most cases has been found to be a less than compelling argument. And so it is less than compelling in this case. There may be many circumstances where the need for confidential dissemination of information between police officers will attract the full force of the "frankness and candour" argument and thus the applicable exemption, but this is not one of them. However (as an aside) it is to be hoped that the unique circumstances of this case will not recur.
36 The Tribunal received no direct evidence that disclosure of these documents would be even remotely likely to impair the ability to obtain similar information in the future. Superintendent Maclean's evidence did not persuade me there would be any impairment to the force's ability to obtain such information. There may be some constraint as he suggested but that is not what is required by s 35(1)(b) - there must be a reasonable likelihood of impaired ability. To my mind officers of Victoria Police are a robust group of individuals not easily cowed by threats of disclosure and that was certainly the impression I took from the officers who gave evidence before me.
37 Because I am not persuaded there will be any impairment to the provision of similar information in the future it follows that I am not persuaded that the section 35 exemption is made out.
38 That takes me to the exemptions claimed pursuant to sections 33 and 38. Counsel for the applicant informed the Tribunal that the applicant does not seek the identity of persons referred to in the document, nor does she seek any information that would identify others or infringe what I will generally call "whistleblower" legislation. That concession relieves the Tribunal of its obligation to consider the effect of s 33(3) of the Act.
39 The applicant's counsel had the opportunity at the commencement of proceedings to inspect the documents (subject to the usual undertakings as to confidentiality) and he did not make any submissions concerning the deletion of any information that was personal to the applicant. As a result I have made deletions from the documents of names and events or descriptions that would be likely to identify all persons other than the applicant.
40 The order I will make is that at the expiration of 30 days, the respondent is to release the documents in the form as edited by the Tribunal and now provided to the respondent.