Watson v Commissioner of Taxation [2025] FCA 1438

1. These proceedings came before the Court on 26 September 2025 on an interlocutory application filed by the respondent, the Commissioner of Taxation, on 27 June 2025. The Commissioner sought the following orders:
   1. That the Applicant's Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 29 July 2024 be struck out in whole pursuant to r 16.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) on the basis that it does not disclose any question of law for the purposes of the former s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) or s 172 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth).
   2. In the alternative, that the Applicant's Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 29 July 2024 be dismissed as not competent, pursuant to r 33.30, r 33.32 and/or r 16.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
   3. That the Applicant pay the Respondent's costs.

1. Before considering the Commissioner's strike out/dismissal application, it is useful to set out the background to the proceedings in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT or Tribunal) and in this Court.

1. On 19 September 2018, the Australian Tax Office issued a default and penalty assessment to Mr Watson for the 2017 income year, and provided reasons for its decision.
2. On 26 April 2021, Mr Watson lodged an objection to the default and penalty assessment for the 2017 income year.
3. On 30 July 2021, the Australian Tax Office finalised its decision regarding Mr Watson's objections. The objections were disallowed.
4. On 5 October 2021, Mr Watson filed an application to review the objection decision in the AAT, and on 13 May 2022, he lodged a second application for review of an objection decision dated 12 May 2022 in the AAT.
5. Both applications for review were joined in the same proceedings (AAT File Numbers 2021/7221; 2022/3888).
6. On 22 November 2022, the parties attended a conciliation conference before an AAT Conference Registrar (November Conference). There is a slight contest between Mr Watson and the Commissioner as to whether this conference was by video or telephone, but nothing turns on this.
7. On 25 November 2022, Mr Watson emailed the AAT, copying in the Commissioner's representative, stating that he wanted to withdraw his application. It was not in dispute that this email was written for Mr Watson by his bookkeeper, Ms Helen Preketes. The email began:

"I would like to advise the Tribunal I want to withdraw my application."

1. The email expressed the reasons for withdrawing the application, stating:

"They [the conference facilitator and the Commissioner's representative] keep referring back to a deal which made me feel very uncomfortable and I feel that the ATO was very prejudiced against me. I feel that there will not be a fair trial with this matter.

...

This is why I am withdrawing today as I now know what the outcome is going to be."

1. The AAT dismissed the applications for review and notified the Commissioner in a letter dated 28 November 2022, stating that the application was "dismissed with effective date of 25 November 2022".
2. On 29 November 2022, a few days after he had withdrawn his application, Mr Watson emailed the AAT requesting that his application be reinstated. The Commissioner opposed the reinstatement application and provided written reasons to the Deputy Registrar.
3. The first reinstatement hearing was held on 28 February 2023; however, Mr Watson did not appear. He advised the AAT and the Commissioner's representative on 2 and 3 March 2023 that he had not attended because he had had trouble logging in and had been in hospital for several days. He provided a hospital discharge report dated 23 February 2023 in support of this explanation.
4. A second reinstatement hearing was held on 6 April 2023. Mr Watson was directed to file a detailed medical report by 20 April 2023 regarding his illness to assist the AAT in determining whether the earlier proceedings had been dismissed in error. In particular, the Deputy President specified that the report should consider whether Mr Watson's medical or mental health challenges impaired his judgment at the time he made the decision to withdraw his application.
5. On 18 May 2023, Mr Watson emailed the AAT and Commissioner a number of documents related to his medical condition. The documents did not include the medical report contemplated above.
6. A third reinstatement hearing was held on 19 May 2023, and Mr Watson was advised that he had failed to provide important evidence to assist the AAT in deciding whether the earlier proceedings had been dismissed in error. Mr Watson requested a further adjournment, noting that he had an appointment in the coming days with a specialist whom he expected would be able to provide the report. The AAT agreed to a further adjournment, and the Associate to the Deputy President reminded Mr Watson of the nature of the medical evidence that was required, stating in an email:

"The Deputy President has also asked me to remind you that the question [the treating specialist] needs to answer, or that need be addressed by the report, is whether your medical conditions were capable of making you prone to outbursts that affected your judgment around November 2022."

1. A fourth reinstatement hearing was listed for 10 August 2023, but was adjourned to give Mr Watson further time to provide the requested medical report.
2. A fifth reinstatement hearing was listed for 26 September 2023, but was vacated as Mr Watson was in distress and unable to attend. A few weeks later, Mr Watson emailed the AAT a number of documents related to his medical condition, but the documents did not include the requested report.
3. A sixth reinstatement hearing was listed for 19 October 2023. On that day, Mr Watson requested that the hearing be adjourned until 26 October 2023 to allow him to see his treating general practitioner. The adjournment was granted, and it was agreed that Mr Watson could attend the reinstatement hearing on 26 October 2023 via video link with his doctor at the time of the appointment.
4. In the afternoon of the 26 October 2023, Mr Watson wrote to the AAT requesting another adjournment. He stated that his doctor had unexpectedly changed the appointment to the morning. In his reasons, the Deputy President noted that he "understood the doctor was not willing (or felt unable) to provide evidence in these proceedings". At the appointment, his doctor had referred him to see a treating specialist on 13 November 2023. The AAT advised Mr Watson that the hearing would proceed at 3 pm that day.
5. At the seventh reinstatement hearing on 26 October 2023, Mr Watson appeared and requested a further adjournment in order to see the treating specialist to whom he had been referred. The Tribunal did not agree to the requested adjournment.
6. On 8 November 2023, the Deputy President made a decision to refuse the application for reinstatement and gave reasons (AAT Decision).

1. On 17 December 2023, Mr Watson filed an application for an extension of time to appeal from the AAT Decision and a supporting affidavit, thereby commencing these proceedings in this Court. Mr Watson also provided a draft notice of appeal dated 8 December 2023 to the Court, which was received on 17 December 2023, but was not accepted for filing.
2. The Commissioner did not oppose Mr Watson's application for an extension of time in which to file his appeal but foreshadowed that he would object to the competency of the appeal.
3. The first case management hearing was held on 8 March 2024 before Bromwich J, who was then docket Judge. His Honour made orders to extend the time for Mr Watson to file and serve the notice of appeal, and set down a timetable to determine the Commissioner's objection to the competency of the appeal.
4. On 15 March 2024, Mr Watson filed a notice of appeal dated 15 March 2024, a different document to the draft notice of appeal dated 8 December 2023, and a supporting affidavit.
5. On 22 March 2024, the Commissioner filed a notice of objection to competency of the appeal, addressed to the draft notice of appeal and the notice of appeal.
6. At an interlocutory hearing on 24 May 2024, Bromwich J made orders that the notice of appeal be struck out and granted Mr Watson leave to file an amended notice of appeal, and indicated via a notation to the orders that the draft notice of appeal was not pressed.
7. Between 24 May 2024 and 29 July 2024, orders were made on four separate occasions allowing Mr Watson an extension of time to file an amended notice of appeal.
8. The matter was allocated to my docket in July 2024. On 29 July 2024, Mr Watson filed an amended notice of appeal.

Interlocutory Application for strike out or dismissal

1. These reasons concern the Commissioner's application that the amended notice of appeal be struck out, or dismissed as not competent, on the basis that it does not disclose any question of law. In its submissions, the Commissioner noted that the strike out/dismissal application was similar to the notice of objection to competency filed in March of 2024, and indicated that it would rely on some materials filed in the objection to competency application in support of the strike out/dismissal application. This is appropriate given that the amended notice of appeal was identical to the notice of appeal save for the following differences:

(a) The last sentence in the third introductory paragraph has been deleted; that sentence had read, "They bullied and intimidated me"; and

(b) A new heading, "Reasons", and five enumerated paragraphs have been inserted before the "Questions of law" heading. Those five paragraphs seek to explain that Mr Watson was suffering from a medical episode when he withdrew his AAT application and that he was not competent at the time.

1. As indicated above, in December 2023, Mr Watson brought an appeal against the AAT Decision. This appeal was brought under section 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act).
2. It should be noted that prayer 1 of the strike out/dismissal application sought relief on the basis that the amended notice of appeal does not disclose any question of law for the purposes of the former s 44 of the AAT Act, or s 172 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (ART Act).
3. In opening submissions, Ms Gatland, counsel for the Commissioner, indicated that the equivalent provision in the ART Act, s 172, did not apply here as the appeal was brought before the relevant date under the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth) (ART Transitional Act).
4. Ms Gatland referred to Item 23 to Schedule 16 of the ART Transitional Act, which provides that:

Applications to courts

(1) This item applies if, immediately before the transition time, a party to a proceeding before the AAT was entitled to appeal or make an application to a court in relation to a decision in the proceeding.

...

(3) For the purposes of the appeal or application, anything the court could have done in relation to the AAT before the transition time may be done in relation to the ART.

1. The "relevant date" or "transition time" is 14 October 2024, being the date that the ART Act commenced. Mr Watson was entitled to appeal or make an application to a court in relation to the AAT Decision before 14 October 2024, therefore I accept the Commissioner's submission that the relevant section is s 44 of the AAT Act.

Appeal on question of law

(1) A party to a proceeding before the Tribunal may appeal to the Federal Court of Australia, on a question of law, from any decision of the Tribunal in that proceeding.

1. The scope of the appeal is confined to the questions of law raised: Haritos v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 233 FCR 315; [2015] FCAFC 92 at [62].
2. The Commissioner makes two main contentions in support of the strike out/dismissal application.
3. Firstly, that the amended notice of appeal, when considered as a whole and on the basis of substance over form, cannot be said to raise a question of law as required by s 44(1) of the AAT Act, as illustrated in Palassis v Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCA 1305 and more recently, Onassys v Comcare [2022] FCA 90.
4. Secondly, should the Court find that the appeal has not been brought on a question of law, then Mr Watson, having had ample opportunity to reformulate the grounds of the appeal, and having failed to make out any grounds which might disclose a question of law, should have his appeal summarily dismissed.

Whether the amended notice of appeal raises a question of law in substance

1. An appeal brought under s 44 of the AAT Act must be brought on a question of law. As the Court observed in Palassis at [29]-[30]:

As has been noted many times, the provision limits appeals to this Court to an appeal 'on a question of law' which is narrower than an appeal that 'involves a question of law': Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs [2008] FCAFC 128; (2008) 169 FCR 241 (at [31]). The requirement of a 'question of law' is not merely a qualifying condition to ground an appeal but is the 'sole subject matter' of the appeal: Brown v Repatriation Commission (1985) 7 FCR 302 (at 304).

It is well established that the role of the Court is not to conduct a merits review. It is not at liberty to find the facts on which a question of law might emerge. Therefore, merely asserting that the Tribunal erred in law in making a particular finding does not elevate a factual finding to a question of law: Australian Telecommunications Corp v Lambroglou (1990) 12 AAR 515, see also Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relation v Ergin [2010] FCA 1438; (2010) 54 AAR 60. Further, an assertion that the findings are against the weight of the evidence is not a question of law: Collins v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1981] FCA 147; (1981) 58 FLR 407 (at 410-411).

(original emphasis)

1. The content and form of a notice of appeal are regulated by r 33.12 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The purpose of that rule was described in Onassys at [14] in the following terms:

The end to be sought by r 33.12(2)(b) is to have the question of law stated with sufficient precision: Haritos v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92; (2015) 233 FCR 315 (Haritos) at [91]. The provision, together with s 44 of the AAT Act, is intended to inject a sense of discipline and precision into the applicant's formulation of the question of law to be determined by the Court: Perry v Comcare [2006] FCA 33; (2006) 150 FCR 319 at [29]. The reason that the notice of appeal must specify the question of law with precision is that an appeal under s 44 of the AAT Act must be on a question of law and the scope of the appeal is confined to the question of law raised: Haritos at [62]. The function of the requirement in r 33.12(2)(e) is different to r 33.12(2)(b), and is namely to "indicate how the appellant relies on the stated questions of law to support the orders sought on appeal": Delis v Tax Practitioners Board [2016] FCA 570 at [25], citing Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Saxby Bridge Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 244; (2003) 133 FCR 290 at [47]; Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice (No 2) [2010] HCA 24; (2010) 241 CLR 320 (Osland (No 2)) at [21]. I note that non-compliance with r 33.12(2) is not determinative of whether the appeal is competent: Berry v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 1244 at [29].

1. Although the Commissioner noted that the amended notice of appeal does not conform to the requirements in r 33.12, he did not complain about strict compliance with that rule, as compliance with the form does not determine whether an appeal is competent: Berry v Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 149 ALR 270; [2015] FCA 1244 at [29].
2. In the amended notice of appeal under the heading "Reasons", Mr Watson set out his concerns regarding his health at the time of the email withdrawing his application. He noted that he suffered from diabetes and other medical conditions, and that he had provided a medical certificate to the Tribunal but "it wasn't correctly considered".
3. The grounds that Mr Watson relied upon in his amended notice of appeal appeared under the heading, "Questions of law". These were:
   1. Natural Justice and Procedural Fairness: The AAT is bound by the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness. This means that all parties should have a fair opportunity to present their case and respond to evidence against them. If [Mr Watson] believes the failure to consider the medical certificate or to allow cross-examination of the doctor violated these principles, this could be a basis for challenging the AAT's decision.
   2. Evidence and the Discretion of the Tribunal: Under sections 33(1) and 33(1B) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, the AAT has broad discretion to determine the procedures to be followed in its reviews, including what evidence it accepts and the weight given to that evidence. The Tribunal is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence that apply in courts. However, its decisions on evidentiary matters must still adhere to principles of fairness and relevance.
   3. Denial of Cross-Examination Rights. The refusal by the AAT to allow for the cross-examination of the medical professional who issued the medical certificate undermines the fundamental principles of procedural fairness and natural justice, impacting the applicant's ability to challenge and clarify the evidence presented.
4. The Commissioner relied on Onassys, noting that the respondent was a model litigant. It adopted a substance over form approach to determine whether the notice of appeal raised issues that are "capable, in theory, of constituting questions of law for the purposes of s 44(1) of the AAT Act": at [36].
5. It should be noted that at the time the Commissioner filed written submissions to the interlocutory application, Mr Watson had not yet filed his submissions. Accordingly, the Commissioner had regard to the entirety of Mr Watson's notices of appeal and submitted that they suggested the following questions of law, reformulated as below:

(a) The Tribunal failed to afford Mr Watson procedural fairness by not allowing him to explain his reasons for the withdrawal of his application. (Reformulated Ground A)

(b) The Tribunal based its decision on findings for which there was no evidence. (Reformulated Ground B)

(c) The Tribunal failed to afford Mr Watson procedural fairness by refusing to adjourn the reinstatement hearing on a further occasion in order to allow him to adduce medical evidence to explain the reasons for the withdrawal of his application. (Reformulated Ground C)

1. Instead of filing submissions, Mr Watson filed a document setting out "Questions of Law" and "Grounds of Appeal" (the 19 September grounds). The Commissioner was prepared to regard the 19 September grounds as a final reformulation of the amended grounds of appeal, and submitted that the new questions in that document were a further reformulation of those in the amended notice of appeal. The terms of the 19 September grounds were phrased slightly differently, but the themes remained that the Tribunal did not give proper consideration to medical evidence, denied him procedural fairness, and that the decision was legally unreasonable.
2. I asked the parties to address the 19 September grounds, and indicated that I would consider whether to grant leave to amend based on the prospects of success of that document. I have taken into account the 19 September grounds, and both the Commissioner's oral submissions and Mr Watson's submissions in reply, and note that neither party contended that he was prejudiced by the hearing proceeding in this way.

Whether the amended notice of appeal should be struck out or dismissed as not competent

1. The Commissioner seeks relief pursuant to r 16.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) that the amended notice of appeal be struck out in whole on the basis that it does not disclose any question of law as required by s 44(1) of the AAT Act.
2. The Commissioner submitted, fairly, that the grounds as reformulated could amount to questions of law; however, it was submitted that the notice of appeal does not raise "an arguable basis upon which these questions could arise". The Commissioner referred to Nelson v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] FCAFC 163; [2014] 144 ALD 512 (Greenwood, Rares and Davies JJ) at [10] where the Court said that "if the questions, properly analysed, are not questions of law, the appeal is not competent. The form of their expression does not turn them into questions of law". See also Haritos at [92].
3. Reformulated Grounds A and C raise issues of a failure to provide Mr Watson procedural fairness. The test, as set out in Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 569 (Gibbs CJ), 585 (Mason J), 615 and 629 (Brennan J), is that the Tribunal must provide Mr Watson with the chance to understand what was being put against him and give him the opportunity to respond.
4. The Commissioner submitted that the 19 September grounds did not, in essence, deviate from the grounds in the amended notice of appeal, and analysed each of them as falling within the same line of argument as the reformulated grounds. It was submitted that no question of law, in substance, arises in relation to the 19 September grounds.
5. The Commissioner pointed to the fact that the reinstatement application was listed on no less than six different occasions before it was dismissed on the seventh. After the third, in May 2023, the Tribunal sought to ensure that Mr Watson was aware of what was required, and the Deputy President took the unusual step of having his Associate contact the applicant to restate the nature of the medical evidence required. It should be recalled that the medical evidence needed was medial evidence at the time of the withdrawal, not general evidence as to ill-health. The proceedings were adjourned to accommodate Mr Watson's difficulties with his health, and the Commissioner submitted that this was to facilitate Mr Watson's participation in the reinstatement hearing.
6. As to Reformulated Ground B, the Commissioner submitted that the best way of regarding this ground was that "it suggests that the Tribunal's decision was made without recourse to the evidence". The Commissioner suggests that this is, in truth, a complaint that the decision was legally unreasonable because it was illogical or irrational, and cited Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21; [2022] FCAFC 3 at [29].
7. Reliance was placed on the statement of the Full Court in Djokovic at [35]:

Ultimately, the question is whether the satisfaction of the relevant state of affairs or matter was irrational, illogical or not based on findings or inferences of fact supported by logical grounds: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; 207 ALR 12 at 20-21 [38]; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; 198 ALR 59 at 71 [52] and 98 [173], such that it cannot be said to be possible for the conclusion to be made or the satisfaction reached logically or rationally on the available material. It will then satisfy the characterisation of unjust, arbitrary or capricious.

1. The Commissioner submitted that the Tribunal considered the evidence before it, albeit that evidence was scant, and that after providing him with several opportunities to present his evidence, was not acting unreasonably or without regard to the matters before it in dismissing the claim, and that no question of law arises in substance. The 19 September grounds make explicit the reliance on legal unreasonableness and cite the passage above in Djokovic and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158; [2016] FCAFC 28 at [65].

1. Mr Watson has not been legally represented at any time before the AAT, nor has he been represented, to date, before this Court. He noted that he was unable to read or write and asked me to take that into account. As a result I asked Ms Gatland to make full oral submissions despite having received written submissions in accordance with previous directions.
2. Mr Watson disclosed to the Court that he had formulated his new grounds using generative AI (being ChatGPT). Despite this, there were no hallucinations in the references to cases provided.
3. Mr Watson made wide-ranging oral submissions which covered the fact that he was unable to read, that the Tribunal was asking for medical evidence which it "... knew very well [he] couldn't provide", that he had mental and physical disabilities which prevented him from engaging with the Tribunal proceedings from time to time, and that a solicitor had lost his documents which were critical to him demonstrating that he did not owe the tax the subject of the Commissioner's assessment. In answer to a question from the Bench, he said that he did not agree that he had been given procedural fairness because:

... one, I have a disadvantage because I can't read, two, I have a mental health issue, and three, I have diabetes.

1. In particular, Mr Watson relied on the fact that he is unable to read and did not himself write the email withdrawing the application. He said that the Tribunal did not take that into account. He said that Ms Preketes gave evidence at the Tribunal hearing and submitted that, as "she's not here [at the hearing of the interlocutory application] to be cross-examined", I could not take what was said into account.
2. He sought to characterise the dismissal of the proceedings as a result of both his inability to read, and to Ms Preketes writing the email withdrawing his application in her own, rather than in his, best interests. The allegation that Ms Preketes was on a frolic of her own is inconsistent with his contentions that the matter was indeed withdrawn for the reasons given in the email (i.e. the mediator and the ATO, he felt, having bullied him). I also note that his appeal grounds which - however formulated - do not reflect the contention, raised in submissions before me, that the withdrawal email was not only written by someone else but not at his instruction.
3. As to the medical evidence, Mr Watson expressed at various times that his GP was not able to provide him with the required evidence, and that he could not attend a specialist appointment because of the cost. He further submitted that he should have been able to bring in other evidence such as 000 calls, and police and hospital records. He submitted that he was unable to get the medical evidence needed because:

... I can't tell a doctor what to write. I can tell him what the issues are, and he has to decide what he's going to write. I can't force him to write anything that he doesn't want to write. And that's all he provided me.

Later Mr Watson said that he relayed the Associate's indication of the required evidence back to his GP, and said:

I asked him, and he said I will provide what I need to, and I can write what I feel is right, but I can't write something that I don't feel is right ... Because he said I'm not a expert in diabetes.

1. Mr Watson noted that the Tribunal did not deal with the fact that he could not read, and submitted that the ATO and the Tribunal were both aware of that fact.

1. The Tribunal undertook the exercise of attempting to give Mr Watson the opportunity to fit, as it were, into s 42A of the AAT Act, which gives only limited grounds for applications withdrawn to be reinstated. The ground which is found in s 42A(10) is that the proceedings were "dismissed in error". At paragraph 10 of the Tribunal's reasons, the Deputy President took into account Mr Watson's contention that he had "medical or mental health challenges ... at the time he made the decision to withdraw", and advised Mr Watson that if he could obtain some medical evidence to this effect, then the Tribunal could consider whether the proceedings were "withdrawn in error".
2. Mr Watson agreed, as set out above, that he understood the requirements for the medical evidence, but it seems that his GP was unwilling or unable to provide that evidence. The last reinstatement hearing - the seventh - had been scheduled to coincide with the GP's appointment, but the time of the GP's appointment was changed unilaterally. However, as Mr Watson admitted, the evidence from that doctor was not what was required.
3. Despite the lack of specific medical evidence, the Tribunal member accepted that he suffered from diabetes with spikes in blood sugar, mental health challenges and "other difficult personal circumstances that make a review process particularly difficult to manage" (possibly a reference to him being unable to read, but unclear if so). There were adjournments for medical and other reasons, and an express acceptance of the barriers to Mr Watson's effective presentation of his case.
4. The Commissioner's submissions that there was no arguable basis for any ground alleging that Mr Watson did not receive procedural fairness are not based on the mere number of occasions on which the reinstatement application was relisted, although that number is large. They were based upon the care which the Tribunal took to ensure that Mr Watson understood the kind of evidence that it needed to consider, including the reminder by the Deputy President's Associate as to the evidence required, which Mr Watson agreed he understood and passed on to his doctor. As Mr Watson is unable to point to a matter of substance which is fairly arguable, his formulations of a lack of procedural fairness do not amount to a question of law which invokes the jurisdiction of this Court to proceed to determine the appeal.
5. Similarly, in relation to legal unreasonableness or a failure to engage with the evidence, the matters pointed to by Mr Watson do not reach the standard of the Full Court in Djokovic in that it cannot be said that the conclusion to dismiss the application to reinstate was not possible to reach on logical or rational grounds. As noted by the Tribunal member, it was not immediately obvious to apply the test of "dismissed in error" to what appeared to be a change of mind on the part of Mr Watson, and the numerous relistings sought to establish whether he could make out a ground of medical reasons for the original email withdrawing his application.
6. The evidence brought by Mr Watson was scant, but the Tribunal did take it into account, and the decision to dismiss the application on the basis of insufficient evidence cannot be said to be illogical or irrational.
7. Mr Watson now contends that he did not instruct Ms Preketes to withdraw his appeal. This is not reflected in any of the grounds that he has brought before the Court to date. The Deputy President's reasons at paragraph 27 also reflect that this was not raised before the Tribunal.
8. Accordingly, I will order that the proceedings be struck out as not disclosing any question of law for the purposes of s 44 of the former AAT Act.
9. As the proceedings do not disclose any question of law, I do not need to determine whether they are not competent as sought in prayer 2 of the Interlocutory Application.

The relevance of Mr Watson being unable to read

1. Mr Watson mentioned, at least 15 times in the transcript, that he was unable to read. However, this was not something raised in clear terms previously, unless the reference noted at [68] above is such a reference.
2. The notice of appeal, amended notice of appeal, and the 19 September grounds all cited the Tribunal's failure to consider Mr Watson's medical evidence at the time of the withdrawal as a denial of procedural fairness. In particular, the 19 September grounds state that the Tribunal denied Mr Watson procedural fairness by "failing to properly consider and weigh medical evidence relevant to the Appellant's ability to participate in the proceedings". While evidence of Mr Watson's ability to participate in the proceedings may cover his inability to read, it is not stated anywhere in the grounds of appeal that the medical evidence was relevant to this. Accordingly, I am of the view that his inability to read had no bearing on the way in which the Tribunal dealt with the evidence nor on the way the ATO conducted itself at the hearing.
3. This finding is relevant because after I reserved my decision in this case, Mr Watson sought to relist the matter on the grounds of amending an issue as to the dates of the AAT applications, and seeking to prove that the ATO knew that he was unable to read. The dates of the AAT applications are not a matter which can be taken into consideration on this application. Given that I have, as set out above, not accepted that his ability to read was a relevant factor, but instead the decisions turned on the lack of medical evidence provided by Mr Watson, I declined to relist the matter.

1. For the reasons stated above, I am satisfied that Mr Watson has been given a meaningful opportunity to amend his pleading and that the amended notice of appeal does not raise a question of law as required by s 44(1) of the former AAT Act. Accordingly, the amended notice of appeal is struck out in whole, without leave to replead. It follows that the proceedings should be dismissed.
2. In the ordinary course, costs follow the event. The Commissioner should have its costs, having succeeded in full.

I certify that the preceding seventy-nine (79) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Needham.