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[2026] NSWSC 1155
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-10-02
Pike J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Waterhouse v Rothner (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 1155
Hearing dates: On the papers, last submissions 11 September 2026
Date of orders: 2 October 2026
Decision date: 02 October 2026
Jurisdiction: Equity - Real Property List
Before: Pike J
Decision: Final orders made – see paragraph [103]
Catchwords: COSTS — claim and cross-claim — mixed success — plaintiff succeeded on significant factual issue and obtained declaratory relief — plaintiff unsuccessful on contractual termination, possession and damages claims — first defendant established breach on cross-claim but failed to prove loss — broad brush apportionment appropriate — whether indemnity costs appropriate for false denial of allegations or unreasonable rejection of offer — late submitting appearance did not insulate second defendant from costs — costs of abandoned relief excluded — reopening applications
Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 98
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 6.11, 42.1
Cases Cited: Colgate Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225; [1993] FCA 801
Doppstadt Australia Pty Ltd v Lovick & Son Developments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] NSWCA 219
Joudo v Joudo (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 469
Kisimul Holdings Pty Ltd v Clear Position Pty Ltd (No 2) (2014) 86 NSWLR 645; [2014] NSWCA 317
Lou v IAG Ltd (t/as NRMA Insurance) (2019) 101 NSWLR 606; [2019] NSWCA 319
Miwa Pty Ltd v Siantan Properties Pte Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 344
Waterhouse v Rothner [2026] NSWSC 937
Texts Cited: Nil
Category: Costs
Parties: David Waterhouse (Plaintiff)
Michael Rothner (First Defendant)
Lisa Rothner (Second Defendant)
Al Shahwan (Fifth Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
F M Douglas KC / D Allen (Plaintiff)
S A Lawrance SC / C J Chiam (First Defendant)
D F Elliott (Second Defendant)
Solicitors:
Ad Valorem Law (Plaintiff)
Arnold Bloch Leibler (First Defendant)
Spectrum Legal Group (Second Defendant)
File Number(s): 2024/00208021
Publication restriction: Nil
I delivered judgment in these proceedings on 6 August 2026: Waterhouse v Rothner [2026] NSWSC 937 (Primary Judgment or PJ).
These reasons assume familiarity with, and maintain the same definitions and abbreviations as in, the Primary Judgment.
At PJ [541]-[544], I directed the parties to confer to seek to agree orders, including as to costs. Agreement was not reached. I have received written submissions in chief and reply from Mr Waterhouse and Mr Rothner, together with separate submissions in chief from Mrs Rothner and submissions in reply from Mr Waterhouse. Mr Shahwan did not provide submissions.
No party requested an oral hearing. The remaining issues can appropriately be determined on the papers.
There is substantial agreement concerning the declarations and the dismissal of the balance of the claim and cross-claim. Accordingly, the real controversy concerns costs.
For the reasons below, I have concluded that:
As between Mr Waterhouse and Mr Rothner, there should be no order as to the costs of Mr Waterhouse’s claim, to the intent that each bear their costs of that claim;
Mr Rothner should pay Mr Waterhouse’s costs of the cross-claim on the ordinary basis, as agreed or assessed;
Mrs Rothner should pay Mr Waterhouse’s costs of the claim as between them on the indemnity basis, excluding costs solely referable to the claims for relief in paragraphs 3, 10 and 11 of the second further amended statement of claim, as agreed or assessed.
Mr Shahwan should pay Mr Waterhouse’s costs of the claim between them on the indemnity basis, excluding costs solely referable to the issues abandoned on 13 November 2025; and
There should be no order as to the costs of the reopening applications, to the intent that Mr Waterhouse and Mr Rothner each bear their own costs of those applications.
Mr Waterhouse proposed seven declarations. Mr Rothner accepted that declarations in substantially those terms should be made. Furthermore, the parties agreed that each declaration should be separately prefaced with the words “the Court declares”.
Mr Waterhouse also accepted Mr Rothner’s submissions that the word “caused” in the proposed declaration concerning Mr Rothner should be replaced by “authorised”. That change aligns with the findings I made at PJ [297] and [303]-[307].
The declarations set out at the conclusion of these reasons reflect those matters.
It is also agreed that the Second Further Amended Statement of Claim should otherwise be dismissed.
Mr Rothner accepts that his Amended Statement of First Cross-Claim should be dismissed.
Section 98 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (CPA) provides that costs are in the discretion of the Court. Rule 42.1 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) provides that, if the Court makes an order as to costs, costs are to follow the event unless it appears that some other order should be made.
The identification of the relevant event is not always straightforward. Depending on the nature of the litigation, the event may be identified by reference to the practical result of a claim or cross-claim. Where there are multiple issues, the Court does not ordinarily attempt to differentiate between every issue on which a party succeeded or failed. A different order may be appropriate where an issue was dominant or separable, or where the unsuccessful issues occupied a significant part of the hearing: Doppstadt Australia Pty Ltd v Lovick & Son Developments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] NSWCA 219 at [14]-[19].
Where the outcome is properly characterised as mixed, any apportionment is undertaken on a broad brush basis. This exercise does not involve mathematical precision but rather is one of impression and evaluation.
Costs on the indemnity basis may be ordered where a party’s conduct takes the case outside the ordinary course. The circumstances identified in Colgate Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 at 233-234; [1993] FCA 801 are not closed. They include the maintenance of allegations known to be false and the unreasonable rejection of a prudent offer of compromise.
In considering the first of those circumstances, it is necessary to distinguish a case which is not accepted, including because the Court does not accept a party’s evidence, and a case which the party knew to be false and deliberately advanced as such. However, it is to be noted that, an adverse finding on credit does not, without more, establish the latter.
Furthermore, rejection of a Calderbank offer does not create a presumption that indemnity costs should be ordered. The offeror must establish that the offer was genuine and capable of acceptance and that its rejection was unreasonable in all the circumstances: Joudo v Joudo (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 469 at [12]–[15].
Relevant considerations include the stage at which the offer was made, the time allowed for its consideration, the extent of the compromise, the offeree’s prospects of success as then understood, the clarity of the terms and whether an application for indemnity costs was foreshadowed: Miwa Pty Ltd v Siantan Properties Pte Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 344 at [12].
Unreasonableness is assessed when the offer is made, and not with the benefit of hindsight arising from the judgment.
Rule 6.11 of the UCPR does not prescribe the costs consequences of a submitting appearance. The question remains one for the exercise of the discretion under s 98 of the CPA. A submitting appearance may be highly relevant, but it does not necessarily insulate a party whose conduct made the proceedings necessary or who maintained a genuinely adversarial position before submitting: Kisimul Holdings Pty Ltd v Clear Position Pty Ltd (No 2) (2014) 86 NSWLR 645; [2014] NSWCA 317 at [14], [19] (Kisimul); Lou v IAG Ltd (t/as NRMA Insurance) (2019) 101 NSWLR 606; [2019] NSWCA 319 at [41]-[43].
Mr Waterhouse sought an order that Mr Rothner pay his costs of the proceedings on the indemnity basis. Alternatively, he sought ordinary costs up to and including 6 May 2025 and indemnity costs from 7 May 2025.
Mr Waterhouse relied on two independent grounds for indemnity costs: (i) Mr Rothner maintained a denial of involvement in the removal of the trees which he knew to be false; and (ii) Mr Rothner unreasonably rejected the Calderbank offer made on 6 May 2025, as subsequently extended, and the later offer of 24 October 2025.
Mr Rothner contended that Mr Waterhouse should pay his costs of defending the plaintiff’s claim. He accepted that the cross-claim should be dismissed and that he should pay Mr Waterhouse’s costs of the cross-claim.
Mr Rothner further contended that each party should bear its own costs of the reopening applications.
If either of the bases advanced by Mr Waterhouse for indemnity costs is made out, that may substantially affect the cost orders which would otherwise follow from the parties’ respective success and failure. It is therefore useful to deal with those bases first, before turning to the ordinary exercise of the costs discretion.
Mr Waterhouse submits that Mr Rothner maintained a case which he knew to be false.
Mr Rothner pleaded and deposed that he was not involved in the trees being cut down and did not become aware of their removal until about 13 May 2024.
Those denials were rejected. I found that Mr Rothner authorised the removal. I also found that the works were carried out surreptitiously, that Mr Rothner took a keen interest in improving the view, that he was kept informed of the removal of trees on No 8 and that his denials were inconsistent with the contemporaneous communications: PJ [297]-[308].
There is some force in Mr Waterhouse’s submission that the finding that Mr Rothner authorised the removal of the trees cannot readily be reconciled with his pleaded and sworn denial of knowledge or involvement. The subject was notably within his knowledge.
I do not consider it necessary, however, to make a further finding for the purposes of costs that Mr Rothner deliberately advanced a case which he knew to be false. The Primary Judgment contains the findings which I considered necessary to resolve the issues before me, including my assessment of Mr Rothner as an unsatisfactory witness. The fact that his evidence on an important issue was rejected does not, without more, require the further conclusion that the case falls within the category of deliberate falsehood contemplated by the authorities concerning indemnity costs.
In any event, even if I were to proceed on the basis most favourable to Mr Waterhouse and assume that Mr Rothner knowingly maintained a false denial concerning his responsibility for the trees, I would not make the indemnity costs order sought. Specifically, an order that Mr Rothner pay the entirety of Mr Waterhouse’s costs of the proceedings on an indemnity basis. This is because the postulated false denial only went to one of the issues litigated.
The proceedings raised a significant number of issues including of contractual construction, rectification, relief against forfeiture, mesne profits and the issues on the cross-claim. Mr Waterhouse was successful in establishing that Mr Rothner authorised the removal of the trees but otherwise failed in his damages claim.
While the issue of responsibility for the removal of the trees was important and occupied a not insubstantial part of the proceedings, it certainly did not occupy the entirety of the proceedings. Even if Mr Rothner admitted responsibility, substantial issues would have remained concerning the legal effects of the removal of the trees. Mr Waterhouse lost on those issues. The removal of the trees was not relevant to the cross claim.
Therefore, I am not satisfied that Mr Rothner’s unsuccessful denial provides a proper basis for an order that he pay the entirety of the costs of the proceedings, or any general class of those costs, on the indemnity basis. Mr Waterhouse’s success on that issue is instead relevant to the ordinary costs discretion considered below.
On 30 April 2025, Mr Rothner made an offer, which was purported to also be on behalf of Mrs Rothner and Mr Shahwan.
Among other matters, that offer proposed a reduction of $3 million in the purchase price, dismissal of the claim and cross-claim without an order as to costs, and mutual releases.
Mr Waterhouse responded by Calderbank letter dated 6 May 2025. The offer was initially open until 5 June 2025 and was extended on 4 June 2025 until 4pm on 5 July 2025.
In substance, Mr Waterhouse offered: (i) to complete the Contract without a reduction in the purchase price; (ii) not to interfere with the existing development applications; (iii) to discontinue the balance of his claim upon the making of declarations vindicating him in relation to the removal of the trees; (iv) to agree to dismissal of the cross-claim without an order as to its costs; and (v) to accept a minor amendment to the deed poll.
Mr Rothner contended that the letter was not an offer capable of his immediate acceptance, because the precise declarations remained to be agreed. I would not reject Mr Waterhouse’s reliance on the offer for that reason alone.
The letter identified the declaratory relief sought by reference to the pleaded declarations. Its invitation to Mr Rothner to propose an alternative formulation was capable of being understood as permitting the same substantive result to be expressed differently. That is, it was open to Mr Rothner to reformulate the declarations for Mr Waterhouse’s approval.
However, in my view, there was a more substantial difficulty with Mr Waterhouse’s reliance upon the offer.
Properly understood, the proposal was an offer to resolve the dispute between Mr Waterhouse and Mr Rothner. It was expressly stated as such. Mr Rothner’s acceptance could not by itself finally determine the position of Mrs Rothner or Mr Shahwan.
Further, if I assume in Mr Waterhouse’s favour that the offer was nonetheless sufficiently certain to be capable of acceptance so as to resolve the proceedings, I am not satisfied that, in the wash up, Mr Waterhouse has bettered the offer.
Mr Waterhouse succeeded in establishing that Mr Rothner authorised the removal of the trees. The declarations now to be made provide the public vindication that Mr Waterhouse identified as an important object of the proceedings.
However, that was not all that Mr Waterhouse sought. He failed on the contractual foundation of his claim. Clause 49(1)(c)(vii) did not extend to the acts on No 8: PJ [314]-[326]. Additionally, even if there had been a breach, it was rectified by the deed polls: PJ [345]-[378]. As a result, Mr Waterhouse was not entitled to terminate Mr Rothner’s occupation rights and his possession and monetary claims failed.
Mr Rothner, for his part, succeeded in establishing that Mr Waterhouse breached cl 50.1 of the Contract and the implied duty to cooperate: PJ [476]-[487]. However, he failed to establish that the breach caused him any loss: PJ [488]-[536]. His cross-claim was therefore dismissed.
The ultimate result thus bears a substantial resemblance to the position contemplated by the offer. Mr Waterhouse obtained vindicatory declaratory relief but failed to obtain the contractual possessory and monetary relief sought against Mr Rothner. Mr Rothner recovered nothing on his cross-claim. Neither party obtained the substantive monetary relief sought against the other.
I thus do not consider that Mr Waterhouse has established that he obtained a result sufficiently more favourable than the compromise proposed in May 2025 to bring the offer into play for indemnity costs purposes.
Further, viewed prospectively and having regard to the issues then remaining for determination, I am also not satisfied that Mr Rothner’s rejection of the 6 May 2025 offer, as extended to 5 July 2025, was unreasonable in the sense required to warrant indemnity costs. There were a number of contestable issues between the parties.
Mr Waterhouse also relied on the latter offer of 24 October 2025. That offer followed the mediation and subsequent discussions and proposed, among other matters, declaratory relief, an injunction, completion on 7 November 2025 with a discount of 0.25%, each party bearing their costs, and an indemnity in respect of any 2025 land tax liability.
The offer did not require Mr Rothner to discontinue his cross-claim, which he remained free to pursue. His acceptance of the offer would therefore not have brought the litigation between Mr Waterhouse and Mr Rothner to an end.
Further, when the offer was made, the position concerning the proposed land tax indemnity had not been resolved by the ruling of 11 November 2025 upon which Mr Waterhouse now relies.
The offer also included other matters which could not be achieved in the proceedings, including the early settlement of the sale at a discount.
In these circumstances, the offer was not a valid offer for costs purposes.
Accordingly, neither basis advanced by Mr Waterhouse justifies an order that Mr Rothner pay costs on the indemnity basis.
I do not accept either party’s attempt to characterise the result on Mr Waterhouse’s claim as an uncomplicated victory.
Mr Waterhouse succeeded on an important factual issue. I found that Mr Rothner authorised Mrs Rothner to remove the trees on No 8: PJ [297]-[308]. I rejected Mr Rothner’s repeated denials of knowledge or involvement. The declarations now to be made provide Mr Waterhouse with the public vindication that he identified as an important object of the proceedings.
That was not merely an incidental issue. It occupied a substantial part of the evidence and was important to the dispute between the parties.
The significance which Mr Waterhouse attached to that result is apparent from the terms upon which he was prepared to compromise the proceedings in May 2025. The declaratory relief was plainly important to him.
Nonetheless, Mr Waterhouse failed on the contractual foundation of his claim against Mr Rothner. Clause 49.1(c)(vii) did not extend to the acts of vandalism on No 8: PJ [345]-[378].
Therefore, Mr Waterhouse was not entitled to terminate Mr Rothner’s occupation rights. Consequently, his possession and monetary claims failed. Although I assessed hypothetical mesne profits at $256,430 plus interest, no damages were awarded.
Those were substantial aspects of the claim. Mr Waterhouse’s success on the factual question of responsibility for the trees, did not establish the breach of contract upon which his claims to possession and monetary relief depended.
As I observed at PJ [540], neither of the chief protagonists fared well. I made adverse credit findings in relation to both parties. While the removal of the trees may have opened up the view from the Property, the litigation has not produced a clear view of a real winner.
It would not be appropriate to simply order that Mr Waterhouse pay all of Mr Rothner’s costs of the claim. Such an order would fail to recognise Mr Waterhouse’s success on the factual dispute of whether Mr Rothner authorised the removal of the trees, reflected in the declaratory relief.
Nor would it be appropriate to order Mr Rothner to pay Mr Waterhouse’s costs of the claim. Such an order would fail to recognise that Mr Waterhouse’s contractual, possessory and monetary claims failed.
The issues were not sufficiently discrete to permit a satisfactory issue by issue costs order. The evidence concerning the parties’ conduct, credibility, the work at the Property and their contemporaneous communications bore upon several issues. Any attempt to assign particular witnesses or portions of the hearing to individual issues would involve excessive refinement.
Adopting a broad brush approach, I am satisfied that the appropriate order is that there be no order as to costs of Mr Waterhouse’s claim against Mr Rothner, to the intent that each bear their own costs of that claim.
That order reflects Mr Waterhouse’s success on the factual issue of removal of the trees and the declaratory relief, while recognising his failure on the contractual, possessory and monetary aspects of his claim.
The position on the cross-claim is more straightforward.
Mr Rothner succeeded in establishing that Mr Waterhouse breached cl 50.1 of the Contract and the implied duty to cooperate: PJ [476]-[536]. His cross-claim, however, which sought substantial damages, failed and is to be dismissed.
Mr Rothner accepts that he should pay Mr Waterhouse’s costs of the cross-claim. In those circumstances, it is unnecessary to undertake a further dissection of the individual issues upon which each party succeeded or failed. In my view, the practical event is clear. Mr Rothner established a breach but failed on causation and recovered nothing.
Mr Rothner should pay Mr Waterhouse’s costs of the cross-claim on the ordinary basis, as agreed or assessed.
Mrs Rothner submitted that there should be no order as to costs of the proceedings between her and Mr Waterhouse. Alternatively, she contended that any order should be confined to 10% of Mr Waterhouse’s costs.
Mrs Rothner relied on the abandonment, on the second day of the hearing, of the injunction and the declarations concerning an alleged agreement to blame Mr Waterhouse. She then filed a submitting appearance save as to costs.
It is appropriate to exclude any costs solely referable to the abandoned relief. That does not, however, justify depriving Mr Waterhouse of his costs of the claims on which he succeeded.
The remaining relief against Mrs Rothner was declaratory. Mr Waterhouse succeeded on that relief. I found that Mrs Rothner was the architect of the removal of the trees and that the declarations sought against her should be made PJ [537]-[539].
I do not accept that the declarations lacked practical utility merely because the Huang’s claim had settled. The evidence was that Mrs Rothner proposed that the removal be blamed on Mr Waterhouse: PJ [204(c)]. The declarations vindicate Mr Waterhouse against the person found responsible for proposing that course.
Mrs Rothner’s submitting appearance on day 2 of the hearing is relevant, but it does not justify an order that she bare no costs.
In Kisimul at [15]–[16], the Court (Beazley P, Barrett and Gleeson JJA) stated:
[15] In the present case, the appellant and the respondent were the only parties to the particular litigation. The appellant sued the respondent in the Equity Division and was unsuccessful. It then appealed and met with success. The litigation was not of a kind in which one party played a role akin to that of a tribunal or decision-maker having no vested interest. To the contrary, the respondent, by defending the Equity Division proceedings, strove to obtain the commercial benefit of a presumption of insolvency against the appellant and successfully resisted the appellant’s attempt to deny it that benefit. When the appellant later renewed that attempt in this Court, the respondent had at its disposal four possible responses: file an unqualified appearance and oppose the grant of the relief the appellant sought; consent to the grant of that relief; file a submitting appearance; or simply ignore the matter.
[16] The stance adopted by the respondent in this Court (the third possibility) did not relieve the appellant of the need to prove its case in this Court. That stance was the same, in that respect, as the fourth possibility. Only if the respondent had consented to the grant of the relief sought would the appellant have been relieved of that need.
(Emphasis added.)
The position of Mrs Rothner is relevantly indistinguishable to that of the respondent in Kisimul.
Mrs Rothner did not submit at the outset. The proceedings were commenced on 5 June 2024. She filed a defence denying involvement, served affidavits, participated in disclosure disputes, appeared by counsel at the view and on the first hearing day, and filed her submitting appearance only on the second day after Mr Waterhouse had prepared to meet her case.
The Primary Judgment records that Mrs Rothner took an active role in defending the proceedings until that time: PJ [15], [38].
It is true that, after filing the submitting appearance, Mrs Rothner did not participate further. That reduced the costs which might otherwise have been occurred. It does not erase the costs already occasioned by her defence nor relieve Mr Waterhouse of the need to prove his entitlement to declaratory relief against her.
The timing of the submitting appearance is important. By the time it was filed, the proceedings had been on foot for a substantial period and Mr Waterhouse had prepared to prove the factual case which Mrs Rothner had until then contested. Her subsequent decision not to participate further does not provide a sufficient basis for depriving Mr Waterhouse of the costs consequences on his success against her. Had she wished to do this, she should have consented to the declaratory relief at the outset of the case.
I have been provided with no rational basis, let alone evidence, as to the proposed limitation to 10% advanced by Mrs Rothner. The main factual issue was whether Mrs Rothner procured the removal of the trees. Mr Waterhouse was required to prove that case against her notwithstanding that substantially the same evidence was relevant to Mr Rothner.
Mr Waterhouse also relies on Mrs Rothner’s denial of involvement as a basis for indemnity costs. There is considerable force in the factual basis for that submission. The findings in the Primary Judgment establish that Mrs Rothner played the central role in the removal of the trees, including hiring the chainsaw.
I do note that Mrs Rothner’s affidavits were not read and their contents were not tested. The case against her, insofar as it involved the removal of the trees, was, however, overwhelming. I think there is considerable force in the submission advanced by Mr Waterhouse that Mrs Rothner participated until the point in time she had to choose whether to further perjure herself or not, and made an informed choice not to do so.
In my view it is appropriate, in the circumstances, that Mrs Rothner pay Mr Waterhouse’s costs of the proceedings as between them on the indemnity basis, excluding costs solely referable to the relief abandoned on 13 November 2025, (being paragraphs 3,10 and 11 of the claims for relief in the Second Further Amended Statement of Claim), as agreed or assessed.
I am not satisfied that the rejection of the Calderbank offers justify an indemnity costs order. This is for the reasons stated above in relation to Mr Rothner.
Mr Shahwan filed no costs submissions.
The evidence established that Mr Shahwan participated in the removal of the trees. I found that he was the person who carried out the removal and that the declarations sought against him should be made: PJ [537]-[539].
Mr Shahwan was represented until the first day of the hearing, when his solicitor was given leave to withdraw. His non-participation thereafter did not remove the need for Mr Waterhouse to prove the claim against him.
Mr Waterhouse seeks indemnity costs against Mr Shahwan on substantially the same bases relied upon against Mrs Rothner.
I am satisfied that Mr Shahwan’s position is relevantly indistinguishable from Mrs Rothner’s. The case against him in relation to removal of the trees was overwhelming, yet he put Mr Waterhouse to the cost of proving that case.
In my view it is appropriate, in the circumstances, that Mr Shahwan pay Mr Waterhouse’s costs of the proceedings as between them on the indemnity basis, excluding costs solely referable to the relief abandoned on 13 November 2025, as agreed or assessed.
Both Mr Waterhouse and Mr Rothner applied to reopen.
Mr Waterhouse sought to reopen not only to tender the PEXA settlement statement but also to pursue further credit issues and obtain access to documents produced under subpoenas and a notice to produce.
Mr Rothner sought leave to tender evidence concerning the quantum of his alleged loss and sought to set aside subpoenas and return documents produced in answer to them.
Leave was granted only in a confined form to permit evidence of objective facts occurring after the first hearing, namely the PEXA settlement statement and documents evidencing the terms on which Mr Rothner borrowed from NAB: PJ [64]-[66].
Neither party obtained the broader reopening for which that party contended, and similar to the main proceedings, neither can fairly be described as the successful party on the motions.
There should be no order as to the costs of the reopening applications, to the intent that Mr Waterhouse and Mr Rothner each bear their own costs.
The Court makes the following declarations and orders:
The Court declares David Richard Charles Waterhouse, by himself, servants and agents, did not cut down any palm trees on the land comprised in folio identifier 25/2538 being land known as 8 Tivoli Avenue Rose Bay, the trees being:
(a) 1 Mexican fan palm of 8m in height. (b) 11 Scaley tree ferns of 4-6m in height. (c) 14 Giant white bird of paradise stems of 4 to 6m in height. (d) 1 Kentia Palm, with a trunk 4-5m wide and of 6-7m in height with fronds. (e) 1 Illawarra flame tree 7m in Height. (f) 1 Blueberry ash 5m in Height.
(the Trees)
(a) without the consent of the registered proprietors of 8 Tivoli Avenue, and (b) without obtaining the consent of Woollahra Council.
(a) without the consent of the registered proprietors of 8 Tivoli Avenue, and (b) without obtaining the consent of Woollahra Council.
(a) without the consent of the registered proprietors of 8 Tivoli Avenue, and (b) without obtaining the consent of Woollahra Council.
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Waterhouse
Rothner (No 2)
[1993] FCA 801
[2026] NSWSC 937
(1993) 46 FCR 225
(2014) 86 NSWLR 645
(2019) 101 NSWLR 606