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[2014] NSWCA 219
procedural. In lieu of order 2 made by the primary judge on 18 April 2013, judgment for the second plaintiff against the defendants for interest from 1 March 2005 to 27 February 2013 in the amount of...
After both sides won parts of a complicated appeal about a shredder that did not work properly, the Court looked at the practical overall result: the sellers managed to reduce the buyers' damages award by only about $38,000. Because the main fight over whether the machine was faulty or just badly operated overlapped heavily between liability and mitigation arguments, and because the net money difference was small, the judges decided it was fairest for each side simply to pay its own appeal costs rather than try to split bills issue by issue.
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2,656 words · generated 24/04/2026
The underlying commercial dispute concerned the supply by Doppstadt Australia Pty Ltd and its director Raymond John Davis of an industrial shredder to Lovick & Son Developments Pty Ltd and Lovick Engineering Pty Ltd. The Lovick companies alleged that the shredder did not perform as represented, giving rise to claims that ultimately succeeded at first instance before Slattery J. The primary judge awarded both respondents the sum of $254,468.80 together with prejudgment interest of $183,046.69: Lovick & Son Developments Pty Ltd & Anor v Doppstadt Australia Pty Ltd & Anor [2012] NSWSC 529, (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1579 and (No 3) [2013] NSWSC 135.
2 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The appellants appealed on liability, the quantum of damages (including the period over which profits from a substitute Peterson machine were calculated and other components), interest and costs. The respondents filed a cross-appeal directed to damages, including the primary judge's one-third reduction for failure to mitigate loss. In the principal judgment delivered on 21 May 2014 ([2014] NSWCA 158) the Court of Appeal (Ward, Emmett and Gleeson JJA) varied the first-instance orders. Judgment was given only in favour of the second respondent (Engineering) for $216,424.32 before interest. The interest order was set aside and the parties were directed to agree upon a recalculated figure.
The net monetary effect of the appeal and cross-appeal was a reduction of approximately $38,000 in the damages awarded to Engineering. The first respondent (Developments) obtained no relief on its cross-appeal. At [409] of the principal reasons Gleeson JA (with whom Ward and Emmett JJA agreed) expressed the provisional view that, because the appellants' limited success on damages was largely offset by the respondents' success on the cross-appeal concerning mitigation, each party should bear its own costs of the appeal. The parties were invited to make further written submissions if they could not agree. They could not agree. The appellants contended for no order as to costs or, alternatively, a suite of orders that would have seen them recover most of their costs. The respondents sought an order that the appellants pay 75 per cent of the respondents' costs on the ordinary basis. This secondary judgment, delivered on the papers, resolves the interest calculation (agreed at $155,679.38 from 1 March 2005 to 27 February 2013) and the costs dispute.
The Court recorded that liability was the dominant issue, occupying about 75 per cent of the hearing time. It noted the substantial factual overlap between the liability debate and the mitigation debate: both turned on whether the shredder's failures were caused by operator error and inadequate maintenance or by inherent shortcomings in the machine as represented by the appellants. Multiple sub-issues existed within both the liability and damages grounds. Against that background the Court declined to undertake an issue-by-issue analysis and instead made a global assessment. Order 1 substituted the agreed interest figure for the primary judge's order. Order 2 provided that, subject to a discrete costs order made on 21 May 2014 concerning a dismissed notice of motion, there would be no order as to costs in the Court of Appeal.
The Court began from the statutory starting point in s 98 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), which confers a broad discretion as to costs, and UCPR r 42.1, which embodies the general rule that costs follow the event unless the circumstances justify otherwise. It reminded itself that the "event" may be characterised by reference to the practical result of the claim or claims (citing Windsurfing International Inc v Petit [1987] AIPC 90-441 and the review by Ward J in Australian Receivables Ltd v Tekitu Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1425).
Having regard to the mixed outcome, the Court considered but ultimately rejected both a strict "costs follow the event" approach and a detailed issue-by-issue apportionment. It drew upon the principles collated in Bostik Australia Pty Ltd v Liddiard (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 304 at [38], which itself synthesised earlier authorities including Waters v PC Henderson (Australia) Pty Ltd [1994] NSWCA 338, Monie v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 15, Elite Protective Service Pty Ltd & Anor v Salmon (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 373, Sydney City Council v Geftlick (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 374, State of New South Wales v Stanley [2007] NSWCA 330 and James v Surf Road Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 296. Those principles emphasise that, unless an issue is clearly dominant or separable, the Court will ordinarily award costs to the successful party without dissecting individual issues. Even where dissection might otherwise be appropriate, the exercise is conducted on a "relatively broad brush basis" as a matter of "impression and evaluation" rather than mathematical precision (James v Surf Road Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) at [36]; Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3) (1998) 30 ACSR 20 at 22; Dodds Family Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Industries Pty Ltd (1993) 26 IPR 261).
The Court identified two reasons why detailed apportionment was not warranted. First, both the liability and damages grounds involved multiple sub-issues on which each side enjoyed some success. Second, and critically, there was "substantial degree of overlap" between liability and the failure-to-mitigate issue. Both turned on the same evidentiary contest concerning "the operation and performance of the Doppstadt shredder" and whether failures were attributable to operator error and failure to follow the manual or to the machine not performing as represented. In those circumstances the respondents' success on liability and mitigation was, in the Court's assessment, "outweighed by the appellants' success on the damages issue" when viewed globally.
The Court expressly declined to treat liability (on which the appellants failed except in one small respect) or the first respondent's failure on its damages claim as so clearly dominant as to justify a special costs order. It emphasised the need to keep in mind "the overall outcome in monetary terms", which was a reduction of only about $38,000. That limited practical success did not persuade the Court to depart from its provisional view expressed at [409] of the principal reasons. The result was an order that each party pay its own costs of the appeal, subject only to the preserved costs order made on 21 May 2014 in respect of the respondents' unsuccessful notice of motion filed 14 November 2013. The decision illustrates a conscious preference for an overall assessment that reflects the "respective successes of the parties on appeal" rather than "separate orders directed to specific issues".
Prior to this judgment the applicable principles were those articulated in the authorities reviewed at paragraphs [17]-[19]. The general rule that costs follow the event (UCPR r 42.1) was already subject to the well-recognised exception that, where a successful party has failed on a clearly dominant or separable issue, the Court may deprive that party of costs referable to that issue (Monie v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) at [64]; Waters v PC Henderson). Bostik Australia Pty Ltd v Liddiard (No 2) had already summarised the position for both trials and appeals: the Court does not usually attempt to differentiate between issues unless they are dominant or separable; even then, a "broad brush" approach is used and the discretion is to be exercised liberally (State of New South Wales v Stanley at [18]). James v Surf Road Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) had made clear that a separable issue can be any disputed question of fact or law and that apportionment is a matter of impression, not mathematics. Sabah Yazgi v Permanent Custodians Ltd (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 306 and Sydney City Council v Geftlick (No 2) had applied similar reasoning to appeals.
This judgment did not change the pre-existing law. Instead it applied and illustrated those principles in the context of a complex commercial appeal involving overlapping factual contests. After the judgment, practitioners have a clear example of how overlap between liability and mitigation, when both turn on the same operational performance evidence, will ordinarily render an issue-by-issue costs analysis inappropriate. The decision reinforces that a "small reduction" in a damages award (here approximately $38,000 against an original judgment exceeding $400,000 inclusive of interest) will rarely justify a costs order in favour of the appellant when that appellant has failed on the dominant liability question. The emphasis on looking at the "practical result" of the claim (echoing Windsurfing International Inc v Petit) and on avoiding "mathematical precision" remains the operative approach. The judgment also confirms that a provisional view on costs expressed in principal reasons will ordinarily be followed unless the parties' submissions demonstrate a sufficient reason to depart.
Paragraph [14] states the statutory foundation: "The starting position is s 98 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) which provides that, subject to the rules of court, costs are in the discretion of the Court including, by whom, to whom, and to what extent costs are to be paid. Next, reference should be made to the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 42.1 which provides that, if the Court makes any order as to costs, it should be in terms that costs follow the event unless the circumstances justify some other order." In plain English: the judge has a very wide discretion, but the default position is that the winner gets its costs unless there is a good reason to do something different.
Paragraph [17] records: "The usual circumstance in which a court will deprive the successful party of the costs relating to an issue on which the successful party lost is when that issue is clearly dominant or separable." Translation: you do not normally strip a winner of part of its costs just because it lost on one point; that only happens if the lost point was the main fight or can be cleanly separated from everything else.
The core reasoning appears at [19]: the Court declined to apportion because of "the multiple sub-issues (on which there was some mixed success for each of the parties) raised by the primary issues of liability and damages" and "the substantial degree of overlap between the liability issue and the failure to mitigate loss issue so far as both concerned the operation and performance of the Doppstadt shredder". Plain English: the same facts about why the shredder kept breaking were relevant to both whether the sellers were liable and whether the buyers had failed to mitigate. When facts overlap that much, trying to split the legal bill issue by issue is artificial and the Court will instead look at who won overall.
Paragraph [21] concludes: "In our view, in the circumstances of this appeal, it is preferable to make a costs order which is the result of an overall assessment reflecting the respective successes of the parties on appeal, rather than separate orders directed to specific issues on which one or other of the parties was successful. We do not consider that an issue-by-issue approach will produce a result that is fairer than looking at the matter globally." Translation: adding up tiny wins and losses on every sub-issue would not produce a fairer bill; standing back and asking who really won overall is the better and fairer method.
Finally, [22] applies the test to the facts: the appellants' damages success produced "only a small reduction of approximately $38,000". That was not enough to displace the provisional view of no order as to costs. In plain English: a modest win on quantum does not entitle the appellant to costs when it lost the main liability battle and the buyers also won on mitigation.
This precedent is triggered by appeals in which (a) there is mixed success on liability, quantum and cross-appeals, (b) the net monetary difference between the parties after all adjustments is relatively modest, (c) the primary factual contest (here the cause of equipment failure) is common to both liability and mitigation, and (d) each side has enjoyed partial success on multiple sub-issues within the major headings. The Court will then prefer a global "broad brush" assessment over an issue-by-issue dissection.
Practitioners should recognise the pattern in commercial contract, misleading conduct or defective goods cases where the same body of evidence (operator conduct, maintenance records, machine specifications, expert engineering opinion) is relevant to both breach and quantum. Where liability occupies the bulk of hearing time (here ~75 per cent) yet the appellant achieves only a modest quantum reduction, and the respondent succeeds on a responsive cross-appeal that overlaps factually with the liability case, the default expectation is that each party will bear its own costs. The precedent is not limited to shredders; any capital equipment, plant or machinery dispute presenting the same overlap will engage the same reasoning. Conversely, the precedent will not apply where one issue is clearly dominant and discrete (for example, a pure limitation defence that occupies discrete evidence and argument) or where the monetary outcome is transformative rather than marginal.
The judgment itself demonstrates how the Court of Appeal treats the line of authority it cites. It followed the principal appeal ([2014] NSWCA 158) on the substantive issues and then applied the Bostik synthesis at paragraph [18] without reservation. It treated James v Surf Road Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) and Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3) as establishing that apportionment is a matter of impression and evaluation, not arithmetic, and applied that proposition directly to reject the respondents' 75 per cent costs claim. Monie and Waters were treated as confirming the "clearly dominant or separable" threshold, which the Court found was not met because of the overlap on the shredder performance evidence. The decision therefore operates as a practical illustration of the Bostik principles rather than a departure from them. By emphasising the "overall outcome in monetary terms" and the undesirability of dissecting overlapping issues, the judgment has reinforced the preference for global assessment in complex commercial appeals. Later courts applying the same discretionary framework are directed to the same bundle of considerations: practical result, degree of overlap, proportion of hearing time, and whether the net monetary shift justifies disturbing the prima facie position that each party bears its own costs where successes are evenly balanced.
The judgment leaves open the precise degree of factual overlap required before an issue-by-issue analysis becomes "not warranted". It identifies "substantial degree of overlap" on the shredder's operation and performance but does not articulate a bright-line test. Practitioners are left to argue, in future cases, whether overlap must be total, predominant or merely significant. A further open question is the monetary threshold at which a damages reduction ceases to be characterised as "small". The $38,000 reduction was treated as modest against an original award exceeding $400,000 inclusive of interest, but the judgment supplies no formula or percentage benchmark. Whether a 10 per cent, 15 per cent or 20 per cent reduction would tip the balance remains a matter of impression in each case.
The Court also left untouched the respondents' contention that liability was the dominant issue occupying 75 per cent of the time. While the Court accepted that characterisation for the purpose of its global assessment, it did not decide whether, absent the overlap, such a dominant issue would have justified a special costs order in the respondents' favour. The interaction between discrete costs orders (such as the preserved order 7 of 21 May 2014) and the general "no order" disposition may also generate future argument in cases where one party has been awarded costs of a separate application heard during the appeal. Finally, the judgment does not address how the analysis changes when one party is a self-represented litigant or where costs are sought on an indemnity rather than ordinary basis; those remain matters for case-by-case discretionary evaluation guided, but not concluded, by the broad-brush approach endorsed here.
Before: Slattery J File Number(s): 2006/255184
Judgment 1THE COURT: The Court delivered judgment in this appeal on 21 May 2014: Doppstadt Australia Pty Ltd v Lovick & Son Developments Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 158 (the principal reasons). The judgment of the primary judge in favour of both respondents (Developments and Engineering) for $254,468.80 was varied and judgment was given only in favour of Engineering for $216,424.32 plus prejudgment interest. The judgment for prejudgment interest of $183,046.69 was set aside and the parties were directed to agree upon and provide the Court with a calculation of prejudgment interest on the reduced judgment. 2These reasons deal with the two remaining issues: interest and costs.
Interest 3The parties have agreed that the prejudgment interest calculation is $155,679.38. The appropriate order is that, in lieu of order 2 by the primary judge on 18 April 2013, judgment be given for the second plaintiff (Engineering) against the defendants for interest from 1 March 2005 to 27 February 2013 in the amount of $155,679.38.
Costs 4At [409] of the principal reasons Gleeson JA indicated his view (with the concurrence of Ward and Emmett JJA) that, since the appellants' limited success on the appeal was largely offset by the respondents' success on the cross-appeal, and this translated into only a small reduction in the amount of the judgment (before interest) in favour of the second respondent (Engineering), then each party should pay their own costs in this Court. 5This provisional view was subject to affording the parties the opportunity to make further written submissions on costs, in the event that agreement could not be reached. The parties did not agree and the Court has now received those submissions.
The costs orders which are sought 6The appellants' written submissions contended that the costs order proposed at [409] of the principal reasons was appropriate. That is, each party should pay their own costs in this Court. 7Alternatively, if the Court did not adhere to the proposed costs order, the appellants contended for the following orders: (1)The respondents pay the appellants' costs of the appeal. (2)Developments pay the cross-respondents' costs of the cross-appeal insofar as it concerned Developments' claim for damages. (3)The cross-respondents otherwise pay Engineering's costs of the cross-appeal. 8In support of its primary position the appellants say that, whilst unsuccessful so far as their appeal related to liability, interest, and costs, they were successful (albeit not wholly) so far as it related to damages. It was argued that substantial time was required to be taken at the hearing of the appeal in respect of damages because the respondents, in their written submissions, failed to engage with the arguments raised by the appellants and stated that they relied on their submissions below. The appellants say that they are in a better position than prior to the appeal and the Court should not embark on a detailed analysis of the various grounds of appeal and cross-appeal and the costs that would have been incurred on each. The argument advanced was that the matter should be looked at globally. 9However if a different approach was to be taken by the Court then the appellants say that costs should follow the event and this would justify the alternative costs order noted above. 10The respondents' written submissions contended for the following order: (1)The appellants pay 75 per cent of the respondents' costs of the proceedings in this Court, on an ordinary basis. 11In support of that position the respondents say that the Court should adopt an issue-by-issue approach on the question of costs and that the proposed order reflects the just outcome on costs. This was said to be because first, liability was the dominant issue on the appeal and the appellants failed on this issue (except in one small respect) and should pay the costs of that issue; secondly, although the appellants enjoyed some limited success on the issue of damages the respondents have retained a not insubstantial award of damages and the appellants should not have the costs of litigating that issue; and thirdly, the respondents were successful on their responsive cross-appeal save for three matters which occupied relatively little time. 12The respondents say that the liability issue occupied about 75 per cent of the time taken in the proceedings in this Court. Next they say that the time spent on, and costs incurred in relation to, the part of their cross-appeal, on which they succeeded, is likely to be equal to or perhaps greater than the time spent on, and costs incurred in relation to, the part of the appellants' damages appeal, on which they succeeded in gaining a minor reduction in the damages award in favour of the respondents. They say that the appropriate order in respect of the damages, interest, and costs issues is that there be no orders as to costs. 13The costs order sought by the respondents reflects what they say was the time taken by the liability issue on which the appellants failed, with the time and costs of the other issues, in effect, offsetting each other.
Consideration and conclusion 14The starting position is s 98 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) which provides that, subject to the rules of court, costs are in the discretion of the Court including, by whom, to whom, and to what extent costs are to be paid. Next, reference should be made to the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 42.1 which provides that, if the Court makes any order as to costs, it should be in terms that costs follow the event unless the circumstances justify some other order. 15Depending on the nature of the litigation the "event" may be characterised in more than one way. The authorities were reviewed by Ward J in Australian Receivables Ltd v Tekitu Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1425 at [24]-[26], [54]-[60]. Generally the "event" refers to the event of the claim or counterclaim, as the case may be, and may be understood as referring to the practical result of a particular claim: Windsurfing International Inc v Petit [1987] AIPC 90-441 at 37,861-37,862 (Waddell J). 16Here, if one looks at the appeal, the appellants were unsuccessful on liability, interest, and costs but succeeded in respect of the damages awarded. Ignoring for the moment the respondents' success on the cross-appeal (on the failure to mitigate loss issue), the appellants were successful in reducing three components of the damages awarded, the most significant of which was a substantial reduction in the estimated profit of a Peterson machine by reducing the period of calculation from 12 to 7.5 months. In monetary terms the amount of damages assessed by the primary judge, before taking into account failure to mitigate loss, was reduced from $381,703.20 to $216,424.32: see Lovick & Son Developments Pty Ltd & Anor v Doppstadt Australia Pty Ltd & Anor (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1579 at [39]-[40] and [349] principal reasons. However, the respondents succeeded on their cross-appeal on the failure to mitigate loss issue. As a consequence the reduction in the second respondent's damages by one third by the primary judge was set aside. In monetary terms the appellants succeeded overall in reducing the award of damages in favour of the second respondent (Engineering) by approximately $38,000. The first respondent (Developments) was totally unsuccessful on its cross-appeal on damages. 17The usual circumstance in which a court will deprive the successful party of the costs relating to an issue on which the successful party lost is when that issue is clearly dominant or separable: Monie v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 15 at [64] (Campbell JA). See also Waters v PC Henderson (Australia) Pty Ltd [1994] NSWCA 338; 254 ALR 328 at 330-331 (Mahoney JA). 18The principles governing the making of an order as to costs so as to reflect the time taken in dealing with a particular issue in which the successful party in the proceedings or on the appeal did not succeed were reviewed by this Court in Elite Protective Service Pty Ltd & Anor v Salmon (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 373, and summarised in Bostik Australia Pty Ltd v Liddiard (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 304 at [38] (Beazley, Ipp and Basten JJA), as follows: "· Where there are multiple issues in a case the Court generally does not attempt to differentiate between the issues on which a party was successful and those on which it failed. Unless a particular issue or group of issues is clearly dominant or separable it will ordinarily be appropriate to award the costs of the proceedings to the successful party without attempting to differentiate between those particular issues on which it was successful and those on which it failed: Waters v PC Henderson (Australia) Pty Ltd. · In relation to trials it has been said that it may be appropriate to deprive a successful party of costs or a portion of the costs if the matters upon which that party was unsuccessful took up a significant part of the trial, either by way of evidence or argument: Sabah Yazgi v Permanent Custodians Limited (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 306 at [24]. A similar approach is adopted on appeal. · If the appellant loses on a separate issue argued on the appeal which has increased the time taken in hearing the appeal, then a special order for costs may be appropriate which deprives the appellant of the costs of that issue: Sydney City Council v Geftlick & Ors (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 374 at [27]. · Whether an order contrary to the general rule that costs follow the event should be made depends on the circumstances of the case viewed against the wide discretionary powers of the court, which powers should be liberally construed: State of New South Wales v Stanley [2007] NSWCA 330 at [18] per Hislop J (with whom Beazley and Tobias JJA agreed). · A separable issue can relate to "any disputed question of fact or law" before a court on which a party fails, notwithstanding that they are otherwise successful in terms of the ultimate outcome of the matter: James v Surf Road Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 296 at [34]. · Where there is a mixed outcome in proceedings, the question of apportionment is very much a matter of discretion and mathematical precision is illusory. The exercise of the discretion depends upon matters of impression and evaluation: James v Surf Road Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2), citing Dodds Family Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Industries Pty Ltd (1993) 26 IPR 261 at 272." 19Where there has been a mixed outcome in the proceedings, and it is appropriate to entertain the process of apportioning costs as between different issues in the proceedings, in general such an exercise will be carried out on a relatively broad brush basis, and largely as a matter of impression and evaluation by the Court: James v Surf Road Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) at [36]; Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3) (1998) 30 ACSR 20 at 22. In our view, such an exercise is not warranted in the present case, particularly having regard to: (1)the multiple sub-issues (on which there was some mixed success for each of the parties) raised by the primary issues of liability and damages; and (2)the substantial degree of overlap between the liability issue and the failure to mitigate loss issue so far as both concerned the operation and performance of the Doppstadt shredder - that is, whether the failures of the Doppstadt shredder were due to operator error and failure to service and maintain the shredder in accordance with the Doppstadt operator manual, or because the shredder did not perform as represented by the appellants. The respondents' success on the issues of liability and failure to mitigate was outweighed by the appellants' success on the damages issue. 20Nor do we consider that this is an appropriate case where one party's failure on what might be viewed as a separable issue, such as the appellants' failure on liability (except in one small respect) or the first respondent's failure on damages, should be treated as so clearly dominant an issue as justifying an order for costs in respect of that particular issue. It is important to bear in mind at all times the overall outcome in monetary terms of these proceedings on appeal as between the parties. 21In our view, in the circumstances of this appeal, it is preferable to make a costs order which is the result of an overall assessment reflecting the respective successes of the parties on appeal, rather than separate orders directed to specific issues on which one or other of the parties was successful. We do not consider that an issue-by-issue approach will produce a result that is fairer than looking at the matter globally. 22Taking account of the fact that the appellants' overall success in the appeal (on the issue of damages) translated into only a small reduction of approximately $38,000 in the damages awarded to the second respondent, we are not persuaded that we should depart from the preliminary view that the appropriate order in the present case is that each party pay their own costs in this Court. This order is not to be taken as affecting order 7 made by this Court on 21 May 2014 concerning the costs of the respondents' notice of motion filed 14 November 2013, which was dismissed with costs. 23Accordingly the Court orders that: (1)In lieu of order 2 by the primary judge on 18 April 2013, judgment be given for the second plaintiff against the defendants for interest from 1 March 2005 to 27 February 2013 in the amount of $155,679.38. (2)Subject to order 7 made on 21 May 2014, there be no order for costs in this Court.
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 10 July 2014
Doppstadt Australia Pty Ltd
Lovick & Son Developments Pty Ltd
In lieu of order 2 made by the primary judge on 18 April 2013, judgment for the second plaintiff against the defendants for interest from 1 March 2005 to 27 February 2013 in the amount of $155,679.38; subject to order 7 made on 21 May 2014, there be no order for costs in this Court.