austlii:cth/ARTA/2025/836
General information, not legal advice.
ARTA
2025-06-18
Original judgment source is linked above.
(d) 'Rental interest deductions' ('Rental Interest Deductions') of between $33,000 and $37,000 in each of the years ended 30 June 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017. > > (e) Capital works deductions ('Capital Works Deductions') in each of the years ended 30 June 2014, 2015, and 2016 in relation to work he said had been carried out at one of the Rental Properties. > > (f) Other rental deductions ('Other Rental Deductions') in each of the years ended 30 June 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 for expenses such as rates, body corporate fees, utility expenses, fees for property valuation services and travel to inspect and manage the Rental Properties.
(a) The Respondent made several requests for further supporting documentation from the Applicant or setting out specific matters where the Respondent required clarification or additional information. The Applicant provided some responses by way of emails clarifying particular matters, confirming that he had located certain documents (including receipts and bank statements which he said would support additional deductions) and stating that he would provide substantiating documentation to the Respondent.[19] > > (b) The Applicant identified 7 boxes of documents in his possession from his time with Brenntag as well as bank statements which he said he needed to go through.[20] > > (c) The Applicant may have provided documents to the Respondent relating to his wife's tax matters but which the Respondent did not believe addressed the Applicant's tax matters. Nevertheless, the Respondent did indicate to the Applicant that it would review material provided in relation to the Applicant's wife's tax matters for the 2015 and 2016 financial years.[21] > > (d) The Applicant may also have provided some information in relation to another objection involving issues in periods outside the Relevant Years.[22] > > (e) The Applicant experienced ill health, being hospitalised in July 2022, and was otherwise away from home around late September/early October 2022 which he told the Respondent would affect his ability to respond to the requests for information.
(a) Found that the Applicant had failed to correctly report salary or wages ('Employment Income') in each of the Relevant Years and the Applicant had not provided any proof as to why the amounts reported by the Applicant in his income tax returns should be preferred over the Respondent's records. > > (b) Found that the Applicant had failed to report a (nominal) amount of bank interest ('Interest Received') received but not returned as assessable income in the year ended 30 June 2014, based on records of an account with the relevant bank. > > (c) Found that the Applicant had failed to report dividends ('Dividends') received but not returned as assessable income in some of the Relevant Years. > > (d) Allowed a deduction for part of the Car Expenses claimed based on the 'cents per kilometre' method rather than on the logbook method, on the basis that the Applicant had not satisfied the substantiation requirements for the logbook method. Further, the Applicant had not provided proof of having made any payments in accordance with the Lease. The Respondent was willing to accept that due to the nature of the Applicant's work in the Relevant Years he would have travelled more than 5000 kilometres in each year and therefore allowed the deduction on the basis of the 5000 kilometres able to be claimed. > > (e) Affirmed its decision in relation to Travel Expenses on the basis that the Applicant had not provided any proof of his entitlement to these deductions. > > (f) Affirmed its decision in relation to Interest Deduction on the basis that the Applicant had not provided any proof of investment income in relation to which a deduction for interest could be claimed. > > (g) Allowed in part the Applicant's Objection in relation to Rental Income on the basis of tenancy agreements and bank statements provided by the Applicant. > > (h) Allowed in part the Applicant's Objection in relation to Rental Interest Deductions on the basis of some loan documentation and investment account statements relevant to some of the Relevant Years. The Respondent also had regard to information about the Rental Properties that it had separately obtained (such as satellite images of the properties) and to the sale of two of the Rental Properties. > > (i) Allowed in part the Applicant's Objection in relation to Capital Works Deductions based on some limited information provided by the Applicant. Otherwise, there was no documentation to quantify the cost of work on the Rental Properties or to indicate whether they were capital works, repairs or a non-deductible amount. > > (j) Allowed in part the Applicant's Objection in relation to Other Rental Deductions. Information relating to charges such as rates, water or sewerage charges and insurance premiums was available. The Respondent also accepted that although the Applicant had not provided evidence of costs relating to travel to inspect or manage properties, it was reasonable to assume that he had undertaken some such travel. The Respondent refused to allow the Applicant a deduction for 'loss of his time' in travelling. The Respondent also refused the Applicant's claims in relation to other amounts, such as property valuation fees, in the absence of any documentation indicating such fees were incurred. > > (k) Affirmed its decision in relation to the Carry Forward Losses. This was on the basis that the Applicant became bankrupt in April 2014 which precluded him from deductions for losses from the year ended 30 June 2014 in relation to losses incurred before he became bankrupt.[31] The Applicant had not provided any evidence to support his contention that some losses related to debts outside his bankruptcy. > > (l) Allowed in part the Applicant's Objection in relation to the CGT treatment of the sale of the Rental Properties based on the settlement statements provided by the bank, invoices from the Applicant's Lawyers and information provided by the Applicant relating to legal proceedings he took against the bank. > > (m) Allowed in part the Applicant's Objection in relation to the Penalty Assessments, but only insofar as the items above reduced the Applicant's tax shortfall amount. Otherwise, the Respondent affirmed its decision that the Applicant was liable to administrative penalties for making false or misleading statements to the Respondent which arose from recklessness by the Applicant, and there were no grounds for remission of the penalty.
I have 3 types of records to verify my actual costs of the motor vehicle all electronic being credit card fuel card and daily diary > > I have transferred to log books over several years > > I have been told this is not acceptable > > The vehicle was used exclusively for work purposes and as such the start and end speedo reading confirm and cross references with credit card and fuel cards
'I am having major issues with the documentation for this matter > > I have a time line to deliver by 12 January 2024 > > The issue is I have reams of paper work > > Full work diaries > > 65 credit cards statements of 2 or 3 pages each statement > > A lot of other bank statements > > And a lot of other documentation with regards to this matter > > I is virtually impossible to send copies > > My approach would be to take the documents to be examined with me present to explain all the contents > > This is quite time consuming'
(a) Although the application had been lodged in April 2023, the timetabling of the matter had been delayed until 2024 due to the Applicant having taken a lengthy holiday during which he said he had limited mobile phone/internet access. > > (b) It was a matter for the Applicant to determine what documentary evidence he sought to rely on, however by law the onus was on the Applicant to prove his case even if this involved a significant volume of material.
(a) A 'credit card statement' for the period 26 August to 26 December 2014. He noted that 'some dates were missing' in that period as he had not been able to locate some statements. The Tribunal notes that this document is not a periodic credit card statement, but is called a 'cardholder activity report' which appears to summarise transactions on the card. > > (b) An 'analysis' of the credit card statement prepared by the Applicant explaining how it demonstrated that the Vehicle was used outside Brisbane and therefore for work purposes. > > (c) A Toyota service maintenance record book which appears to relate to the Vehicle, recording periodic servicing from October 2014 to January 2023. Odometer readings at the time of each service are recorded. > > (d) A statement signed by the Applicant[33] and dated 11 January 2014 that the Vehicle was used solely for work related purposes. > > (e) A covering email stating that: > > > (i) He had credit card statements for the 2015 to 2018 financial years, but they were 'numerous', he could spend time scanning and emailing the statements, but he would not have time to undertake an analysis of those. > > > > (ii) He and his wife owned a second Landcruiser of the same make and model as the Vehicle, which they used for personal purposes. > > > > (iii) He was unable to obtain the bank statements or trust deed of the Trust because these documents were held by his former accountant who had lost the documents when they ceased their accountancy business. > > > > (iv) He had previously provided logbooks for the Vehicle to the Respondent. He only recorded odometer readings at the beginning and end of each calendar year and had thought that 'there was no need to record the various trips because all trips were work related.'
(a) Mr Stephens said he had proceeded on the basis that detailed and complete expense records relating to the Vehicle were not available and if such records did become available, he would need to update his analysis. > > (b) The report covered both the Vehicle and the other Landcruiser identified by the Applicant as being kept by him and his wife for their personal use. Some of the documentation referenced by Mr Stephens, such as financing documents[37], relate to the 'personal use' Landcruiser. > > (c) The schedule of modifications to the Vehicle at Annexure 3 to the report appears to be a document that had been typed up by the Applicant without further supporting documentation. > > (d) The report included miscellaneous receipts for car parts, engine oil and accessories from various auto retailers and repair outlets. However, it is not clear whether which of these receipts relate to the Vehicle or the other Landcruiser (or whether any relate to a different vehicle).
(e) Each party to give a hearing certificate to the Tribunal by 13 September 2024 indicating their availability for a hearing in the time period between February and April 2025. > > (f) The Applicant to file with the Tribunal by 8 October 2024 a Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (SFIC), together with any further witness statements, expert reports, records or other documents on which he intended to rely at the hearing. > > (g) The parties to inform the Tribunal by 4 November 2024 whether they had reached agreement as to the terms of a decision in the proceeding. > > (h) The Respondent to file with the Tribunal by 16 December 2024, a SFIC together with any further witness statements, expert reports, records or other documents on which it intended to rely at the hearing. > > (i) The Applicant to file with the Tribunal by 25 January 2025 any amended SFIC.
(a) A copy of an undated email from the Oaks Gateway hotel in Townsville indicating that the Applicant had had a reservation to stay at the hotel on 30 January 2018. > > (b) A copy of a tax invoice from Kortes Resort in Rockhampton indicating that the Applicant stayed there on 2 and 3 January 2018. > > (c) A copy of a travel itinerary for travel between Mt Isa and Brisbane in October 2017, with the Applicant as the passenger, to be charged to Brenntag as the 'debtor.' > > (d) A copy of a tax invoice dated 17 January 2017 addressed to Brenntag care of the Applicant for a 21-night stay at the Allure hotel in Townsville. > > (e) Copies of 'cardholder activity statements' for a card issued in the name of the Mr Ian Warry of Brenntag, care of an address in Victoria, for miscellaneous periods across April 2014, June 2014 to March 2015, January to November 2017 and January 2018. An expense claim statement is included with one such document and there are handwritten annotations on some of the pages.
(a) The Applicant had been on an overseas trip since July 2024[38] that had been delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a workplace injury in 2020[39] and a subsequent road injury. > > (b) The Applicant had been self-represented when he filed his application with the Tribunal and was unaware of restraints and timelines that would be imposed. > > (c) In the Applicant's view, the Respondent would not be prejudiced by the delay.
(a) The Respondent had raised an issue of whether the Trust had been placed into receivership. A letter from the Respondent had suggested that the Trust was put into receivership around 2013, when it had never been in receivership. This was a 'major point' and a 'serious error.' It had taken him some time to obtain evidence rebutting this. The Applicant's Affidavit and Additional Evidence would address this. > > (b) He had a lot of personal evidence to provide, obtained on an ongoing basis. > > (c) The Respondent had incorrectly suggested that the Applicant did not have a signed version of the Lease, casting doubt on the validity of the Lease. > > (d) He had not seen or was not aware of the Respondent's SFIC of 16 December 2024 > > (e) Nevertheless, he had previously indicated to the Respondent that he disputed the characterisation of the Vehicle as a 'car' such that Division 28 of the ITAA 1997 (and therefore the analysis in the Respondent's SFIC) was not relevant. The Applicant's Affidavit and the Additional Evidence would also address the question of whether the Vehicle was a car. > > (f) The Applicant Affidavit and Additional Evidence would also address the question of lease payments being made. He referred to a Luxury Car Tax Determination of the Respondent. > > (g) He confirmed that he had not filed a SFIC but sought to rely at the hearing on matters he had raised in a confidential issues statement or similar prepared on a 'without prejudice' by the Applicant's Lawyers around June 2024 for the purposes of a Tribunal conciliation.[42] The Applicant's Affidavit and Additional Evidence were in support of matters raised in those documents. He indicated that he was unaware of the need for him to prepare and file a further document by way of a SFIC. > > (h) He had applied considerable resources and time to this proceeding, particularly in relation to obtaining information and materials to support his case. He had spent months pursuing the issues relating to the receivers. > > (i) He had not made arrangements for Mr Stephens to attend the hearing and give evidence, and would rely on Mr Stephens' written report as previously filed with the Tribunal.
(a) The Applicant had referred to having 3000 pages of documents in January 2024 and the Respondent had agreed to view that material, however those documents had not been provided to the Respondent. > > (b) It had written to the Applicant in June 2024 with questions in relation to the appointment or cessation of appointment of PWC as a receiver.[43] It had not put forward any contentions or argument relating to the existence of any trust or the receivership of any trust or trustee for the purposes of the hearing of the proceeding. Queries that might have been raised in the course of other dispute resolution processes were not part of its case before the Tribunal. > > (c) It had not received a copy of a signed version of the Lease but had included an unsigned copy in the hearing book filed with the Tribunal.[44] Similarly, the question of whether a signed copy of the Lease had been provided to the Respondent or Tribunal was not part of its case. > > (d) It had indicated that it wished to cross-examine Mr Stephens on the content of his expert report in relation to several issues, including the facts assumed by him in preparing his report and whether there was proof of lease payments having been made in accordance with the Lease. > > (e) It did not agree that the scope of the proceeding should be extended to address the characterisation of the Vehicle as a 'car' or other alternative basis for deduction of vehicle related expenses. It had discussed with the Applicant's Lawyers in 2024 whether the Applicant wished to put an alternative argument based on the 'general deduction' provision of section 8-1 of the ITAA 1997, but the Applicant had not responded.
(a) It wanted the proceeding resolved with some finality. > > (b) Although it would have preferred to examine Mr Stephens on aspects of his report, it would be willing to forego cross examination of Mr Stephens and rely on its submissions in relation to the reliability and relevance of his written report, in the interests of progressing the hearing. > > (c) As set out in its SFIC the Respondent understood that the Applicant was only seeking review of the Objection Decision as it related to the Car Expenses. The Respondent had set out its contentions and the facts on which it relied in its SFIC. The Respondent was willing and ready to proceed with a hearing of the operation of Division 28 to the Applicant's circumstances. > > (d) However, the Respondent was not willing to debate the question of whether the Vehicle was a 'car' as the Applicant had had the opportunity to engage on that point. > > (e) The Respondent also indicated that it might be in a position to address the issue of Travel Expenses should the hearing proceed.
Should the Applicant be given leave to provide the Applicant Affidavit and Additional Evidence to the Tribunal?
(a) The objective of the Tribunal as set out in section 9 of the ART Act is to provide an independent mechanism of review that is 'fair and just', 'ensures that applications to the Tribunal are resolved as quickly, and with as little formality and expense as a proper consideration of the matters before the Tribunal permits' and 'promotes public trust and confidence in the Tribunal'. > > (b) The Tribunal must ensure that each party to a proceeding in the Tribunal is given a 'reasonable opportunity' to present the party's case and make submissions and adduce evidence: subsection 55(1). > > (c) In a proceeding for review of a decision the Tribunal may determine the scope of the review by limiting the questions of fact, the evidence and the issues that it considers: section 53. > > (d) The procedure of the Tribunal in a proceeding is within the discretion of the Tribunal, but in exercising that discretion the Tribunal must have regard to the circumstances of the proceeding: section 49. > > (e) The Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform itself on any matter in such manner as it considers appropriate: section 52. > > (f) As far as practicable the Tribunal must conduct each proceeding in a way that is accessible for the parties, taking into account the needs of the parties: section 51. > > (g) The Tribunal must act with as little formality and technicality as a proper consideration of the matters before the Tribunal permits: subsection 50(1).
(a) The Respondent's SFIC does not raise any issue or contention in relation to the existence of the Trust or whether the Trust was subject to any form receivership. Paragraph 7 of the Respondent's SFIC simply refers to a lease with 'the Trust.' > > (b) The Objection Decision does not suggest any issue relating to the existence of the Trust. The facts set out in the Objection Decision recite that the Vehicle was purchased by the Macdonald Warry Family Trust and that the Applicant's wife was the trustee of that Trust.[48] > > (c) The only references in the Objection Decision to bankruptcy or receivership are to the personal bankruptcy of the Applicant in 2014 (which the Tribunal understands is not in dispute) and the receivership of Bridgeport (which is a different entity to the Trust). > > (d) As noted above, the Applicant and his wife had a second Landcruiser for personal use and Mr Stephen's expert report provides analysis in relation to both the Vehicle and the personal use Landcruiser. Mr Stephen's report states that the Vehicle was provided by the Trust to the Applicant.[49] The report also notes that the personal use Landcruiser was purchased by Bridgeport around 2011.[50] The personal use Landcruiser is not the subject of the Objection Decision or this proceeding. > > (e) The Objection Decision refers to the receivership of Bridgeport in relation to the inclusion of certain amounts[51] in the cost base of the Rental Properties that were sold. The receivership of Bridgeport is not a matter raised in the Respondent's SFIC and is unrelated to the Car Expenses. > > (f) The Additional Evidence appears to incorporate at least part of the material that the Applicant had previously told the Tribunal and the Respondent that he would file with the Tribunal in January 2024. He was directed by the Tribunal to file the evidence upon which he would seek to rely at the hearing under the January 2024 Directions, the March 2024 Directions, the June 2024 Directions and the August 2024 Directions. This includes extensions of time given in response to requests by the Applicant's Lawyers for additional time to review documents and conduct further investigations into the Lease. These directions indicate that he was given several extensions of time by the Tribunal to provide this material, but ultimately, he did not do so. > > (g) It was not clear to the Tribunal precisely when the Applicant first sought to prepare the Applicant Affidavit and Additional Evidence. He indicated at various points during the hearing that it may have been a couple of days before the hearing (that is, when the Tribunal contacted the Applicant's Lawyers) or a few weeks prior or possibly months previously. The first indication to the Tribunal that there might be further evidence from the Applicant was received the day before the hearing. This was not communicated formally or in writing but in the course of a telephone discussion between a Tribunal Officer and the Applicant's Lawyers (who were apparently his former lawyers by this time). The Respondent advised the Tribunal that they also only received notice of this further material the day before the hearing.
Should the Tribunal dismiss the proceeding or make a decision on the reviewable decision?
The Tribunal may dismiss an application made to the Tribunal if the applicant fails to do either of the following within a reasonable time: > > (a) proceed with the application; > > (b) comply with this Act or an order of the Tribunal in relation to the proceeding in relation to the application.
(1) The Tribunal may, at any time, dismiss an application made to the Tribunal if the Tribunal is satisfied that the application: > > (a) is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance; or > > (b) has no reasonable prospects of success; or > > (c) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Tribunal.
In relation to the reviewable decision, the Tribunal must make a decision: > > (a) affirming the reviewable decision; or > > (b) varying the reviewable decision; or > > (c) setting aside the reviewable decision and: > > > (i) making a decision in substitution for the reviewable decision; or > > > > (ii) remitting the matter to the decision‑maker for reconsideration in accordance with any orders or recommendations of the Tribunal.
[1] A reference to T Documents or Supplementary T Documents is a reference to documents required to be filed by the Respondent in accordance with section 14ZZF of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth).
[4] The Applicant's income tax returns are at T3 to T7, and a summary of deductions claimed is set out in the audit finalisation letter at T9.
[12] The Applicant does not seem to have lodged an objection in relation to his tax matters at this point.
[13] See letter from Respondent dated 27 October 2021 at T19.
[14] It is not clear from the correspondence whether the 'thousands' of documents were not provided by the Applicant to the Respondent at all, or whether some or all were provided after finalisation of the relevant review processes by the Respondent.
[25] T42 and T43. The logbook material comprises photocopies of pages for the calendar years 2015 and 2017. It is not clear when these logbooks were completed.
[28] T49. A copy of the relevant transfer, a title search and a copy of a demand by the bank to the Applicant's wife in her personal capacity is consistent with PWC's statement.
[31] See section 36-25 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth).
[32] The application did not include the Objection Decision. After inquiries by the Tribunal, the Respondent provided a copy of the Objection Decision to the Tribunal directly. The Respondent also clarified that the 16 February 2023 Objection Decision was an amended version of a document sent on 14 February 2023, to take account of excess concessional contributions.
[33] This was not prepared as an affidavit or statutory declaration.
[34] Per directions made on 22 January 2024 ('January 2024 Directions').
[35] This is the same firm of solicitors that represented the Applicant in relation to his Bridgeport matters and the sale of his Rental Properties.
[36] One of the third parties had acquired the business of the other, hence the need to issue a summons to both.
[37] See for example Annexure 1, 2011 Toyota Finance Offer
[38] At the hearing the Tribunal confirmed with the Applicant that he had been on an overseas trip in Europe for approximately six months in 2024.
[39] It appears that this refers to the injury sustained in 2018.
[40] This was on the basis that the relevant vehicle, a 2014 Toyota Landcruiser, had a payload capacity of less than 1 tonne and was therefore a 'car' for the purposes of Division 28.
[41] It was not clear whether the Applicant's support person was legally qualified.
[42] Any document prepared for an alternative dispute resolution process and provided on a 'without prejudice' basis would ordinarily be treated as confidential and not be made available to the Member undertaking the hearing of the substantive matter.
[43] This appears to refer to correspondence exchanged in the context of an alternative dispute resolution process.
[45] The hearing was adjourned around 11.20 am and resumed at 2 pm.
[46] See section 102 of the ART Act which provides for the circumstances in which a Tribunal may reinstate an application after it has previously been dismissed. This could include circumstances where the Applicant was able to demonstrate that the application had been dismissed in error.
[47] Pochi and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1979] AATA 64 per Brennan J as President of the former Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
[49] See page 7 of Mr Stephens' report. Annexure 2 to the report contains a copy of the invoice dated 19 August 2014 for the sale of the Vehicle to the Trust.
[50] Page 6 of Mr Stephens' report and Annexure 1.
[51] This includes legal fees paid to the Applicant's Lawyers.
[52] Charara v Commissioner of Taxation [2016] FCA 451 at [75] per Wigney J.
[56] Re Filsell and Comcare [2009] AATA 90. This decision was made by the former Administrative Appeals Tribunal in relation to a predecessor provision to section 101(1).
[57] Kristoffersen and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2018] AATA 524 at [10] per Senior Member Tavoularis, drawing from several previous decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
[58] The Tribunal has also had regard to any material contained in the T Documents which had been provided by the Applicant to the Respondent during the course of the audit and objection processes.
Charara v Commissioner of Taxation [2016] FCA 451
Pochi and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1979] AATA 64
Re Filsell and Comcare [2009] AATA 90
Kristoffersen and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2018] AATA 524