Vrkic as Liquidator of V Health Plus Corporation Pty Ltd v Singh

(Revised from the transcript) GLEESON J: 1 The plaintiff (liquidator) seeks summary or, alternatively, default judgment against the first defendant (Ms Singh), a former director of V Health Plus Corporation Pty Ltd (company), in an amount of $160,720.80 plus interest pursuant to s 588M and or s 1317H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Act). The principal amount comprises a debt of $68,021.88 for the supply of goods by Galderma Australia Pty Ltd (Galderma) (Galderma debt) and tax refunds of $92,698.92 paid into a bank account owned by V Health Plus Foundation Pty Ltd (V Health Plus Foundation). 2 The company was registered as a company on 3 February 2014. The liquidator was appointed by an order of this Court on 24 August 2019, on the application of Galderma. 3 The liquidator's application for this relief, by interlocutory process filed 7 February 2020, followed Ms Singh's failure to file a defence in the proceeding, as required by an order made on 16 December 2019.

Service of liquidator's application on Ms Singh 4 Also on 16 December 2019, I made an order that any application by the liquidator for summary or default judgment be served on Ms Singh within 3 days of the date of filing by scanning and emailing the application and any supporting evidence to the two email addresses which had been specified in an order for substituted service of the originating process on Ms Singh. 5 Unsealed copies of the liquidator's interlocutory process and supporting affidavit of Mr Inan sworn 6 February 2020 (Mr Inan's 6 February 2020 affidavit) were served on Ms Singh by an email sent on 6 February 2020 to five addresses including the two addresses specified in the order for substituted service (mirzab@aryshealth.com.au and sb@vhealthplus.com.au) and including an email address identified to the Court on 28 November 2019 by the second defendant (Dr Baig) as Ms Singh's email address, being rss.singh@hotmail.com. 6 Sealed copies of the interlocutory process and Mr Inan's 6 February 2020 affidavit were served on Ms Singh by an email sent on 7 February 2020 to the same five addresses. 7 On this basis, I am satisfied that Ms Singh was duly served with the interlocutory process and Mr Inan's 6 February 2020 affidavit in accordance with the 16 December 2019 order. 8 Ms Singh did not attend the hearing of the liquidator's application on 20 February 2020. By that time, she had not participated in the proceeding except to file an affidavit affirmed by "Simran Roselyne Singh" on 7 February 2020 in which the deponent identified herself as the "First Respondent (alleged)" (7 February 2020 affidavit). 9 The 7 February 2020 affidavit was filed shortly after the liquidator's solicitor sent a copy of the liquidator's 31 January 2020 affidavit and exhibit "DTV-1" to Ms Singh at an address in Hay Street, Collaroy (Collaroy address), by express post. This address is another address for service specified in the order for substituted service.

Summary judgment 10 Section 31A(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) provides: (1) The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if: (a) the first party is prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and (b) the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding. 11 Rule 26.01(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Rules) permits a party to apply to the Court for an order that judgment be given against another party because the respondent has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or part of the proceeding. 12 By r 26.01(2), the application must be accompanied by an affidavit stating the grounds of the application, and the facts and circumstances relied on to support those grounds. 13 By r 26.01(3), the application and the accompanying affidavit must be served on the party against whom the order is sought at least 14 days before the hearing of the application. 14 In Tolkien Estate Limited v Saltalamacchia [2016] FCA 944 at [21], Beach J identified the following principles applicable to the grant of summary judgment: (a) The Court must assess the strength of the allegations made by reference to the pleadings, the affidavits and any other evidence adduced. (b) The applicant bears the onus of demonstrating that the respondent has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding. However, if the applicant establishes a prima facie case for summary judgment, the respondent must identify factual or evidentiary matters which necessitate a trial. …. (c) In order to have reasonable prospects of success, the respondent must have prospects of success that are "real" and not "fanciful" or even "merely arguable".

Default judgment 15 Rule 5.22 of the Rules provides that a party is in default if, relevantly, the party fails to comply with an order of the Court. 16 Rule 5.23(2)(c) provides relevantly: (2) If a respondent is in default, an applicant may apply to the Court for: … (c) if the proceeding was started by an originating application supported by a statement of claim … an order giving judgment against the respondent for the relief claimed in the statement of claim … to which the Court is satisfied that the applicant is entitled; 17 In Maylord Equity Management Pty Ltd v Parazelsus Ltd [2014] FCA 979, I recorded the following relevant principles at [10]-[14]: [10] The condition in rule 5.23(2)(c) of the Rules, that the Court be satisfied that the applicant is entitled to relief before judgment is entered against the respondent, does not require proof by way of evidence of the applicant's claim, although evidence may be adduced: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline Net AU Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 665, [2006] FCA 1427 at [44]; Yeo v Damos Earthmoving Pty Ltd, Re Beachwood Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] FCA 1129 at [9]. [11] However, the applicant must demonstrate, on the face of the statement of claim: a. a claim for relief sought; and b. that the court has jurisdiction to grant that relief. See Luna Park Sydney Pty Ltd v Bose [2006] FCA 94 at [20]. [12] An applicant will appear to be entitled to the relief sought in the statement of claim if each element of the relevant civil wrong is properly and discretely pleaded: Macquarie Bank Ltd v Seagle [2005] FCA 1239; (2005) 146 FCR 400 at [24]; Macquarie Bank Ltd v Seagle (2008) 79 IPR 7, [2008] FCA 1417 at [20]. [13] The Court may permit recourse to further limited evidence but cannot admit evidence that would alter the case as pleaded: Speedo Holdings BV v Evans (No 2) [2011] FCA 1227 at [25] ("Speedo"). [14] If an order for relief under rule 5.23(2)(c) is made, it gives the applicant a special privilege to gain judgment without proof of the applicant's claim - a severe disadvantage to the respondent. As a result, the rules governing default judgment are strictly construed and the discretion must be exercised cautiously: Clayton v Thomas C Denton & Co Pty Ltd [1972] VicRp 5; [1972] VR 46 at 49; Speedo at [20].

Liquidator's case 18 The liquidator relied on the following affidavits: (1) Mr Inan's 6 February 2020 affidavit; (2) the liquidator's 30 January 2020 affidavit and exhibit "DTV-1"; (3) affidavit of the liquidator sworn 18 February 2020; (4) affidavit of Daniel John O'Brien, liquidator, sworn 18 February 2020 (Mr O'Brien's affidavit); and (5) affidavit of Mr Inan sworn 2 March 2020. 19 Mr Inan's 6 February 2020 affidavit informed Ms Singh that the liquidator proposed to rely on that affidavit in support of the relief sought in the interlocutory process, as well as the affidavit of the liquidator sworn 31 January 2020, together with its accompanying exhibit "DTV-1". 20 Mr Inan's 2 March 2020 affidavit includes an email from Mr Inan to Ms Singh attaching the liquidator's 18 February 2020 affidavit and Mr O'Brien's affidavit, and informing her of the liquidator's intention to rely on those two affidavits.

Ms Singh's affidavit 21 The liquidator's argument proceeded upon the assumption that the Court would take into account Ms Singh's 7 February 2020 affidavit, on the issue of whether Ms Singh has a reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding. However, the liquidator also contended that Ms Singh's affidavit contains allegations against him that are scandalous and without merit and which should be disregarded. 22 Ms Singh's affidavit or parts of it may be relevant evidence in support of the liquidator's application, as informal admissions of facts supporting the application: s 81 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). I have treated the whole of the affidavit as an item of evidence tendered in support of the liquidator's application. 23 Ms Singh's affidavit comprises 43 paragraphs and annexes a further affidavit sworn by her on 6 February 2020, as well as eight annexures. The affidavit includes the following statements or statements to the following effect: (1) Concerning her relationship with the company: (a) Ms Singh was never a director of the company and was never responsible for running the company's affairs; (b) Ms Singh was not a director of the company as at 1 June 2015 and was not responsible for the business affairs of the company as at 1 June 2015; (c) Ms Singh and Dr Baig were directors of a business operated from 40 Park Street, Sydney, and are the owners of the V Health Plus registered trademark; (d) The true directors of the company were Karen James and Simiran Snigh; (e) Ms Singh has been informed by ASIC that she is not listed as a director of the company according to ASIC's records; (f) the owner of the company is 5 G General Trading LLC, which acquired the shares in the company pursuant to an agreement dated 1 June 2015, and which appointed independent directors. (2) As to the Galderma debt: (a) there are emails from Karen James which dispute the delivery of the goods; (b) although she is a director of a business that owns the V Health Plus Registered trademark, that business did not purchase any Galderma products; and (c) the claim for recovery of the Galderma debt is made falsely by the liquidator, based on the following matters: (i) there is no invoice recorded, no tax claims or expense recorded in the ledgers of V Health Plus business located at 40 Park Street, Sydney 2000; (ii) no Galderma products were ordered, received or delivered to 40 Park Street, Sydney 2000; and (iii) there was no individual by the name of Sandy or Dax, working from the site, alleged to have accepted the consignments at 1 June 2015. (3) As to the tax refunds: (a) the liquidator has failed to disclose a joint venture between the company and V Health Plus Foundation pursuant to which the latter company was entitled to receive the tax refunds. 24 The 6 February 2020 affidavit is in the incorrect form. Broadly, it contains statements that repeat or are consistent with the contents of the 7 February 2020 affidavit.

Annexures to Ms Singh's affidavit 25 The annexures comprise: (1) Five documents relating to the Galderma debt including: (a) part of a form entitled "Application for Commercial Credit Facility" which appears to be a copy of a document contained in exhibit "DTV-1"; (b) page 3 of the form, which is also included in exhibit "DTV-1"; (c) the execution page of the form, which is also included in exhibit "DTV-1"; (d) invoice 150004523 from Galderma to the company in the sum of $68,021.88, and delivery receipt (proof of delivery), both of which is also included in exhibit "DTV-1"; and (e) email correspondence comprising: (i) email sent 7 October 2015 from Galderma to accounts@vhealthplus.com.au seeking payment for six boxes of Restylane, and attaching a copy of the proof of delivery. The email refers to an attached email which is said to state that Dr Baig "confirmed receipt of the 48 vials"; (ii) email sent 21 September 2015 from accounts@vhealthplus.com.au to Galderma which states: During our stock take over the weekend, we noted discrepancies in products supply/stock held with V Health Plus and your invoice. We are unable to fully count the supply, hence I will not be able to approve/process invoice as issued, unless it can be validated with proof of delivery. Upon which I will review situation with Roselyn. In future, to avoid such delays, please ensure all PO is approved by me and invoices directly sent to me with proof of delivery. Regards, Karen (iii) emails on 17 November 2015 between Galderma and Dr Baig including a statement from Galderma that "it's been 4 ½ months since you ordered and received the stock" and Dr Baig's response: Karen has asked the matter to be handled by her. I not to be involved. With your team engaging recovery [sic] is not apprecuated [sic] by her. Sorry I am not able to assist from here onwards. (2) An ASIC Current & Historical Organisation Extract (ASIC Extract) for the company dated 4 July 2017. (3) A letter from the liquidator's lawyers, Access Law Group, to Dr Baig dated 14 June 2018 (Access Law Group letter). The letter includes the following statement: 2.1 The evidence arising from the recent Public Examinations was that V Health Plus International Pty Ltd … and V Health Plus Foundation Pty Ltd (Ms Singh's company) were the companies carrying on the "V Health" business at 40 Park Street where Galderma's goods were delivered. 2.2 According to you and Ms Singh, the Company carried on no business at all. Therefore, in placing the order, and receiving the Goods without any ability to pay for them, the Company was trading whilst insolvent. (4) A document purporting to be an affidavit of Karen James. 26 The affidavit purportedly sworn by Karen James is a very strange document. Ms Singh's affidavit does not explain how she obtained it. The affidavit is undated. It refers to the "Supreme Court of Australia", NSW Registry and includes no file number. The contents of the affidavit do not include any evidence that could be relied upon by the liquidator as an admission by Ms Singh. Accordingly, it is not necessary to give this document further consideration.

3 February 2014 to 13 May 2015 27 Exhibit "DTV-1" includes an ASIC Extract for the company dated 29 January 2020, which shows that a person named "Roselyn Singh" of 40 Park Street, Sydney was a director and secretary of the company from the time of registration until 13 May 2015. 28 This extract is consistent with Ms Singh's admission that she was a director of a business operated from 40 Park Street, Sydney. It is also consistent with the ASIC Extract's identification of the company's registered office as 40 Park Street, Sydney from the time of registration until 9 September 2015 and Ms Singh's association with the name "V Health Plus" by her admitted ownership of the registered trademark "V Health Plus". 29 As she did not appear to oppose the liquidator's application, Ms Singh did not put forward any evidence to explain why the ASIC Extract should not be accepted as accurate. In the absence of such evidence, the liquidator has a strong case that Ms Singh was a director and secretary of the company from the time of registration until 13 May 2015.

13 May 2015 to 9 August 2015 30 The liquidator contends that Ms Singh was also a director and secretary of the company from 13 May 2015 to 9 August 2015 under the name "Simiran Snigh". The ASIC Extract shows that a person of this name of 92 Liverpool Street, Sydney was a director and secretary of the company from 13 May 2015 until 9 August 2015. The stated date of birth for this person is 11 January 1977. 31 That name Simiran Snigh is similar to the name "Simran Roselyne Singh", that is, the name used by Ms Singh in her 7 February 2020 affidavit. 32 By his affidavit, Mr O'Brien states evidence that he visited 40 Park Street, Sydney on 25 August 2016 (that is, the day after the appointment of the liquidator to the company). According to Mr O'Brien, on that occasion, he met a woman who called herself "Simiran Snigh" and said "I'm also known as Roselyn". 33 In the absence of any cogent evidence in response to Mr O'Brien's affidavit, I am satisfied that there is a strong case that Ms Singh, using the alias, Simiran Snigh, continued to be a director of the company from 14 May 2015 until 9 August 2015.

9 August 2015 to 24 August 2016 34 The liquidator contends that Ms Singh was a de facto director or a shadow director of the company from 9 August 2015 to 24 August 2016. 35 Section 9 of the Act defines "director" of a company to mean, unless the contrary intention appears, a person who is not validly appointed as a director if: (i) they act in the position of a director; or (ii) the directors of the company or body are accustomed to act in accordance with the person's instructions or wishes. 36 The former is referred to as a "de facto" director, the latter a "shadow" director. 37 The liquidator's evidence also includes records for the company from the Australian Taxation Business Portal. The records identify the registered office address for the company as 40 Park Street, Sydney. Ms Singh is also identified in the ATO records as the "Australian Business Register Contact" for the company. The ATO records also identify "Ms Roselyn Singh" as a "current associate" of the company. 38 The ATO records also show that Ms Singh had communications with the ATO on behalf of the company on at least 14 August 2015, 1, 4, 11, 17, 23 and 25 September 2015 and 8 February 2016. 39 The ATO records are evidence that Ms Singh acted as a "de facto" director of the company during the period from when she ceased to be a director using the alias, Simiran Snigh, until at least 8 February 2016. I am satisfied that the liquidator has a strong case that Ms Singh was a de facto director of the company during that period.

Insolvency 40 Section 286(1) of the Act imposes an obligation on a company to keep written financial records that correctly record and explain its transactions and financial position and performance, and would enable true and fair financial statements to be prepared and audited. By s 286(2), the financial records must be retained for 7 years after the transactions covered by the records are completed. 41 The liquidator gave evidence of steps taken since his appointment as liquidator to obtain the books and records of the company, including writing to all persons identified as directors or former directors of the company in ASIC's records. The only records concerning the company that the liquidator has obtained are bank statements obtained from the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, an ATO Running Account Balance and ATO Business Activity Statements. The liquidator's evidence was that the company's records (which I take to be the records that the liquidator has obtained from the Bank and the ATO) have not enabled true and fair financial statements to be prepared and audited; nor do they correctly record and explain the company's transactions and financial position. 42 The liquidator also gave evidence that he believes, based on his investigations and enquiries that the company was, at all relevant times, insolvent, in that: (1) the company paid tax invoices for goods and services, but did not generate any revenue from trading; (2) the company appears to have failed to pay a single creditor a single debt; and (3) the documents provided to him do not enable him to prepare true and fair financial records and otherwise correctly record and explain the company's transactions and financial position. 43 In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I accept the liquidator's evidence and consider that the liquidator has established a strong case that the company was, at all relevant times, insolvent. 44 Further, the liquidator has established a strong case that the company either failed to keep financial records in relation to the period from its registration to the appointment of the liquidator to wind up the company, as required by s 286(1), or failed to retain financial records in relation to the same period, as required by s 286(2). If proved then, by s 588E(4) and, subject to ss 588E(5) to (7), the company is presumed to have been insolvent throughout the period. This presumption has effect for the purposes of a "recovery proceeding" in relation to the company. The expression "recovery proceeding" is defined in s 588E(1) and includes, relevantly, proceedings under s 588M in relation to the incurring of the debt (but not including proceedings for an offence).

Alleged insolvent transaction: Galderma debt 45 As set out in his statement of claim, the liquidator's principal case against Ms Singh is that he is entitled to recover from her, as a debt due to the company, the amount of $68,021.88 pursuant to s 588M of the Act. 46 Section 588M provides relevantly: (1) This section applies where: (a) a person (in this section called the director) has contravened subsection 588G(2) or (3) in relation to the incurring of a debt by a company; and (b) the person (in this section called the creditor) to whom the debt is owed has suffered loss or damage in relation to the debt because of the company's insolvency; and (c) the debt was wholly or partly unsecured when the loss or damage was suffered; and (d) the company is being wound up; … (2) The company's liquidator may recover from the director, as a debt due to the company, an amount equal to the amount of the loss or damage. 47 Section 588M(1) first requires proof that Ms Singh has contravened s 588G(2) or s 588G(3) in relation to the incurring of the debt to Geldarma. By s 588G(1), s 588G applies if, relevantly, at the time when the company incurs a debt, there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the company is insolvent. 48 Section 588G(2) provides: (2) By failing to prevent the company from incurring the debt, the person contravenes this section if: (a) the person is aware at that time that there are such grounds for so suspecting; or (b) a reasonable person in a like position in a company in the company's circumstances would be so aware. 49 The liquidator's evidence includes a tax invoice and delivery confirmation which together provide strong evidence that the company incurred the alleged debt for goods supplied to the company. 50 That evidence is supported by the email correspondence annexed to Ms Singh's affidavit which includes a claim by Galderma to Dr Baig that the relevant goods were delivered, which claim was not disputed by Dr Baig in his email response. 51 A director will be taken to have failed to prevent a company from incurring a debt if the debt is incurred by the company at a time when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the company is insolvent: Elliott v Australian Securities and Investments Act [2004] VSCA 54 at [116]. 52 The liquidator's evidence set out above provides a basis for concluding that there were reasonable grounds for such a suspicion in June 2015: the company did not generate any revenue from trading. Further, the Access Law Group letter states that Ms Singh had contended that the company "carried on no business at all". In her affidavit annexing the letter, Ms Singh did not dispute that she had made such a statement. 53 On this material, I am satisfied that there is strong evidence that Ms Singh failed to prevent the company from incurring the Galderma debt at a time when she was aware that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the company was insolvent or, at least, a reasonable person in the position of director of the company in the company's circumstances would have been so aware. 54 Accordingly, I am satisfied that there is strong evidence that Ms Singh contravened s 588G(2) by failing to prevent the company from incurring the Galderma debt. 55 It is unnecessary to consider the claim based, in the alternative, on either s 180 or s 181 of the Act. 56 By s 588M(1)(b), s 588M applies where the person to whom the relevant debt is owed has suffered loss or damage in relation to the debt because of the company's insolvency. 57 The evidence is that Galderma obtained a default judgment against the company in an amount of $71,515.70; that judgment debt was not paid; and the company was thereafter wound up in insolvency for failure to comply with a statutory demand on the application of Galderma. 58 From that evidence, I am satisfied that the liquidator has an arguable case that Galderma has suffered loss in relation to the Galderma debt because of the company's insolvency. I also infer from the nature of the debt, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that the liquidator can demonstrate that the Galderma debt was wholly or partly unsecured when the loss or damage was suffered. 59 It follows that the liquidator has established a prima facie case for summary judgment against Ms Singh in at least the sum claimed, that is, $68,021.88. 60 As she did not appear at the hearing, Ms Singh has not identified any factual or evidentiary matters which necessitate a trial in relation to this aspect of the liquidator's claim. 61 Accordingly, I am satisfied that Ms Singh has no reasonable prospect of defending the liquidator's claim for this amount.

Alleged "misappropriation": tax refunds 62 The liquidator's case is that Ms Singh is liable to compensate the company for tax refunds due to the company but paid at her direction to V Health Plus Foundation. 63 The liquidator's evidence is that, between 6 February 2015 and 30 September 2015, eight payments totalling $92,698.92 were made by the ATO into a bank account in the name of V Health Plus Foundation. According to an extract from ASIC records dated 12 January 2015, V Health Plus Foundation is a company whose registered office was then 40 Park Street, Sydney. As at that date, its sole director was Simiran Snigh. Another extract shows that Ms Singh was a director of V Health Plus Foundation from 1 November 2012 to 29 July 2014. 64 The payments correspond with eight amounts identified as "EFT refund" to the company in the ATO records for the company. 65 Ms Singh's affidavit implicitly acknowledges that the relevant amounts were paid to V Health Plus Foundation and also implicitly suggests that the relevant payments were made pursuant to a joint venture with the company. 66 Records obtained from the ATO show that Ms Singh had communications with the ATO on behalf of the company on at least 27 November 2014, 14 August 2015, 1, 4, 11, 17, 23 and 25 September 2015 and 8 February 2016. 67 The statement of claim alleges that Ms Singh directed the tax refunds be paid into V Health Plus Foundation's bank account. It also alleges that, at all material times, Ms Singh was a director and shareholder in V Health Plus Foundation and that V Health Plus Foundation was ordered to be wound up on 6 December 2017. As noted above, the Access Law Group letter refers to V Health Plus Foundation as Ms Singh's company, apparently on the basis of statements made during public examinations. 68 Finally, exhibit DTV-1 includes a document entitled "Memorandum of Understanding V Health Plus" between Ms Singh and Dr Baig by which they agreed to operate and manage one or more multidisciplinary medical facilities, including at 40 Park Street, Sydney, under the name of V Health. The document states that Ms Singh nominated V Health Plus Foundation "of which Roselyn is the sole director and shareholder" as her "entity to be the party to the joint venture agreement". The document specifies 1 October 2013 as the commencement date of the agreement. 69 In the absence of any company records to explain the payment of the tax refunds to V Health Plus Foundation, I accept that the liquidator has a strong case that Ms Singh, acting as a de facto director of the company, directed the payment of those amounts to V Health Plus Foundation to benefit the latter company and for no consideration, thereby causing a detriment to the company in the total amount of the payments. Self-evidently, such conduct is inconsistent with the duty of a company director to act in good faith in the best interests of the company: s 181 of the Act. I therefore accept that the liquidator has a strong case for an order pursuant to s 1317H of the Act that Ms Singh compensate the company for damage in the amount of the tax refunds paid to V Health Plus Foundation. 70 As she did not appear at the hearing, Ms Singh has also not identified any factual or evidentiary matters which necessitate a trial in relation to this aspect of the liquidator's claim and, accordingly, I am also satisfied that Ms Singh has no reasonable prospect of defending the liquidator's claim for this amount.

Default judgment 71 As I am satisfied that the liquidator is entitled to summary judgment, it is not necessary to consider his claim for default judgment. However, I note that this claim would require attention to the statement of claim and whether each element of the relevant civil wrong is properly and discretely pleaded. On a cursory review, the statement of claim may not be adequately pleaded to support a default judgment.

First defendant's name and identity 72 The liquidator's evidence includes: (1) a "Change of Name" form lodged with New South Wales Land Registry Services, dated 1 August 2014, by which "Simran Roselyne Singh" affirms that she is identical with the registered proprietor of property at 48 Hay Street, Collaroy, being Roselyn Singh; (2) a copy of a driver's licence for "Simran Roselyne Singh", 48 Hay Street, Collaroy, which expired on 7 October 2019. This driver's licence notes Ms Singh's date of birth as 29 June 1967. 73 The 7 February 2020 affidavit supports a conclusion that Roselyn Singh and Simran Roselyne Singh are the same person, but that the first defendant currently uses the name Simran Roselyne Singh and used that name in about August 2014. 74 On that evidence, I accept that the first defendant's name is Simran Roselyne Singh. 75 Rule 8.21(1)(c) permits a party to apply for leave to amend an originating application to correct a mistake in the name of a party to the proceeding. Here, the liquidator simply seeks an order that the name of the first defendant be amended to Simran Roselyne Singh. On the evidence above, I am satisfied that it is appropriate in the interests of justice to make that order. 76 There is a plethora of evidence that raises questions about whether the first defendant has from time to time sought to identify herself by references to different places of birth and different dates of birth, but for present purposes I do not consider it is necessary for me to go through that evidence in any detail. As well as using different birth dates, the ASIC extracts seem to show that Ms Singh has used different addresses to identify herself, but, again, I do not consider it is necessary to go through that in any detail. However, I do note that in her 7 February 2020 affidavit Ms Singh identified her email address as rss.sings@hotmail.com, and there is evidence that the liquidator has attempted unsuccessfully to use that email address to contact Ms Singh. 77 The affidavit also identifies as an address for service on Ms Singh, 15/110 Sussex Street, Sydney, which is similar, but not identical to an address that has been used by Dr Baig. It is a matter of concern that the disconformity between these addresses and descriptions of Ms Singh's identity have made it unnecessarily difficult for the liquidator to conduct his liquidation.

Other Matters 78 The 6 February 2020 affidavit of Mr Inan did not comply with r 26.01(2) in that it did not state the ground of the application for summary judgment (that Ms Singh had no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding) and the facts and circumstances relied upon to support that ground, except by stating the liquidator's intention to rely on the liquidator's 31 January 2020 affidavit. However, I am satisfied from Ms Singh's own affidavit that she was sufficiently notified of the application for summary judgment and the grounds upon which it was made as set out in the liquidator's 30 January 2020 affidavit. 79 Accordingly, I will dispense with the requirement for compliance with r 26.01(2). I certify that the preceding seventy-nine (79) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gleeson.