V96/05079 [1997] RRTA 2586 (8 July 1997)

Decision: The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant a protection visa to the Applicant.

Catchwords: Bad family background; pro-democracy activities.

This is an application for review of the decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs on 26 April 1994 that the Applicant is not a refugee under the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 ("the Convention") as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees ("the Protocol"). On 1 September 1994 the protection visa was introduced for people in Australia seeking protection as refugees (s.36 of the Migration Act 1958 (as amended) - "the Act"). The Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal / RRT") is required to deal with unfinalised refugee-related applications as if they were applications for a protection visa (s.39 of the Migration Reform Act 1992).

This decision is made pursuant to a consent order of Dawson J. in High Court No. M. 80 of 1996, dated 20 February 1997 (unreported), where His Honour quashed the RRT decision of Member K. Boland and ordered that the matter be heard and determined by the Tribunal according to law.

The Applicant is a 29 year old male citizen from Beijing, in the People's Republic of China (China / the PRC) who arrived in Australia in1990 and applied to the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs ("the Department") for recognition as a refugee in late 1993. The application (together with applications for associated entry permits) was refused on 19 July 1994 and a valid application for a review of those decisions was received by the Tribunal on 18 August 1994.

The Applicant did not respond to invitations to attend a Tribunal hearing, although checks with the post office demonstrates that the relevant certified mail was collected by the Applicant, or on his behalf. In the circumstances, the Tribunal is satisfied that he has had an adequate opportunity to make oral representations and, in the absence of that opportunity being taken up, proceeds on the basis of the information it has before it.

The Applicant's case was presented in written and oral submissions to the Department and written submissions given to the Tribunal. He also submitted some documentary materials in support of his claims, which focus on his bad family background, his involvement in the pro-democracy movement in the PRC in mid-1989 and continued pro-democracy activities in Australia.

Having considered the Applicant's written and oral submissions, the Tribunal finds that his claims are accurately set out in part 3 of the primary decision, entitled "Summary of Claims/Submissions". In brief, he claims that his parents were adversely classified during the Cultural Revolution and that he was separated from his parents because they were exiled. During the 1989 pro-democracy demonstrations in China, the Applicant was an organiser and leader of demonstrators at his university and was sanctioned by being required to write self-criticisms. He claims his participation was particularly noticeable because he joined in during April, before many others. He abandoned an initial claim that he had been suspended from study, but added at the departmental interview that he had been "laid off" work. He stated that his activities were unknown when he left for Australia, but came to light after colleagues were detained and arrested in 1991 and, according to the Applicant, disclosed his role. In his review submissions, he added that there had been police visits to his home after the arrest of his friends and his mail to his parents had been opened. He claimed that he had attended various pro-democracy activities after his arrival in Australia, such as rallies and meetings.

The prescribed criteria for the grant of a protection visa are set out in Part 866 of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations ("the Regulations"): see s.31(3) of the Act and r.2.03 of the Regulations. One of the criteria is that at the time of application the applicant claims to be a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention and either makes specific claims under the Convention or claims to be a member of the family unit of a person who is also an applicant and has made such claims: cl. 866.211 of Schedule 2 of the Regulations.

It is also a criterion for the grant of a protection visa that at the time of decision the Minister is satisfied the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention: cl.866.221 of Schedule 2 of the Regulations. For the purposes of this application, Australia has protection obligations to the Applicant if he demonstrates that he is a person who is a refugee:

"owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."

The definition, and the issues arising from it, were addressed by the High Court in the case of Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 62; (1989) 169 CLR 379. (Chan's case). The Full Federal Court has found in MIEA & RRT v Mohinder Singh (unreported, 24 January 1997) that the relevant time for assessing whether or not a person has refugee status is at the time of determination, although it remains clear that it is logical and relevant to take into account circumstances prior to this, commencing at the time the applicant left his country of nationality (at 10-11: see also Chan's case at 387,391, per Mason C.J.; at 399, per Dawson J.; at 405-406, per Toohey J.; at 414, 415, per Gaudron J.).

Where "well-founded fear of persecution" exists, it must be for one of the reasons set out in the definition - race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. If it arises solely for any other reason, the applicant does not fall within the definition regardless of the suffering he or she may endure.

The Court in Chan's case observed that the term "well-founded fear of persecution" required that the applicant have a subjective fear and that there must be an objective justification or foundation for this fear (at 396, per Dawson J.; at 406, per Toohey J.; at 413,415, per Gaudron J.; at 429, per McHugh J.). It held that fear of persecution is well-founded if there is a "real chance" of being persecuted on return to the country of nationality (at 389, per Mason C.J.; at 398, per Dawson J.; at 407, per Toohey J.; at 429, per McHugh J.). A "real chance" is one that is "substantial" as distinct from "remote", "insubstantial" or "far-fetched" (at 389 per Mason C.J.; at 398, per Dawson J.; at 407, per Toohey J.; at 429, per McHugh J.). The prospectivity involved in the assessment of whether or not an applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution is reflected in Mok Gek Bouy v. The Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1993] FCA 545; (1993) 47 FCR 1, where Keely J. made the following observation with regard to the impact which future events may have on the issue of refugee status:

"In my opinion, the question of whether there was a real chance of persecution necessarily required the delegate to look at the future in so far as it was reasonably foreseeable at the time when he was making his decision. On the one hand the delegate was not required to look at the possibility of something occurring in 50 years time ... On the other hand a delegate errs in law, in my opinion, if he confines his attention to whether there is a real chance of persecution on the day after the applicant's return."

Sheppard J., with whom Black C.J. and Lockhart J. agreed, elaborated this issue in the subsequent appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court (The Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Mok Gek Bouy, (1994) 127 ALR 223) where he stated in reference to assessing "well-founded fear" that it is:

"... a matter to be considered in relation to the immediately foreseeable future." [at 248]

In his book The Law of Refugee Status, J.C. Hathaway, at pp.104-105, refers to persecution as "... the sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection." While this statement is not definitive of what type of harm may constitute persecution, it is consistent with comments about the term "persecution" made in Chan's case. Mason C.J., at 388 refers to:

"some serious punishment or penalty or some significant detriment or disadvantage if he returns. Obviously harm or the threat of harm as part of a course of selective harassment of a person, whether individually or as a member of a group subjected to such harassment by reason of membership of the group, amounts to persecution if done for a Convention reason."

However, harm amounting to persecution need not be inflicted over a period of time. Mc Hugh J., in Chan's case, makes this clear at 430, in stating:

"Nor is it a necessary element of 'persecution' that the individual be the victim of a series of acts. A single act of oppression may suffice. As long as the person is threatened with harm and the harm can be seen as part of a course of systematic conduct directed for a Convention reason against that person as an individual or as a member of a class, he or she is "being persecuted" for the purposes of the Convention."

In addition to the evidence provided by the Applicant and that contained on his Departmental file and referred to in the primary decision, the Tribunal had before it the further evidence referred to in this section of the decision.

The Applicant's claims that he might continue to be harassed on account of his family background are at odds with his own history. He made no claim that he was the target of discrimination or intimidation during any of the campaigns conducted after the official repudiation of the policies of the Cultural Revolution in 1978, he was allocated employment in a Government Bureau between 1986 and his departure for Australia, he continued to study during the 1989 pro-democracy movement, graduating after the authorities had cracked down on participants, and he obtained permission to go overseas to study and thereby improve his career prospects on his return to China.

It is plausible that the Applicant's parents were mistreated during the Cultural Revolution but his post-Cultural Revolution history leads to the conclusion that, whatever sanctions were imposed on the family, the issue soon became irrelevant. The evidence available to the Tribunal demonstrates that the policies applicable to the period before and during the Cultural Revolution had been repudiated in 1977-8 (see DFAT publication Country Profile - China, June 1994 ("DFAT Profile") at p 28), and efforts were made to rehabilitate those who were the victims of those policies. The Applicant's history is consistent with the analysis in Professor Merle Goldman's book Sowing the Seeds of Democracy - Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1994). At pp. 27-28 it refers to the rehabilitation by CCP leader Hu Yaobang of vast numbers of victims of the Cultural Revolution and their children, and states that :

"In the spring of 1977, even before Deng [Xiaoping]'s reappearance in July, Hu [Yaobang] returned to power as a vice president of the Central Party School, the training centre for high officials. At the Eleventh Party Congress that August he was elected to the Central Committee, and in December he became head of the Organisation Department, the office of the party apparatus. Hu's arrival at the Organisation Department was greeted enthusiastically. As his subordinates hoped, he immediately took out the long-ignored appeals for justice from those who had been purged and began the process of rehabilitation. One observer recalls that Hu convened a meeting at which he talked emotionally about the injustices committed during the Mao era, moving many to tears.

Against very strong opposition, he rehabilitated virtually all those purged not only during the Cultural Revolution but also during the anti-rightist campaign. Mao's designated successor, Hua Guofeng, and the remaining Maoist's in the top leadership had wanted just a few people rehabilitated; Deng himself thought that about 60 percent should be rehabilitated. But Hu insisted that it was necessary to rehabilitate almost all victims of the campaigns, not only out of fairness, but also to heal the wounds of the past and to gain their co-operation in carrying out reforms.

Over three million officials, scientists, intellectuals, and skilled workers who had been imprisoned, detained, or suffered persecution returned to public life. ... In addition, at Hu's behest, the designation of landlords, rich peasants, and their children as reactionaries, in place since the beginning of the Mao era, was removed. The political atmosphere was suddenly infused with elation and expectation."

If his family was adversely classified before and during the Cultural Revolution, the Applicant's history demonstrates that it was rehabilitated soon afterwards and that there have been no ongoing persecutory consequences. In light of the information regarding the end of the Cultural Revolution and the Applicant's circumstances, the Tribunal concludes that there is not a real chance that he faces persecution on account of his family background if he returns, either for that reason alone or in combination with other reasons.

The Applicant claims that he faces persecution on account of his participation in the 1989 pro-democracy demonstrations, during which he attended some demonstrations, shouted slogans, signed partitions, participated in hunger strikes and fought with security officials. He abandoned a claim that he was suspended from university while, on the other hand, he satisfactorily completed a self criticism. After that, he was able to leave the country unhindered, despite intricate security measures implemented to track down pro-democracy activists. He remained in Beijing until March 1990 and worked and studied until just prior to his departure without being harassed.

The response of the authorities to the demonstrators after the 4 June Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing, is described in an article produced by the Immigration and Refugee Board Documentation Centre Ottawa, Canada in October 1990, "The Hunt for Dissidents in China", (IRBDC, 1990). That article indicates that security measures across the country were comprehensively tightened after Tiananmen through the use of the household registration scheme, the work unit and its close relationship with the PSB, and the system of neighbourhood committees. At pp. 2-4 it refers to the pressure on workers to denounce their colleagues and the requirement that workers undertake self-criticism and political education. It continues by relating how participants were caught up by the authorities. To quote from the article at pp.4-5:

"According to an independent source, Chinese police laid charges of antigovernment activism against "anyone who could be identified" on videotape (even from traffic control cameras) or photographs taken by security forces or published by international press and television (China Review, August 1989,5). One source reported that even people who were passing in the street during demonstrations and appeared in such pictures were arrested, interrogated and, in some cases, sent for re-education (Asia Watch 1990, 7-29)."

The fact that the Applicant was not sanctioned other than to complete a self-criticism suggests that the authorities were satisfied he did not play any significant role in the democracy movement. He lived, studied and worked at the same places until he left the country and if the authorities wanted to locate or punish him, they had ample opportunity to do so prior to his departure.

His failure to lodge an application for refugee status is consistent with a conclusion that he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution when he left China. Indeed, his refugee application was lodged a few days after the Australian government announced new visa provisions for students already in the refugee process and it is apparent to the Tribunal that the Applicant sought to take advantage of those provisions by making an application. He was provoked into applying not by a fear of persecution but by the opportunity to obtain permanent residence in Australia by a different procedure.

The Applicant claimed that his pro-democracy activities were unknown when he left, despite his self-criticism. However, he believes colleagues who were later detained may have informed on him. The delegate found that hard to believe, but even if his colleagues did tell of his activities, they were not the activities of a leader or an organiser and would not be of any adverse interest to the Chinese authorities. Indeed, his ultimate claims were that he was not involved in any activities after the declaration of martial law on 20 May 1989. He claimed that there had been visits to his home and tampering with his mail after the arrest of his friends, but given that he did not include this in his initial submissions, made some two years after the event, or at his departmental interview, the timing of those claims in his review submissions leads to the conclusion that they were deliberatley concocted to shore up his claims to be a refugee.

Since he left the PRC, action against 1989 pro-democracy participants has receded. DFAT cable 0.BJ1879 of 1 June 1993 comments that:

"The Chinese authorities are not so much concerned about the issue of political activities overseas, but rather the question whether returnees have an intention to oppose the government in an effective and organised way after their return to China. Even relatively well-known dissidents have been able to return to China without too much difficulty as long as they do not publicly advocate opposition to the government.

"...Students and others who did not have a high dissident profile and significant influence in China at the time of the Tiananmen incident, even if they are now office-bearers of overseas pro-democracy organisations, would have only a remote chance of facing administrative or criminal sanctions by the Chinese authorities unless, after their return, they initiated organised activities opposing the government in an effective way."

(Cable O.BJ 2041 1540 of 14 June, 1993 makes clear that the expression "whether returnees have an intention to oppose the government" in the above cable is intended to refer to the Chinese authorities' "judgment" of the person's likely future behaviour. "That judgment would be based principally on the returnee's dissident profile and influence before he or she left China for Australia").

This view was confirmed by a later DFAT cable BJ4761, 9 February 1994 and is further developed in a report by Peter Coyne entitled Dissent in China - 1993 (CIS Research Paper, Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, April 1994). After canvassing a broad range of sources of information, Coyne states "By mid 1992 no continuing arrests of those involved with the events of June 1989 were reported." and "Reports have provided no indication that 1989 activists are still being pursued by the police" (at pp.6-7).

There is no doubt that people who continue to be active dissidents and had also participated in 1989 continue to be at risk of mistreatment (see below). There is no cogent information before the Tribunal that supports the contention that minor participants in 1989, who did not otherwise become involved in political activities in China, were pursued by the authorities after mid-1992.

"The undertakings given to activists overseas appear to have been honoured and have resulted in the return of dozens of exiles. There have been no reports of reprisals or action taken against those who have returned irrespective of their dissident profiles overseas. For individuals of particular interest to the authorities, exclusion from the PRC appears to be the preferred policy instead of punishment on return."

The report goes on at pp.24-25 to give specific information about returnees who appear, in the Tribunal's view, to have taken far more active dissenting roles and have a much higher public profile than the Applicant, yet have been able to return without significant sanctions being imposed on them. A recent report referring to a ban on the re-entry of dissidents, supports the view that exclusion is a preferred option: the Human Rights Watch report "China: Enforced Exile of Dissidents" (Vol.7 No.1, January 1995) names 49 dissidents barred from returning to the PRC. The Applicant is not listed among the dissidents who are described as:

"Almost 50 percent of those listed were placed on the police "most wanted" notices after June 4, 1989, all in connection with alleged offences arising from their exercise of internationally recognized rights to free speech and association ...

"Prominent among those listed are a number of former political prisoners who, in response to sustained diplomatic pressure from the United States government over the question of China's Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status, were finally granted passports or exit permits and allowed to leave China .... Prior to August 1991...China, for the most part, had prevented such people or their relatives from leaving the country..." [p.1]

"Included in the re-entry blacklist are all of the principal student leaders of the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement who subsequently escaped to the West, together with numerous leading intellectuals, writers and former government officials who likewise played leading roles in the movement and later arrived in the West under similar circumstances." [p.3]

The Tribunal has also considered reports of actions taken against dissidents within the PRC in more recent times. These actions have been clearly directed at a handful of high profile dissidents such as Wei Jiangsheng. The Australian newspaper on 8 March 1994 carried a report by David Lague which referred to the current "campaign of arrests and harassment of leading activists". Further on, that report states:

"Senior US officials told The Australian that the US Secretary of State for Human Rights, Mr. John Shattuck, had been "disconcerted" at the arrests of high profile dissidents while he was in China last week trying to persuade Beijing to improve its human rights record".

Amnesty International reports of 2 August 1994 "People's Republic of China: Update on dissidents detained in Beijing and Shanghai since March 1994" and 13 September 1994 "China: Further News on Dissidents Detained in Beijing Since March 1994" further indicate that leading figures in pro-democracy, human rights or labour rights groups are at risk of suffering serious sanctions at the hands of the authorities, as they are perceived to be a threat to stability and unity. Those reports indicate that approximately 16 activists had been detained in the two cities since March 1994, among them being original signatories to the October 1993 Peace Charter, "founders" and "principal sponsors" of the League for the Protection of the Rights of the Working People (LPRWP), and the assistant of Wei Jingsheng, described as "one of China's best known dissidents". These observations are repeated in a February 1995 report "China: Dissidents detained without charge or trial since 1994". The Age reported on 28 June 1995 ("Chinese dissident goes back under arrest in Beijing", p.13) that Chen Ziming had been re-arrested because he had been on a 24-hour fast on the anniversary of Tiananmen. The article traces a long history of public dissidence and leadership of anti-government activities conducted by Chen since 1975. It also states that:

"two dozen activists were detained before the anniversary of the crackdown. Most have been released. Among the most prominent still being held are Wang Dan, a student leader during the 1989 protests, and the labour activist Liu Nianchun."

The June 1995 Amnesty International report "Six years after Tiananmen: Human rights violations continue" refers to the continuing mistreatment of pro-democracy participants arrested soon after June 1989, as well as the cases of political prisoners who were previously unknown. It reiterates previous reports of mistreatment of dissidents associated with the LPRWP and members of the Association for Human Rights and documents a broader crackdown on religious dissidence. The Amnesty reports reinforce the conclusion that those political activists who were arrested generally have a significant history of dissidence in China, are involved in the establishment of local mainland opposition groups which present a threat to the CCP, and often have influential positions and are outspoken and willing to confront the authorities with their views. The Applicant shares none of those traits with those activists.

More recently, there have been reports of the trial and sentencing of Wei Jingsheng. The Australian reported on 12 December 1995 ("Lawyers race to defend Wei" at p.11) that:

"China currently feels vulnerable to pressure about human rights and considers Mr. Wei very dangerous. There is no sacred cow of the CCP that he has not attacked, nor is there any grandee spared his contempt. He is a focus for China's disparate dissidents - intellectuals, peasants and industrial workers - who regard him as an inspirational icon..."

Wei's activities have been highly public, both in China and in the international arena, where he is the focus of intense scrutiny. His profile is reflected by the fact that two former USA attorneys-general, a former French justice minister, a former solicitor -general from Singapore and other leading legal figures were seeking to assist Wei at his trial (ibid). The Applicant does not have a history of dissidence that correlates with those of people who continue to be persecuted in China, and the Tribunal concludes that the recent punishment of such activists is not, in any way, an indicator of what may happen to the Applicant.

In regard to overseas pro-democracy groups and activities, Coyne adds at pp. 35-36, :

"It is generally acknowledged that the overseas movement has lost its momentum as a dissident force. With no credible alternative leadership in exile and little influence, the overseas pro-democracy movement does not appear to be a cause of concern for the Chinese Government."

Coyne examined a broad range of material from government agencies and non-government organisations and his conclusions match those of other impartial commentators. An article - "Isolation proves more fatal than tanks to China's reformers" - in the Sydney Morning Herald of 12 December 1993, reports on the fragmentation and decreasing influence of the overseas pro-democracy movement and concludes that:

"Today the pro-democracy movement is irrelevant to the relationship between China and its trading partners, but more importantly, irrelevant to the Chinese people it aspires to lead. Worst of all, it has disappeared from the world political map."

The Far Eastern Economic Review of 15 September 1994, in the article "China: Innocents abroad" (pp.22 ff.) reported on the failure of the amalgamation of the two large pro-democracy groups in early 1993 and the perpetual infighting amongst members. The reporter writes that:

"Instead of [the overseas pro-democracy organisations] expanding their influence abroad and connections with dissident networks at home, most of the leading figures have dissipated their energies in factional struggles and an unending search for funding. And, with little prospect that cooperation will improve, the dissident movement seems set to become increasingly marginalised and irrelevant."

The author cites China expert Merle Goldman of Boston University in stating that the principal reason or the increasing irrelevancy of the overseas pro-democracy movement, apart from factionalism, is the rapid change in economic and social circumstances since the 1980's, with the push for reform now "unfolding from the bottom up ...[from]... untold numbers of business people, freelance scholars, labour activists and others" whereas the motivation for liberalisation in the 1980's came from "above" from the "1980's generation of democratic elitists", many of whom are leaders of the overseas pro-democracy movement. Among these are Wan Run Nan, Fang Lizhi, Yan Yiaqi, Liu Binyan, Wang Ruowang, Gong Xiaoxia and the younger prominent leaders of the Tiannanmen protests, Shen Tong and Chai Ling. All of these people have a highly public and lengthy history of organising and leading other people in opposition to the Chinese government. This shift of influence from the "democratic elitists" to what the article refers to as the "civil society, in which structures and groups form and function without reference to party permission" is commented on in a later article in the South China Morning Post of 14-15 January 1995, at p.11, entitled "Andy Lau beats Mao in the civil society". That article refers to increasing challenges to the CCP from the civil society through means such as litigation and the accretion of independent wealth, with a rejoinder that the CCP "will not surrender its last line of defence by allowing non-party elements to join the ruling apparatus..." These articles are solidly in support of other evidence that the overseas pro-democracy organisations have become increasingly marginalised. Newsweek on 22/3/94, in an article entitled "Unstilled Voices" observes:

"... gone are most of the student protesters ... The new dissident leaders are veterans, many in their 40's, most with no links to the West but with strong ties to Chinese Workers."

The significance of this commentary is that it is not activists who have developed a profile through their association with overseas pro-democracy groups or activities who represent a threat to the Chinese authorities, but those with a history of dissidence and leadership on the mainland. In some instances, there may be an overlap, such as in the case of the leader of the overseas Federation for a Democratic China (FDC), Wan Runnan and a leader of the Alliance for a Democratic China (ADC), Wang Ruowang. However, each has had a long and well-known history of organising protest and dissidence in China, utilised in their organisation of the FDC and ADC, respectively, and it is this capacity that may bring them to the attention of Chinese authorities rather than their membership of the overseas group, per se. Although he has participated in popular protest rallies on the anniversary of the Tiannanmen Square massacre, and been to meetings where more prominent pro-democracy figures have attended, the Applicant has not demonstrated any inclination to join, let alone lead, identifiable organisations that voice opposition to the CCP and other organs of Chinese authority.

There may also be isolated instances where a dissident has shown ability to organise effective opposition in a role as an overseas activist, but the Applicant has not demonstrated any such capacity in his political activities in Australia. Given the Applicant's minor participation in the 1989 movement and lack of interest and sanctions as a consequence of that activity, and his minor involvement in activities in Australia, the chances that he faces persecution for his combined political activities and opinions in China and Australia remain remote, notwithstanding that the Chinese authorities may be aware of his 1989 involvement and are probably aware of his attendance at various activities in Australia.

The available materials demonstrate that some people arrested around the time of the 1989 demonstrations continue to be severely punished, although active pursuit of 1989 activists has largely ceased since 1992. The Applicant was a low profile participant and was not significantly sanctioned in 1989. His activities were not suggestive of any organising role, this being reflected in the subsequent lack of interest in him when he continued to work until he left the country some nine months after the Tiannanmen Square massacre. While low-key political participation in 1989 may have resulted in severe treatment at that time, the Applicant escaped any such treatment which is not now the fate of those low key participants who were not apprehended in the crackdown. More recent information points to a conclusion that dissidents with a history of anti-government activities or who have a "high profile" or are seen to be "leading activists" may come to the adverse attention of the Chinese authorities. The Applicant does not fit that description.

In considering all of the circumstances and the evidence of the Applicant, the Tribunal finds that the Applicant has not been involved in activities in the PRC or in Australia that will result in him facing a real chance of being persecuted on account of his political opinions should he return to China. The possibility of an increased chance of persecution as a result of his family background is groundless and has not been relevant since the period of the Cultural Revolution. Examining the totality of the evidence, the Tribunal concludes that the Applicant does not face a real chance of persecution for Convention reasons should he return to China.

It arrives at such a conclusion having taken into account the record the Chinese authorities have in breaching the fundamental human rights of some of its citizens. While there is no doubt that such breaches continue, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real chance any such treatment will be visited on the Applicant for a Convention reason. The conclusion remains the same after considering whether or not knowledge of the Applicant's political opinions and family background may be contained on his personal dossier and will be used against him in some future political campaign conducted by the authorities. It is apparent that the Applicant was not subject to punishment on account of information on his personal dossier after the Cultural Revolution and it is clear that there was no evidence of information on his file that led to punishment in 1989, refusal to allow him to travel or to further Convention-based enquiries or an investigation of him prior to his departure for Australia or in the following seven years or so.

In summary, the Tribunal is satisfied that the Applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason should he return to China. He is not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations and is not, therefore, entitled to the grant of a protection visa.

The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant a protection visa to the Applicant.